Clean up RAIDZ/DRAID ereport code

The RAIDZ and DRAID code is responsible for reporting checksum errors on
their child vdevs.  Checksum errors represent events where a disk
returned data or parity that should have been correct, but was not.  In
other words, these are instances of silent data corruption.  The
checksum errors show up in the vdev stats (and thus `zpool status`'s
CKSUM column), and in the event log (`zpool events`).

Note, this is in contrast with the more common "noisy" errors where a
disk goes offline, in which case ZFS knows that the disk is bad and
doesn't try to read it, or the device returns an error on the requested
read or write operation.

RAIDZ/DRAID generate checksum errors via three code paths:

1. When RAIDZ/DRAID reconstructs a damaged block, checksum errors are
reported on any children whose data was not used during the
reconstruction.  This is handled in `raidz_reconstruct()`.  This is the
most common type of RAIDZ/DRAID checksum error.

2. When RAIDZ/DRAID is not able to reconstruct a damaged block, that
means that the data has been lost.  The zio fails and an error is
returned to the consumer (e.g. the read(2) system call).  This would
happen if, for example, three different disks in a RAIDZ2 group are
silently damaged.  Since the damage is silent, it isn't possible to know
which three disks are damaged, so a checksum error is reported against
every child that returned data or parity for this read.  (For DRAID,
typically only one "group" of children is involved in each io.)  This
case is handled in `vdev_raidz_cksum_finish()`. This is the next most
common type of RAIDZ/DRAID checksum error.

3. If RAIDZ/DRAID is not able to reconstruct a damaged block (like in
case 2), but there happens to be additional copies of this block due to
"ditto blocks" (i.e. multiple DVA's in this blkptr_t), and one of those
copies is good, then RAIDZ/DRAID compares each sector of the data or
parity that it retrieved with the good data from the other DVA, and if
they differ then it reports a checksum error on this child.  This
differs from case 2 in that the checksum error is reported on only the
subset of children that actually have bad data or parity.  This case
happens very rarely, since normally only metadata has ditto blocks.  If
the silent damage is extensive, there will be many instances of case 2,
and the pool will likely be unrecoverable.

The code for handling case 3 is considerably more complicated than the
other cases, for two reasons:

1. It needs to run after the main raidz read logic has completed.  The
data RAIDZ read needs to be preserved until after the alternate DVA has
been read, which necessitates refcounts and callbacks managed by the
non-raidz-specific zio layer.

2. It's nontrivial to map the sections of data read by RAIDZ to the
correct data.  For example, the correct data does not include the parity
information, so the parity must be recalculated based on the correct
data, and then compared to the parity that was read from the RAIDZ
children.

Due to the complexity of case 3, the rareness of hitting it, and the
minimal benefit it provides above case 2, this commit removes the code
for case 3.  These types of errors will now be handled the same as case
2, i.e. the checksum error will be reported against all children that
returned data or parity.

Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Closes #11735 

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions