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Security
========================================
If you think you have found a security bug in Botan please contact
Jack Lloyd (jack@randombit.net). If you would like to encrypt your
mail please use::
pub rsa3072/57123B60 2015-03-23
Key fingerprint = 4E60 C735 51AF 2188 DF0A 5A62 78E9 8043 5712 3B60
uid Jack Lloyd <jack@randombit.net>
This key can be found in the file `pgpkey.txt` or online at
https://keybase.io/jacklloyd and on most PGP keyservers.
Advisories
----------------------------------------
2016
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
* 2016-08-30 (CVE-2016-6878) Undefined behavior in Curve25519
On systems without a native 128-bit integer type, the Curve25519 code invoked
undefined behavior. This was known to produce incorrect results on 32-bit ARM
when compiled by Clang.
Introduced in 1.11.12, fixed in 1.11.31
* 2016-08-30 (CVE-2016-6879) Bad result from X509_Certificate::allowed_usage
If allowed_usage was called with more than one Key_Usage set in the enum
value, the function would return true if *any* of the allowed usages were set,
instead of if *all* of the allowed usages are set. This could be used to
bypass an application key usage check. Credit to Daniel Neus of Rohde &
Schwarz Cybersecurity for finding this issue.
Introduced in 1.11.0, fixed in 1.11.31
* 2016-03-17 (CVE-2016-2849): ECDSA side channel
ECDSA (and DSA) signature algorithms perform a modular inverse on the
signature nonce `k`. The modular inverse algorithm used had input dependent
loops, and it is possible a side channel attack could recover sufficient
information about the nonce to eventually recover the ECDSA secret key. Found
by Sean Devlin.
Introduced in 1.7.15, fixed in 1.10.13 and 1.11.29
* 2016-03-17 (CVE-2016-2850): Failure to enforce TLS policy
TLS v1.2 allows negotiating which signature algorithms and hash functions each
side is willing to accept. However received signatures were not actually
checked against the specified policy. This had the effect of allowing a
server to use an MD5 or SHA-1 signature, even though the default policy
prohibits it. The same issue affected client cert authentication.
The TLS client also failed to verify that the ECC curve the server chose to
use was one which was acceptable by the client policy.
Introduced in 1.11.0, fixed in 1.11.29
* 2016-02-01 (CVE-2016-2196): Overwrite in P-521 reduction
The P-521 reduction function would overwrite zero to one word
following the allocated block. This could potentially result
in remote code execution or a crash. Found with AFL
Introduced in 1.11.10, fixed in 1.11.27
* 2016-02-01 (CVE-2016-2195): Heap overflow on invalid ECC point
The PointGFp constructor did not check that the affine coordinate
arguments were less than the prime, but then in curve multiplication
assumed that both arguments if multiplied would fit into an integer
twice the size of the prime.
The bigint_mul and bigint_sqr functions received the size of the
output buffer, but only used it to dispatch to a faster algorithm in
cases where there was sufficient output space to call an unrolled
multiplication function.
The result is a heap overflow accessible via ECC point decoding,
which accepted untrusted inputs. This is likely exploitable for
remote code execution.
On systems which use the mlock pool allocator, it would allow an
attacker to overwrite memory held in secure_vector objects. After
this point the write will hit the guard page at the end of the
mmap'ed region so it probably could not be used for code execution
directly, but would allow overwriting adjacent key material.
Found by Alex Gaynor fuzzing with AFL
Introduced in 1.9.18, fixed in 1.11.27 and 1.10.11
* 2016-02-01 (CVE-2016-2194): Infinite loop in modular square root algorithm
The ressol function implements the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm for
finding square roots could be sent into a nearly infinite loop due
to a misplaced conditional check. This could occur if a composite
modulus is provided, as this algorithm is only defined for primes.
