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/*
* DTLS Hello Verify Request
* (C) 2012 Jack Lloyd
*
* Released under the terms of the Botan license
*/
#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
#include <botan/lookup.h>
#include <memory>
namespace Botan {
namespace TLS {
Hello_Verify_Request::Hello_Verify_Request(const std::vector<byte>& buf)
{
if(buf.size() < 3)
throw Decoding_Error("Hello verify request too small");
Protocol_Version version(buf[0], buf[1]);
if(version != Protocol_Version::DTLS_V10 &&
version != Protocol_Version::DTLS_V12)
{
throw Decoding_Error("Unknown version from server in hello verify request");
}
if(static_cast<size_t>(buf[2]) + 3 != buf.size())
throw Decoding_Error("Bad length in hello verify request");
m_cookie.assign(&buf[3], &buf[buf.size()]);
}
Hello_Verify_Request::Hello_Verify_Request(const std::vector<byte>& client_hello_bits,
const std::string& client_identity,
const SymmetricKey& secret_key)
{
std::unique_ptr<MessageAuthenticationCode> hmac(get_mac("HMAC(SHA-256)"));
hmac->set_key(secret_key);
hmac->update_be(client_hello_bits.size());
hmac->update(client_hello_bits);
hmac->update_be(client_identity.size());
hmac->update(client_identity);
m_cookie = unlock(hmac->final());
}
std::vector<byte> Hello_Verify_Request::serialize() const
{
/* DTLS 1.2 server implementations SHOULD use DTLS version 1.0
regardless of the version of TLS that is expected to be
negotiated (RFC 6347, section 4.2.1)
*/
Protocol_Version format_version(Protocol_Version::DTLS_V10);
std::vector<byte> bits;
bits.push_back(format_version.major_version());
bits.push_back(format_version.minor_version());
bits.push_back(static_cast<byte>(m_cookie.size()));
bits += m_cookie;
return bits;
}
}
}
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