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authorTom Caputi <[email protected]>2017-08-14 13:36:48 -0400
committerBrian Behlendorf <[email protected]>2017-08-14 10:36:48 -0700
commitb52563034230b35f0562b6f40ad1a00f02bd9a05 (patch)
tree794ccc5160e997e280cb6e36c7778ce9f7a96548 /module/zfs/dnode_sync.c
parent376994828fd3753aba75d492859727ca76f6a293 (diff)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]> Closes #494 Closes #5769
Diffstat (limited to 'module/zfs/dnode_sync.c')
-rw-r--r--module/zfs/dnode_sync.c13
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/module/zfs/dnode_sync.c b/module/zfs/dnode_sync.c
index 742d962bc..c5ce4b2a2 100644
--- a/module/zfs/dnode_sync.c
+++ b/module/zfs/dnode_sync.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <sys/dmu.h>
#include <sys/dmu_tx.h>
#include <sys/dmu_objset.h>
+#include <sys/dmu_send.h>
#include <sys/dsl_dataset.h>
#include <sys/spa.h>
#include <sys/range_tree.h>
@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ dnode_sync_free(dnode_t *dn, dmu_tx_t *tx)
void
dnode_sync(dnode_t *dn, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
+ objset_t *os = dn->dn_objset;
dnode_phys_t *dnp = dn->dn_phys;
int txgoff = tx->tx_txg & TXG_MASK;
list_t *list = &dn->dn_dirty_records[txgoff];
@@ -572,8 +574,13 @@ dnode_sync(dnode_t *dn, dmu_tx_t *tx)
ASSERT(dn->dn_dbuf == NULL || arc_released(dn->dn_dbuf->db_buf));
- if (dmu_objset_userused_enabled(dn->dn_objset) &&
- !DMU_OBJECT_IS_SPECIAL(dn->dn_object)) {
+ /*
+ * Do user accounting if it is enabled and this is not
+ * an encrypted receive.
+ */
+ if (dmu_objset_userused_enabled(os) &&
+ !DMU_OBJECT_IS_SPECIAL(dn->dn_object) &&
+ (!os->os_encrypted || !dmu_objset_is_receiving(os))) {
mutex_enter(&dn->dn_mtx);
dn->dn_oldused = DN_USED_BYTES(dn->dn_phys);
dn->dn_oldflags = dn->dn_phys->dn_flags;
@@ -584,7 +591,7 @@ dnode_sync(dnode_t *dn, dmu_tx_t *tx)
mutex_exit(&dn->dn_mtx);
dmu_objset_userquota_get_ids(dn, B_FALSE, tx);
} else {
- /* Once we account for it, we should always account for it. */
+ /* Once we account for it, we should always account for it */
ASSERT(!(dn->dn_phys->dn_flags &
DNODE_FLAG_USERUSED_ACCOUNTED));
ASSERT(!(dn->dn_phys->dn_flags &