| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Mark functions used only in the same translation unit as static. This
only includes functions that do not have a prototype in a header file
either.
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <[email protected]>
Closes #10470
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Otherwise when running with reference_tracking_enable=TRUE mounting
and unmounting an encrypted dataset panics with:
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x66/0x90
slab_err+0xcd/0xf2
? __kmalloc+0x174/0x260
? __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x158/0x240
__kmem_cache_shutdown.cold+0x1d/0x115
shutdown_cache+0x11/0x140
kmem_cache_destroy+0x210/0x230
spl_kmem_cache_destroy+0x122/0x3e0 [spl]
zfs_refcount_fini+0x11/0x20 [zfs]
spa_fini+0x4b/0x120 [zfs]
zfs_kmod_fini+0x6b/0xa0 [zfs]
_fini+0xa/0x68c [zfs]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x19c/0x2b0
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Reviewed-By: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: George Amanakis <[email protected]>
Closes #10246
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The normal lock order is that the dp_config_rwlock must be held before
the ds_opening_lock. For example, dmu_objset_hold() does this.
However, dmu_objset_open_impl() is called with the ds_opening_lock held,
and if the dp_config_rwlock is not already held, it will attempt to
acquire it. This may lead to deadlock, since the lock order is
reversed.
Looking at all the callers of dmu_objset_open_impl() (which is
principally the callers of dmu_objset_from_ds()), almost all callers
already have the dp_config_rwlock. However, there are a few places in
the send and receive code paths that do not. For example:
dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist, send_cb, dmu_recv_stream,
receive_write_byref, redact_traverse_thread.
This commit resolves the problem by requiring all callers ot
dmu_objset_from_ds() to hold the dp_config_rwlock. In most cases, the
code has been restructured such that we call dmu_objset_from_ds()
earlier on in the send and receive processes, when we already have the
dp_config_rwlock, and save the objset_t until we need it in the middle
of the send or receive (similar to what we already do with the
dsl_dataset_t). Thus we do not need to acquire the dp_config_rwlock in
many new places.
I also cleaned up code in dmu_redact_snap() and send_traverse_thread().
Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Zuchowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Closes #9662
Closes #10115
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Sleepable (KM_SLEEP) allocations cannot fail. Hence
error handling for them is not useful.
Reviewed-By: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Macy <[email protected]>
Closes #10031
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When we finish a zfs receive, dmu_recv_end_sync() calls
zvol_create_minors(async=TRUE). This kicks off some other threads that
create the minor device nodes (in /dev/zvol/poolname/...). These async
threads call zvol_prefetch_minors_impl() and zvol_create_minor(), which
both call dmu_objset_own(), which puts a "long hold" on the dataset.
Since the zvol minor node creation is asynchronous, this can happen
after the `ZFS_IOC_RECV[_NEW]` ioctl and `zfs receive` process have
completed.
After the first receive ioctl has completed, userland may attempt to do
another receive into the same dataset (e.g. the next incremental
stream). This second receive and the asynchronous minor node creation
can interfere with one another in several different ways, because they
both require exclusive access to the dataset:
1. When the second receive is finishing up, dmu_recv_end_check() does
dsl_dataset_handoff_check(), which can fail with EBUSY if the async
minor node creation already has a "long hold" on this dataset. This
causes the 2nd receive to fail.
2. The async udev rule can fail if zvol_id and/or systemd-udevd try to
open the device while the the second receive's async attempt at minor
node creation owns the dataset (via zvol_prefetch_minors_impl). This
causes the minor node (/dev/zd*) to exist, but the udev-generated
/dev/zvol/... to not exist.
3. The async minor node creation can silently fail with EBUSY if the
first receive's zvol_create_minor() trys to own the dataset while the
second receive's zvol_prefetch_minors_impl already owns the dataset.
To address these problems, this change synchronously creates the minor
node. To avoid the lock ordering problems that the asynchrony was
introduced to fix (see #3681), we create the minor nodes from open
context, with no locks held, rather than from syncing contex as was
originally done.
Implementation notes:
We generally do not need to traverse children or prefetch anything (e.g.
when running the recv, snapshot, create, or clone subcommands of zfs).