This function is exposed to attacker controlled input via the OS2ECP
function during ECC point decompression. Found by AFL
Introduced in 1.7.15, fixed in 1.11.27 and 1.10.11
2015
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
* 2015-11-04: TLS certificate authentication bypass
When the bugs affecting X.509 path validation were fixed in 1.11.22, a check
in Credentials_Manager::verify_certificate_chain was accidentally removed
which caused path validation failures not to be signaled to the TLS layer. So
for affected versions, certificate authentication in TLS is bypassed. As a
workaround, applications can override the call and implement the correct
check. Reported by Florent Le Coz in GH #324
Introduced in 1.11.22, fixed in 1.11.24
* 2015-10-26 (CVE-2015-7824): Padding oracle attack on TLS
A padding oracle attack was possible against TLS CBC ciphersuites because if a
certain length check on the packet fields failed, a different alert type than
one used for message authentication failure would be returned to the sender.
This check triggering would leak information about the value of the padding
bytes and could be used to perform iterative decryption.
As with most such oracle attacks, the danger depends on the underlying
protocol - HTTP servers are particularly vulnerable. The current analysis
suggests that to exploit it an attacker would first have to guess several
bytes of plaintext, but again this is quite possible in many situations
including HTTP.
Found in a review by Sirrix AG and 3curity GmbH.
Introduced in 1.11.0, fixed in 1.11.22
* 2015-10-26 (CVE-2015-7825): Infinite loop during certificate path validation
When evaluating a certificate path, if a loop in the certificate chain
was encountered (for instance where C1 certifies C2, which certifies C1)
an infinite loop would occur eventually resulting in memory exhaustion.
Found in a review by Sirrix AG and 3curity GmbH.
Introduced in 1.11.6, fixed in 1.11.22
* 2015-10-26 (CVE-2015-7826): Acceptance of invalid certificate names
RFC 6125 specifies how to match a X.509v3 certificate against a DNS name
for application usage.
Otherwise valid certificates using wildcards would be accepted as matching
certain hostnames that should they should not according to RFC 6125. For
example a certificate issued for '*.example.com' should match
'foo.example.com' but not 'example.com' or 'bar.foo.example.com'. Previously
Botan would accept such a certificate as valid for 'bar.foo.example.com'.
RFC 6125 also requires that when matching a X.509 certificate against a DNS
name, the CN entry is only compared if no subjectAlternativeName entry is
available. Previously X509_Certificate::matches_dns_name would always check
both names.
Found in a review by Sirrix AG and 3curity GmbH.
Introduced in 1.11.0, fixed in 1.11.22
* 2015-10-26 (CVE-2015-7827): PKCS #1 v1.5 decoding was not constant time
During RSA decryption, how long decoding of PKCS #1 v1.5 padding took was
input dependent. If these differences could be measured by an attacker, it
could be used to mount a Bleichenbacher million-message attack. PKCS #1 v1.5
decoding has been rewritten to use a sequence of operations which do not
contain any input-dependent indexes or jumps. Notations for checking constant
time blocks with ctgrind (https://github.com/agl/ctgrind) were added to PKCS
#1 decoding among other areas. Found in a review by Sirrix AG and 3curity GmbH.
Fixed in 1.11.22 and 1.10.13. Affected all previous versions.
* 2015-08-03 (CVE-2015-5726): Crash in BER decoder
The BER decoder would crash due to reading from offset 0 of an empty vector if
it encountered a BIT STRING which did not contain any data at all. This can be
used to easily crash applications reading untrusted ASN.1 data, but does not
seem exploitable for code execution. Found with afl.
Fixed in 1.11.19 and 1.10.10, affected all previous versions of 1.10 and 1.11
* 2015-08-03 (CVE-2015-5727): Excess memory allocation in BER decoder
The BER decoder would allocate a fairly arbitrary amount of memory in a length
field, even if there was no chance the read request would succeed. This might
cause the process to run out of memory or invoke the OOM killer. Found with afl.
Fixed in 1.11.19 and 1.10.10, affected all previous versions of 1.10 and 1.11
2014
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
* 2014-04-10 (CVE-2014-9742): Insufficient randomness in Miller-Rabin primality check
A bug in the Miller-Rabin primality test resulted in only a single random base
being used instead of a sequence of such bases. This increased the probability
that a non-prime would be accepted by is_prime or that a randomly generated
prime might actually be composite. The probability of a random 1024 bit
number being incorrectly classed as prime with a single base is around 2^-40.
Reported by Jeff Marrison.
Introduced in 1.8.3, fixed in 1.10.8 and 1.11.9
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