| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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a4741cd07f50a9e1b29b0dd97c6fb8697c038ade)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.cxx11' (head 116e5ff139c07000be431e07d3472cc8f3919b91)
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the peer are automatically responded to. TLS::Channel::heartbeat can
initiate a new heartbeat if the peer allows it. Heartbeat replies are
passed back to the application processing function with an Alert value
of HEARTBEAT_PAYLOAD (a 'fake' value, 256, which is out of range of
the valid TLS alert space), along with the sent payload.
The RFC requires us to have no more than one heartbeat 'in flight' at
a time, ie without getting a response (or a timeout in the case of
DTLS). Currently we do not prevent an application from requesting
more.
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63b88a65b699c95ef839bc18336bceccfbfabd2e)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.cxx11' (head 1adcc46808b403b8f6bf1669f022e65f9c30e8ea)
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Hide the handshake reader behind a function.
Add pieces for DTLS hello verify request message
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quite differently).
Avoid using a queue for reading certificates.
Hide the version code in the handshake state with a getter and setter.
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and unique_ptr.
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of just the type code.
Implement Alert::type_string
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the Alert class for namespacing.
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for such a minor change.
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everything into a new namespace (Botan::TLS), removing the TLS_
prefixes on everything.
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entire handshake state in many cases makes things simpler to update,
in that each message type already knows what it needs depending on the
version, params, etc, and this way a) that knowledge doesn't need to
percolate up the the actual client and server handshake code and b)
each message type can be updated for new formats/version without
having to change its callers. Downside is it hides the dependency
information away, and makes it non-obvious what needs to be created
beforehand for each message to work correctly. However this is
(almost) entirely predicated on the handshake message flows, and these
we control with the next expected message scheme, so this should be
fairly safe to do.
This checkin only updates the ones where it was immediately relevant
but for consistency probably all of them should be updated in the same
way.
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counterparty might want to send us a matching close notify under the
currently existing key state. New logic is if we send the alert our
writer is reset (we will send nothing more), but leave the reader as
is. The reader will then be reset if and when we get a close notify,
or if the counterparty doesn't send one, we'll just end the connection
normally. This will also deal with the case where there is some
application data queued still in the recv buffer.
Don't close in ~TLS_Channel: applications should do this explicitly
when the application-level protocol is ended. Otherwise we'd send a
close_notify upon, for instance, an uncaught exception unwinding the
stack.
Add an enum for the maximum size of any TLS ciphertext packet
including header. Handy for apps.
If we get a bad alert size report size we got.
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pure RSA ciphersuite was negotiated.
Detection of version rollback attacks with pure RSA ciphersuites was
incorrect and would cause failures if the client supported a version
we didn't (eg GnuTLS with TLS 1.2 enabled).
Improve detection of SSLv2 client hellos. In particular, if a client
that only supports SSLv2 connects, we will detect this case and send a
protocol_version alert (which the SSLv2-only client will not
understand, but a packet analyzer probably will) plus an exception
with the message "Client claims to only support SSLv2, rejecting"
instead of the previous much less helpful "Unknown record type"
message.
Remove vestigial support for RSA export ciphersuite key exchange.
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handshake callback info instead. Clean up the buffer consumption code
in the record reader.
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expense of significant complexity. Needs careful testing for corner
cases and malicious inputs, but seems to work well with randomly
chosen segmentations in a correctly formatted stream at least.
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Currently has the same behavior in client and server; if we got a
NO_RENEGOTIATION alert, and we appear to be renegotiating, delete the
state if it exists.
Noticed when talking to OpenSSL 0.9.8g which rejects all renegotiation
requests.
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completes. The client gets a callback when the handshake is complete
so they can know exactly when it's OK to send.
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per-se, it's a notification by the client. Rename accordingly.
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specifying if the session should be saved to the session cache.
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its own file. Rename tls_state to tls_handshake_state.
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Add a new callback that is called with the session info when a
handshake completes. Currently only called on the server side as
the client doesn't have session resumption yet.
Rename CipherSuite to TLS_Cipher_Suite.
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has been completed and if the connection has been definitely closed by
a fatal alert or a close notify.
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client and server. Server side can handle SCSV values as well,
client always sends the extension instead.
Handle an empty SNI extension coming back from the server - this is
used to indicate that it understood the name. Also add better checking
for extensions by passing in what the supposed size of the extension
is.
Only send the secure negotiation extension in the server hello if the
client indicated support for it.
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extension (client side only at the moment). Add an interface that
allows applications to request renegotiation.
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send out inputs as they are available. Thus, flushing is never
required, and we avoid some unnecessary copying.
If we are using a CBC mode cipher in SSLv3/TLSv1.0, send a 1-byte
fragment to start to prevent the adaptive plaintext attack.
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TLS 1.0/1.1, SSLv3 uses a different hash format. Only RSA certs tested
so far.
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active == false, which made debugging hard and caused timeouts/hangs
in clients if (for instance) a ciphersuite couldn't be
negotiated. Always send alerts.
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with TLS at the moment, SessionKeys is a mess.
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Also delete the obsolete/never worked CMS examples
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