summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/module
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAttila Fülöp <[email protected]>2020-02-10 21:59:50 +0100
committerGitHub <[email protected]>2020-02-10 12:59:50 -0800
commit31b160f0a6c673c8f926233af2ed6d5354808393 (patch)
tree185a34810ead2f887d7e4f08f18ba28b1e257c49 /module
parentfa3922df75d722724dd51819cb49da0418d054f5 (diff)
ICP: Improve AES-GCM performance
Currently SIMD accelerated AES-GCM performance is limited by two factors: a. The need to disable preemption and interrupts and save the FPU state before using it and to do the reverse when done. Due to the way the code is organized (see (b) below) we have to pay this price twice for each 16 byte GCM block processed. b. Most processing is done in C, operating on single GCM blocks. The use of SIMD instructions is limited to the AES encryption of the counter block (AES-NI) and the Galois multiplication (PCLMULQDQ). This leads to the FPU not being fully utilized for crypto operations. To solve (a) we do crypto processing in larger chunks while owning the FPU. An `icp_gcm_avx_chunk_size` module parameter was introduced to make this chunk size tweakable. It defaults to 32 KiB. This step alone roughly doubles performance. (b) is tackled by porting and using the highly optimized openssl AES-GCM assembler routines, which do all the processing (CTR, AES, GMULT) in a single routine. Both steps together result in up to 32x reduction of the time spend in the en/decryption routines, leading up to approximately 12x throughput increase for large (128 KiB) blocks. Lastly, this commit changes the default encryption algorithm from AES-CCM to AES-GCM when setting the `encryption=on` property. Reviewed-By: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Reviewed-By: Jason King <[email protected]> Reviewed-By: Tom Caputi <[email protected]> Reviewed-By: Richard Laager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Attila Fülöp <[email protected]> Closes #9749
Diffstat (limited to 'module')
-rw-r--r--module/icp/Makefile.in9
-rw-r--r--module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c746
-rw-r--r--module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.cryptogams36
-rw-r--r--module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.cryptogams.descrip1
-rw-r--r--module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl177
-rw-r--r--module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl.descrip1
-rw-r--r--module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.S892
-rw-r--r--module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/ghash-x86_64.S714
-rw-r--r--module/icp/include/aes/aes_impl.h5
-rw-r--r--module/icp/include/modes/modes.h29
10 files changed, 2590 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/module/icp/Makefile.in b/module/icp/Makefile.in
index 9e1f2906d..51e69bd7d 100644
--- a/module/icp/Makefile.in
+++ b/module/icp/Makefile.in
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ $(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += asm-x86_64/aes/aeskey.o
$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += asm-x86_64/aes/aes_amd64.o
$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += asm-x86_64/aes/aes_aesni.o
$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += asm-x86_64/modes/gcm_pclmulqdq.o
+$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += asm-x86_64/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.o
+$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += asm-x86_64/modes/ghash-x86_64.o
$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += asm-x86_64/sha1/sha1-x86_64.o
$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += asm-x86_64/sha2/sha256_impl.o
$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += asm-x86_64/sha2/sha512_impl.o
@@ -59,6 +61,13 @@ $(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86) += algs/modes/gcm_pclmulqdq.o
$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86) += algs/aes/aes_impl_aesni.o
$(MODULE)-$(CONFIG_X86) += algs/aes/aes_impl_x86-64.o
+# Suppress objtool "can't find jump dest instruction at" warnings. They
+# are caused by the constants which are defined in the text section of the
+# assembly file using .byte instructions (e.g. bswap_mask). The objtool
+# utility tries to interpret them as opcodes and obviously fails doing so.
+OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_aesni-gcm-x86_64.o := y
+OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ghash-x86_64.o := y
+
ICP_DIRS = \
api \
core \
diff --git a/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c b/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c
index 8d1b8822a..d20a079ad 100644
--- a/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c
+++ b/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c
@@ -30,12 +30,46 @@
#include <sys/byteorder.h>
#include <sys/simd.h>
#include <modes/gcm_impl.h>
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+#include <aes/aes_impl.h>
+#endif
#define GHASH(c, d, t, o) \
xor_block((uint8_t *)(d), (uint8_t *)(c)->gcm_ghash); \
(o)->mul((uint64_t *)(void *)(c)->gcm_ghash, (c)->gcm_H, \
(uint64_t *)(void *)(t));
+/* Select GCM implementation */
+#define IMPL_FASTEST (UINT32_MAX)
+#define IMPL_CYCLE (UINT32_MAX-1)
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+#define IMPL_AVX (UINT32_MAX-2)
+#endif
+#define GCM_IMPL_READ(i) (*(volatile uint32_t *) &(i))
+static uint32_t icp_gcm_impl = IMPL_FASTEST;
+static uint32_t user_sel_impl = IMPL_FASTEST;
+
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+/*
+ * Whether to use the optimized openssl gcm and ghash implementations.
+ * Set to true if module parameter icp_gcm_impl == "avx".
+ */
+static boolean_t gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE;
+#define GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX (*(volatile boolean_t *)&gcm_use_avx)
+
+static inline boolean_t gcm_avx_will_work(void);
+static inline void gcm_set_avx(boolean_t);
+static inline boolean_t gcm_toggle_avx(void);
+
+static int gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, char *, size_t,
+ crypto_data_t *, size_t);
+
+static int gcm_encrypt_final_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, size_t);
+static int gcm_decrypt_final_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, size_t);
+static int gcm_init_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, unsigned char *, size_t, unsigned char *,
+ size_t, size_t);
+#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
+
/*
* Encrypt multiple blocks of data in GCM mode. Decrypt for GCM mode
* is done in another function.
@@ -47,6 +81,12 @@ gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, char *data, size_t length,
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
{
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ if (ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE)
+ return (gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks_avx(
+ ctx, data, length, out, block_size));
+#endif
+
const gcm_impl_ops_t *gops;
size_t remainder = length;
size_t need = 0;
@@ -111,6 +151,14 @@ gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, char *data, size_t length,
ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += block_size;
+ /*
+ * The following copies a complete GCM block back to where it
+ * came from if there was a remainder in the last call and out
+ * is NULL. That doesn't seem to make sense. So we assert this
+ * can't happen and leave the code in for reference.
+ * See https://github.com/zfsonlinux/zfs/issues/9661
+ */
+ ASSERT(out != NULL);
if (out == NULL) {
if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) {
bcopy(blockp, ctx->gcm_copy_to,
@@ -171,6 +219,11 @@ gcm_encrypt_final(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size,
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
{
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ if (ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE)
+ return (gcm_encrypt_final_avx(ctx, out, block_size));
+#endif
+
const gcm_impl_ops_t *gops;
uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL);
uint8_t *ghash, *macp = NULL;
@@ -325,6 +378,11 @@ gcm_decrypt_final(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size,
int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
{
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ if (ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE)
+ return (gcm_decrypt_final_avx(ctx, out, block_size));
+#endif
+
const gcm_impl_ops_t *gops;
size_t pt_len;
size_t remainder;
@@ -530,6 +588,9 @@ gcm_init(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
}
+/*
+ * Init the GCM context struct. Handle the cycle and avx implementations here.
+ */
int
gcm_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size,
int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
@@ -560,11 +621,37 @@ gcm_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size,
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
}
- if (gcm_init(gcm_ctx, gcm_param->pIv, gcm_param->ulIvLen,
- gcm_param->pAAD, gcm_param->ulAADLen, block_size,
- encrypt_block, copy_block, xor_block) != 0) {
- rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ /*
+ * Handle the "cycle" implementation by creating avx and non avx
+ * contexts alternately.
+ */
+ if (GCM_IMPL_READ(icp_gcm_impl) != IMPL_CYCLE) {
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX;
+ } else {
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = gcm_toggle_avx();
+ }
+ /* We don't handle byte swapped key schedules in the avx code path. */
+ aes_key_t *ks = (aes_key_t *)gcm_ctx->gcm_keysched;
+ if (ks->ops->needs_byteswap == B_TRUE) {
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* Avx and non avx context initialization differs from here on. */
+ if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_FALSE) {
+#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
+ if (gcm_init(gcm_ctx, gcm_param->pIv, gcm_param->ulIvLen,
+ gcm_param->pAAD, gcm_param->ulAADLen, block_size,
+ encrypt_block, copy_block, xor_block) != 0) {
+ rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ }
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ } else {
+ if (gcm_init_avx(gcm_ctx, gcm_param->pIv, gcm_param->ulIvLen,
+ gcm_param->pAAD, gcm_param->ulAADLen, block_size) != 0) {
+ rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ }
}
+#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
return (rv);
}
@@ -594,11 +681,37 @@ gmac_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size,
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
}
- if (gcm_init(gcm_ctx, gmac_param->pIv, AES_GMAC_IV_LEN,
- gmac_param->pAAD, gmac_param->ulAADLen, block_size,
- encrypt_block, copy_block, xor_block) != 0) {
- rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ /*
+ * Handle the "cycle" implementation by creating avx and non avx
+ * contexts alternately.
+ */
+ if (GCM_IMPL_READ(icp_gcm_impl) != IMPL_CYCLE) {
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX;
+ } else {
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = gcm_toggle_avx();
}
+ /* We don't handle byte swapped key schedules in the avx code path. */
+ aes_key_t *ks = (aes_key_t *)gcm_ctx->gcm_keysched;
+ if (ks->ops->needs_byteswap == B_TRUE) {
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* Avx and non avx context initialization differs from here on. */
+ if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_FALSE) {
+#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
+ if (gcm_init(gcm_ctx, gmac_param->pIv, AES_GMAC_IV_LEN,
+ gmac_param->pAAD, gmac_param->ulAADLen, block_size,
+ encrypt_block, copy_block, xor_block) != 0) {
+ rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ }
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ } else {
+ if (gcm_init_avx(gcm_ctx, gmac_param->pIv, AES_GMAC_IV_LEN,
+ gmac_param->pAAD, gmac_param->ulAADLen, block_size) != 0) {
+ rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
return (rv);
}
@@ -649,15 +762,6 @@ const gcm_impl_ops_t *gcm_all_impl[] = {
/* Indicate that benchmark has been completed */
static boolean_t gcm_impl_initialized = B_FALSE;
-/* Select GCM implementation */
-#define IMPL_FASTEST (UINT32_MAX)
-#define IMPL_CYCLE (UINT32_MAX-1)
-
-#define GCM_IMPL_READ(i) (*(volatile uint32_t *) &(i))
-
-static uint32_t icp_gcm_impl = IMPL_FASTEST;
-static uint32_t user_sel_impl = IMPL_FASTEST;
-
/* Hold all supported implementations */
static size_t gcm_supp_impl_cnt = 0;
static gcm_impl_ops_t *gcm_supp_impl[ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_all_impl)];
@@ -689,6 +793,16 @@ gcm_impl_get_ops()
size_t idx = (++cycle_impl_idx) % gcm_supp_impl_cnt;
ops = gcm_supp_impl[idx];
break;
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ case IMPL_AVX:
+ /*
+ * Make sure that we return a valid implementation while
+ * switching to the avx implementation since there still
+ * may be unfinished non-avx contexts around.
