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Correct various typos in the comments and tests.
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gelmini <[email protected]>
Closes #10423
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The 'zfs load-key' command was broken for 'keyformat=passphrase'.
Use the correct output vars when stdin is an interactive terminal.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: adam moss <[email protected]>
Closes #10264
Closes #10265
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Every platform has their own preferred methods for implementing URI
schemes beyond the currently supported file scheme (e.g. 'https' on
FreeBSD would likely use libfetch, while Linux distros and illumos
would probably use libcurl, etc). It would be helpful if libzfs can
be extended to support additional schemes in a simple manner.
A table of (scheme, handler_function) pairs is added to libzfs_crypto.c,
and the existing functions in libzfs_crypto.c so that when the key
format is ZFS_KEYFORMAT_URI, the scheme from the URI string is
extracted, and a matching handler it located in the aforementioned
table (returning an error if no matching handler is found). The handler
function is then invoked to retrieve the key material (in the format
specified by the keyformat property) and the key is loaded or the
handler can return an error to abort the key loading process.
Reviewed by: Sean Eric Fagan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason King <[email protected]>
Closes #10218
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Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Laager <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gelmini <[email protected]>
Closes #9237
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When encryption was first added to ZFS, we made a decision to
prevent users from creating unencrypted children of encrypted
datasets. The idea was to prevent users from inadvertently
leaving some of their data unencrypted. However, since the
release of 0.8.0, some legitimate reasons have been brought up
for this behavior to be allowed. This patch simply removes this
limitation from all code paths that had checks for it and updates
the tests accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Jason King <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sean Eric Fagan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Laager <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #8737
Closes #8870
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One small integration that was absent from b52563 was
support for zfs recv -o / -x with regards to encryption
parameters. The main use cases of this are as follows:
* Receiving an unencrypted stream as encrypted without
needing to create a "dummy" encrypted parent so that
encryption can be inheritted.
* Allowing users to change their keylocation on receive,
so long as the receiving dataset is an encryption root.
* Allowing users to explicitly exclude or override the
encryption property from an unencrypted properties stream,
allowing it to be received as encrypted.
* Receiving a recursive heirarchy of unencrypted datasets,
encrypting the top-level one and forcing all children to
inherit the encryption.
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Elling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #7650
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This commit introduces several changes:
* Update LICENSE and project information
* Give a good PEP8 talk to existing Python source code
* Add RPM/DEB packaging for pyzfs
* Fix some outstanding issues with the existing pyzfs code caused by
changes in the ABI since the last time the code was updated
* Integrate pyzfs Python unittest with the ZFS Test Suite
* Add missing libzfs_core functions: lzc_change_key,
lzc_channel_program, lzc_channel_program_nosync, lzc_load_key,
lzc_receive_one, lzc_receive_resumable, lzc_receive_with_cmdprops,
lzc_receive_with_header, lzc_reopen, lzc_send_resume, lzc_sync,
lzc_unload_key, lzc_remap
Note: this commit slightly changes zfs_ioc_unload_key() ABI. This allow
to differentiate the case where we tried to unload a key on a
non-existing dataset (ENOENT) from the situation where a dataset has
no key loaded: this is consistent with the "change" case where trying
to zfs_ioc_change_key() from a dataset with no key results in EACCES.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: loli10K <[email protected]>
Closes #7230
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get_format_prompt_string() and zpool_state_to_name() return
a string literal which is read-only, thus they should return
`const char*`.
zpool_get_prop_string() returns a non-const string after
successful nv-lookup, and returns a string literal otherwise.
Since this function is designed to be used for read-only purpose,
the return type should also be `const char*`.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tomohiro Kusumi <[email protected]>
Closes #7285
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The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only
the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also
the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to
make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw
sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all
the MACs in the block below it along with a few other
fields that determine how the data is interpreted.
Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously
includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot
support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around
this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which
causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be
compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In
addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk
formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an
issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally,
raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when
sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are
needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining
the portable objset MAC.
This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing
the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always
calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host
system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata
for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a
"version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow
datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted
for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now
include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC
can be maintained correctly.
This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups.
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #6845
Closes #6864
Closes #7052
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* PBKDF2 implementation changed to OpenSSL implementation.
* HKDF implementation moved to its own file and tests
added to ensure correctness.
* Removed libzfs's now unnecessary dependency on libzpool
and libicp.
* Ztest can now create and test encrypted datasets. This is
currently disabled until issue #6526 is resolved, but
otherwise functions as advertised.
* Several small bug fixes discovered after enabling ztest
to run on encrypted datasets.
* Fixed coverity defects added by the encryption patch.
* Updated man pages for encrypted send / receive behavior.
* Fixed a bug where encrypted datasets could receive
DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED records.
* Minor code cleanups / consolidation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
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This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
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