| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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seconds and report that value to the client in the NewSessionTicket
message. After that point, a session ticket is ignored and a full
renegotiation is forced.
Only send a new session ticket on a new session, or on a resumed
session where the client indicated it supports session tickets but for
whatever reason didn't send one in the hello. Perhaps in this case, we
should also remove the session from the session manager?
Clean up server selection of the ciphersuite a bit, all in an anon
function in tls_server instead of scattered over Server, Policy, and
Server_Hello.
Add Session::session_age and Session_Manager::session_lifetime
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integer->info mapping to tls_suite_info.cpp which is mostly
autogenerated by a Python script from the IANA parameters file.
The SRP method now uses kex "SRP_SHA" which is what the RFC calls it.
(And hypothetically, SRP_SHA256 might be defined at some point and
we'd need to be able to distinguish them).
Remove IDEA ciphersuite; we don't want to require IDEA be available
due to the European patent still being valid (IIRC), but I didn't want
to have to hand-edit the autogenerated switch with an #if check. Not a
huge issue though as most sites don't support it anyway.
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Fix Ciphersuite_Preference_Ordering which treated two ciphersuites
with the same algos but different keylengths as equivalent, causing
them to be lost. Always prefer the longer key.
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existing enum values.
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ciphersuites.
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ephemeral RSA, and key exchange == "" meant RSA via the key in the
server certificate. However we don't support any of the export suites
anymore (and in fact that code probably never worked), so use kex algo
== "RSA" to represent the server cert case as it's much easier to read
the code and to understand from a policy configuration perspective.
Also fix the default policy, "TripleDES" != "3DES" so we would not
offer (as a client) and would reject (as a server) any 3DES
ciphersuites.
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The client can constrain their offering if they want to.
Add identifiers for PSK suites (not implemented)
Rename hide_unknown_srp_users to hide_unknown_users as it can be used
for PSK as well.
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