diff options
author | Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> | 2009-07-27 17:18:59 -0700 |
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committer | Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> | 2009-07-27 17:18:59 -0700 |
commit | ec7d53e99aee17ae1500701520649d3b54b31676 (patch) | |
tree | f421355a405d77f19d0ce0505a0e1069f64984ed /module | |
parent | 3d0cb2d31dbeef37382249ceb9f16a46c2ccd819 (diff) |
Add basic credential support and splat tests.
The previous credential implementation simply provided the needed types and
a couple of dummy functions needed. This update correctly ties the basic
Solaris credential API in to one of two Linux kernel APIs.
Prior to 2.6.29 the linux kernel embeded all credentials in the task
structure. For these kernels, we pass around the entire task struct as if
it were the credential, then we use the helper functions to extract the
credential related bits.
As of 2.6.29 a new credential type was added which we can and do fairly
cleanly layer on top of. Once again the helper functions nicely hide
the implementation details from all callers.
Three tests were added to the splat test framework to verify basic
correctness. They should be extended as needed when need credential
functions are added.
Diffstat (limited to 'module')
-rw-r--r-- | module/spl/Makefile.in | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | module/spl/spl-cred.c | 308 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | module/spl/spl-debug.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | module/splat/Makefile.in | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | module/splat/splat-cred.c | 247 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | module/splat/splat-ctl.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | module/splat/splat-internal.h | 3 |
7 files changed, 564 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/module/spl/Makefile.in b/module/spl/Makefile.in index e9c8d3470..ad29af406 100644 --- a/module/spl/Makefile.in +++ b/module/spl/Makefile.in @@ -23,3 +23,4 @@ spl-objs += spl-mutex.o spl-objs += spl-kstat.o spl-objs += spl-condvar.o spl-objs += spl-xdr.o +spl-objs += spl-cred.o diff --git a/module/spl/spl-cred.c b/module/spl/spl-cred.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c5994aa20 --- /dev/null +++ b/module/spl/spl-cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,308 @@ +/* + * This file is part of the SPL: Solaris Porting Layer. + * + * Copyright (c) 2009 Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. + * Produced at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory + * Written by: + * Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>, + * UCRL-CODE-235197 + * + * This is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT + * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License + * for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along + * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + */ + +#include <sys/cred.h> + +#ifdef DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM +#undef DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM +#endif + +#define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_CRED + +#ifdef HAVE_GROUPS_SEARCH +/* Symbol may be exported by custom kernel patch */ +#define cr_groups_search(gi, grp) groups_search(gi, grp) +#else +/* Implementation from 2.6.30 kernel */ +static int +cr_groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp) +{ + unsigned int left, right; + + if (!group_info) + return 0; + + left = 0; + right = group_info->ngroups; + while (left < right) { + unsigned int mid = (left+right)/2; + int cmp = grp - GROUP_AT(group_info, mid); + if (cmp > 0) + left = mid + 1; + else if (cmp < 0) + right = mid; + else + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_CRED_STRUCT + +/* + * As of 2.6.29 a clean credential API appears in the linux kernel. + * We attempt to layer the Solaris API on top of the linux API. + */ + +/* Hold a reference on the credential and group info */ +void +crhold(cred_t *cr) +{ + (void)get_cred((const cred_t *)cr); + (void)get_group_info(cr->group_info); +} + +/* Free a reference on the credential and group info */ +void +crfree(cred_t *cr) +{ + put_group_info(cr->group_info); + put_cred((const cred_t *)cr); +} + +/* Return the effective user id */ +uid_t +crgetuid(const cred_t *cr) +{ + return cr->euid; +} + +/* Return the real user id */ +uid_t +crgetruid(const cred_t *cr) +{ + return cr->uid; +} + +/* Return the saved user id */ +uid_t +crgetsuid(const cred_t *cr) +{ + return cr->suid; +} + +/* Return the effective group id */ +gid_t +crgetgid(const cred_t *cr) +{ + return cr->egid; +} + +/* Return the real group id */ +gid_t +crgetrgid(const cred_t *cr) +{ + return cr->gid; +} + +/* Return the saved group id */ +gid_t +crgetsgid(const cred_t *cr) +{ + return cr->sgid; +} + +/* Return the number of supplemental groups */ +int +crgetngroups(const cred_t *cr) +{ + struct group_info *gi; + int rc; + + gi = get_group_info(cr->group_info); + rc = gi->ngroups; + put_group_info(gi); + + return rc; +} + +/* + * Return an array of supplemental gids. The returned address is safe + * to use as long as the caller has taken a reference with crhold(). + * The caller is responsible for releasing the reference with crfree(). + */ +gid_t * +crgetgroups(const cred_t *cr) +{ + struct group_info *gi; + gid_t *gids; + + gi = get_group_info(cr->group_info); + gids = gi->blocks[0]; + put_group_info(gi); + + return gids; +} + +/* Check if the passed gid is available is in supplied credential. */ +int +groupmember(gid_t gid, const cred_t *cr) +{ + struct group_info *gi; + int rc; + + gi = get_group_info(cr->group_info); + rc = cr_groups_search(cr->group_info, gid); + put_group_info(gi); + + return rc; +} + +#else /* HAVE_CRED_STRUCT */ + +/* + * Until very recently all credential information was embedded in + * the linux task struct. For this reason to simulate a Solaris + * cred_t we need to pass the entire task structure around. + */ + +/* Hold a reference on the credential and group info */ +void +crhold(cred_t *cr) +{ + get_task_struct(cr); +} + +/* Free a reference on the credential and group info */ +void +crfree(cred_t *cr) +{ + put_task_struct(cr); +} + +/* Return the effective user id */ +uid_t +crgetuid(const cred_t *cr) { + return cr->euid; +} + +/* Return the effective real id */ +uid_t +crgetruid(const cred_t *cr) { + return cr->uid; +} + +/* Return the effective saved id */ +uid_t +crgetsuid(const cred_t *cr) { + return cr->suid; +} + +/* Return the effective group id */ +gid_t +crgetgid(const cred_t *cr) { + return cr->egid; +} + +/* Return the real group id */ +gid_t +crgetrgid(const cred_t *cr) { + return cr->gid; +} + +/* Return the saved group id */ +gid_t +crgetsgid(const cred_t *cr) { + return cr->sgid; +} + +/* Return the number of supplemental groups */ +int +crgetngroups(const cred_t *cr) +{ + int lock, rc; + + lock = (cr != current); + if (lock) + task_lock((struct task_struct *)cr); + + get_group_info(cr->group_info); + rc = cr->group_info->ngroups; + put_group_info(cr->group_info); + + if (lock) + task_unlock((struct task_struct *)cr); + + return rc; +} + +/* + * Return an array of supplemental gids. The returned address is safe + * to use as long as the caller has taken a reference with crhold(). + * The caller is responsible for releasing the reference with crfree(). + */ +gid_t * +crgetgroups(const cred_t *cr) +{ + gid_t *gids; + int lock; + + lock = (cr != current); + if (lock) + task_lock((struct task_struct *)cr); + + get_group_info(cr->group_info); + gids = cr->group_info->blocks[0]; + put_group_info(cr->group_info); + + if (lock) + task_unlock((struct task_struct *)cr); + + return gids; +} + +/* Check if the passed gid is available is in supplied credential. */ +int +groupmember(gid_t gid, const cred_t *cr) +{ + int lock, rc; + + lock = (cr != current); + if (lock) + task_lock((struct task_struct *)cr); + + get_group_info(cr->group_info); + rc = cr_groups_search(cr->group_info, gid); + put_group_info(cr->group_info); + + if (lock) + task_unlock((struct task_struct *)cr); + + return rc; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_CRED_STRUCT */ + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crhold); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crfree); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crgetuid); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crgetruid); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crgetsuid); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crgetgid); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crgetrgid); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crgetsgid); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crgetngroups); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crgetgroups); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(groupmember); diff --git a/module/spl/spl-debug.c b/module/spl/spl-debug.c index a60740519..6d71f4b82 100644 --- a/module/spl/spl-debug.c +++ b/module/spl/spl-debug.c @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ spl_debug_subsys2str(int subsys) return "proc"; case S_MODULE: return "module"; + case S_CRED: + return "cred"; } } diff --git a/module/splat/Makefile.in b/module/splat/Makefile.in index c2d4c3f22..2f63b458a 100644 --- a/module/splat/Makefile.in +++ b/module/splat/Makefile.in @@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ splat-objs += splat-kobj.o splat-objs += splat-atomic.o splat-objs += splat-list.o splat-objs += splat-generic.o +splat-objs += splat-cred.o diff --git a/module/splat/splat-cred.c b/module/splat/splat-cred.