Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines | |
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* | Camellia is now split by key length | lloyd | 2012-04-24 | 1 | -26/+26 |
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* | Add anonymous DH/ECDH ciphersuites to the cipher list. Interop checked | lloyd | 2012-04-02 | 1 | -15/+58 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | against OpenSSL. One big issue that needs to be resolved is that with these ciphersuites available to be negotiated, we want to make sure they only are used when the application/user expects them to. Problem is that PSK and SRP are "anonymous" but authenticated via the shared secret. We need to be able to distinguish these on a policy level. Otherwise a MITM could simply offer anon DH, which would be somewhat unfortunate. A client could detect this in the handshake callback, but might not. In the short term to ensure this doesn't occur, disable both anon DH and PSK/SRP in the default policy. | ||||
* | Remove the Ciphersuite_Code enum and move all ciphersuite | lloyd | 2012-03-30 | 1 | -0/+274 |
integer->info mapping to tls_suite_info.cpp which is mostly autogenerated by a Python script from the IANA parameters file. The SRP method now uses kex "SRP_SHA" which is what the RFC calls it. (And hypothetically, SRP_SHA256 might be defined at some point and we'd need to be able to distinguish them). Remove IDEA ciphersuite; we don't want to require IDEA be available due to the European patent still being valid (IIRC), but I didn't want to have to hand-edit the autogenerated switch with an #if check. Not a huge issue though as most sites don't support it anyway. |