+ */
+ ops = &gcm_generic_impl;
+ break;
+#endif
default:
ASSERT3U(impl, <, gcm_supp_impl_cnt);
ASSERT3U(gcm_supp_impl_cnt, >, 0);
@@ -737,6 +851,16 @@ gcm_impl_init(void)
strcpy(gcm_fastest_impl.name, "fastest");
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ /*
+ * Use the avx implementation if it's available and the implementation
+ * hasn't changed from its default value of fastest on module load.
+ */
+ if (gcm_avx_will_work() &&
+ GCM_IMPL_READ(user_sel_impl) == IMPL_FASTEST) {
+ gcm_set_avx(B_TRUE);
+ }
+#endif
/* Finish initialization */
atomic_swap_32(&icp_gcm_impl, user_sel_impl);
gcm_impl_initialized = B_TRUE;
@@ -748,6 +872,9 @@ static const struct {
} gcm_impl_opts[] = {
{ "cycle", IMPL_CYCLE },
{ "fastest", IMPL_FASTEST },
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ { "avx", IMPL_AVX },
+#endif
};
/*
@@ -781,6 +908,12 @@ gcm_impl_set(const char *val)
/* Check mandatory options */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_impl_opts); i++) {
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ /* Ignore avx implementation if it won't work. */
+ if (gcm_impl_opts[i].sel == IMPL_AVX && !gcm_avx_will_work()) {
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
if (strcmp(req_name, gcm_impl_opts[i].name) == 0) {
impl = gcm_impl_opts[i].sel;
err = 0;
@@ -799,6 +932,18 @@ gcm_impl_set(const char *val)
}
}
}
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ /*
+ * Use the avx implementation if available and the requested one is
+ * avx or fastest.
+ */
+ if (gcm_avx_will_work() == B_TRUE &&
+ (impl == IMPL_AVX || impl == IMPL_FASTEST)) {
+ gcm_set_avx(B_TRUE);
+ } else {
+ gcm_set_avx(B_FALSE);
+ }
+#endif
if (err == 0) {
if (gcm_impl_initialized)
@@ -829,6 +974,12 @@ icp_gcm_impl_get(char *buffer, zfs_kernel_param_t *kp)
/* list mandatory options */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_impl_opts); i++) {
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ /* Ignore avx implementation if it won't work. */
+ if (gcm_impl_opts[i].sel == IMPL_AVX && !gcm_avx_will_work()) {
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
fmt = (impl == gcm_impl_opts[i].sel) ? "[%s] " : "%s ";
cnt += sprintf(buffer + cnt, fmt, gcm_impl_opts[i].name);
}
@@ -845,4 +996,563 @@ icp_gcm_impl_get(char *buffer, zfs_kernel_param_t *kp)
module_param_call(icp_gcm_impl, icp_gcm_impl_set, icp_gcm_impl_get,
NULL, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(icp_gcm_impl, "Select gcm implementation.");
-#endif
+#endif /* defined(__KERNEL) */
+
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+#define GCM_BLOCK_LEN 16
+/*
+ * The openssl asm routines are 6x aggregated and need that many bytes
+ * at minimum.
+ */
+#define GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES (GCM_BLOCK_LEN * 6)
+#define GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES (GCM_BLOCK_LEN * 6 * 3)
+/*
+ * Ensure the chunk size is reasonable since we are allocating a
+ * GCM_AVX_MAX_CHUNK_SIZEd buffer and disabling preemption and interrupts.
+ */
+#define GCM_AVX_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE \
+ (((128*1024)/GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES) * GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES)
+
+/* Get the chunk size module parameter. */
+#define GCM_CHUNK_SIZE_READ *(volatile uint32_t *) &gcm_avx_chunk_size
+
+/* Clear the FPU registers since they hold sensitive internal state. */
+#define clear_fpu_regs() clear_fpu_regs_avx()
+#define GHASH_AVX(ctx, in, len) \
+ gcm_ghash_avx((ctx)->gcm_ghash, (const uint64_t (*)[2])(ctx)->gcm_Htable, \
+ in, len)
+
+#define gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx) gcm_incr_counter_block_by(ctx, 1)
+
+/*
+ * Module parameter: number of bytes to process at once while owning the FPU.
+ * Rounded down to the next GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES byte boundary and is
+ * ensured to be greater or equal than GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES.
+ */
+static uint32_t gcm_avx_chunk_size =
+ ((32 * 1024) / GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES) * GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES;
+
+extern boolean_t atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(volatile boolean_t *);
+extern void clear_fpu_regs_avx(void);
+extern void gcm_xor_avx(const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst);
+extern void aes_encrypt_intel(const uint32_t rk[], int nr,
+ const uint32_t pt[4], uint32_t ct[4]);
+
+extern void gcm_init_htab_avx(uint64_t Htable[16][2], const uint64_t H[2]);
+extern void gcm_ghash_avx(uint64_t ghash[2], const uint64_t Htable[16][2],
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+
+extern size_t aesni_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t,
+ const void *, uint64_t *, uint64_t *);
+
+extern size_t aesni_gcm_decrypt(const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t,
+ const void *, uint64_t *, uint64_t *);
+
+static inline boolean_t
+gcm_avx_will_work(void)
+{
+ /* Avx should imply aes-ni and pclmulqdq, but make sure anyhow. */
+ return (kfpu_allowed() &&
+ zfs_avx_available() && zfs_movbe_available() &&
+ zfs_aes_available() && zfs_pclmulqdq_available());
+}
+
+static inline void
+gcm_set_avx(boolean_t val)
+{
+ if (gcm_avx_will_work() == B_TRUE) {
+ atomic_swap_32(&gcm_use_avx, val);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline boolean_t
+gcm_toggle_avx(void)
+{
+ if (gcm_avx_will_work() == B_TRUE) {
+ return (atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(&GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX));
+ } else {
+ return (B_FALSE);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear senssitve data in the context.
+ *
+ * ctx->gcm_remainder may contain a plaintext remainder. ctx->gcm_H and
+ * ctx->gcm_Htable contain the hash sub key which protects authentication.
+ *
+ * Although extremely unlikely, ctx->gcm_J0 and ctx->gcm_tmp could be used for
+ * a known plaintext attack, they consists of the IV and the first and last
+ * counter respectively. If they should be cleared is debatable.
+ */
+static inline void
+gcm_clear_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx)
+{
+ bzero(ctx->gcm_remainder, sizeof (ctx->gcm_remainder));
+ bzero(ctx->gcm_H, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H));
+ bzero(ctx->gcm_Htable, sizeof (ctx->gcm_Htable));
+ bzero(ctx->gcm_J0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_J0));
+ bzero(ctx->gcm_tmp, sizeof (ctx->gcm_tmp));
+}
+
+/* Increment the GCM counter block by n. */
+static inline void
+gcm_incr_counter_block_by(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, int n)
+{
+ uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL);
+ uint64_t counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask);
+
+ counter = htonll(counter + n);
+ counter &= counter_mask;
+ ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt multiple blocks of data in GCM mode.
+ * This is done in gcm_avx_chunk_size chunks, utilizing AVX assembler routines
+ * if possible. While processing a chunk the FPU is "locked".
+ */
+static int
+gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks_avx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, char *data,
+ size_t length, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size)
+{
+ size_t bleft = length;
+ size_t need = 0;
+ size_t done = 0;
+ uint8_t *datap = (uint8_t *)data;
+ size_t chunk_size = (size_t)GCM_CHUNK_SIZE_READ;
+ const aes_key_t *key = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched);
+ uint64_t *ghash = ctx->gcm_ghash;
+ uint64_t *cb = ctx->gcm_cb;
+ uint8_t *ct_buf = NULL;
+ uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
+ int rv = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+
+ ASSERT(block_size == GCM_BLOCK_LEN);
+ /*
+ * If the last call left an incomplete block, try to fill
+ * it first.
+ */
+ if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) {
+ need = block_size - ctx->gcm_remainder_len;
+ if (length < need) {
+ /* Accumulate bytes here and return. */
+ bcopy(datap, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder +
+ ctx->gcm_remainder_len, length);
+
+ ctx->gcm_remainder_len += length;
+ if (ctx->gcm_copy_to == NULL) {
+ ctx->gcm_copy_to = datap;
+ }
+ return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
+ } else {
+ /* Complete incomplete block. */
+ bcopy(datap, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder +
+ ctx->gcm_remainder_len, need);
+
+ ctx->gcm_copy_to = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a buffer to encrypt to if there is enough input. */
+ if (bleft >= GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES) {
+ ct_buf = vmem_alloc(chunk_size, ctx->gcm_kmflag);
+ if (ct_buf == NULL) {
+ return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we completed an incomplete block, encrypt and write it out. */
+ if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) {
+ kfpu_begin();
+ aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr,
+ (const uint32_t *)cb, (uint32_t *)tmp);
+
+ gcm_xor_avx((const uint8_t *) ctx->gcm_remainder, tmp);
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, tmp, block_size);
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+ /*
+ * We don't follow gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks() here
+ * but assert that out is not null.
