diff options
author | lloyd <[email protected]> | 2010-08-20 14:54:01 +0000 |
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committer | lloyd <[email protected]> | 2010-08-20 14:54:01 +0000 |
commit | 50a545ebbfb9695159fbd607372a28798db1f413 (patch) | |
tree | 2f5214bc9e8685de02cdb163f07430e36e05322a /src | |
parent | df4b36149bbec56a74cb824494fe5eb7ccf335c8 (diff) |
Fix paper ref URL, remove unused prefetch include
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r-- | src/block/aes/aes.cpp | 14 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/src/block/aes/aes.cpp b/src/block/aes/aes.cpp index 54a663045..8783f13a0 100644 --- a/src/block/aes/aes.cpp +++ b/src/block/aes/aes.cpp @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ #include <botan/aes.h> #include <botan/loadstor.h> #include <botan/rotate.h> -#include <botan/internal/prefetch.h> namespace Botan { @@ -487,10 +486,14 @@ void AES::encrypt_n(const byte in[], byte out[], u32bit blocks) const } /* - Joseph Bonneau and Ilya Mironov's paper - <a href = "http://icme2007.org/users/mironov/papers/aes-timing.pdf"> - Cache-Collision Timing Attacks Against AES</a> describes an attack - that can recover AES keys with as few as 2<sup>13</sup> samples. + Joseph Bonneau and Ilya Mironov's paper "Cache-Collision Timing + Attacks Against AES" describes an attack that can recover AES + keys with as few as 2**13 samples. + + http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.88.4753 + + They recommend using a byte-wide table, which still allows an attack + but increases the samples required from 2**13 to 2**25: """In addition to OpenSSL v. 0.9.8.(a), which was used in our experiments, the AES implementations of Crypto++ 5.2.1 and @@ -500,6 +503,7 @@ void AES::encrypt_n(const byte in[], byte out[], u32bit blocks) const use a smaller byte-wide final table which lessens the effectiveness of the attacks.""" */ + out[ 0] = SE[get_byte(0, B0)] ^ ME[0]; out[ 1] = SE[get_byte(1, B1)] ^ ME[1]; out[ 2] = SE[get_byte(2, B2)] ^ ME[2]; |