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f808625e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/module/splat/splat-cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +/* + * This file is part of the SPL: Solaris Porting Layer. + * + * Copyright (c) 2009 Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. + * Produced at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory + * Written by: + * Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>, + * UCRL-CODE-235197 + * + * This is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT + * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License + * for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along + * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + */ + +#include "splat-internal.h" + +#define SPLAT_CRED_NAME "cred" +#define SPLAT_CRED_DESC "Kernel Cred Tests" + +#define SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_ID 0x0e01 +#define SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_NAME "cred" +#define SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_DESC "Task Credential Test" + +#define SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_ID 0x0e02 +#define SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_NAME "kcred" +#define SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_DESC "Kernel Credential Test" + +#define SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_ID 0x0e03 +#define SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_NAME "groupmember" +#define SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_DESC "Group Member Test" + +#define GROUP_STR_SIZE 128 +#define GROUP_STR_REDZONE 16 + +static int +splat_cred_test1(struct file *file, void *arg) +{ + char str[GROUP_STR_SIZE]; + uid_t uid, ruid, suid; + gid_t gid, rgid, sgid, *groups; + int ngroups, i, count = 0; + + uid = crgetuid(CRED()); + ruid = crgetruid(CRED()); + suid = crgetsuid(CRED()); + + gid = crgetgid(CRED()); + rgid = crgetrgid(CRED()); + sgid = crgetsgid(CRED()); + + crhold(CRED()); + ngroups = crgetngroups(CRED()); + groups = crgetgroups(CRED()); + + memset(str, 0, GROUP_STR_SIZE); + for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { + count += sprintf(str + count, "%d ", groups[i]); + + if (count > (GROUP_STR_SIZE - GROUP_STR_REDZONE)) { + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_NAME, + "Failed too many group entries for temp " + "buffer: %d, %s\n", ngroups, str); + return -ENOSPC; + } + } + + crfree(CRED()); + + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_NAME, + "uid: %d ruid: %d suid: %d " + "gid: %d rgid: %d sgid: %d\n", + uid, ruid, suid, gid, rgid, sgid); + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_NAME, + "ngroups: %d groups: %s\n", ngroups, str); + + if (uid || ruid || suid || gid || rgid || sgid) { + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_NAME, + "Failed expected all uids+gids to be %d\n", 0); + return -EIDRM; + } + + if (ngroups > NGROUPS_MAX) { + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_NAME, + "Failed ngroups must not exceed NGROUPS_MAX: " + "%d > %d\n", ngroups, NGROUPS_MAX); + return -EIDRM; + } + + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_NAME, + "Success sane CRED(): %d\n", 0); + + return 0; +} /* splat_cred_test1() */ + +static int +splat_cred_test2(struct file *file, void *arg) +{ + char str[GROUP_STR_SIZE]; + uid_t uid, ruid, suid; + gid_t gid, rgid, sgid, *groups; + int ngroups, i, count = 0; + + uid = crgetuid(kcred); + ruid = crgetruid(kcred); + suid = crgetsuid(kcred); + + gid = crgetgid(kcred); + rgid = crgetrgid(kcred); + sgid = crgetsgid(kcred); + + crhold(kcred); + ngroups = crgetngroups(kcred); + groups = crgetgroups(kcred); + + memset(str, 0, GROUP_STR_SIZE); + for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { + count += sprintf(str + count, "%d ", groups[i]); + + if (count > (GROUP_STR_SIZE - GROUP_STR_REDZONE)) { + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_NAME, + "Failed too many group entries for temp " + "buffer: %d, %s\n", ngroups, str); + return -ENOSPC; + } + } + + crfree(kcred); + + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_NAME, + "uid: %d ruid: %d suid: %d " + "gid: %d rgid: %d sgid: %d\n", + uid, ruid, suid, gid, rgid, sgid); + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_NAME, + "ngroups: %d groups: %s\n", ngroups, str); + + if (uid || ruid || suid || gid || rgid || sgid) { + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_NAME, + "Failed expected all uids+gids to be %d\n", 0); + return -EIDRM; + } + + if (ngroups > NGROUPS_MAX) { + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_NAME, + "Failed ngroups must not exceed NGROUPS_MAX: " + "%d > %d\n", ngroups, NGROUPS_MAX); + return -EIDRM; + } + + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_NAME, + "Success sane