/* * (C) 1999-2010,2015 Jack Lloyd * * Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt) */ #include #include #include #include #include #include namespace Botan { namespace { template T* get_pk_op(const std::string& what, const Key& key, const std::string& pad, const std::string& provider = "") { if(T* p = Algo_Registry::global_registry().make(typename T::Spec(key, pad), provider)) return p; const std::string err = what + " with " + key.algo_name() + "/" + pad + " not supported"; if(!provider.empty()) throw Lookup_Error(err + " with provider " + provider); else throw Lookup_Error(err); } } secure_vector PK_Decryptor::decrypt(const byte in[], size_t length) const { byte valid_mask = 0; secure_vector decoded = do_decrypt(valid_mask, in, length); if(valid_mask == 0) throw Decoding_Error("Invalid public key ciphertext, cannot decrypt"); return decoded; } secure_vector PK_Decryptor::decrypt_or_random(const byte in[], size_t length, size_t expected_pt_len, RandomNumberGenerator& rng, const byte required_content_bytes[], const byte required_content_offsets[], size_t required_contents_length) const { const secure_vector fake_pms = rng.random_vec(expected_pt_len); CT::poison(in, length); byte valid_mask = 0; secure_vector decoded = do_decrypt(valid_mask, in, length); valid_mask &= CT::is_equal(decoded.size(), expected_pt_len); decoded.resize(expected_pt_len); for(size_t i = 0; i != required_contents_length; ++i) { /* These values are chosen by the application and for TLS are constants, so this early failure via assert is fine since we know 0,1 < 48 If there is a protocol that has content checks on the key where the expected offsets are controllable by the attacker this could still leak. Alternately could always reduce the offset modulo the length? */ const byte exp = required_content_bytes[i]; const byte off = required_content_offsets[i]; BOTAN_ASSERT(off < expected_pt_len, "Offset in range of plaintext"); valid_mask &= CT::is_equal(decoded[off], exp); } CT::conditional_copy_mem(valid_mask, /*output*/decoded.data(), /*from0*/decoded.data(), /*from1*/fake_pms.data(), expected_pt_len); CT::unpoison(in, length); CT::unpoison(decoded.data(), decoded.size()); return decoded; } secure_vector PK_Decryptor::decrypt_or_random(const byte in[], size_t length, size_t expected_pt_len, RandomNumberGenerator& rng) const { return decrypt_or_random(in, length, expected_pt_len, rng, nullptr, nullptr, 0); } PK_Encryptor_EME::PK_Encryptor_EME(const Public_Key& key, const std::string& padding, const std::string& provider) { m_op.reset(get_pk_op("Encryption", key, padding, provider)); } std::vector PK_Encryptor_EME::enc(const byte in[], size_t length, RandomNumberGenerator& rng) const { return unlock(m_op->encrypt(in, length, rng)); } size_t PK_Encryptor_EME::maximum_input_size() const { return m_op->max_input_bits() / 8; } PK_Decryptor_EME::PK_Decryptor_EME(const Private_Key& key, const std::string& padding, const std::string& provider) { m_op.reset(get_pk_op("Decryption", key, padding, provider)); } secure_vector PK_Decryptor_EME::do_decrypt(byte& valid_mask, const byte in[], size_t in_len) const { return m_op->decrypt(valid_mask, in, in_len); } PK_KEM_Encryptor::PK_KEM_Encryptor(const Public_Key& key, const std::string& param, const std::string& provider) { m_op.reset(get_pk_op("KEM", key, param, provider)); } void PK_KEM_Encryptor::encrypt(secure_vector& out_encapsulated_key, secure_vector& out_shared_key, size_t desired_shared_key_len, Botan::RandomNumberGenerator& rng, const uint8_t salt[], size_t salt_len) { m_op->kem_encrypt(out_encapsulated_key, out_shared_key, desired_shared_key_len, rng, salt, salt_len); } PK_KEM_Decryptor::PK_KEM_Decryptor(const