+ * See gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks() above and
+ * https://github.com/zfsonlinux/zfs/issues/9661
+ */
+ ASSERT(out != NULL);
+ rv = crypto_put_output_data(tmp, out, block_size);
+ out->cd_offset += block_size;
+ gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx);
+ ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += block_size;
+ bleft -= need;
+ datap += need;
+ ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the bulk encryption in chunk_size blocks. */
+ for (; bleft >= chunk_size; bleft -= chunk_size) {
+ kfpu_begin();
+ done = aesni_gcm_encrypt(
+ datap, ct_buf, chunk_size, key, cb, ghash);
+
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+ if (done != chunk_size) {
+ rv = CRYPTO_FAILED;
+ goto out_nofpu;
+ }
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ rv = crypto_put_output_data(ct_buf, out, chunk_size);
+ if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
+ goto out_nofpu;
+ }
+ out->cd_offset += chunk_size;
+ }
+ datap += chunk_size;
+ ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += chunk_size;
+ }
+ /* Check if we are already done. */
+ if (bleft == 0) {
+ goto out_nofpu;
+ }
+ /* Bulk encrypt the remaining data. */
+ kfpu_begin();
+ if (bleft >= GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES) {
+ done = aesni_gcm_encrypt(datap, ct_buf, bleft, key, cb, ghash);
+ if (done == 0) {
+ rv = CRYPTO_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ rv = crypto_put_output_data(ct_buf, out, done);
+ if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ out->cd_offset += done;
+ }
+ ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += done;
+ datap += done;
+ bleft -= done;
+
+ }
+ /* Less than GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES remain, operate on blocks. */
+ while (bleft > 0) {
+ if (bleft < block_size) {
+ bcopy(datap, ctx->gcm_remainder, bleft);
+ ctx->gcm_remainder_len = bleft;
+ ctx->gcm_copy_to = datap;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Encrypt, hash and write out. */
+ aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr,
+ (const uint32_t *)cb, (uint32_t *)tmp);
+
+ gcm_xor_avx(datap, tmp);
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, tmp, block_size);
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ rv = crypto_put_output_data(tmp, out, block_size);
+ if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ out->cd_offset += block_size;
+ }
+ gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx);
+ ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += block_size;
+ datap += block_size;
+ bleft -= block_size;
+ }
+out:
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+out_nofpu:
+ if (ct_buf != NULL) {
+ vmem_free(ct_buf, chunk_size);
+ }
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize the encryption: Zero fill, encrypt, hash and write out an eventual
+ * incomplete last block. Encrypt the ICB. Calculate the tag and write it out.
+ */
+static int
+gcm_encrypt_final_avx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size)
+{
+ uint8_t *ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash;
+ uint32_t *J0 = (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_J0;
+ uint8_t *remainder = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder;
+ size_t rem_len = ctx->gcm_remainder_len;
+ const void *keysched = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched)->encr_ks.ks32;
+ int aes_rounds = ((aes_key_t *)keysched)->nr;
+ int rv;
+
+ ASSERT(block_size == GCM_BLOCK_LEN);
+
+ if (out->cd_length < (rem_len + ctx->gcm_tag_len)) {
+ return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
+ }
+
+ kfpu_begin();
+ /* Pad last incomplete block with zeros, encrypt and hash. */
+ if (rem_len > 0) {
+ uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
+ const uint32_t *cb = (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_cb;
+
+ aes_encrypt_intel(keysched, aes_rounds, cb, (uint32_t *)tmp);
+ bzero(remainder + rem_len, block_size - rem_len);
+ for (int i = 0; i < rem_len; i++) {
+ remainder[i] ^= tmp[i];
+ }
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, remainder, block_size);
+ ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += rem_len;
+ /* No need to increment counter_block, it's the last block. */
+ }
+ /* Finish tag. */
+ ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[1] =
+ htonll(CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(ctx->gcm_processed_data_len));
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, (const uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c, block_size);
+ aes_encrypt_intel(keysched, aes_rounds, J0, J0);
+
+ gcm_xor_avx((uint8_t *)J0, ghash);
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+
+ /* Output remainder. */
+ if (rem_len > 0) {
+ rv = crypto_put_output_data(remainder, out, rem_len);
+ if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
+ return (rv);
+ }
+ out->cd_offset += rem_len;
+ ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0;
+ rv = crypto_put_output_data(ghash, out, ctx->gcm_tag_len);
+ if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
+ return (rv);
+
+ out->cd_offset += ctx->gcm_tag_len;
+ /* Clear sensitive data in the context before returning. */
+ gcm_clear_ctx(ctx);
+ return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize decryption: We just have accumulated crypto text, so now we
+ * decrypt it here inplace.
+ */
+static int
+gcm_decrypt_final_avx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size)
+{
+ ASSERT3U(ctx->gcm_processed_data_len, ==, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
+ ASSERT3U(block_size, ==, 16);
+
+ size_t chunk_size = (size_t)GCM_CHUNK_SIZE_READ;
+ size_t pt_len = ctx->gcm_processed_data_len - ctx->gcm_tag_len;
+ uint8_t *datap = ctx->gcm_pt_buf;
+ const aes_key_t *key = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched);
+ uint32_t *cb = (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_cb;
+ uint64_t *ghash = ctx->gcm_ghash;
+ uint32_t *tmp = (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
+ int rv = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+ size_t bleft, done;
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt in chunks of gcm_avx_chunk_size, which is asserted to be
+ * greater or equal than GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES, and a multiple of
+ * GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES.
+ */
+ for (bleft = pt_len; bleft >= chunk_size; bleft -= chunk_size) {
+ kfpu_begin();
+ done = aesni_gcm_decrypt(datap, datap, chunk_size,
+ (const void *)key, ctx->gcm_cb, ghash);
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+ if (done != chunk_size) {
+ return (CRYPTO_FAILED);
+ }
+ datap += done;
+ }
+ /* Decrypt remainder, which is less then chunk size, in one go. */
+ kfpu_begin();
+ if (bleft >= GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES) {
+ done = aesni_gcm_decrypt(datap, datap, bleft,
+ (const void *)key, ctx->gcm_cb, ghash);
+ if (done == 0) {
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+ return (CRYPTO_FAILED);
+ }
+ datap += done;
+ bleft -= done;
+ }
+ ASSERT(bleft < GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES);
+
+ /*
+ * Now less then GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES bytes remain,
+ * decrypt them block by block.
+ */
+ while (bleft > 0) {
+ /* Incomplete last block. */
+ if (bleft < block_size) {
+ uint8_t *lastb = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder;
+
+ bzero(lastb, block_size);
+ bcopy(datap, lastb, bleft);
+ /* The GCM processing. */
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, lastb, block_size);
+ aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr, cb, tmp);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < bleft; i++) {
+ datap[i] = lastb[i] ^ ((uint8_t *)tmp)[i];
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ /* The GCM processing. */
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, datap, block_size);
+ aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr, cb, tmp);
+ gcm_xor_avx((uint8_t *)tmp, datap);
+ gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx);
+
+ datap += block_size;
+ bleft -= block_size;
+ }
+ if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+ return (rv);
+ }
+ /* Decryption done, finish the tag. */
+ ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[1] = htonll(CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(pt_len));
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c, block_size);
+ aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr, (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_J0,
+ (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_J0);
+
+ gcm_xor_avx((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, (uint8_t *)ghash);
+
+ /* We are done with the FPU, restore its state. */
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+
+ /* Compare the input authentication tag with what we calculated. */
+ if (bcmp(&ctx->gcm_pt_buf[pt_len], ghash, ctx->gcm_tag_len)) {
+ /* They don't match. */
+ return (CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC);
+ }
+ rv = crypto_put_output_data(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, out, pt_len);
+ if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
+ return (rv);
+ }
+ out->cd_offset += pt_len;
+ gcm_clear_ctx(ctx);
+ return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the GCM params H, Htabtle and the counter block. Save the
+ * initial counter block.
+ */
+static int
+gcm_init_avx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ unsigned char *auth_data, size_t auth_data_len, size_t block_size)
+{
+ uint8_t *cb = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb;
+ uint64_t *H = ctx->gcm_H;
+ const void *keysched = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched)->encr_ks.ks32;
+ int aes_rounds = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched)->nr;
+ uint8_t *datap = auth_data;
+ size_t chunk_size = (size_t)GCM_CHUNK_SIZE_READ;
+ size_t bleft;
+
+ ASSERT(block_size == GCM_BLOCK_LEN);
+
+ /* Init H (encrypt zero block) and create the initial counter block. */
+ bzero(ctx->gcm_ghash, sizeof (ctx->gcm_ghash));
+ bzero(H, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H));
+ kfpu_begin();
+ aes_encrypt_intel(keysched, aes_rounds,
+ (const uint32_t *)H, (uint32_t *)H);
+
+ gcm_init_htab_avx(ctx->gcm_Htable, H);
+
+ if (iv_len == 12) {
+ bcopy(iv, cb, 12);
+ cb[12] = 0;
+ cb[13] = 0;
+ cb[14] = 0;
+ cb[15] = 1;
+ /* We need the ICB later. */
+ bcopy(cb, ctx->gcm_J0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_J0));
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Most consumers use 12 byte IVs, so it's OK to use the
+ * original routines for other IV sizes, just avoid nesting
+ * kfpu_begin calls.
+ */
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+ gcm_format_initial_blocks(iv, iv_len, ctx, block_size,
+ aes_copy_block, aes_xor_block);
+ kfpu_begin();
+ }
+
+ /* Openssl post increments the counter, adjust for that. */
+ gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx);
+
+ /* Ghash AAD in chunk_size blocks. */
+ for (bleft = auth_data_len; bleft >= chunk_size; bleft -= chunk_size) {
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, datap, chunk_size);
+ datap += chunk_size;
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+ kfpu_begin();
+ }
+ /* Ghash the remainder and handle possible incomplete GCM block. */
+ if (bleft > 0) {
+ size_t incomp = bleft % block_size;
+
+ bleft -= incomp;
+ if (bleft > 0) {
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, datap, bleft);
+ datap += bleft;
+ }
+ if (incomp > 0) {
+ /* Zero pad and hash incomplete last block. */
+ uint8_t *authp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
+
+ bzero(authp, block_size);
+ bcopy(datap, authp, incomp);
+ GHASH_AVX(ctx, authp, block_size);
+ }
+ }
+ clear_fpu_regs();
+ kfpu_end();
+ return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+#if defined(_KERNEL)
+static int
+icp_gcm_avx_set_chunk_size(const char *buf, zfs_kernel_param_t *kp)
+{
+ unsigned long val;
+ char val_rounded[16];
+ int error = 0;
+
+ error = kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
+ val = (val / GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES) * GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES;
+
+ if (val < GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES || val > GCM_AVX_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE)
+ return (-EINVAL);
+
+ snprintf(val_rounded, 16, "%u", (uint32_t)val);
+ error = param_set_uint(val_rounded, kp);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+module_param_call(icp_gcm_avx_chunk_size, icp_gcm_avx_set_chunk_size,
+ param_get_uint, &gcm_avx_chunk_size, 0644);
+
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(icp_gcm_avx_chunk_size,
+ "How many bytes to process while owning the FPU");
+
+#endif /* defined(__KERNEL) */
+#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
diff --git a/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.cryptogams b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.cryptogams
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0de1883dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.cryptogams
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Copyright (c) 2006-2017, CRYPTOGAMS by <[email protected]>
+All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+
+ * Redistributions of source code must retain copyright notices,
+ this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+
+ * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+ copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
+ provided with the distribution.
