Fix spelling errors in comments

This patch simply corrects some spelling / grammar errors in
the QAT and encryption code comments. No functional changes

Reviewed-by: George Melikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giuseppe Di Natale <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <[email protected]>
Closes #7319 

4 files changed, 48 insertions, 47 deletions

diff --git a/module/zfs/qat.h b/module/zfs/qat.h
index 4866dfe15..dc8825de2 100644
--- a/module/zfs/qat.h
+++ b/module/zfs/qat.h
@@ -46,96 +46,97 @@ typedef enum qat_encrypt_dir {
 #define	QAT_TIMEOUT_MS		500
 
 /*
- * The minimal and maximal buffer size, which are not restricted
+ * The minimal and maximal buffer size which are not restricted
  * in the QAT hardware, but with the input buffer size between 4KB
- * and 128KB, the hardware can provide the optimal performance.
+ * and 128KB the hardware can provide the optimal performance.
  */
 #define	QAT_MIN_BUF_SIZE	(4*1024)
 #define	QAT_MAX_BUF_SIZE	(128*1024)
 
 /*
- * Used for qat kstat.
+ * Used for QAT kstat.
  */
 typedef struct qat_stats {
 	/*
-	 * Number of jobs submitted to qat compression engine.
+	 * Number of jobs submitted to QAT compression engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t comp_requests;
 	/*
-	 * Total bytes sent to qat compression engine.
+	 * Total bytes sent to QAT compression engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t comp_total_in_bytes;
 	/*
-	 * Total bytes output from qat compression engine.
+	 * Total bytes output from QAT compression engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t comp_total_out_bytes;
 	/*
-	 * Number of jobs submitted to qat de-compression engine.
+	 * Number of jobs submitted to QAT de-compression engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t decomp_requests;
 	/*
-	 * Total bytes sent to qat de-compression engine.
+	 * Total bytes sent to QAT de-compression engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t decomp_total_in_bytes;
 	/*
-	 * Total bytes output from qat de-compression engine.
+	 * Total bytes output from QAT de-compression engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t decomp_total_out_bytes;
 	/*
-	 * Number of fails in the qat compression / decompression engine.
-	 * Note: when qat fail happens, it doesn't mean a critical hardware
-	 * issue. Sometimes it is because the output buffer is not big enough.
-	 * The compression job will be transfered to gzip software
-	 * implementation, so the functionality of ZFS is not impacted.
+	 * Number of fails in the QAT compression / decompression engine.
+	 * Note: when a QAT error happens, it doesn't necessarily indicate a
+	 * critical hardware issue. Sometimes it is because the output buffer
+	 * is not big enough. The compression job will be transfered to the
+	 * gzip software implementation so the functionality of ZFS is not
+	 * impacted.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t dc_fails;
 
 	/*
-	 * Number of jobs submitted to qat encryption engine.
+	 * Number of jobs submitted to QAT encryption engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t encrypt_requests;
 	/*
-	 * Total bytes sent to qat encryption engine.
+	 * Total bytes sent to QAT encryption engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t encrypt_total_in_bytes;
 	/*
-	 * Total bytes output from qat encryption engine.
+	 * Total bytes output from QAT encryption engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t encrypt_total_out_bytes;
 	/*
-	 * Number of jobs submitted to qat decryption engine.
+	 * Number of jobs submitted to QAT decryption engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t decrypt_requests;
 	/*
-	 * Total bytes sent to qat decryption engine.
+	 * Total bytes sent to QAT decryption engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t decrypt_total_in_bytes;
 	/*
-	 * Total bytes output from qat decryption engine.
+	 * Total bytes output from QAT decryption engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t decrypt_total_out_bytes;
 	/*
-	 * Number of fails in the qat encryption / decryption engine.
-	 * Note: when qat fail happens, it doesn't mean a critical hardware
-	 * issue. Sometimes it is because the output buffer is not big enough.
-	 * The encryption job will be transfered to the software implementation,
-	 * so the functionality of ZFS is not impacted.
+	 * Number of fails in the QAT encryption / decryption engine.
+	 * Note: when a QAT error happens, it doesn't necessarily indicate a
+	 * critical hardware issue. The encryption job will be transfered
+	 * to the software implementation so the functionality of ZFS is
+	 * not impacted.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t crypt_fails;
 
 	/*
-	 * Number of jobs submitted to qat checksum engine.
+	 * Number of jobs submitted to QAT checksum engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t cksum_requests;
 	/*
-	 * Total bytes sent to qat checksum engine.
+	 * Total bytes sent to QAT checksum engine.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t cksum_total_in_bytes;
 	/*
-	 * Number of fails in the qat checksum engine.
-	 * Note: when qat fail happens, it doesn't mean a critical hardware
-	 * issue. The checksum job will be transfered to the software
-	 * implementation, so the functionality of ZFS is not impacted.
+	 * Number of fails in the QAT checksum engine.
+	 * Note: when a QAT error happens, it doesn't necessarily indicate a
+	 * critical hardware issue. The checksum job will be transfered to the
+	 * software implementation so the functionality of ZFS is not impacted.
 	 */
 	kstat_named_t cksum_fails;
 } qat_stats_t;
diff --git a/module/zfs/qat_compress.c b/module/zfs/qat_compress.c
index 2f7dad4b4..fff0751fb 100644
--- a/module/zfs/qat_compress.c
+++ b/module/zfs/qat_compress.c
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
 #include "qat.h"
 
