/* * TLS Record Reading * (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd * * Released under the terms of the Botan license */ #include #include #include namespace Botan { /* * Reset the state */ void Record_Reader::reset() { cipher.reset(); delete mac; mac = 0; mac_size = 0; block_size = 0; iv_size = 0; major = minor = 0; seq_no = 0; } /* * Set the version to use */ void Record_Reader::set_version(Version_Code version) { if(version != SSL_V3 && version != TLS_V10 && version != TLS_V11) throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Reader: Invalid protocol version"); major = (version >> 8) & 0xFF; minor = (version & 0xFF); } /* * Set the keys for reading */ void Record_Reader::set_keys(const CipherSuite& suite, const SessionKeys& keys, Connection_Side side) { cipher.reset(); delete mac; mac = 0; SymmetricKey mac_key, cipher_key; InitializationVector iv; if(side == CLIENT) { cipher_key = keys.server_cipher_key(); iv = keys.server_iv(); mac_key = keys.server_mac_key(); } else { cipher_key = keys.client_cipher_key(); iv = keys.client_iv(); mac_key = keys.client_mac_key(); } const std::string cipher_algo = suite.cipher_algo(); const std::string mac_algo = suite.mac_algo(); if(have_block_cipher(cipher_algo)) { cipher.append(get_cipher( cipher_algo + "/CBC/NoPadding", cipher_key, iv, DECRYPTION) ); block_size = block_size_of(cipher_algo); if(major > 3 || (major == 3 && minor >= 2)) iv_size = block_size; else iv_size = 0; } else if(have_stream_cipher(cipher_algo)) { cipher.append(get_cipher(cipher_algo, cipher_key, DECRYPTION)); block_size = 0; iv_size = 0; } else throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Reader: Unknown cipher " + cipher_algo); if(have_hash(mac_algo)) { Algorithm_Factory& af = global_state().algorithm_factory(); if(major == 3 && minor == 0) mac = af.make_mac("SSL3-MAC(" + mac_algo + ")"); else mac = af.make_mac("HMAC(" + mac_algo + ")"); mac->set_key(mac_key); mac_size = mac->output_length(); } else throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Reader: Unknown hash " + mac_algo); } void Record_Reader::add_input(const byte input[], size_t input_size) { input_queue.write(input, input_size); } /* * Retrieve the next record */ size_t Record_Reader::get_record(byte& msg_type, MemoryRegion& output) { byte header[5] = { 0 }; const size_t have_in_queue = input_queue.size(); if(have_in_queue < sizeof(header)) return (sizeof(header) - have_in_queue); /* * We peek first to make sure we have the full record */ input_queue.peek(header, sizeof(header)); // SSLv2-format client hello? if(header[0] & 0x80 && header[2] == 1 && header[3] == 3) { size_t record_len = make_u16bit(header[0], header[1]) & 0x7FFF; if(have_in_queue < record_len + 2) return (record_len + 2 - have_in_queue); msg_type = HANDSHAKE; output.resize(record_len + 4); input_queue.read(&output[2], record_len + 2); output[0] = CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2; output[1] = 0; output[2] = header[0] & 0x7F; output[3] = header[1]; return 0; } if(header[0] != CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && header[0] != ALERT && header[0] != HANDSHAKE && header[0] != APPLICATION_DATA) { throw TLS_Exception(UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, "Record_Reader: Unknown record type"); } const u16bit version = make_u16bit(header[1], header[2]); const u16bit record_len = make_u16bit(header[3], header[4]); if(major && (header[1] != major || header[2] != minor)) throw TLS_Exception(PROTOCOL_VERSION, "Record_Reader: Got unexpected version"); // If insufficient data, return without doing anything if(have_in_queue < (sizeof(header) + record_len)) return (sizeof(header) + record_len - have_in_queue); SecureVector buffer(record_len); input_queue.read(header, sizeof(header)); // pull off the header input_queue.read(&buffer[0], buffer.size()); /* * We are handshaking, no crypto to do so return as-is * TODO: Check msg_type to confirm a handshake? */ if(mac_size == 0) { msg_type = header[0]; output = buffer; return 0; // got a full record } // Otherwise, decrypt, check MAC, return plaintext cipher.process_msg(buffer); SecureVector plaintext = cipher.read_all(Pipe::LAST_MESSAGE); size_t pad_size = 0; if(block_size) { byte pad_value = plaintext[plaintext.size()-1]; pad_size = pad_value + 1; /* * Check the padding; if it is wrong, then say we have 0 bytes of * padding, which should ensure that the MAC check below does not * suceed. This hides a timing channel. * * This particular countermeasure is recommended in the TLS 1.2 * spec (RFC 5246) in section 6.2.3.2 */ if(version == SSL_V3) { if(pad_value > block_size) pad_size = 0; } else { bool padding_good = true; for(size_t i = 0; i != pad_size; ++i) if(plaintext[plaintext.size()-i-1] != pad_value) padding_good = false; if(!padding_good) pad_size = 0; } } if(plaintext.size() < mac_size + pad_size + iv_size) throw Decoding_Error("Record_Reader: Record truncated"); const size_t mac_offset = plaintext.size() - (mac_size + pad_size); SecureVector received_mac(&plaintext[mac_offset], mac_size); const u16bit plain_length = plaintext.size() - (mac_size + pad_size + iv_size); mac->update_be(seq_no); mac->update(header[0]); // msg_type if(version != SSL_V3) for(size_t i = 0; i != 2; ++i) mac->update(get_byte(i, version)); mac->update_be(plain_length); mac->update(&plaintext[iv_size], plain_length); ++seq_no; SecureVector computed_mac = mac->final(); if(received_mac != computed_mac) throw TLS_Exception(BAD_RECORD_MAC, "Record_Reader: MAC failure"); msg_type = header[0]; output.resize(plain_length); copy_mem(&output[0], &plaintext[iv_size], plain_length); return 0; } }