+
+ * Neither the name of the CRYPTOGAMS nor the names of its
+ copyright holder and contributors may be used to endorse or
+ promote products derived from this software without specific
+ prior written permission.
+
+ALTERNATIVELY, provided that this notice is retained in full, this
+product may be distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public
+License (GPL), in which case the provisions of the GPL apply INSTEAD OF
+those given above.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER AND CONTRIBUTORS
+"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
diff --git a/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.cryptogams.descrip b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.cryptogams.descrip
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6184759c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.cryptogams.descrip
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+PORTIONS OF GCM and GHASH FUNCTIONALITY
diff --git a/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..49cc83d2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+
+ Apache License
+ Version 2.0, January 2004
+ https://www.apache.org/licenses/
+
+ TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
+
+ 1. Definitions.
+
+ "License" shall mean the terms and conditions for use, reproduction,
+ and distribution as defined by Sections 1 through 9 of this document.
+
+ "Licensor" shall mean the copyright owner or entity authorized by
+ the copyright owner that is granting the License.
+
+ "Legal Entity" shall mean the union of the acting entity and all
+ other entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common
+ control with that entity. For the purposes of this definition,
+ "control" means (i) the power, direct or indirect, to cause the
+ direction or management of such entity, whether by contract or
+ otherwise, or (ii) ownership of fifty percent (50%) or more of the
+ outstanding shares, or (iii) beneficial ownership of such entity.
+
+ "You" (or "Your") shall mean an individual or Legal Entity
+ exercising permissions granted by this License.
+
+ "Source" form shall mean the preferred form for making modifications,
+ including but not limited to software source code, documentation
+ source, and configuration files.
+
+ "Object" form shall mean any form resulting from mechanical
+ transformation or translation of a Source form, including but
+ not limited to compiled object code, generated documentation,
+ and conversions to other media types.
+
+ "Work" shall mean the work of authorship, whether in Source or
+ Object form, made available under the License, as indicated by a
+ copyright notice that is included in or attached to the work
+ (an example is provided in the Appendix below).
+
+ "Derivative Works" shall mean any work, whether in Source or Object
+ form, that is based on (or derived from) the Work and for which the
+ editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
+ represent, as a whole, an original work of authorship. For the purposes
+ of this License, Derivative Works shall not include works that remain
+ separable from, or merely link (or bind by name) to the interfaces of,
+ the Work and Derivative Works thereof.
+
+ "Contribution" shall mean any work of authorship, including
+ the original version of the Work and any modifications or additions
+ to that Work or Derivative Works thereof, that is intentionally
+ submitted to Licensor for inclusion in the Work by the copyright owner
+ or by an individual or Legal Entity authorized to submit on behalf of
+ the copyright owner. For the purposes of this definition, "submitted"
+ means any form of electronic, verbal, or written communication sent
+ to the Licensor or its representatives, including but not limited to
+ communication on electronic mailing lists, source code control systems,
+ and issue tracking systems that are managed by, or on behalf of, the
+ Licensor for the purpose of discussing and improving the Work, but
+ excluding communication that is conspicuously marked or otherwise
+ designated in writing by the copyright owner as "Not a Contribution."
+
+ "Contributor" shall mean Licensor and any individual or Legal Entity
+ on behalf of whom a Contribution has been received by Licensor and
+ subsequently incorporated within the Work.
+
+ 2. Grant of Copyright License. Subject to the terms and conditions of
+ this License, each Contributor hereby grants to You a perpetual,
+ worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable
+ copyright license to reproduce, prepare Derivative Works of,
+ publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute the
+ Work and such Derivative Works in Source or Object form.
+
+ 3. Grant of Patent License. Subject to the terms and conditions of
+ this License, each Contributor hereby grants to You a perpetual,
+ worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable
+ (except as stated in this section) patent license to make, have made,
+ use, offer to sell, sell, import, and otherwise transfer the Work,
+ where such license applies only to those patent claims licensable
+ by such Contributor that are necessarily infringed by their
+ Contribution(s) alone or by combination of their Contribution(s)
+ with the Work to which such Contribution(s) was submitted. If You
+ institute patent litigation against any entity (including a
+ cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging that the Work
+ or a Contribution incorporated within the Work constitutes direct
+ or contributory patent infringement, then any patent licenses
+ granted to You under this License for that Work shall terminate
+ as of the date such litigation is filed.
+
+ 4. Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the
+ Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without
+ modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You
+ meet the following conditions:
+
+ (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or
+ Derivative Works a copy of this License; and
+
+ (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices
+ stating that You changed the files; and
+
+ (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works
+ that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and
+ attribution notices from the Source form of the Work,
+ excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of
+ the Derivative Works; and
+
+ (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its
+ distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must
+ include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained
+ within such NOTICE file, excluding those notices that do not
+ pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one
+ of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed
+ as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or
+ documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or,
+ within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and
+ wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents
+ of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and
+ do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution
+ notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside
+ or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided
+ that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed
+ as modifying the License.
+
+ You may add Your own copyright statement to Your modifications and
+ may provide additional or different license terms and conditions
+ for use, reproduction, or distribution of Your modifications, or
+ for any such Derivative Works as a whole, provided Your use,
+ reproduction, and distribution of the Work otherwise complies with
+ the conditions stated in this License.
+
+ 5. Submission of Contributions. Unless You explicitly state otherwise,
+ any Contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the Work
+ by You to the Licensor shall be under the terms and conditions of
+ this License, without any additional terms or conditions.
+ Notwithstanding the above, nothing herein shall supersede or modify
+ the terms of any separate license agreement you may have executed
+ with Licensor regarding such Contributions.
+
+ 6. Trademarks. This License does not grant permission to use the trade
+ names, trademarks, service marks, or product names of the Licensor,
+ except as required for reasonable and customary use in describing the
+ origin of the Work and reproducing the content of the NOTICE file.
+
+ 7. Disclaimer of Warranty. Unless required by applicable law or
+ agreed to in writing, Licensor provides the Work (and each
+ Contributor provides its Contributions) on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or
+ implied, including, without limitation, any warranties or conditions
+ of TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, or FITNESS FOR A
+ PARTICULAR PURPOSE. You are solely responsible for determining the
+ appropriateness of using or redistributing the Work and assume any
+ risks associated with Your exercise of permissions under this License.
+
+ 8. Limitation of Liability. In no event and under no legal theory,
+ whether in tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise,
+ unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate and grossly
+ negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, shall any Contributor be
+ liable to You for damages, including any direct, indirect, special,
+ incidental, or consequential damages of any character arising as a
+ result of this License or out of the use or inability to use the
+ Work (including but not limited to damages for loss of goodwill,
+ work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any and all
+ other commercial damages or losses), even if such Contributor
+ has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
+
+ 9. Accepting Warranty or Additional Liability. While redistributing
+ the Work or Derivative Works thereof, You may choose to offer,
+ and charge a fee for, acceptance of support, warranty, indemnity,
+ or other liability obligations and/or rights consistent with this
+ License. However, in accepting such obligations, You may act only
+ on Your own behalf and on Your sole responsibility, not on behalf
+ of any other Contributor, and only if You agree to indemnify,
+ defend, and hold each Contributor harmless for any liability
+ incurred by, or claims asserted against, such Contributor by reason
+ of your accepting any such warranty or additional liability.
+
+ END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
diff --git a/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl.descrip b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl.descrip
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6184759c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl.descrip
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+PORTIONS OF GCM and GHASH FUNCTIONALITY
diff --git a/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.S b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bad0b7d23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,892 @@
+# Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <[email protected]> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+#
+# AES-NI-CTR+GHASH stitch.
+#
+# February 2013
+#
+# OpenSSL GCM implementation is organized in such way that its
+# performance is rather close to the sum of its streamed components,
+# in the context parallelized AES-NI CTR and modulo-scheduled
+# PCLMULQDQ-enabled GHASH. Unfortunately, as no stitch implementation
+# was observed to perform significantly better than the sum of the
+# components on contemporary CPUs, the effort was deemed impossible to
+# justify. This module is based on combination of Intel submissions,
+# [1] and [2], with MOVBE twist suggested by Ilya Albrekht and Max
+# Locktyukhin of Intel Corp. who verified that it reduces shuffles
+# pressure with notable relative improvement, achieving 1.0 cycle per
+# byte processed with 128-bit key on Haswell processor, 0.74 - on
+# Broadwell, 0.63 - on Skylake... [Mentioned results are raw profiled
+# measurements for favourable packet size, one divisible by 96.
+# Applications using the EVP interface will observe a few percent
+# worse performance.]
+#
+# Knights Landing processes 1 byte in 1.25 cycles (measured with EVP).
+#
+# [1] http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2900&user=guest&pass=guest
+# [2] http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/software-support/enabling-high-performance-gcm.pdf
+
+# Generated once from
+# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/5ffc3324/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
+# and modified for ICP. Modification are kept at a bare minimum to ease later
+# upstream merges.