 /*
- * Max instances in QAT device, each instance is a channel to submit
- * jobs to QAT hardware, this is only for pre-allocating instance,
- * and session arrays, the actual number of instances are defined in
- * the QAT driver's configure file.
+ * Max instances in a QAT device, each instance is a channel to submit
+ * jobs to QAT hardware, this is only for pre-allocating instance and
+ * session arrays; the actual number of instances are defined in the
+ * QAT driver's configuration file.
  */
 #define	QAT_DC_MAX_INSTANCES	48
 
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ qat_compress(qat_compress_dir_t dir, char *src, int src_len,
 		/* move to the last page */
 		flat_buf_dst += (compressed_sz + hdr_sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
-		/* no space for gzip foot in the last page */
+		/* no space for gzip footer in the last page */
 		if (((compressed_sz + hdr_sz) % PAGE_SIZE)
 		    + ZLIB_FOOT_SZ > PAGE_SIZE)
 			goto fail;
diff --git a/module/zfs/qat_crypt.c b/module/zfs/qat_crypt.c
index b9931e404..e77644161 100644
--- a/module/zfs/qat_crypt.c
+++ b/module/zfs/qat_crypt.c
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@
 #include "qat.h"
 
 /*
- * Max instances in QAT device, each instance is a channel to submit
- * jobs to QAT hardware, this is only for pre-allocating instance,
- * and session arrays, the actual number of instances are defined in
+ * Max instances in a QAT device, each instance is a channel to submit
+ * jobs to QAT hardware, this is only for pre-allocating instances
+ * and session arrays; the actual number of instances are defined in
  * the QAT driver's configure file.
  */
 #define	QAT_CRYPT_MAX_INSTANCES		48
diff --git a/module/zfs/zio_crypt.c b/module/zfs/zio_crypt.c
index 741d64ad5..d9e88404f 100644
--- a/module/zfs/zio_crypt.c
+++ b/module/zfs/zio_crypt.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
  * A secret binary key, generated from an HKDF function used to encrypt and
  * decrypt data.
  *
- * Message Authenication Code (MAC)
+ * Message Authentication Code (MAC)
  * The MAC is an output of authenticated encryption modes such as AES-GCM and
  * AES-CCM. Its purpose is to ensure that an attacker cannot modify encrypted
  * data on disk and return garbage to the application. Effectively, it is a
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
  * OBJECT SET AUTHENTICATION:
  * Up to this point, everything we have encrypted and authenticated has been
  * at level 0 (or -2 for the ZIL). If we did not do any further work the
- * on-disk format would be susceptible to attacks that deleted or rearrannged
+ * on-disk format would be susceptible to attacks that deleted or rearranged
  * the order of level 0 blocks. Ideally, the cleanest solution would be to
  * maintain a tree of authentication MACs going up the bp tree. However, this
  * presents a problem for raw sends. Send files do not send information about
@@ -131,11 +131,11 @@
  * for the indirect levels of the bp tree, we use a regular SHA512 of the MACs
  * from the level below. We also include some portable fields from blk_prop such
  * as the lsize and compression algorithm to prevent the data from being
- * misinterpretted.
+ * misinterpreted.
  *
- * At the objset level, we maintain 2 seperate 256 bit MACs in the
+ * At the objset level, we maintain 2 separate 256 bit MACs in the
  * objset_phys_t. The first one is "portable" and is the logical root of the
- * MAC tree maintianed in the metadnode's bps. The second, is "local" and is
+ * MAC tree maintained in the metadnode's bps. The second, is "local" and is
  * used as the root MAC for the user accounting objects, which are also not
  * transferred via "zfs send". The portable MAC is sent in the DRR_BEGIN payload
  * of the send file. The useraccounting code ensures that the useraccounting
@@ -148,13 +148,13 @@
  * need to use the same IV and encryption key, so that they will have the same
  * ciphertext. Normally, one should never reuse an IV with the same encryption
  * key or else AES-GCM and AES-CCM can both actually leak the plaintext of both
- * blocks. In this case, however, since we are using the same plaindata as
+ * blocks. In this case, however, since we are using the same plaintext as
  * well all that we end up with is a duplicate of the original ciphertext we
  * already had. As a result, an attacker with read access to the raw disk will
  * be able to tell which blocks are the same but this information is given away
  * by dedup anyway. In order to get the same IVs and encryption keys for
- * equivalent blocks of data we use an HMAC of the plaindata. We use an HMAC
- * here so that a reproducible checksum of the plaindata is never available to
+ * equivalent blocks of data we use an HMAC of the plaintext. We use an HMAC
+ * here so that a reproducible checksum of the plaintext is never available to
  * the attacker. The HMAC key is kept alongside the master key, encrypted on
  * disk. The first 64 bits of the HMAC are used in place of the random salt, and
  * the next 96 bits are used as the IV. As a result of this mechanism, dedup