kcred: %d\n", 0); + + return 0; +} /* splat_cred_test2() */ + +/* + * On most/all systems it can be expected that a task with root + * permissions also is a member of the root group, Since the + * test suite is always run as root we check first that CRED() is + * a member of the root group, and secondly that it is not a member + * of our fake group. This test will break is someone happens to + * create group number NGROUPS_MAX-1 and then added root to it. + */ +static int +splat_cred_test3(struct file *file, void *arg) +{ + gid_t root_gid, fake_gid; + int rc; + + root_gid = 0; + fake_gid = NGROUPS_MAX-1; + + rc = groupmember(root_gid, CRED()); + if (!rc) { + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_NAME, + "Failed root git %d expected to be member " + "of CRED() groups: %d\n", root_gid, rc); + return -EIDRM; + } + + rc = groupmember(fake_gid, CRED()); + if (rc) { + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_NAME, + "Failed fake git %d expected not to be member " + "of CRED() groups: %d\n", fake_gid, rc); + return -EIDRM; + } + + splat_vprint(file, SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_NAME, "Success root gid " + "is a member of the expected groups: %d\n", rc); + + return rc; +} /* splat_cred_test3() */ + +splat_subsystem_t * +splat_cred_init(void) +{ + splat_subsystem_t *sub; + + sub = kmalloc(sizeof(*sub), GFP_KERNEL); + if (sub == NULL) + return NULL; + + memset(sub, 0, sizeof(*sub)); + strncpy(sub->desc.name, SPLAT_CRED_NAME, SPLAT_NAME_SIZE); + strncpy(sub->desc.desc, SPLAT_CRED_DESC, SPLAT_DESC_SIZE); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sub->subsystem_list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sub->test_list); + spin_lock_init(&sub->test_lock); + sub->desc.id = SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_CRED; + + SPLAT_TEST_INIT(sub, SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_NAME, SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_DESC, + SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_ID, splat_cred_test1); + SPLAT_TEST_INIT(sub, SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_NAME, SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_DESC, + SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_ID, splat_cred_test2); + SPLAT_TEST_INIT(sub, SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_NAME, SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_DESC, + SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_ID, splat_cred_test3); + + return sub; +} /* splat_cred_init() */ + +void +splat_cred_fini(splat_subsystem_t *sub) +{ + ASSERT(sub); + + SPLAT_TEST_FINI(sub, SPLAT_CRED_TEST3_ID); + SPLAT_TEST_FINI(sub, SPLAT_CRED_TEST2_ID); + SPLAT_TEST_FINI(sub, SPLAT_CRED_TEST1_ID); + + kfree(sub); +} /* splat_cred_fini() */ + +int +splat_cred_id(void) +{ + return SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_CRED; +} /* splat_cred_id() */ diff --git a/module/splat/splat-ctl.c b/module/splat/splat-ctl.c index c8925636a..159103980 100644 --- a/module/splat/splat-ctl.c +++ b/module/splat/splat-ctl.c @@ -630,6 +630,7 @@ splat_init(void) SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_INIT(atomic); SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_INIT(list); SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_INIT(generic); + SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_INIT(cred); dev = MKDEV(SPLAT_MAJOR, 0); if ((rc = register_chrdev_region(dev, SPLAT_MINORS, SPLAT_NAME))) @@ -676,6 +677,7 @@ splat_fini(void) cdev_del(&splat_cdev); unregister_chrdev_region(dev, SPLAT_MINORS); + SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_FINI(cred); SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_FINI(generic); SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_FINI(list); SPLAT_SUBSYSTEM_FINI(atomic); diff --git a/module/splat/splat-internal.h b/module/splat/splat-internal.h index 0fa177c02..c1c84d8d1 100644 --- a/module/splat/splat-internal.h +++ b/module/splat/splat-internal.h @@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ splat_subsystem_t *splat_kobj_init(void); splat_subsystem_t *splat_atomic_init(void); splat_subsystem_t *splat_list_init(void); splat_subsystem_t *splat_generic_init(void); +splat_subsystem_t *splat_cred_init(void); void splat_condvar_fini(splat_subsystem_t *); void splat_kmem_fini(splat_subsystem_t *); @@ -222,6 +223,7 @@ void splat_kobj_fini(splat_subsystem_t *); void splat_atomic_fini(splat_subsystem_t *); void splat_list_fini(splat_subsystem_t *); void splat_generic_fini(splat_subsystem_t *); +void splat_cred_fini(splat_subsystem_t *); int splat_condvar_id(void); int splat_kmem_id(void); @@ -236,5 +238,6 @@ int splat_kobj_id(void); int splat_atomic_id(void); int splat_list_id(void); int splat_generic_id(void); +int splat_cred_id(void); #endif /* _SPLAT_INTERNAL_H */ |