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(HAVE_AVX) && \
+ defined(HAVE_AES) && defined(HAVE_PCLMULQDQ) && defined(HAVE_MOVBE)
+
+.text
+
+.type _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x,@function
+.align 32
+_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x:
+ vmovdqu 32(%r11),%xmm2
+ subq $6,%rdx
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 0-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm1,%xmm10
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm10,%xmm11
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm11,%xmm12
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm12,%xmm13
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm13,%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm1,%xmm9
+ vmovdqu %xmm4,16+8(%rsp)
+ jmp .Loop6x
+
+.align 32
+.Loop6x:
+ addl $100663296,%ebx
+ jc .Lhandle_ctr32
+ vmovdqu 0-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+
+.Lresume_ctr32:
+ vmovdqu %xmm1,(%r8)
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm3,%xmm7,%xmm5
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vmovups 16-128(%rcx),%xmm2
+ vpclmulqdq $0x01,%xmm3,%xmm7,%xmm6
+ xorq %r12,%r12
+ cmpq %r14,%r15
+
+ vaesenc %xmm2,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vmovdqu 48+8(%rsp),%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm3,%xmm7,%xmm1
+ vaesenc %xmm2,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ setnc %r12b
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm3,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vaesenc %xmm2,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vmovdqu 16-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ negq %r12
+ vaesenc %xmm2,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm5
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vaesenc %xmm2,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm1,%xmm4
+ andq $0x60,%r12
+ vmovups 32-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm1
+ vaesenc %xmm2,%xmm14,%xmm14
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x01,%xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm2
+ leaq (%r14,%r12,1),%r14
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor 16+8(%rsp),%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vmovdqu 64+8(%rsp),%xmm0
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ movbeq 88(%r14),%r13
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ movbeq 80(%r14),%r12
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ movq %r13,32+8(%rsp)
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ movq %r12,40+8(%rsp)
+ vmovdqu 48-32(%r9),%xmm5
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+
+ vmovups 48-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm5,%xmm0,%xmm1
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm5,%xmm0,%xmm2
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpclmulqdq $0x01,%xmm5,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm5,%xmm0,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 80+8(%rsp),%xmm0
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 64-32(%r9),%xmm1
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+
+ vmovups 64-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm2
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ movbeq 72(%r14),%r13
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpclmulqdq $0x01,%xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm5
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ movbeq 64(%r14),%r12
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 96+8(%rsp),%xmm0
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ movq %r13,48+8(%rsp)
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ movq %r12,56+8(%rsp)
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 96-32(%r9),%xmm2
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+
+ vmovups 80-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm5
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ movbeq 56(%r14),%r13
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpclmulqdq $0x01,%xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm1
+ vpxor 112+8(%rsp),%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ movbeq 48(%r14),%r12
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm2
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ movq %r13,64+8(%rsp)
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ movq %r12,72+8(%rsp)
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 112-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+
+ vmovups 96-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm3,%xmm8,%xmm5
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x01,%xmm3,%xmm8,%xmm1
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ movbeq 40(%r14),%r13
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm3,%xmm8,%xmm2
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ movbeq 32(%r14),%r12
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm3,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ movq %r13,80+8(%rsp)
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ movq %r12,88+8(%rsp)
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm6,%xmm6
+
+ vmovups 112-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm6,%xmm5
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 16(%r11),%xmm3
+
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm8,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ movbeq 24(%r14),%r13
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ movbeq 16(%r14),%r12
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm4,%xmm4,%xmm0
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm3,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ movq %r13,96+8(%rsp)
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ movq %r12,104+8(%rsp)
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vmovups 128-128(%rcx),%xmm1
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vmovups 144-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpxor %xmm6,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ movbeq 8(%r14),%r13
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ movbeq 0(%r14),%r12
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vmovups 160-128(%rcx),%xmm1
+ cmpl $12,%ebp // ICP uses 10,12,14 not 9,11,13 for rounds.
+ jb .Lenc_tail
+
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vmovups 176-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vmovups 192-128(%rcx),%xmm1
+ cmpl $14,%ebp // ICP does not zero key schedule.
+ jb .Lenc_tail
+
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vmovups 208-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vaesenc %xmm1,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vmovups 224-128(%rcx),%xmm1
+ jmp .Lenc_tail
+
+.align 32
+.Lhandle_ctr32:
+ vmovdqu (%r11),%xmm0
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm6
+ vmovdqu 48(%r11),%xmm5
+ vpaddd 64(%r11),%xmm6,%xmm10
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm6,%xmm11
+ vmovdqu 0-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm10,%xmm12
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm11,%xmm13
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm12,%xmm14
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm13,%xmm1
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ jmp .Lresume_ctr32
+
+.align 32
+.Lenc_tail:
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vmovdqu %xmm7,16+8(%rsp)
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm4,%xmm4,%xmm8
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm3,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpxor 0(%rdi),%xmm1,%xmm2
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpxor 16(%rdi),%xmm1,%xmm0
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpxor 32(%rdi),%xmm1,%xmm5
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpxor 48(%rdi),%xmm1,%xmm6
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpxor 64(%rdi),%xmm1,%xmm7
+ vpxor 80(%rdi),%xmm1,%xmm3
+ vmovdqu (%r8),%xmm1
+
+ vaesenclast %xmm2,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vmovdqu 32(%r11),%xmm2
+ vaesenclast %xmm0,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm1,%xmm0
+ movq %r13,112+8(%rsp)
+ leaq 96(%rdi),%rdi
+ vaesenclast %xmm5,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm5
+ movq %r12,120+8(%rsp)
+ leaq 96(%rsi),%rsi
+ vmovdqu 0-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ vaesenclast %xmm6,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm6
+ vaesenclast %xmm7,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm6,%xmm7
+ vaesenclast %xmm3,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm7,%xmm3
+
+ addq $0x60,%r10
+ subq $0x6,%rdx
+ jc .L6x_done
+
+ vmovups %xmm9,-96(%rsi)
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm1,%xmm9
+ vmovups %xmm10,-80(%rsi)
+ vmovdqa %xmm0,%xmm10
+ vmovups %xmm11,-64(%rsi)
+ vmovdqa %xmm5,%xmm11
+ vmovups %xmm12,-48(%rsi)
+ vmovdqa %xmm6,%xmm12
+ vmovups %xmm13,-32(%rsi)
+ vmovdqa %xmm7,%xmm13
+ vmovups %xmm14,-16(%rsi)
+ vmovdqa %xmm3,%xmm14
+ vmovdqu 32+8(%rsp),%xmm7
+ jmp .Loop6x
+
+.L6x_done:
+ vpxor 16+8(%rsp),%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ .byte 0xf3,0xc3
+.size _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x,.-_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x
+.globl aesni_gcm_decrypt
+.type aesni_gcm_decrypt,@function
+.align 32
+aesni_gcm_decrypt:
+.cfi_startproc
+ xorq %r10,%r10
+ cmpq $0x60,%rdx
+ jb .Lgcm_dec_abort
+
+ leaq (%rsp),%rax
+.cfi_def_cfa_register %rax
+ pushq %rbx
+.cfi_offset %rbx,-16
+ pushq %rbp
+.cfi_offset %rbp,-24
+ pushq %r12
+.cfi_offset %r12,-32
+ pushq %r13
+.cfi_offset %r13,-40
+ pushq %r14
+.cfi_offset %r14,-48
+ pushq %r15
+.cfi_offset %r15,-56
+ vzeroupper
+
+ vmovdqu (%r8),%xmm1
+ addq $-128,%rsp
+ movl 12(%r8),%ebx
+ leaq .Lbswap_mask(%rip),%r11
+ leaq -128(%rcx),%r14
+ movq $0xf80,%r15
+ vmovdqu (%r9),%xmm8
+ andq $-128,%rsp
+ vmovdqu (%r11),%xmm0
+ leaq 128(%rcx),%rcx
+ leaq 32+32(%r9),%r9
+ movl 504-128(%rcx),%ebp // ICP has a larger offset for rounds.
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ andq %r15,%r14
+ andq %rsp,%r15
+ subq %r14,%r15
+ jc .Ldec_no_key_aliasing
+ cmpq $768,%r15
+ jnc .Ldec_no_key_aliasing
+ subq %r15,%rsp
+.Ldec_no_key_aliasing:
+
+ vmovdqu 80(%rdi),%xmm7
+ leaq (%rdi),%r14
+ vmovdqu 64(%rdi),%xmm4
+ leaq -192(%rdi,%rdx,1),%r15
+ vmovdqu 48(%rdi),%xmm5
+ shrq $4,%rdx
+ xorq %r10,%r10
+ vmovdqu 32(%rdi),%xmm6
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vmovdqu 16(%rdi),%xmm2
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu (%rdi),%xmm3
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu %xmm4,48(%rsp)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vmovdqu %xmm5,64(%rsp)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vmovdqu %xmm6,80(%rsp)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vmovdqu %xmm2,96(%rsp)
+ vmovdqu %xmm3,112(%rsp)
+
+ call _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x
+
+ vmovups %xmm9,-96(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm10,-80(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm11,-64(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm12,-48(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm13,-32(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm14,-16(%rsi)
+
+ vpshufb (%r11),%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu %xmm8,-64(%r9)
+
+ vzeroupper
+ movq -48(%rax),%r15
+.cfi_restore %r15
+ movq -40(%rax),%r14
+.cfi_restore %r14
+ movq -32(%rax),%r13
+.cfi_restore %r13
+ movq -24(%rax),%r12
+.cfi_restore %r12
+ movq -16(%rax),%rbp
+.cfi_restore %rbp
+ movq -8(%rax),%rbx
+.cfi_restore %rbx
+ leaq (%rax),%rsp
+.cfi_def_cfa_register %rsp
+.Lgcm_dec_abort:
+ movq %r10,%rax
+ .byte 0xf3,0xc3
+.cfi_endproc
+.size aesni_gcm_decrypt,.-aesni_gcm_decrypt
+.type _aesni_ctr32_6x,@function
+.align 32
+_aesni_ctr32_6x:
+ vmovdqu 0-128(%rcx),%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 32(%r11),%xmm2
+ leaq -2(%rbp),%r13 // ICP uses 10,12,14 not 9,11,13 for rounds.