We only need recursion when importing/opening a pool and when loading
encryption keys. The existing recursive, asynchronous, prefetching code
is preserved for use in these cases.
Channel programs may need to create zvol minor nodes, when creating a
snapshot of a zvol with the snapdev property set. We figure out what
snapshots are created when running the LUA program in syncing context.
In this case we need to remember what snapshots were created, and then
try to create their minor nodes from open context, after the LUA code
has completed.
There are additional zvol use cases that asynchronously own the dataset,
which can cause similar problems. E.g. changing the volmode or snapdev
properties. These are less problematic because they are not recursive
and don't touch datasets that are not involved in the operation, there
is still potential for interference with subsequent operations. In the
future, these cases should be similarly converted to create the zvol
minor node synchronously from open context.
The async tasks of removing and renaming minors do not own the objset,
so they do not have this problem. However, it may make sense to also
convert these operations to happen synchronously from open context, in
the future.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Prakash Surya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
External-issue: DLPX-65948
Closes #7863
Closes #9885
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Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Macy <[email protected]>
Closes #9861
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Provide a common zfs_file_* interface which can be implemented on all
platforms to perform normal file access from either the kernel module
or the libzpool library.
This allows all non-portable vnode_t usage in the common code to be
replaced by the new portable zfs_file_t. The associated vnode and
kobj compatibility functions, types, and macros have been removed
from the SPL. Moving forward, vnodes should only be used in platform
specific code when provided by the native operating system.
Reviewed-by: Sean Eric Fagan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Igor Kozhukhov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Macy <[email protected]>
Closes #9556
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Currently, when you call 'zfs change-key' on an encrypted dataset
that has an unencrypted child, the code will trigger a VERIFY.
This VERIFY is leftover from before we allowed unencrypted
datasets to exist underneath encrypted ones. This patch fixes the
issue by simply replacing the VERIFY with an early return when
recursing through datasets.
Reviewed by: Jason King <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Igor Kozhukhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #9524
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Contrary to initial testing we cannot rely on these kernels to
invalidate the per-cpu FPU state and restore the FPU registers.
Nor can we guarantee that the kernel won't modify the FPU state
which we saved in the task struck.
Therefore, the kfpu_begin() and kfpu_end() functions have been
updated to save and restore the FPU state using our own dedicated
per-cpu FPU state variables.
This has the additional advantage of allowing us to use the FPU
again in user threads. So we remove the code which was added to
use task queues to ensure some functions ran in kernel threads.
Reviewed-by: Fabian Grünbichler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tony Hutter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Issue #9346
Closes #9403
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Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse
into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to
'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of
these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong
dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in
some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping
keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function
properly recurses into clones during processing.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #9267
Closes #9294
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When adding the SIMD compatibility code in e5db313 the decryption of a
dataset wrapping key was left in a user thread context. This was done
intentionally since it's a relatively infrequent operation. However,
this also meant that the encryption context templates were initialized
using the generic operations. Therefore, subsequent encryption and
decryption operations would use the generic implementation even when
executed by an I/O pipeline thread.
Resolve the issue by initializing the context templates in an I/O
pipeline thread. And by updating zio_do_crypt_uio() to dispatch any
encryption operations to a pipeline thread when called from the user
context. For example, when performing a read from the ARC.
Tested-by: Attila Fülöp <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Closes #9215
Closes #9296
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Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Laager <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gelmini <[email protected]>
Closes #9240
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This patch fixes an issue where dsl_dataset_crypt_stats() would
VERIFY that it was able to hold the encryption root. This function
should instead silently continue without populating the related
field in the nvlist, as is the convention for this code.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #8976
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This patch corrects the error message reported when attempting
to promote a dataset outside of its encryption root.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #8905
Closes #8935
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When encryption was first added to ZFS, we made a decision to
prevent users from creating unencrypted children of encrypted
datasets. The idea was to prevent users from inadvertently
leaving some of their data unencrypted. However, since the
release of 0.8.0, some legitimate reasons have been brought up
for this behavior to be allowed. This patch simply removes this
limitation from all code paths that had checks for it and updates
the tests accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Jason King <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sean Eric Fagan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Laager <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #8737
Closes #8870
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This patch attempts to address some user concerns that have arisen
since errata 4 was introduced.