Private_Key& key, const std::string& param, const std::string& provider) { m_op.reset(get_pk_op("KEM", key, param, provider)); } secure_vector PK_KEM_Decryptor::decrypt(const byte encap_key[], size_t encap_key_len, size_t desired_shared_key_len, const uint8_t salt[], size_t salt_len) { return m_op->kem_decrypt(encap_key, encap_key_len, desired_shared_key_len, salt, salt_len); } PK_Key_Agreement::PK_Key_Agreement(const Private_Key& key, const std::string& kdf, const std::string& provider) { m_op.reset(get_pk_op("Key agreement", key, kdf, provider)); } SymmetricKey PK_Key_Agreement::derive_key(size_t key_len, const byte in[], size_t in_len, const byte salt[], size_t salt_len) const { return m_op->agree(key_len, in, in_len, salt, salt_len); } namespace { std::vector der_encode_signature(const std::vector& sig, size_t parts) { if(sig.size() % parts) throw Encoding_Error("PK_Signer: strange signature size found"); const size_t SIZE_OF_PART = sig.size() / parts; std::vector sig_parts(parts); for(size_t j = 0; j != sig_parts.size(); ++j) sig_parts[j].binary_decode(&sig[SIZE_OF_PART*j], SIZE_OF_PART); return DER_Encoder() .start_cons(SEQUENCE) .encode_list(sig_parts) .end_cons() .get_contents_unlocked(); } std::vector der_decode_signature(const byte sig[], size_t len, size_t part_size, size_t parts) { std::vector real_sig; BER_Decoder decoder(sig, len); BER_Decoder ber_sig = decoder.start_cons(SEQUENCE); size_t count = 0; while(ber_sig.more_items()) { BigInt sig_part; ber_sig.decode(sig_part); real_sig += BigInt::encode_1363(sig_part, part_size); ++count; } if(count != parts) throw Decoding_Error("PK_Verifier: signature size invalid"); return real_sig; } } PK_Signer::PK_Signer(const Private_Key& key, const std::string& emsa, Signature_Format format, const std::string& provider) { m_op.reset(get_pk_op("Signing", key, emsa, provider)); m_sig_format = format; } void PK_Signer::update(const byte in[], size_t length) { m_op->update(in, length); } std::vector PK_Signer::signature(RandomNumberGenerator& rng) { const std::vector plain_sig = unlock(m_op->sign(rng)); const size_t parts = m_op->message_parts(); if(parts == 1 || m_sig_format == IEEE_1363) return plain_sig; else if(m_sig_format == DER_SEQUENCE) return der_encode_signature(plain_sig, parts); else throw Encoding_Error("PK_Signer: Unknown signature format " + std::to_string(m_sig_format)); } PK_Verifier::PK_Verifier(const Public_Key& key, const std::string& emsa_name, Signature_Format format, const std::string& provider) { m_op.reset(get_pk_op("Verification", key, emsa_name, provider)); m_sig_format = format; } void PK_Verifier::set_input_format(Signature_Format format) { if(m_op->message_parts() == 1 && format != IEEE_1363) throw Invalid_State("PK_Verifier: This algorithm always uses IEEE 1363"); m_sig_format = format; } bool PK_Verifier::verify_message(const byte msg[], size_t msg_length, const byte sig[], size_t sig_length) { update(msg, msg_length); return check_signature(sig, sig_length); } void PK_Verifier::update(const byte in[], size_t length) { m_op->update(in, length); } bool PK_Verifier::check_signature(const byte sig[], size_t length) { try { if(m_sig_format == IEEE_1363) { return m_op->is_valid_signature(sig, length); } else if(m_sig_format == DER_SEQUENCE) { std::vector real_sig = der_decode_signature(sig, length, m_op->message_part_size(), m_op->message_parts()); return m_op->is_valid_signature(real_sig.data(), real_sig.size()); } else throw Decoding_Error("PK_Verifier: Unknown signature format " + std::to_string(m_sig_format)); } catch(Invalid_Argument&) { return false; } } }