+ vmovups 16-128(%rcx),%xmm15
+ leaq 32-128(%rcx),%r12
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm1,%xmm9
+ addl $100663296,%ebx
+ jc .Lhandle_ctr32_2
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm1,%xmm10
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm10,%xmm11
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm11,%xmm12
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm12,%xmm13
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm13,%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpaddb %xmm2,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ jmp .Loop_ctr32
+
+.align 16
+.Loop_ctr32:
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vmovups (%r12),%xmm15
+ leaq 16(%r12),%r12
+ decl %r13d
+ jnz .Loop_ctr32
+
+ vmovdqu (%r12),%xmm3
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor 0(%rdi),%xmm3,%xmm4
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor 16(%rdi),%xmm3,%xmm5
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpxor 32(%rdi),%xmm3,%xmm6
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpxor 48(%rdi),%xmm3,%xmm8
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpxor 64(%rdi),%xmm3,%xmm2
+ vaesenc %xmm15,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpxor 80(%rdi),%xmm3,%xmm3
+ leaq 96(%rdi),%rdi
+
+ vaesenclast %xmm4,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vaesenclast %xmm5,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vaesenclast %xmm6,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vaesenclast %xmm8,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vaesenclast %xmm2,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vaesenclast %xmm3,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vmovups %xmm9,0(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm10,16(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm11,32(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm12,48(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm13,64(%rsi)
+ vmovups %xmm14,80(%rsi)
+ leaq 96(%rsi),%rsi
+
+ .byte 0xf3,0xc3
+.align 32
+.Lhandle_ctr32_2:
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm6
+ vmovdqu 48(%r11),%xmm5
+ vpaddd 64(%r11),%xmm6,%xmm10
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm6,%xmm11
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm10,%xmm12
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm11,%xmm13
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm12,%xmm14
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpaddd %xmm5,%xmm13,%xmm1
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ jmp .Loop_ctr32
+.size _aesni_ctr32_6x,.-_aesni_ctr32_6x
+
+.globl aesni_gcm_encrypt
+.type aesni_gcm_encrypt,@function
+.align 32
+aesni_gcm_encrypt:
+.cfi_startproc
+ xorq %r10,%r10
+ cmpq $288,%rdx
+ jb .Lgcm_enc_abort
+
+ leaq (%rsp),%rax
+.cfi_def_cfa_register %rax
+ pushq %rbx
+.cfi_offset %rbx,-16
+ pushq %rbp
+.cfi_offset %rbp,-24
+ pushq %r12
+.cfi_offset %r12,-32
+ pushq %r13
+.cfi_offset %r13,-40
+ pushq %r14
+.cfi_offset %r14,-48
+ pushq %r15
+.cfi_offset %r15,-56
+ vzeroupper
+
+ vmovdqu (%r8),%xmm1
+ addq $-128,%rsp
+ movl 12(%r8),%ebx
+ leaq .Lbswap_mask(%rip),%r11
+ leaq -128(%rcx),%r14
+ movq $0xf80,%r15
+ leaq 128(%rcx),%rcx
+ vmovdqu (%r11),%xmm0
+ andq $-128,%rsp
+ movl 504-128(%rcx),%ebp // ICP has an larger offset for rounds.
+
+ andq %r15,%r14
+ andq %rsp,%r15
+ subq %r14,%r15
+ jc .Lenc_no_key_aliasing
+ cmpq $768,%r15
+ jnc .Lenc_no_key_aliasing
+ subq %r15,%rsp
+.Lenc_no_key_aliasing:
+
+ leaq (%rsi),%r14
+ leaq -192(%rsi,%rdx,1),%r15
+ shrq $4,%rdx
+
+ call _aesni_ctr32_6x
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm9,%xmm8
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm10,%xmm2
+ vmovdqu %xmm8,112(%rsp)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm11,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu %xmm2,96(%rsp)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm12,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu %xmm4,80(%rsp)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm13,%xmm6
+ vmovdqu %xmm5,64(%rsp)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm14,%xmm7
+ vmovdqu %xmm6,48(%rsp)
+
+ call _aesni_ctr32_6x
+
+ vmovdqu (%r9),%xmm8
+ leaq 32+32(%r9),%r9
+ subq $12,%rdx
+ movq $192,%r10
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ call _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x
+ vmovdqu 32(%rsp),%xmm7
+ vmovdqu (%r11),%xmm0
+ vmovdqu 0-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm7,%xmm7,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 32-32(%r9),%xmm15
+ vmovups %xmm9,-96(%rsi)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm7,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vmovups %xmm10,-80(%rsi)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vmovups %xmm11,-64(%rsi)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vmovups %xmm12,-48(%rsi)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vmovups %xmm13,-32(%rsi)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vmovups %xmm14,-16(%rsi)
+ vpshufb %xmm0,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vmovdqu %xmm9,16(%rsp)
+ vmovdqu 48(%rsp),%xmm6
+ vmovdqu 16-32(%r9),%xmm0
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm6,%xmm6,%xmm2
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm3,%xmm7,%xmm5
+ vpxor %xmm6,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm3,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm15,%xmm1,%xmm1
+
+ vmovdqu 64(%rsp),%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm0,%xmm6,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 48-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm9,%xmm9,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm0,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm9,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpxor %xmm7,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm15,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vmovdqu 80-32(%r9),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm2,%xmm2
+
+ vmovdqu 80(%rsp),%xmm1
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm3,%xmm9,%xmm7
+ vmovdqu 64-32(%r9),%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm1,%xmm1,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm3,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm6,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm15,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+
+ vmovdqu 96(%rsp),%xmm2
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm6
+ vmovdqu 96-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm7,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm2,%xmm7
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm9,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm15,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 128-32(%r9),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm4,%xmm4
+
+ vpxor 112(%rsp),%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm3,%xmm2,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 112-32(%r9),%xmm0
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm8,%xmm8,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm6,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm3,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm8,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm15,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm7,%xmm4
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm0,%xmm8,%xmm6
+ vmovdqu 0-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm14,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm0,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm6,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vmovdqu 32-32(%r9),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm8,%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm9,%xmm6
+
+ vmovdqu 16-32(%r9),%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm7,%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm3,%xmm14,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm9,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm13,%xmm13,%xmm2
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm3,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm13,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm6,%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm15,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm9,%xmm5,%xmm8
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm6,%xmm7,%xmm7
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm0,%xmm13,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 48-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm12,%xmm12,%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm0,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpxor %xmm12,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm13,%xmm13
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm8,%xmm8,%xmm14
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm15,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vmovdqu 80-32(%r9),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm2,%xmm2
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm3,%xmm12,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 64-32(%r9),%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm11,%xmm11,%xmm1
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm3,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpxor %xmm11,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm13,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vxorps 16(%rsp),%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm9,%xmm9
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,16(%r11),%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vxorps %xmm14,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm0,%xmm11,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 96-32(%r9),%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm10,%xmm10,%xmm2
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm0,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpxor %xmm10,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm8,%xmm8,%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm12,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm15,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 128-32(%r9),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm9,%xmm1,%xmm1
+
+ vxorps %xmm7,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,16(%r11),%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vxorps %xmm14,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm3,%xmm10,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 112-32(%r9),%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm8,%xmm8,%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm3,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm8,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm11,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm15,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm2,%xmm2
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm0,%xmm8,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm0,%xmm8,%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm15,%xmm9,%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm10,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm6,%xmm6
+
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm7,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm6,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 16(%r11),%xmm3
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm5,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm6,%xmm7,%xmm7
+
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm8,%xmm8,%xmm2
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm3,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm8,%xmm8,%xmm2
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm3,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm7,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpshufb (%r11),%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu %xmm8,-64(%r9)
+
+ vzeroupper
+ movq -48(%rax),%r15
+.cfi_restore %r15
+ movq -40(%rax),%r14
+.cfi_restore %r14
+ movq -32(%rax),%r13
+.cfi_restore %r13
+ movq -24(%rax),%r12
+.cfi_restore %r12
+ movq -16(%rax),%rbp
+.cfi_restore %rbp
+ movq -8(%rax),%rbx
+.cfi_restore %rbx
+ leaq (%rax),%rsp
+.cfi_def_cfa_register %rsp
+.Lgcm_enc_abort:
+ movq %r10,%rax
+ .byte 0xf3,0xc3
+.cfi_endproc
+.size aesni_gcm_encrypt,.-aesni_gcm_encrypt
+
+/* Some utility routines */
+
+/*
+ * clear all fpu registers
+ * void clear_fpu_regs_avx(void);
+ */
+.globl clear_fpu_regs_avx
+.type clear_fpu_regs_avx,@function
+.align 32
+clear_fpu_regs_avx:
+ vzeroall
+ ret
+.size clear_fpu_regs_avx,.-clear_fpu_regs_avx
+
+/*
+ * void gcm_xor_avx(const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst);
+ *
+ * XORs one pair of unaligned 128-bit blocks from `src' and `dst' and
+ * stores the result at `dst'. The XOR is performed using FPU registers,
+ * so make sure FPU state is saved when running this in the kernel.
+ */
+.globl gcm_xor_avx
+.type gcm_xor_avx,@function
+.align 32
+gcm_xor_avx:
+ movdqu (%rdi), %xmm0
+ movdqu (%rsi), %xmm1
+ pxor %xmm1, %xmm0
+ movdqu %xmm0, (%rsi)
+ ret
+.size gcm_xor_avx,.-gcm_xor_avx
+
+/*
+ * Toggle a boolean_t value atomically and return the new value.
+ * boolean_t atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(volatile boolean_t *);
+ */
+.globl atomic_toggle_boolean_nv
+.type atomic_toggle_boolean_nv,@function
+.align 32
+atomic_toggle_boolean_nv:
+ xorl %eax, %eax
+ lock
+ xorl $1, (%rdi)
+ jz 1f
+ movl $1, %eax
+1:
+ ret
+.size atomic_toggle_boolean_nv,.-atomic_toggle_boolean_nv
+
+.align 64
+.Lbswap_mask:
+.byte 15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0
+.Lpoly:
+.byte 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2
+.Lone_msb:
+.byte 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+.Ltwo_lsb:
+.byte 2,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.Lone_lsb:
+.byte 1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.byte 65,69,83,45,78,73,32,71,67,77,32,109,111,100,117,108,101,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54,95,54,52,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
+.align 64
+
+/* Mark the stack non-executable. */
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
+.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
+#endif
+
+#endif /* defined(__x86_64__) && defined(HAVE_AVX) && defined(HAVE_AES) ... */
diff --git a/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/ghash-x86_64.S b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/ghash-x86_64.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..90cc36b43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/module/icp/asm-x86_64/modes/ghash-x86_64.S
@@ -0,0 +1,714 @@
+# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <[email protected]> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# March, June 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that
+# it uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. GHASH
+# function features so called "528B" variant utilizing additional
+# 256+16 bytes of per-key storage [+512 bytes shared table].
+# Performance results are for this streamed GHASH subroutine and are
+# expressed in cycles per processed byte, less is better:
+#
+# gcc 3.4.x(*) assembler
+#
+# P4 28.6 14.0 +100%
+# Opteron 19.3 7.7 +150%
+# Core2 17.8 8.1(**) +120%
+# Atom 31.6 16.8 +88%
+# VIA Nano 21.8 10.1 +115%
+#
+# (*) comparison is not completely fair, because C results are
+# for vanilla "256B" implementation, while assembler results
+# are for "528B";-)
+# (**) it's mystery [to me] why Core2 result is not same as for
+# Opteron;
+
+# May 2010
+#
+# Add PCLMULQDQ version performing at 2.02 cycles per processed byte.