* The errata warning has been made less scary for users without
any encrypted datasets.
* The errata warning now clears itself without a pool reimport if
the bookmark_v2 feature is enabled and no encrypted datasets
exist.
* It is no longer possible to create new encrypted datasets without
enabling the bookmark_v2 feature, thus helping to ensure that the
errata is resolved.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Issue ##8308
Closes #8504
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Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where
raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously
non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the
source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on
the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in
the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both
blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the
destination will be incorrect. This will result in
authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset.
This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the
raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid",
which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to
encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received,
the destination snapshot will take this value from the
DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap"
operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid.
When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check
that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of
the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the
code will error out the receive, preventing the problem.
This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the
IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this
patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected
users resolve the issue with as little interruption as
possible.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #8308
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Currently, the receive code can create an unreadable dataset from
a correct raw send stream. This is because it is currently
impossible to set maxblkid to a lower value without freeing the
associated object. This means truncating files on the send side
to a non-0 size could result in corruption. This patch solves this
issue by adding a new 'force' flag to dnode_new_blkid() which will
allow the raw receive code to force the DMU to accept the provided
maxblkid even if it is a lower value than the existing one.
For testing purposes the send_encrypted_files.ksh test has been
extended to include a variety of truncated files and multiple
snapshots. It also now leverages the xattrtest command to help
ensure raw receives correctly handle xattrs.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #8168
Closes #8487
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This patch ensures that logs are replayed on all datasets prior
to starting ztest workers. This ensures that the call to
vdev_offline() a log device in ztest_fault_inject() will not fail
due to the log device being required for replay.
This patch also fixes a small issue found during testing where
spa_keystore_load_wkey() does not check that the dataset specified
is an encryption root. This check was present in libzfs, however.
Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #8084
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The boolean featureflags in use thus far in ZFS are extremely useful,
but because they take advantage of the zap layer, more interesting data
than just a true/false value can be stored in a featureflag. In redacted
send/receive, this is used to store the list of redaction snapshots for
a redacted dataset.
This change adds the ability for ZFS to store types other than a boolean
in a featureflag. The only other implemented type is a uint64_t array.
It also modifies the interfaces around dataset features to accomodate
the new capabilities, and adds a few new functions to increase
encapsulation.
This functionality will be used by the Redacted Send/Receive feature.
Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Dagnelie <[email protected]>
Closes #7981
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Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting
against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key
mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are
created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can
have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after
the dataset is disowned.
In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to
ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by
calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases
that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high
number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue
differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg
it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the
unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past
and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future.
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #7949
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Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix
the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision.
To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future
collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <[email protected]>
Closes #7963
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torvalds/linux@59b57717f ("blkcg: delay blkg destruction until
after writeback has finished") added a refcount_t to the blkcg
structure. Due to the refcount_t compatibility code, zfs_refcount_t
was used by mistake.
Resolve this by removing the compatibility code and replacing the
occurrences of refcount_t with zfs_refcount_t.
Reviewed-by: Franz Pletz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <[email protected]>
Closes #7885
Closes #7932
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This patch fixes a bug where attempting to receive a send stream
with embedded data into an encrypted dataset would not cleanup
that dataset when the error was reached. The check was moved into
dmu_recv_begin_check(), preventing this issue.
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Elling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #7650
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One small integration that was absent from b52563 was
support for zfs recv -o / -x with regards to encryption
parameters. The main use cases of this are as follows:
* Receiving an unencrypted stream as encrypted without
needing to create a "dummy" encrypted parent so that
encryption can be inheritted.
* Allowing users to change their keylocation on receive,
so long as the receiving dataset is an encryption root.
* Allowing users to explicitly exclude or override the
encryption property from an unencrypted properties stream,
allowing it to be received as encrypted.
* Receiving a recursive heirarchy of unencrypted datasets,
encrypting the top-level one and forcing all children to
inherit the encryption.
