/* * HMAC_RNG * (C) 2008-2009 Jack Lloyd */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include namespace Botan { namespace { void hmac_prf(MessageAuthenticationCode* prf, MemoryRegion& K, u32bit& counter, const std::string& label) { prf->update(K, K.size()); prf->update(label); for(u32bit i = 0; i != 4; ++i) prf->update(get_byte(i, counter)); prf->final(K); ++counter; } } /** * Generate a buffer of random bytes */ void HMAC_RNG::randomize(byte out[], u32bit length) { /* Attempt to seed if we are currently not seeded, or if the counter is greater than 2^20 If HMAC_RNG is wrapped in an X9.31/AES PRNG (the default), this means a reseed will be kicked off every 16 MiB of RNG output. */ if(!is_seeded() || counter >= 0x100000) { reseed(8 * prf->OUTPUT_LENGTH); if(!is_seeded()) throw PRNG_Unseeded(name() + " seeding attempt failed"); } /* HMAC KDF as described in E-t-E, using a CTXinfo of "rng" */ while(length) { hmac_prf(prf, K, counter, "rng"); const u32bit copied = std::min(K.size(), length); copy_mem(out, K.begin(), copied); out += copied; length -= copied; } } /** * Reseed the internal state, also accepting user input to include */ void HMAC_RNG::reseed_with_input(u32bit poll_bits, const byte input[], u32bit input_length) { /** Using the terminology of E-t-E, XTR is the MAC function (normally HMAC) seeded with XTS (below) and we form SKM, the key material, by fast polling each source, and then slow polling as many as we think we need (in the following loop), and feeding all of the poll results, along with any optional user input, along with, finally, feedback of the current PRK value, into the extractor function. */ Entropy_Accumulator accum(poll_bits); for(u32bit i = 0; i < entropy_sources.size(); ++i) { if(accum.polling_goal_achieved()) break; entropy_sources[i]->poll(accum); } // And now add the user-provided input, if any if(input_length) accum.add(input, input_length, 1); extractor->update(accum.get_entropy_buffer()); /* It is necessary to feed forward poll data. Otherwise, a good poll (collecting a large amount of conditional entropy) followed by a bad one (collecting little) would be unsafe. Do this by generating new PRF outputs using the previous key and feeding them into the extractor function. Cycle the RNG once (CTXinfo="rng"), then generate a new PRF output using the CTXinfo "reseed". Provide these values as input to the extractor function. */ hmac_prf(prf, K, counter, "rng"); extractor->update(K); // K is the CTXinfo=rng PRF output hmac_prf(prf, K, counter, "reseed"); extractor->update(K); // K is the CTXinfo=reseed PRF output /* Now derive the new PRK using everything that has been fed into the extractor, and set the PRF key to that */ prf->set_key(extractor->final()); // Now generate a new PRF output to use as the XTS extractor salt hmac_prf(prf, K, counter, "xts"); extractor->set_key(K, K.size()); // Reset state K.clear(); counter = 0; // Upper bound entropy estimate at the extractor output size entropy = std::min(entropy + accum.bits_collected(), 8 * extractor->OUTPUT_LENGTH); } /** * Reseed the internal state */ void HMAC_RNG::reseed(u32bit poll_bits) { reseed_with_input(poll_bits, 0, 0); } /** * Add user-supplied entropy by reseeding and including this * input among the poll data */ void HMAC_RNG::add_entropy(const byte input[], u32bit length) { reseed_with_input(0, input, length); } /** * Add another entropy source to the list */ void HMAC_RNG::add_entropy_source(EntropySource* src) { entropy_sources.push_back(src); } /** * Check if the the pool is seeded */ bool HMAC_RNG::is_seeded() const { return (entropy >= 8 * prf->OUTPUT_LENGTH); } /* * Clear memory of sensitive data */ void HMAC_RNG::clear() throw() { extractor->clear(); prf->clear(); K.clear(); entropy = 0; counter = 0; } /** * Return the name of this type */ std::string HMAC_RNG::name() const { return "HMAC_RNG(" + extractor->name() + "," + prf->name() + ")"; } /** * HMAC_RNG Constructor */ HMAC_RNG::HMAC_RNG(MessageAuthenticationCode* extractor_mac, MessageAuthenticationCode* prf_mac) : extractor(extractor_mac), prf(prf_mac) { entropy = 0; // First PRF inputs are all zero, as specified in section 2 K.create(prf->OUTPUT_LENGTH); counter = 0; /* Normally we want to feedback PRF output into the input to the extractor function to ensure a single bad poll does not damage the RNG, but obviously that is meaningless to do on the first poll. We will want to use the PRF before we set the first key (in reseed_with_input), and it is a pain to keep track if it is set or not. Since the first time it doesn't matter anyway, just set it to a constant: randomize() will not produce output unless is_seeded() returns true, and that will only be the case if the estimated entropy counter is high enough. That variable is only set when a reseeding is performed. */ std::string prf_key = "Botan HMAC_RNG PRF"; prf->set_key(reinterpret_cast(prf_key.c_str()), prf_key.length()); /* This will be used as the first XTS value when extracting input. XTS values after this one are generated using the PRF. If I understand the E-t-E paper correctly (specifically Section 4), using this fixed extractor key is safe to do. */ std::string xts = "Botan HMAC_RNG XTS"; extractor->set_key(reinterpret_cast(xts.c_str()), xts.length()); } /** * HMAC_RNG Destructor */ HMAC_RNG::~HMAC_RNG() { delete extractor; delete prf; std::for_each(entropy_sources.begin(), entropy_sources.end(), del_fun()); entropy = 0; counter = 0; } }