+# See ghash-x86.pl for background information and details about coding
+# techniques.
+#
+# Special thanks to David Woodhouse for providing access to a
+# Westmere-based system on behalf of Intel Open Source Technology Centre.
+
+# December 2012
+#
+# Overhaul: aggregate Karatsuba post-processing, improve ILP in
+# reduction_alg9, increase reduction aggregate factor to 4x. As for
+# the latter. ghash-x86.pl discusses that it makes lesser sense to
+# increase aggregate factor. Then why increase here? Critical path
+# consists of 3 independent pclmulqdq instructions, Karatsuba post-
+# processing and reduction. "On top" of this we lay down aggregated
+# multiplication operations, triplets of independent pclmulqdq's. As
+# issue rate for pclmulqdq is limited, it makes lesser sense to
+# aggregate more multiplications than it takes to perform remaining
+# non-multiplication operations. 2x is near-optimal coefficient for
+# contemporary Intel CPUs (therefore modest improvement coefficient),
+# but not for Bulldozer. Latter is because logical SIMD operations
+# are twice as slow in comparison to Intel, so that critical path is
+# longer. A CPU with higher pclmulqdq issue rate would also benefit
+# from higher aggregate factor...
+#
+# Westmere 1.78(+13%)
+# Sandy Bridge 1.80(+8%)
+# Ivy Bridge 1.80(+7%)
+# Haswell 0.55(+93%) (if system doesn't support AVX)
+# Broadwell 0.45(+110%)(if system doesn't support AVX)
+# Skylake 0.44(+110%)(if system doesn't support AVX)
+# Bulldozer 1.49(+27%)
+# Silvermont 2.88(+13%)
+# Knights L 2.12(-) (if system doesn't support AVX)
+# Goldmont 1.08(+24%)
+
+# March 2013
+#
+# ... 8x aggregate factor AVX code path is using reduction algorithm
+# suggested by Shay Gueron[1]. Even though contemporary AVX-capable
+# CPUs such as Sandy and Ivy Bridge can execute it, the code performs
+# sub-optimally in comparison to above mentioned version. But thanks
+# to Ilya Albrekht and Max Locktyukhin of Intel Corp. we knew that
+# it performs in 0.41 cycles per byte on Haswell processor, in
+# 0.29 on Broadwell, and in 0.36 on Skylake.
+#
+# Knights Landing achieves 1.09 cpb.
+#
+# [1] http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2900&user=guest&pass=guest
+
+# Generated once from
+# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/5ffc3324/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
+# and modified for ICP. Modification are kept at a bare minimum to ease later
+# upstream merges.
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(HAVE_AVX) && \
+ defined(HAVE_AES) && defined(HAVE_PCLMULQDQ)
+
+.text
+
+.globl gcm_gmult_clmul
+.type gcm_gmult_clmul,@function
+.align 16
+gcm_gmult_clmul:
+.cfi_startproc
+.L_gmult_clmul:
+ movdqu (%rdi),%xmm0
+ movdqa .Lbswap_mask(%rip),%xmm5
+ movdqu (%rsi),%xmm2
+ movdqu 32(%rsi),%xmm4
+.byte 102,15,56,0,197
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm1
+ pshufd $78,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+.byte 102,15,58,68,194,0
+.byte 102,15,58,68,202,17
+.byte 102,15,58,68,220,0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm3
+
+ movdqa %xmm3,%xmm4
+ psrldq $8,%xmm3
+ pslldq $8,%xmm4
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
+
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm3
+ psllq $5,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ psllq $1,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm0
+ psllq $57,%xmm0
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pslldq $8,%xmm0
+ psrldq $8,%xmm3
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm1
+
+
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4
+ psrlq $1,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm4
+ psrlq $5,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm0
+ psrlq $1,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
+.byte 102,15,56,0,197
+ movdqu %xmm0,(%rdi)
+ .byte 0xf3,0xc3
+.cfi_endproc
+.size gcm_gmult_clmul,.-gcm_gmult_clmul
+
+.globl gcm_init_htab_avx
+.type gcm_init_htab_avx,@function
+.align 32
+gcm_init_htab_avx:
+.cfi_startproc
+ vzeroupper
+
+ vmovdqu (%rsi),%xmm2
+ // KCF/ICP stores H in network byte order with the hi qword first
+ // so we need to swap all bytes, not the 2 qwords.
+ vmovdqu .Lbswap_mask(%rip),%xmm4
+ vpshufb %xmm4,%xmm2,%xmm2
+
+
+ vpshufd $255,%xmm2,%xmm4
+ vpsrlq $63,%xmm2,%xmm3
+ vpsllq $1,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpcmpgtd %xmm4,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpor %xmm3,%xmm2,%xmm2
+
+
+ vpand .L0x1c2_polynomial(%rip),%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm2,%xmm2
+
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm2,%xmm2,%xmm6
+ vmovdqa %xmm2,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm6,%xmm6
+ movq $4,%r10
+ jmp .Linit_start_avx
+.align 32
+.Linit_loop_avx:
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm3,%xmm4,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu %xmm5,-16(%rdi)
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm0,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm1
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm3,%xmm3
+
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm3,%xmm4
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpsllq $57,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vpsllq $62,%xmm0,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpsllq $63,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm4,%xmm3
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm1,%xmm1
+
+ vpsrlq $1,%xmm0,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpsrlq $5,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpsrlq $1,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm0
+.Linit_start_avx:
+ vmovdqa %xmm0,%xmm5
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm0,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm1
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm3,%xmm3
+
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm3,%xmm4
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpsllq $57,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vpsllq $62,%xmm0,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpsllq $63,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm4,%xmm3
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm1,%xmm1
+
+ vpsrlq $1,%xmm0,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpsrlq $5,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpsrlq $1,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpshufd $78,%xmm5,%xmm3
+ vpshufd $78,%xmm0,%xmm4
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vmovdqu %xmm5,0(%rdi)
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu %xmm0,16(%rdi)
+ leaq 48(%rdi),%rdi
+ subq $1,%r10
+ jnz .Linit_loop_avx
+
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm4,%xmm3,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu %xmm5,-16(%rdi)
+
+ vzeroupper
+ .byte 0xf3,0xc3
+.cfi_endproc
+.size gcm_init_htab_avx,.-gcm_init_htab_avx
+
+.globl gcm_gmult_avx
+.type gcm_gmult_avx,@function
+.align 32
+gcm_gmult_avx:
+.cfi_startproc
+ jmp .L_gmult_clmul
+.cfi_endproc
+.size gcm_gmult_avx,.-gcm_gmult_avx
+.globl gcm_ghash_avx
+.type gcm_ghash_avx,@function
+.align 32
+gcm_ghash_avx:
+.cfi_startproc
+ vzeroupper
+
+ vmovdqu (%rdi),%xmm10
+ leaq .L0x1c2_polynomial(%rip),%r10
+ leaq 64(%rsi),%rsi
+ vmovdqu .Lbswap_mask(%rip),%xmm13
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ cmpq $0x80,%rcx
+ jb .Lshort_avx
+ subq $0x80,%rcx
+
+ vmovdqu 112(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vmovdqu 0-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vmovdqu 32-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm14,%xmm14,%xmm9
+ vmovdqu 96(%rdx),%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 16-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu 80(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm9,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm3
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm14,%xmm14,%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 48-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vmovdqu 64(%rdx),%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 80-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 64-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm9,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ vmovdqu 48(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 96-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm14,%xmm14,%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 128-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm9,%xmm9
+
+ vmovdqu 32(%rdx),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 112-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm9,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ vmovdqu 16(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 144-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm14,%xmm14,%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 176-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm9,%xmm9
+
+ vmovdqu (%rdx),%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 160-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm7,%xmm9,%xmm2
+
+ leaq 128(%rdx),%rdx
+ cmpq $0x80,%rcx
+ jb .Ltail_avx
+
+ vpxor %xmm10,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ subq $0x80,%rcx
+ jmp .Loop8x_avx
+
+.align 32
+.Loop8x_avx:
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu 112(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm10
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm11
+ vmovdqu 0-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm14,%xmm14,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm12
+ vmovdqu 32-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm9,%xmm9
+
+ vmovdqu 96(%rdx),%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vxorps %xmm4,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vmovdqu 16-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm9,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vxorps %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+
+ vmovdqu 80(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm10,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm3
+ vpxor %xmm11,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm12,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm4
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpxor %xmm9,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vmovdqu 48-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vxorps %xmm12,%xmm11,%xmm11
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm14,%xmm14,%xmm9
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 80-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+
+ vmovdqu 64(%rdx),%xmm15
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm10,%xmm10,%xmm12
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm0
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 64-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm9,%xmm2
