/* * ECKCDSA (ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006/Cor.2:2009) * (C) 2016 René Korthaus, Sirrix AG * * Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt) */ #include #include #include #include #include namespace Botan { bool ECKCDSA_PrivateKey::check_key(RandomNumberGenerator& rng, bool strong) const { if(!public_point().on_the_curve()) { return false; } if(!strong) { return true; } return KeyPair::signature_consistency_check(rng, *this, "EMSA1(SHA-1)"); } namespace { /** * ECKCDSA signature operation */ class ECKCDSA_Signature_Operation : public PK_Ops::Signature_with_EMSA { public: typedef ECKCDSA_PrivateKey Key_Type; ECKCDSA_Signature_Operation(const ECKCDSA_PrivateKey& eckcdsa, const std::string& emsa) : PK_Ops::Signature_with_EMSA(emsa), m_order(eckcdsa.domain().get_order()), m_base_point(eckcdsa.domain().get_base_point(), m_order), m_x(eckcdsa.private_value()), m_mod_order(m_order), m_prefix() { const BigInt public_point_x = eckcdsa.public_point().get_affine_x(); const BigInt public_point_y = eckcdsa.public_point().get_affine_y(); m_prefix.resize(public_point_x.bytes() + public_point_y.bytes()); public_point_x.binary_encode(m_prefix.data()); public_point_y.binary_encode(&m_prefix[public_point_x.bytes()]); m_prefix.resize(HashFunction::create(hash_for_signature())->hash_block_size()); // use only the "hash input block size" leftmost bits } secure_vector raw_sign(const byte msg[], size_t msg_len, RandomNumberGenerator& rng) override; size_t message_parts() const override { return 2; } size_t message_part_size() const override { return m_order.bytes(); } size_t max_input_bits() const override { return m_order.bits(); } bool has_prefix() override { return true; } secure_vector message_prefix() const override { return m_prefix; } private: const BigInt& m_order; Blinded_Point_Multiply m_base_point; const BigInt& m_x; Modular_Reducer m_mod_order; secure_vector m_prefix; }; secure_vector ECKCDSA_Signature_Operation::raw_sign(const byte msg[], size_t, RandomNumberGenerator& rng) { const BigInt k = BigInt::random_integer(rng, 1, m_order); const PointGFp k_times_P = m_base_point.blinded_multiply(k, rng); const BigInt k_times_P_x = k_times_P.get_affine_x(); secure_vector to_be_hashed(k_times_P_x.bytes()); k_times_P_x.binary_encode(to_be_hashed.data()); std::unique_ptr emsa(m_emsa->clone()); emsa->update(to_be_hashed.data(), to_be_hashed.size()); secure_vector c = emsa->raw_data(); c = emsa->encoding_of(c, max_input_bits(), rng); const BigInt r(c.data(), c.size()); xor_buf(c, msg, c.size()); BigInt w(c.data(), c.size()); w = m_mod_order.reduce(w); const BigInt s = m_mod_order.multiply(m_x, k - w); BOTAN_ASSERT(s != 0, "invalid s"); secure_vector output = BigInt::encode_1363(r, c.size()); output += BigInt::encode_1363(s, m_mod_order.get_modulus().bytes()); return output; } /** * ECKCDSA verification operation */ class ECKCDSA_Verification_Operation : public PK_Ops::Verification_with_EMSA { public: typedef ECKCDSA_PublicKey Key_Type; ECKCDSA_Verification_Operation(const ECKCDSA_PublicKey& eckcdsa, const std::string& emsa) : PK_Ops::Verification_with_EMSA(emsa), m_base_point(eckcdsa.domain().get_base_point()), m_public_point(eckcdsa.public_point()), m_order(eckcdsa.domain().get_order()), m_mod_order(m_order), m_prefix() { const BigInt public_point_x = m_public_point.get_affine_x(); const BigInt public_point_y = m_public_point.get_affine_y(); m_prefix.resize(public_point_x.bytes() + public_point_y.bytes()); public_point_x.binary_encode(&m_prefix[0]); public_point_y.binary_encode(&m_prefix[public_point_x.bytes()]); m_prefix.resize(HashFunction::create(hash_for_signature())->hash_block_size()); // use only the "hash input block size" leftmost bits } bool has_prefix() override { return true; } secure_vector message_prefix() const override { return m_prefix; } size_t message_parts() const override { return 2; } size_t message_part_size() const override { return m_order.bytes(); } size_t max_input_bits() const override { return m_order.bits(); } bool with_recovery() const override { return false; } bool verify(const byte msg[], size_t msg_len, const byte sig[], size_t sig_len) override; private: const PointGFp& m_base_point; const PointGFp& m_public_point; const BigInt& m_order; // FIXME: should be offered by curve Modular_Reducer m_mod_order; secure_vector m_prefix; }; bool ECKCDSA_Verification_Operation::verify(const byte msg[], size_t, const byte sig[], size_t sig_len) { // check that bit length of r is equal to output bit length of employed hash function h const std::unique_ptr hash = HashFunction::create(hash_for_signature()); // no way to know size of r in sig, so check that we have at least hash->output_length()+1 // bytes in sig, enough for r and an arbitrary size s if(sig_len <= hash->output_length()) { return false; } secure_vector r(sig, sig + hash->output_length()); // check that 0 < s < q const BigInt s(sig + hash->output_length(), sig_len - hash->output_length()); if(s <= 0 || s >= m_order) { return false; } secure_vector r_xor_e(r); xor_buf(r_xor_e, msg, r.size()); BigInt w(r_xor_e.data(), r_xor_e.size()); w = m_mod_order.reduce(w); const PointGFp q = (m_base_point * w) + (m_public_point * s); const BigInt q_x = q.get_affine_x(); secure_vector c(q_x.bytes()); q_x.binary_encode(c.data()); std::unique_ptr emsa(m_emsa->clone()); emsa->update(c.data(), c.size()); secure_vector v = emsa->raw_data(); Null_RNG rng; v = emsa->encoding_of(v, max_input_bits(), rng); return (v == r); } BOTAN_REGISTER_PK_SIGNATURE_OP("ECKCDSA", ECKCDSA_Signature_Operation); BOTAN_REGISTER_PK_VERIFY_OP("ECKCDSA", ECKCDSA_Verification_Operation); } }