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/*
* GCM Mode Encryption
* (C) 2013,2015 Jack Lloyd
*
* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
*/
#include <botan/gcm.h>
#include <botan/internal/mode_utils.h>
#include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h>
#include <botan/ctr.h>
#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_GCM_CLMUL)
#include <botan/internal/clmul.h>
#include <botan/cpuid.h>
#endif
namespace Botan {
void GHASH::gcm_multiply(secure_vector<byte>& x) const
{
#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_GCM_CLMUL)
if(CPUID::has_clmul())
return gcm_multiply_clmul(x.data(), m_H.data());
#endif
static const u64bit R = 0xE100000000000000;
u64bit H[2] = {
load_be<u64bit>(m_H.data(), 0),
load_be<u64bit>(m_H.data(), 1)
};
u64bit Z[2] = { 0, 0 };
CT::poison(H, 2);
CT::poison(Z, 2);
CT::poison(x.data(), x.size());
// SSE2 might be useful here
for(size_t i = 0; i != 2; ++i)
{
const u64bit X = load_be<u64bit>(x.data(), i);
u64bit mask = 0x8000000000000000;
for(size_t j = 0; j != 64; ++j)
{
const u64bit XMASK = CT::expand_mask<u64bit>(X & mask);
mask >>= 1;
Z[0] ^= H[0] & XMASK;
Z[1] ^= H[1] & XMASK;
// GCM's bit ops are reversed so we carry out of the bottom
const u64bit carry = R & CT::expand_mask<u64bit>(H[1] & 1);
H[1] = (H[1] >> 1) | (H[0] << 63);
H[0] = (H[0] >> 1) ^ carry;
}
}
store_be<u64bit>(x.data(), Z[0], Z[1]);
CT::unpoison(x.data(), x.size());
}
void GHASH::ghash_update(secure_vector<byte>& ghash,
const byte input[], size_t length)
{
const size_t BS = 16;
/*
This assumes if less than block size input then we're just on the
final block and should pad with zeros
*/
while(length)
{
const size_t to_proc = std::min(length, BS);
xor_buf(ghash.data(), input, to_proc);
gcm_multiply(ghash);
input += to_proc;
length -= to_proc;
}
}
void GHASH::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length)
{
m_H.assign(key, key+length);
m_H_ad.resize(16);
m_ad_len = 0;
m_text_len = 0;
}
void GHASH::start(const byte nonce[], size_t len)
{
m_nonce.assign(nonce, nonce + len);
m_ghash = m_H_ad;
}
void GHASH::set_associated_data(const byte input[], size_t length)
{
zeroise(m_H_ad);
ghash_update(m_H_ad, input, length);
m_ad_len = length;
}
void GHASH::update(const byte input[], size_t length)
{
BOTAN_ASSERT(m_ghash.size() == 16, "Key was set");
m_text_len += length;
ghash_update(m_ghash, input, length);
}
void GHASH::add_final_block(secure_vector<byte>& hash,
size_t ad_len, size_t text_len)
{
secure_vector<byte> final_block(16);
store_be<u64bit>(final_block.data(), 8*ad_len, 8*text_len);
ghash_update(hash, final_block.data(), final_block.size());
}
secure_vector<byte> GHASH::final()
{
add_final_block(m_ghash, m_ad_len, m_text_len);
secure_vector<byte> mac;
mac.swap(m_ghash);
mac ^= m_nonce;
m_text_len = 0;
return mac;
}
secure_vector<byte> GHASH::nonce_hash(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len)
{
BOTAN_ASSERT(m_ghash.size() == 0, "nonce_hash called during wrong time");
secure_vector<byte> y0(16);
ghash_update(y0, nonce, nonce_len);
add_final_block(y0, 0, nonce_len);
return y0;
}
void GHASH::clear()
{
zeroise(m_H);
zeroise(m_H_ad);
m_ghash.clear();
m_text_len = m_ad_len = 0;
}
/*
* GCM_Mode Constructor
*/
GCM_Mode::GCM_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size) :
m_tag_size(tag_size),
m_cipher_name(cipher->name())
{
if(cipher->block_size() != BS)
throw std::invalid_argument("GCM requires a 128 bit cipher so cannot be used with " +
cipher->name());
m_ghash.reset(new GHASH);
m_ctr.reset(new CTR_BE(cipher)); // CTR_BE takes ownership of cipher
if(m_tag_size != 8 && m_tag_size != 16)
throw Invalid_Argument(name() + ": Bad tag size " + std::to_string(m_tag_size));
}
void GCM_Mode::clear()
{
m_ctr->clear();
m_ghash->clear();
}
std::string GCM_Mode::name() const
{
return (m_cipher_name + "/GCM");
}
size_t GCM_Mode::update_granularity() const
{
return BS;
}
Key_Length_Specification GCM_Mode::key_spec() const
{
return m_ctr->key_spec();
}
void GCM_Mode::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t keylen)
{
m_ctr->set_key(key, keylen);
const std::vector<byte> zeros(BS);
m_ctr->set_iv(zeros.data(), zeros.size());
secure_vector<byte> H(BS);
m_ctr->encipher(H);
m_ghash->set_key(H);
}
void GCM_Mode::set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len)
{
m_ghash->set_associated_data(ad, ad_len);
}
secure_vector<byte> GCM_Mode::start_raw(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len)
{
if(!valid_nonce_length(nonce_len))
throw Invalid_IV_Length(name(), nonce_len);
secure_vector<byte> y0(BS);
if(nonce_len == 12)
{
copy_mem(y0.data(), nonce, nonce_len);
y0[15] = 1;
}
else
{
y0 = m_ghash->nonce_hash(nonce, nonce_len);
}
m_ctr->set_iv(y0.data(), y0.size());
secure_vector<byte> m_enc_y0(BS);
m_ctr->encipher(m_enc_y0);
m_ghash->start(m_enc_y0.data(), m_enc_y0.size());
return secure_vector<byte>();
}
void GCM_Encryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset)
{
BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane");
const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset;
byte* buf = buffer.data() + offset;
m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, sz);
m_ghash->update(buf, sz);
}
void GCM_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset)
{
update(buffer, offset);
auto mac = m_ghash->final();
buffer += std::make_pair(mac.data(), tag_size());
}
void GCM_Decryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset)
{
BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane");
const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset;
byte* buf = buffer.data() + offset;
m_ghash->update(buf, sz);
m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, sz);
}
void GCM_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset)
{
BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane");
const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset;
byte* buf = buffer.data() + offset;
BOTAN_ASSERT(sz >= tag_size(), "Have the tag as part of final input");
const size_t remaining = sz - tag_size();
// handle any final input before the tag
if(remaining)
{
m_ghash->update(buf, remaining);
m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, remaining);
}
auto mac = m_ghash->final();
const byte* included_tag = &buffer[remaining];
if(!same_mem(mac.data(), included_tag, tag_size()))
throw Integrity_Failure("GCM tag check failed");
buffer.resize(offset + remaining);
}
}
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