+ vxorps %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm2,%xmm2
+
+ vmovdqu 48(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,(%r10),%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm3
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 96-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm14,%xmm14,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 128-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+
+ vmovdqu 32(%rdx),%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm0
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 112-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm4,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm9,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vxorps %xmm12,%xmm10,%xmm10
+
+ vmovdqu 16(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm10,%xmm10,%xmm12
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm3
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm4
+ vmovdqu 144-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,(%r10),%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vxorps %xmm11,%xmm12,%xmm12
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm14,%xmm14,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm5
+ vmovdqu 176-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ vpxor %xmm14,%xmm9,%xmm9
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+
+ vmovdqu (%rdx),%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm0
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm14,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 160-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpxor %xmm12,%xmm15,%xmm15
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm7,%xmm9,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm10,%xmm15,%xmm15
+
+ leaq 128(%rdx),%rdx
+ subq $0x80,%rcx
+ jnc .Loop8x_avx
+
+ addq $0x80,%rcx
+ jmp .Ltail_no_xor_avx
+
+.align 32
+.Lshort_avx:
+ vmovdqu -16(%rdx,%rcx,1),%xmm14
+ leaq (%rdx,%rcx,1),%rdx
+ vmovdqu 0-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vmovdqu 32-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm15
+
+ vmovdqa %xmm0,%xmm3
+ vmovdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
+ vmovdqa %xmm2,%xmm5
+ subq $0x10,%rcx
+ jz .Ltail_avx
+
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu -32(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 16-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm2
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ subq $0x10,%rcx
+ jz .Ltail_avx
+
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu -48(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 48-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm2
+ vmovdqu 80-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ subq $0x10,%rcx
+ jz .Ltail_avx
+
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu -64(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 64-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm2
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ subq $0x10,%rcx
+ jz .Ltail_avx
+
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu -80(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 96-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm2
+ vmovdqu 128-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ subq $0x10,%rcx
+ jz .Ltail_avx
+
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu -96(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 112-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm2
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm7,%xmm7
+ subq $0x10,%rcx
+ jz .Ltail_avx
+
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vmovdqu -112(%rdx),%xmm14
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 144-64(%rsi),%xmm6
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm14,%xmm15
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm2
+ vmovq 184-64(%rsi),%xmm7
+ subq $0x10,%rcx
+ jmp .Ltail_avx
+
+.align 32
+.Ltail_avx:
+ vpxor %xmm10,%xmm15,%xmm15
+.Ltail_no_xor_avx:
+ vpunpckhqdq %xmm15,%xmm15,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm8,%xmm8
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vpclmulqdq $0x11,%xmm6,%xmm15,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpclmulqdq $0x00,%xmm7,%xmm8,%xmm2
+
+ vmovdqu (%r10),%xmm12
+
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm1,%xmm4,%xmm11
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm5,%xmm5
+
+ vpxor %xmm10,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpxor %xmm11,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpslldq $8,%xmm5,%xmm9
+ vpsrldq $8,%xmm5,%xmm5
+ vpxor %xmm9,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm5,%xmm11,%xmm11
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm12,%xmm10,%xmm9
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm10,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm9,%xmm10,%xmm10
+
+ vpclmulqdq $0x10,%xmm12,%xmm10,%xmm9
+ vpalignr $8,%xmm10,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm11,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vpxor %xmm9,%xmm10,%xmm10
+
+ cmpq $0,%rcx
+ jne .Lshort_avx
+
+ vpshufb %xmm13,%xmm10,%xmm10
+ vmovdqu %xmm10,(%rdi)
+ vzeroupper
+ .byte 0xf3,0xc3
+.cfi_endproc
+.size gcm_ghash_avx,.-gcm_ghash_avx
+.align 64
+.Lbswap_mask:
+.byte 15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0
+.L0x1c2_polynomial:
+.byte 1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2
+.L7_mask:
+.long 7,0,7,0
+.L7_mask_poly:
+.long 7,0,450,0
+.align 64
+.type .Lrem_4bit,@object
+.Lrem_4bit:
+.long 0,0,0,471859200,0,943718400,0,610271232
+.long 0,1887436800,0,1822425088,0,1220542464,0,1423966208
+.long 0,3774873600,0,4246732800,0,3644850176,0,3311403008
+.long 0,2441084928,0,2376073216,0,2847932416,0,3051356160
+.type .Lrem_8bit,@object
+.Lrem_8bit:
+.value 0x0000,0x01C2,0x0384,0x0246,0x0708,0x06CA,0x048C,0x054E
+.value 0x0E10,0x0FD2,0x0D94,0x0C56,0x0918,0x08DA,0x0A9C,0x0B5E
+.value 0x1C20,0x1DE2,0x1FA4,0x1E66,0x1B28,0x1AEA,0x18AC,0x196E
+.value 0x1230,0x13F2,0x11B4,0x1076,0x1538,0x14FA,0x16BC,0x177E
+.value 0x3840,0x3982,0x3BC4,0x3A06,0x3F48,0x3E8A,0x3CCC,0x3D0E
+.value 0x3650,0x3792,0x35D4,0x3416,0x3158,0x309A,0x32DC,0x331E
+.value 0x2460,0x25A2,0x27E4,0x2626,0x2368,0x22AA,0x20EC,0x212E
+.value 0x2A70,0x2BB2,0x29F4,0x2836,0x2D78,0x2CBA,0x2EFC,0x2F3E
+.value 0x7080,0x7142,0x7304,0x72C6,0x7788,0x764A,0x740C,0x75CE
+.value 0x7E90,0x7F52,0x7D14,0x7CD6,0x7998,0x785A,0x7A1C,0x7BDE
+.value 0x6CA0,0x6D62,0x6F24,0x6EE6,0x6BA8,0x6A6A,0x682C,0x69EE
+.value 0x62B0,0x6372,0x6134,0x60F6,0x65B8,0x647A,0x663C,0x67FE
+.value 0x48C0,0x4902,0x4B44,0x4A86,0x4FC8,0x4E0A,0x4C4C,0x4D8E
+.value 0x46D0,0x4712,0x4554,0x4496,0x41D8,0x401A,0x425C,0x439E
+.value 0x54E0,0x5522,0x5764,0x56A6,0x53E8,0x522A,0x506C,0x51AE
+.value 0x5AF0,0x5B32,0x5974,0x58B6,0x5DF8,0x5C3A,0x5E7C,0x5FBE
+.value 0xE100,0xE0C2,0xE284,0xE346,0xE608,0xE7CA,0xE58C,0xE44E
+.value 0xEF10,0xEED2,0xEC94,0xED56,0xE818,0xE9DA,0xEB9C,0xEA5E
+.value 0xFD20,0xFCE2,0xFEA4,0xFF66,0xFA28,0xFBEA,0xF9AC,0xF86E
+.value 0xF330,0xF2F2,0xF0B4,0xF176,0xF438,0xF5FA,0xF7BC,0xF67E
+.value 0xD940,0xD882,0xDAC4,0xDB06,0xDE48,0xDF8A,0xDDCC,0xDC0E
+.value 0xD750,0xD692,0xD4D4,0xD516,0xD058,0xD19A,0xD3DC,0xD21E
+.value 0xC560,0xC4A2,0xC6E4,0xC726,0xC268,0xC3AA,0xC1EC,0xC02E
+.value 0xCB70,0xCAB2,0xC8F4,0xC936,0xCC78,0xCDBA,0xCFFC,0xCE3E
+.value 0x9180,0x9042,0x9204,0x93C6,0x9688,0x974A,0x950C,0x94CE
+.value 0x9F90,0x9E52,0x9C14,0x9DD6,0x9898,0x995A,0x9B1C,0x9ADE
+.value 0x8DA0,0x8C62,0x8E24,0x8FE6,0x8AA8,0x8B6A,0x892C,0x88EE
+.value 0x83B0,0x8272,0x8034,0x81F6,0x84B8,0x857A,0x873C,0x86FE
+.value 0xA9C0,0xA802,0xAA44,0xAB86,0xAEC8,0xAF0A,0xAD4C,0xAC8E
+.value 0xA7D0,0xA612,0xA454,0xA596,0xA0D8,0xA11A,0xA35C,0xA29E
+.value 0xB5E0,0xB422,0xB664,0xB7A6,0xB2E8,0xB32A,0xB16C,0xB0AE
+.value 0xBBF0,0xBA32,0xB874,0xB9B6,0xBCF8,0xBD3A,0xBF7C,0xBEBE
+
+.byte 71,72,65,83,72,32,102,111,114,32,120,56,54,95,54,52,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
+.align 64
+
+/* Mark the stack non-executable. */
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__ELF__)
+.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
+#endif
+
+#endif /* defined(__x86_64__) && defined(HAVE_AVX) && defined(HAVE_AES) ... */
diff --git a/module/icp/include/aes/aes_impl.h b/module/icp/include/aes/aes_impl.h
index a0b82ade4..0484462ca 100644
--- a/module/icp/include/aes/aes_impl.h
+++ b/module/icp/include/aes/aes_impl.h
@@ -107,6 +107,11 @@ typedef union {
} aes_ks_t;
typedef struct aes_impl_ops aes_impl_ops_t;
+
+/*
+ * The absolute offset of the encr_ks (0) and the nr (504) fields are hard
+ * coded in aesni-gcm-x86_64, so please don't change (or adjust accordingly).
+ */
typedef struct aes_key aes_key_t;
struct aes_key {
aes_ks_t encr_ks; /* encryption key schedule */
diff --git a/module/icp/include/modes/modes.h b/module/icp/include/modes/modes.h
index 7c1f10b16..9396eab5c 100644
--- a/module/icp/include/modes/modes.h
+++ b/module/icp/include/modes/modes.h
@@ -34,6 +34,16 @@ extern "C" {
#include <sys/crypto/common.h>
#include <sys/crypto/impl.h>
+/*
+ * Does the build chain support all instructions needed for the GCM assembler
+ * routines. AVX support should imply AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ, but make sure
+ * anyhow.
+ */
+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(HAVE_AVX) && \
+ defined(HAVE_AES) && defined(HAVE_PCLMULQDQ) && defined(HAVE_MOVBE)
+#define CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+#endif
+
#define ECB_MODE 0x00000002
#define CBC_MODE 0x00000004
#define CTR_MODE 0x00000008
@@ -189,13 +199,17 @@ typedef struct ccm_ctx {
*
* gcm_H: Subkey.
*
+ * gcm_Htable: Pre-computed and pre-shifted H, H^2, ... H^6 for the
+ * Karatsuba Algorithm in host byte order.
+ *
* gcm_J0: Pre-counter block generated from the IV.
*
* gcm_len_a_len_c: 64-bit representations of the bit lengths of
* AAD and ciphertext.
*
- * gcm_kmflag: Current value of kmflag. Used only for allocating
- * the plaintext buffer during decryption.
+ * gcm_kmflag: Current value of kmflag. Used for allocating
+ * the plaintext buffer during decryption and a
+ * gcm_avx_chunk_size'd buffer for avx enabled encryption.
*/
typedef struct gcm_ctx {
struct common_ctx gcm_common;
@@ -203,12 +217,23 @@ typedef struct gcm_ctx {
size_t gcm_processed_data_len;
size_t gcm_pt_buf_len;
uint32_t gcm_tmp[4];
+ /*
+ * The relative positions of gcm_ghash, gcm_H and pre-computed
+ * gcm_Htable are hard coded in aesni-gcm-x86_64.S and ghash-x86_64.S,
+ * so please don't change (or adjust accordingly).
+ */
uint64_t gcm_ghash[2];
uint64_t gcm_H[2];
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ uint64_t gcm_Htable[12][2];
+#endif
uint64_t gcm_J0[2];
uint64_t gcm_len_a_len_c[2];
uint8_t *gcm_pt_buf;
int gcm_kmflag;
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ boolean_t gcm_use_avx;
+#endif
} gcm_ctx_t;
#define gcm_keysched gcm_common.cc_keysched