diff options
author | Attila Fülöp <[email protected]> | 2020-10-30 23:24:21 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | GitHub <[email protected]> | 2020-10-30 15:24:21 -0700 |
commit | e8beeaa1116cc771360a24c9c1f9e6f47ced0e28 (patch) | |
tree | 2abe313d9fa753ef2ade6a19781641841d3b0c86 /module/icp/algs | |
parent | d9655c5b3723abc21dc2915e8d6aecf22d842527 (diff) |
ICP: gcm: Allocate hash subkey table separately
While evaluating other assembler implementations it turns out that
the precomputed hash subkey tables vary in size, from 8*16 bytes
(avx2/avx512) up to 48*16 bytes (avx512-vaes), depending on the
implementation.
To be able to handle the size differences later, allocate
`gcm_Htable` dynamically rather then having a fixed size array, and
adapt consumers.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Attila Fülöp <[email protected]>
Closes #11102
Diffstat (limited to 'module/icp/algs')
-rw-r--r-- | module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c | 54 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c | 8 |
2 files changed, 57 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c b/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c index 5553c55e1..23686c59e 100644 --- a/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c +++ b/module/icp/algs/modes/gcm.c @@ -59,10 +59,12 @@ boolean_t gcm_avx_can_use_movbe = B_FALSE; static boolean_t gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE; #define GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX (*(volatile boolean_t *)&gcm_use_avx) +extern boolean_t atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(volatile boolean_t *); + static inline boolean_t gcm_avx_will_work(void); static inline void gcm_set_avx(boolean_t); static inline boolean_t gcm_toggle_avx(void); -extern boolean_t atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(volatile boolean_t *); +static inline size_t gcm_simd_get_htab_size(boolean_t); static int gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, char *, size_t, crypto_data_t *, size_t); @@ -629,6 +631,21 @@ gcm_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size, (volatile boolean_t *)&gcm_avx_can_use_movbe); } } + /* Allocate Htab memory as needed. */ + if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE) { + size_t htab_len = gcm_simd_get_htab_size(gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx); + + if (htab_len == 0) { + return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID); + } + gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len = htab_len; + gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable = + (uint64_t *)kmem_alloc(htab_len, gcm_ctx->gcm_kmflag); + + if (gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable == NULL) { + return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY); + } + } /* Avx and non avx context initialization differs from here on. */ if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_FALSE) { #endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */ @@ -689,6 +706,22 @@ gmac_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size, if (ks->ops->needs_byteswap == B_TRUE) { gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE; } + /* Allocate Htab memory as needed. */ + if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE) { + size_t htab_len = gcm_simd_get_htab_size(gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx); + + if (htab_len == 0) { + return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID); + } + gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len = htab_len; + gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable = + (uint64_t *)kmem_alloc(htab_len, gcm_ctx->gcm_kmflag); + + if (gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable == NULL) { + return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY); + } + } + /* Avx and non avx context initialization differs from here on. */ if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_FALSE) { #endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */ @@ -1018,7 +1051,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(icp_gcm_impl, "Select gcm implementation."); /* Clear the FPU registers since they hold sensitive internal state. */ #define clear_fpu_regs() clear_fpu_regs_avx() #define GHASH_AVX(ctx, in, len) \ - gcm_ghash_avx((ctx)->gcm_ghash, (const uint64_t (*)[2])(ctx)->gcm_Htable, \ + gcm_ghash_avx((ctx)->gcm_ghash, (const uint64_t *)(ctx)->gcm_Htable, \ in, len) #define gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx) gcm_incr_counter_block_by(ctx, 1) @@ -1036,8 +1069,8 @@ extern void gcm_xor_avx(const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst); extern void aes_encrypt_intel(const uint32_t rk[], int nr, const uint32_t pt[4], uint32_t ct[4]); -extern void gcm_init_htab_avx(uint64_t Htable[16][2], const uint64_t H[2]); -extern void gcm_ghash_avx(uint64_t ghash[2], const uint64_t Htable[16][2], +extern void gcm_init_htab_avx(uint64_t *Htable, const uint64_t H[2]); +extern void gcm_ghash_avx(uint64_t ghash[2], const uint64_t *Htable, const uint8_t *in, size_t len); extern size_t aesni_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t, @@ -1073,6 +1106,18 @@ gcm_toggle_avx(void) } } +static inline size_t +gcm_simd_get_htab_size(boolean_t simd_mode) +{ + switch (simd_mode) { + case B_TRUE: + return (2 * 6 * 2 * sizeof (uint64_t)); + + default: + return (0); + } +} + /* * Clear sensitive data in the context. * @@ -1088,7 +1133,6 @@ gcm_clear_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx) { bzero(ctx->gcm_remainder, sizeof (ctx->gcm_remainder)); bzero(ctx->gcm_H, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H)); - bzero(ctx->gcm_Htable, sizeof (ctx->gcm_Htable)); bzero(ctx->gcm_J0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_J0)); bzero(ctx->gcm_tmp, sizeof (ctx->gcm_tmp)); } diff --git a/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c b/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c index f07876a47..faae9722b 100644 --- a/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c +++ b/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c @@ -152,6 +152,14 @@ crypto_free_mode_ctx(void *ctx) vmem_free(((gcm_ctx_t *)ctx)->gcm_pt_buf, ((gcm_ctx_t *)ctx)->gcm_pt_buf_len); +#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM + if (((gcm_ctx_t *)ctx)->gcm_Htable != NULL) { + gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx = (gcm_ctx_t *)ctx; + bzero(gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable, gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len); + kmem_free(gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable, gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len); + } +#endif + kmem_free(ctx, sizeof (gcm_ctx_t)); } } |