/* * TLS Hello Request and Client Hello Messages * (C) 2004-2011 Jack Lloyd * * Released under the terms of the Botan license */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include namespace Botan { namespace TLS { enum { TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV = 0x00FF }; std::vector make_hello_random(RandomNumberGenerator& rng) { std::vector buf(32); const u32bit time32 = static_cast( std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(std::chrono::system_clock::now())); store_be(time32, &buf[0]); rng.randomize(&buf[4], buf.size() - 4); return buf; } /* * Create a new Hello Request message */ Hello_Request::Hello_Request(Record_Writer& writer) { writer.send(*this); } /* * Deserialize a Hello Request message */ Hello_Request::Hello_Request(const std::vector& buf) { if(buf.size()) throw Decoding_Error("Bad Hello_Request, has non-zero size"); } /* * Serialize a Hello Request message */ std::vector Hello_Request::serialize() const { return std::vector(); } /* * Create a new Client Hello message */ Client_Hello::Client_Hello(Record_Writer& writer, Handshake_Hash& hash, const Policy& policy, RandomNumberGenerator& rng, const std::vector& reneg_info, bool next_protocol, const std::string& hostname, const std::string& srp_identifier) : m_version(policy.pref_version()), m_random(make_hello_random(rng)), m_suites(ciphersuite_list(policy, (srp_identifier != ""))), m_comp_methods(policy.compression()), m_hostname(hostname), m_srp_identifier(srp_identifier), m_next_protocol(next_protocol), m_fragment_size(0), m_secure_renegotiation(true), m_renegotiation_info(reneg_info), m_supported_curves(policy.allowed_ecc_curves()), m_supports_session_ticket(true), m_supports_heartbeats(true), m_peer_can_send_heartbeats(true) { std::vector hashes = policy.allowed_hashes(); std::vector sigs = policy.allowed_signature_methods(); for(size_t i = 0; i != hashes.size(); ++i) for(size_t j = 0; j != sigs.size(); ++j) m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair(hashes[i], sigs[j])); hash.update(writer.send(*this)); } /* * Create a new Client Hello message (session resumption case) */ Client_Hello::Client_Hello(Record_Writer& writer, Handshake_Hash& hash, const Policy& policy, RandomNumberGenerator& rng, const std::vector& reneg_info, const Session& session, bool next_protocol) : m_version(session.version()), m_session_id(session.session_id()), m_random(make_hello_random(rng)), m_suites(ciphersuite_list(policy, (session.srp_identifier() != ""))), m_comp_methods(policy.compression()), m_hostname(session.sni_hostname()), m_srp_identifier(session.srp_identifier()), m_next_protocol(next_protocol), m_fragment_size(session.fragment_size()), m_secure_renegotiation(session.secure_renegotiation()), m_renegotiation_info(reneg_info), m_supported_curves(policy.allowed_ecc_curves()), m_supports_session_ticket(true), m_session_ticket(session.session_ticket()), m_supports_heartbeats(true), m_peer_can_send_heartbeats(true) { if(!value_exists(m_suites, session.ciphersuite_code())) m_suites.push_back(session.ciphersuite_code()); if(!value_exists(m_comp_methods, session.compression_method())) m_comp_methods.push_back(session.compression_method()); std::vector hashes = policy.allowed_hashes(); std::vector sigs = policy.allowed_signature_methods(); for(size_t i = 0; i != hashes.size(); ++i) for(size_t j = 0; j != sigs.size(); ++j) m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair(hashes[i], sigs[j])); hash.update(writer.send(*this)); } /* * Read a counterparty client hello */ Client_Hello::Client_Hello(const std::vector& buf, Handshake_Type type) { m_next_protocol = false; m_secure_renegotiation = false; m_supports_session_ticket = false; m_supports_heartbeats = false; m_peer_can_send_heartbeats = false; m_fragment_size = 0; if(type == CLIENT_HELLO) deserialize(buf); else deserialize_sslv2(buf); } /* * Serialize a Client Hello message */ std::vector Client_Hello::serialize() const { std::vector buf; buf.push_back(m_version.major_version()); buf.push_back(m_version.minor_version()); buf += m_random; append_tls_length_value(buf, m_session_id, 1); append_tls_length_value(buf, m_suites, 2); append_tls_length_value(buf, m_comp_methods, 1); /* * May not want to send extensions at all in some cases. * If so, should include SCSV value (if reneg info is empty, if * not we are renegotiating with a modern server and should only * send that extension. */ Extensions extensions; if(m_secure_renegotiation) extensions.add(new Renegotation_Extension(m_renegotiation_info)); extensions.add(new Session_Ticket(m_session_ticket)); extensions.add(new Server_Name_Indicator(m_hostname)); extensions.add(new SRP_Identifier(m_srp_identifier)); extensions.add(new Supported_Elliptic_Curves(m_supported_curves)); if(m_version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V12) extensions.add(new Signature_Algorithms(m_supported_algos)); extensions.add(new Heartbeat_Support_Indicator(true)); if(m_renegotiation_info.empty() && m_next_protocol) extensions.add(new Next_Protocol_Notification()); buf += extensions.serialize(); return