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Elling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #7650
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Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matt Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Don Brady <[email protected]>
Closes #7759
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This patch adds the ability for zinject to trigger decryption
and authentication faults in the ZIO and ARC layers. This
functionality is exposed via the new "decrypt" error type, which
may be provided for "data" object types.
This patch also refactors some of the core encryption / decryption
functions so that they have consistent prototypes, handle errors
consistently, and do not have unused arguments.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #7474
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This commit introduces several changes:
* Update LICENSE and project information
* Give a good PEP8 talk to existing Python source code
* Add RPM/DEB packaging for pyzfs
* Fix some outstanding issues with the existing pyzfs code caused by
changes in the ABI since the last time the code was updated
* Integrate pyzfs Python unittest with the ZFS Test Suite
* Add missing libzfs_core functions: lzc_change_key,
lzc_channel_program, lzc_channel_program_nosync, lzc_load_key,
lzc_receive_one, lzc_receive_resumable, lzc_receive_with_cmdprops,
lzc_receive_with_header, lzc_reopen, lzc_send_resume, lzc_sync,
lzc_unload_key, lzc_remap
Note: this commit slightly changes zfs_ioc_unload_key() ABI. This allow
to differentiate the case where we tried to unload a key on a
non-existing dataset (ENOENT) from the situation where a dataset has
no key loaded: this is consistent with the "change" case where trying
to zfs_ioc_change_key() from a dataset with no key results in EACCES.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: loli10K <[email protected]>
Closes #7230
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Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and
objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of
each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are
read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set
before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that
this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they
might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally
were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the
processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of
which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be
done atomically.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #7200
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The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O.
Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so
they the first successful caller adds the key.
Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl().
Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus>
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Closes #7112
Closes #7115
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Currently, os_next_write_raw is a single boolean used for determining
whether or not the next call to dmu_objset_sync() should write out
the objset_phys_t as a raw buffer. Since the boolean is not associated
with a txg, the work simply happens during the next txg, which is not
necessarily the correct one. In the current implementation this issue
was misdiagnosed, resulting in a small hack in dmu_objset_sync() which
seemed to resolve the problem.
This patch changes os_next_write_raw to be an array of booleans, one
for each txg in TXG_OFF and removes the hack.
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #6864
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The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only
the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also
the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to
make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw
sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all
the MACs in the block below it along with a few other
fields that determine how the data is interpreted.
Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously
includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot
support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around
this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which
causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be
compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In
addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk
formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an
issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally,
raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when
sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are
needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining
the portable objset MAC.
This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing
the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always
calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host
system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata
for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a
"version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow
datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted
for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now
include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC
can be maintained correctly.
This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups.
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #6845
Closes #6864
Closes #7052
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After doing a recursive raw receive, zfs userspace performs
a final pass to adjust the encryption root hierarchy as
needed. Unfortunately, the FORCE_INHERIT ioctl had a bug
which caused the encryption root to always be assigned to
the direct parent instead of the inheriting parent. This
patch simply fixes this issue.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #6847
Closes #6848
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This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send
encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded
before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root.
The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which
was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to
lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key.
Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some
non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption
parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these
values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys.
This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not
being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was
received.
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
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This patch resolves an issue where spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl()
incorrectly recursed into clone DSL Directories while recursively
rewrapping encryption keys. Clones share keys with their origins, so
this logic was incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
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* PBKDF2 implementation changed to OpenSSL implementation.
* HKDF implementation moved to its own file and tests
added to ensure correctness.
* Removed libzfs's now unnecessary dependency on libzpool
and libicp.
* Ztest can now create and test encrypted datasets. This is
currently disabled until issue #6526 is resolved, but
otherwise functions as advertised.
* Several small bug fixes discovered after enabling ztest
to run on encrypted datasets.
* Fixed coverity defects added by the encryption patch.
* Updated man pages for encrypted send / receive behavior.
* Fixed a bug where encrypted datasets could receive
DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED records.
* Minor code cleanups / consolidation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
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This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
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