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authorAttila Fülöp <[email protected]>2020-10-30 23:24:21 +0100
committerGitHub <[email protected]>2020-10-30 15:24:21 -0700
commite8beeaa1116cc771360a24c9c1f9e6f47ced0e28 (patch)
tree2abe313d9fa753ef2ade6a19781641841d3b0c86 /module/icp/algs
parentd9655c5b3723abc21dc2915e8d6aecf22d842527 (diff)
ICP: gcm: Allocate hash subkey table separately
While evaluating other assembler implementations it turns out that the precomputed hash subkey tables vary in size, from 8*16 bytes (avx2/avx512) up to 48*16 bytes (avx512-vaes), depending on the implementation. To be able to handle the size differences later, allocate `gcm_Htable` dynamically rather then having a fixed size array, and adapt consumers. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Attila Fülöp <[email protected]> Closes #11102
Diffstat (limited to 'module/icp/algs')
-rw-r--r--module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c54
-rw-r--r--module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c8
2 files changed, 57 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c b/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c
index 5553c55e1..23686c59e 100644
--- a/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c
+++ b/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c
@@ -59,10 +59,12 @@ boolean_t gcm_avx_can_use_movbe = B_FALSE;
static boolean_t gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE;
#define GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX (*(volatile boolean_t *)&gcm_use_avx)
+extern boolean_t atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(volatile boolean_t *);
+
static inline boolean_t gcm_avx_will_work(void);
static inline void gcm_set_avx(boolean_t);
static inline boolean_t gcm_toggle_avx(void);
-extern boolean_t atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(volatile boolean_t *);
+static inline size_t gcm_simd_get_htab_size(boolean_t);
static int gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, char *, size_t,
crypto_data_t *, size_t);
@@ -629,6 +631,21 @@ gcm_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size,
(volatile boolean_t *)&gcm_avx_can_use_movbe);
}
}
+ /* Allocate Htab memory as needed. */
+ if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE) {
+ size_t htab_len = gcm_simd_get_htab_size(gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx);
+
+ if (htab_len == 0) {
+ return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
+ }
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len = htab_len;
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable =
+ (uint64_t *)kmem_alloc(htab_len, gcm_ctx->gcm_kmflag);
+
+ if (gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable == NULL) {
+ return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY);
+ }
+ }
/* Avx and non avx context initialization differs from here on. */
if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_FALSE) {
#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
@@ -689,6 +706,22 @@ gmac_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size,
if (ks->ops->needs_byteswap == B_TRUE) {
gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE;
}
+ /* Allocate Htab memory as needed. */
+ if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE) {
+ size_t htab_len = gcm_simd_get_htab_size(gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx);
+
+ if (htab_len == 0) {
+ return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
+ }
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len = htab_len;
+ gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable =
+ (uint64_t *)kmem_alloc(htab_len, gcm_ctx->gcm_kmflag);
+
+ if (gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable == NULL) {
+ return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY);
+ }
+ }
+
/* Avx and non avx context initialization differs from here on. */
if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_FALSE) {
#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
@@ -1018,7 +1051,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(icp_gcm_impl, "Select gcm implementation.");
/* Clear the FPU registers since they hold sensitive internal state. */
#define clear_fpu_regs() clear_fpu_regs_avx()
#define GHASH_AVX(ctx, in, len) \
- gcm_ghash_avx((ctx)->gcm_ghash, (const uint64_t (*)[2])(ctx)->gcm_Htable, \
+ gcm_ghash_avx((ctx)->gcm_ghash, (const uint64_t *)(ctx)->gcm_Htable, \
in, len)
#define gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx) gcm_incr_counter_block_by(ctx, 1)
@@ -1036,8 +1069,8 @@ extern void gcm_xor_avx(const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst);
extern void aes_encrypt_intel(const uint32_t rk[], int nr,
const uint32_t pt[4], uint32_t ct[4]);
-extern void gcm_init_htab_avx(uint64_t Htable[16][2], const uint64_t H[2]);
-extern void gcm_ghash_avx(uint64_t ghash[2], const uint64_t Htable[16][2],
+extern void gcm_init_htab_avx(uint64_t *Htable, const uint64_t H[2]);
+extern void gcm_ghash_avx(uint64_t ghash[2], const uint64_t *Htable,
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
extern size_t aesni_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t,
@@ -1073,6 +1106,18 @@ gcm_toggle_avx(void)
}
}
+static inline size_t
+gcm_simd_get_htab_size(boolean_t simd_mode)
+{
+ switch (simd_mode) {
+ case B_TRUE:
+ return (2 * 6 * 2 * sizeof (uint64_t));
+
+ default:
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Clear sensitive data in the context.
*
@@ -1088,7 +1133,6 @@ gcm_clear_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx)
{
bzero(ctx->gcm_remainder, sizeof (ctx->gcm_remainder));
bzero(ctx->gcm_H, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H));
- bzero(ctx->gcm_Htable, sizeof (ctx->gcm_Htable));
bzero(ctx->gcm_J0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_J0));
bzero(ctx->gcm_tmp, sizeof (ctx->gcm_tmp));
}
diff --git a/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c b/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c
index f07876a47..faae9722b 100644
--- a/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c
+++ b/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c
@@ -152,6 +152,14 @@ crypto_free_mode_ctx(void *ctx)
vmem_free(((gcm_ctx_t *)ctx)->gcm_pt_buf,
((gcm_ctx_t *)ctx)->gcm_pt_buf_len);
+#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
+ if (((gcm_ctx_t *)ctx)->gcm_Htable != NULL) {
+ gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx = (gcm_ctx_t *)ctx;
+ bzero(gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable, gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len);
+ kmem_free(gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable, gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len);
+ }
+#endif
+
kmem_free(ctx, sizeof (gcm_ctx_t));
}
}