buf; } void Client_Hello::deserialize_sslv2(const std::vector& buf) { if(buf.size() < 12 || buf[0] != 1) throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: SSLv2 hello corrupted"); const size_t cipher_spec_len = make_u16bit(buf[3], buf[4]); const size_t m_session_id_len = make_u16bit(buf[5], buf[6]); const size_t challenge_len = make_u16bit(buf[7], buf[8]); const size_t expected_size = (9 + m_session_id_len + cipher_spec_len + challenge_len); if(buf.size() != expected_size) throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: SSLv2 hello corrupted"); if(m_session_id_len != 0 || cipher_spec_len % 3 != 0 || (challenge_len < 16 || challenge_len > 32)) { throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: SSLv2 hello corrupted"); } for(size_t i = 9; i != 9 + cipher_spec_len; i += 3) { if(buf[i] != 0) // a SSLv2 cipherspec; ignore it continue; m_suites.push_back(make_u16bit(buf[i+1], buf[i+2])); } m_version = Protocol_Version(buf[1], buf[2]); m_random.resize(challenge_len); copy_mem(&m_random[0], &buf[9+cipher_spec_len+m_session_id_len], challenge_len); m_secure_renegotiation = value_exists(m_suites, static_cast(TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV)); } /* * Deserialize a Client Hello message */ void Client_Hello::deserialize(const std::vector& buf) { if(buf.size() == 0) throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: Packet corrupted"); if(buf.size() < 41) throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: Packet corrupted"); TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf); const byte major_version = reader.get_byte(); const byte minor_version = reader.get_byte(); m_version = Protocol_Version(major_version, minor_version); m_random = reader.get_fixed(32); m_session_id = reader.get_range(1, 0, 32); m_suites = reader.get_range_vector(2, 1, 32767); m_comp_methods = reader.get_range_vector(1, 1, 255); Extensions extensions(reader); if(Server_Name_Indicator* sni = extensions.get()) { m_hostname = sni->host_name(); } if(SRP_Identifier* srp = extensions.get()) { m_srp_identifier = srp->identifier(); } if(Next_Protocol_Notification* npn = extensions.get()) { if(!npn->protocols().empty()) throw Decoding_Error("Client sent non-empty NPN extension"); m_next_protocol = true; } if(Maximum_Fragment_Length* frag = extensions.get()) { m_fragment_size = frag->fragment_size(); } if(Renegotation_Extension* reneg = extensions.get()) { // checked by Client / Server as they know the handshake state m_secure_renegotiation = true; m_renegotiation_info = reneg->renegotiation_info(); } if(Supported_Elliptic_Curves* ecc = extensions.get()) m_supported_curves = ecc->curves(); if(Signature_Algorithms* sigs = extensions.get()) { m_supported_algos = sigs->supported_signature_algorthms(); } else { if(m_version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V12) { /* The rule for when a TLS 1.2 client not sending the extension is strange; in theory, the server is supposed to act as if the client had sent only SHA-1 using whatever signature algorithm we end up negotiating. Right here, we don't know what we'll end up negotiating (depends on policy), but we do know that we'll only negotiate something the client sent, so we can safely say it supports everything here and know that we'll filter it out later. */ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "RSA")); m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "DSA")); m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "ECDSA")); } else { // For versions before TLS 1.2, insert fake values for the old defaults m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("TLS.Digest.0", "RSA")); m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "DSA")); m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "ECDSA")); } } if(Maximum_Fragment_Length* frag = extensions.get()) { m_fragment_size = frag->fragment_size(); } if(Session_Ticket* ticket = extensions.get()) { m_supports_session_ticket = true; m_session_ticket = ticket->contents(); } if(Heartbeat_Support_Indicator* hb = extensions.get()) { m_supports_heartbeats = true; m_peer_can_send_heartbeats = hb->peer_allowed_to_send(); } if(Renegotation_Extension* reneg = extensions.get()) { // checked by TLS_Client / TLS_Server as they know the handshake state m_secure_renegotiation = true; m_renegotiation_info = reneg->renegotiation_info(); } if(value_exists(m_suites, static_cast(TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV))) { /* * Clients are allowed to send both the extension and the SCSV * though it is not recommended. If it did, require that the * extension value be empty. */ if(m_secure_renegotiation) { if(!m_renegotiation_info.empty()) { throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, "Client send SCSV and non-empty extension"); } } m_secure_renegotiation = true; m_renegotiation_info.clear(); } } /* * Check if we offered this ciphersuite */ bool Client_Hello::offered_suite(u16bit ciphersuite) const { for(size_t i = 0; i != m_suites.size(); ++i) if(m_suites[i] == ciphersuite) return true; return false; } } }