diff options
author | Richard Yao <[email protected]> | 2022-10-27 14:16:04 -0400 |
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committer | Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> | 2022-10-29 13:05:11 -0700 |
commit | 97143b9d314d54409244f3995576d8cc8c1ebf0a (patch) | |
tree | efb7386fdf61ba289a8e99e8f958bc9b21c5f31e /module/os/freebsd | |
parent | 2e08df84d8649439e5e9ed39ea13d4b755ee97c9 (diff) |
Introduce kmem_scnprintf()
`snprintf()` is meant to protect against buffer overflows, but operating
on the buffer using its return value, possibly by calling it again, can
cause a buffer overflow, because it will return how many characters it
would have written if it had enough space even when it did not. In a
number of places, we repeatedly call snprintf() by successively
incrementing a buffer offset and decrementing a buffer length, by its
return value. This is a potentially unsafe usage of `snprintf()`
whenever the buffer length is reached. CodeQL complained about this.
To fix this, we introduce `kmem_scnprintf()`, which will return 0 when
the buffer is zero or the number of written characters, minus 1 to
exclude the NULL character, when the buffer was too small. In all other
cases, it behaves like snprintf(). The name is inspired by the Linux and
XNU kernels' `scnprintf()`. The implementation was written before I
thought to look at `scnprintf()` and had a good name for it, but it
turned out to have identical semantics to the Linux kernel version.
That lead to the name, `kmem_scnprintf()`.
CodeQL only catches this issue in loops, so repeated use of snprintf()
outside of a loop was not caught. As a result, a thorough audit of the
codebase was done to examine all instances of `snprintf()` usage for
potential problems and a few were caught. Fixes for them are included in
this patch.
Unfortunately, ZED is one of the places where `snprintf()` is
potentially used incorrectly. Since using `kmem_scnprintf()` in it would
require changing how it is linked, we modify its usage to make it safe,
no matter what buffer length is used. In addition, there was a bug in
the use of the return value where the NULL format character was not
being written by pwrite(). That has been fixed.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]>
Closes #14098
Diffstat (limited to 'module/os/freebsd')
-rw-r--r-- | module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c | 30 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c b/module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c index 523e10ff6..eb74720c9 100644 --- a/module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c +++ b/module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c @@ -105,3 +105,33 @@ kmem_strfree(char *str) ASSERT3P(str, !=, NULL); kmem_free(str, strlen(str) + 1); } + +/* + * kmem_scnprintf() will return the number of characters that it would have + * printed whenever it is limited by value of the size variable, rather than + * the number of characters that it did print. This can cause misbehavior on + * subsequent uses of the return value, so we define a safe version that will + * return the number of characters actually printed, minus the NULL format + * character. Subsequent use of this by the safe string functions is safe + * whether it is snprintf(), strlcat() or strlcpy(). + */ + +int +kmem_scnprintf(char *restrict str, size_t size, const char *restrict fmt, ...) +{ + int n; + va_list ap; + + /* Make the 0 case a no-op so that we do not return -1 */ + if (size == 0) + return (0); + + va_start(ap, fmt); + n = vsnprintf(str, size, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (n >= size) + n = size - 1; + + return (n); +} |