diff options
author | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2020-03-29 07:58:05 -0400 |
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committer | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2020-03-29 08:36:38 -0400 |
commit | 7318a40b65b3564ebf8dbfcb1c45b5934363da9e (patch) | |
tree | be30a0b4e698d681a2e129496faaee7ca8f1c58e /doc | |
parent | 21303bf8000d93ac856452674d71d6b880e1b93f (diff) |
Make CBC padding constant time
Maximilian Blochberger points out that while unpadding was constant
time, padding operation leaked the length of the plaintext. This is
probably not too serious in most circumstances but is not desirable
behavior.
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/security.rst | 17 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/security.rst b/doc/security.rst index b606e57f6..e2e736a91 100644 --- a/doc/security.rst +++ b/doc/security.rst @@ -15,6 +15,23 @@ mail please use:: This key can be found in the file ``doc/pgpkey.txt`` or online at https://keybase.io/jacklloyd and on most PGP keyservers. +2020 +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +* 2020-03-24: Side channel during CBC padding + + The CBC padding operations were not constant time and as a result would leak + the length of the plaintext values which were being padded to an attacker + running a side channel attack via shared resources such as cache or branch + predictor. No information about the contents was leaked, but the length alone + might be used to make inferences about the contents. This issue affects TLS + CBC ciphersuites as well as CBC encryption using PKCS7 or other similar padding + mechanisms. In all cases, the unpadding operations were already constant time + and are not affected. Reported by Maximilian Blochberger of Universität + Hamburg. + + Fixed in 2.14.0, all prior versions affected. + 2018 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |