Use consistent logic for OAEP and PKCS1v15 decoding

The decoding leaked some information about the delimiter index
due to copying only exactly input_len - delim_idx bytes. I can't
articulate a specific attack that would work here, but it is easy
enough to fix this to run in const time instead, where all bytes
are accessed regardless of the length of the padding.

CT::copy_out is O(n^2) and thus terrible, but in practice it is only
used with RSA decryption, and multiplication is also O(n^2) with the
modulus size, so a few extra cycles here doesn't matter much.

2 files changed, 19 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_pkcs1/eme_pkcs.cpp b/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_pkcs1/eme_pkcs.cpp
index 597b7c26a..eac3da5d9 100644
--- a/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_pkcs1/eme_pkcs.cpp
+++ b/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_pkcs1/eme_pkcs.cpp
@@ -50,7 +50,13 @@ secure_vector<uint8_t> EME_PKCS1v15::pad(const uint8_t in[], size_t inlen,
 secure_vector<uint8_t> EME_PKCS1v15::unpad(uint8_t& valid_mask,
                                         const uint8_t in[], size_t inlen) const
    {
-   if(inlen < 2)
+   /*
+   * RSA decryption pads the ciphertext up to the modulus size, so this only
+   * occurs with very (!) small keys, or when fuzzing.
+   *
+   * 11 bytes == 00,02 + 8 bytes mandatory padding + 00
+   */
+   if(inlen < 11)
       {
       valid_mask = false;
       return secure_vector<uint8_t>();
@@ -60,7 +66,7 @@ secure_vector<uint8_t> EME_PKCS1v15::unpad(uint8_t& valid_mask,
 
    CT::Mask<uint8_t> bad_input_m = CT::Mask<uint8_t>::cleared();
    CT::Mask<uint8_t> seen_zero_m = CT::Mask<uint8_t>::cleared();
-   size_t delim_idx = 0;
+   size_t delim_idx = 2; // initial 0002
 
    bad_input_m |= ~CT::Mask<uint8_t>::is_equal(in[0], 0);
    bad_input_m |= ~CT::Mask<uint8_t>::is_equal(in[1], 2);
@@ -68,23 +74,24 @@ secure_vector<uint8_t> EME_PKCS1v15::unpad(uint8_t& valid_mask,
    for(size_t i = 2; i < inlen; ++i)
       {
       const auto is_zero_m = CT::Mask<uint8_t>::is_zero(in[i]);
-
       delim_idx += seen_zero_m.if_not_set_return(1);
-
-      bad_input_m |= is_zero_m & CT::Mask<uint8_t>(CT::Mask<size_t>::is_lt(i, 10));
       seen_zero_m |= is_zero_m;
       }
 
+   // no zero delim -> bad padding
    bad_input_m |= ~seen_zero_m;
-   bad_input_m |= CT::Mask<uint8_t>(CT::Mask<size_t>::is_lt(delim_idx, 8));
+   /*
+   delim indicates < 8 bytes padding -> bad padding
+
+   We require 11 here because we are counting also the 00 delim byte
+   */
+   bad_input_m |= CT::Mask<uint8_t>(CT::Mask<size_t>::is_lt(delim_idx, 11));
+
+   valid_mask = (~bad_input_m).unpoisoned_value();
+   const secure_vector<uint8_t> output = CT::copy_output(bad_input_m, in, inlen, delim_idx);
 
    CT::unpoison(in, inlen);
-   CT::unpoison(bad_input_m);
-   CT::unpoison(delim_idx);
 
-   secure_vector<uint8_t> output(&in[delim_idx + 2], &in[inlen]);
-   bad_input_m.if_set_zero_out(output.data(), output.size());
-   valid_mask = ~bad_input_m.value();
    return output;
    }
 
diff --git a/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_pkcs1/eme_pkcs.h b/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_pkcs1/eme_pkcs.h
index a77e0141b..26b03e47a 100644
--- a/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_pkcs1/eme_pkcs.h
+++ b/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_pkcs1/eme_pkcs.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ class BOTAN_PUBLIC_API(2,0) EME_PKCS1v15 final : public EME
    {
    public:
       size_t maximum_input_size(size_t) const override;
-   private:
+
       secure_vector<uint8_t> pad(const uint8_t[], size_t, size_t,
                              RandomNumberGenerator&) const override;