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authorRichard Yao <[email protected]>2022-09-27 15:36:58 -0400
committerTony Hutter <[email protected]>2022-09-28 17:25:10 -0700
commit566e908fa01eb91e0637347987bc61772d47aee1 (patch)
tree0e55ea2c9ce89f3cd7bb878ffddd0a850388ef21 /module/icp
parenta2705b1dd5f8d186db02091b96efdd5f87e38090 (diff)
Fix bad free in skein code
Clang's static analyzer found a bad free caused by skein_mac_atomic(). It will allocate a context on the stack and then pass it to skein_final(), which attempts to free it. Upon inspection, skein_digest_atomic() also has the same problem. These functions were created to match the OpenSolaris ICP API, so I was curious how we avoided this in other providers and looked at the SHA2 code. It appears that SHA2 has a SHA2Final() helper function that is called by the exported sha2_mac_final()/sha2_digest_final() as well as the sha2_mac_atomic() and sha2_digest_atomic() functions. The real work is done in SHA2Final() while some checks and the free are done in sha2_mac_final()/sha2_digest_final(). We fix the use after free in the skein code by taking inspiration from the SHA2 code. We introduce a skein_final_nofree() that does most of the work, and make skein_final() into a function that calls it and then frees the memory. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tony Hutter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]> Closes #13954
Diffstat (limited to 'module/icp')
-rw-r--r--module/icp/io/skein_mod.c18
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/module/icp/io/skein_mod.c b/module/icp/io/skein_mod.c
index 5ee36af12..8992c5895 100644
--- a/module/icp/io/skein_mod.c
+++ b/module/icp/io/skein_mod.c
@@ -494,7 +494,8 @@ skein_update(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_req_handle_t req)
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
-skein_final(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *digest, crypto_req_handle_t req)
+skein_final_nofree(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *digest,
+ crypto_req_handle_t req)
{
int error = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
@@ -525,6 +526,17 @@ skein_final(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *digest, crypto_req_handle_t req)
else
digest->cd_length = 0;
+ return (error);
+}
+
+static int
+skein_final(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *digest, crypto_req_handle_t req)
+{
+ int error = skein_final_nofree(ctx, digest, req);
+
+ if (error == CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
+ return (error);
+
bzero(SKEIN_CTX(ctx), sizeof (*SKEIN_CTX(ctx)));
kmem_free(SKEIN_CTX(ctx), sizeof (*(SKEIN_CTX(ctx))));
SKEIN_CTX_LVALUE(ctx) = NULL;
@@ -560,7 +572,7 @@ skein_digest_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t provider,
if ((error = skein_update(&ctx, data, digest)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
goto out;
- if ((error = skein_final(&ctx, data, digest)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
+ if ((error = skein_final_nofree(&ctx, data, digest)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
goto out;
out:
@@ -669,7 +681,7 @@ skein_mac_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t provider,
if ((error = skein_update(&ctx, data, req)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
goto errout;
- if ((error = skein_final(&ctx, mac, req)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
+ if ((error = skein_final_nofree(&ctx, mac, req)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
goto errout;
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);