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authorRichard Yao <[email protected]>2022-10-27 14:16:04 -0400
committerBrian Behlendorf <[email protected]>2022-10-29 13:05:11 -0700
commit97143b9d314d54409244f3995576d8cc8c1ebf0a (patch)
treeefb7386fdf61ba289a8e99e8f958bc9b21c5f31e /module/os/freebsd
parent2e08df84d8649439e5e9ed39ea13d4b755ee97c9 (diff)
Introduce kmem_scnprintf()
`snprintf()` is meant to protect against buffer overflows, but operating on the buffer using its return value, possibly by calling it again, can cause a buffer overflow, because it will return how many characters it would have written if it had enough space even when it did not. In a number of places, we repeatedly call snprintf() by successively incrementing a buffer offset and decrementing a buffer length, by its return value. This is a potentially unsafe usage of `snprintf()` whenever the buffer length is reached. CodeQL complained about this. To fix this, we introduce `kmem_scnprintf()`, which will return 0 when the buffer is zero or the number of written characters, minus 1 to exclude the NULL character, when the buffer was too small. In all other cases, it behaves like snprintf(). The name is inspired by the Linux and XNU kernels' `scnprintf()`. The implementation was written before I thought to look at `scnprintf()` and had a good name for it, but it turned out to have identical semantics to the Linux kernel version. That lead to the name, `kmem_scnprintf()`. CodeQL only catches this issue in loops, so repeated use of snprintf() outside of a loop was not caught. As a result, a thorough audit of the codebase was done to examine all instances of `snprintf()` usage for potential problems and a few were caught. Fixes for them are included in this patch. Unfortunately, ZED is one of the places where `snprintf()` is potentially used incorrectly. Since using `kmem_scnprintf()` in it would require changing how it is linked, we modify its usage to make it safe, no matter what buffer length is used. In addition, there was a bug in the use of the return value where the NULL format character was not being written by pwrite(). That has been fixed. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]> Closes #14098
Diffstat (limited to 'module/os/freebsd')
-rw-r--r--module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c30
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c b/module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c
index 523e10ff6..eb74720c9 100644
--- a/module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c
+++ b/module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_string.c
@@ -105,3 +105,33 @@ kmem_strfree(char *str)
ASSERT3P(str, !=, NULL);
kmem_free(str, strlen(str) + 1);
}
+
+/*
+ * kmem_scnprintf() will return the number of characters that it would have
+ * printed whenever it is limited by value of the size variable, rather than
+ * the number of characters that it did print. This can cause misbehavior on
+ * subsequent uses of the return value, so we define a safe version that will
+ * return the number of characters actually printed, minus the NULL format
+ * character. Subsequent use of this by the safe string functions is safe
+ * whether it is snprintf(), strlcat() or strlcpy().
+ */
+
+int
+kmem_scnprintf(char *restrict str, size_t size, const char *restrict fmt, ...)
+{
+ int n;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ /* Make the 0 case a no-op so that we do not return -1 */
+ if (size == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ n = vsnprintf(str, size, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (n >= size)
+ n = size - 1;
+
+ return (n);
+}