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* Move the get_byte template to its own header, because many fileslloyd2010-02-021-1/+1
| | | | including loadstor.h actually just needed get_byte and nothing else.
* Un-internal loadstor.h (and its header deps, rotate.h andlloyd2009-12-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | bswap.h); too many external apps rely on loadstor.h existing. Define 64-bit generic bswap in terms of 32-bit bswap, since it's not much slower if 32-bit is also generic, and much faster if it's not. This may be quite helpful on 32-bit x86 in particular. Change formulation of generic 32-bit bswap. It may be faster or slower depending on the CPU, especially the latency and throuput of rotate instructions, but should be faster on an ideally superscalar processor with rotate instructions (ie, what I expect future CPUs to look more like).
* Make many more headers internal-only.lloyd2009-12-161-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes for the amalgamation generator for internal headers. Remove BOTAN_DLL exporting macros from all internal-only headers; the classes/functions there don't need to be exported, and avoiding the PIC/GOT indirection can be a big win. Add missing BOTAN_DLLs where necessary, mostly gfpmath and cvc For GCC, use -fvisibility=hidden and set BOTAN_DLL to the visibility __attribute__ to export those classes/functions.
* Full working amalgamation build, plus internal-only headers concept.lloyd2009-12-161-7/+0
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* Consolidate the non-canonical epoch timers, like cpuid and Win32'slloyd2009-12-011-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | QueryPerformanceCounter, into an entropy source hres_timer. Its results, if any, do not count as contributing entropy to the poll. Convert the other (monotonic/fixed epoch) timers to a single function get_nanoseconds_clock(), living in time.h, which statically chooses the 'best' timer type (clock_gettime, gettimeofday, std::clock, in that order depending on what is available). Add feature test macros for clock_gettime and gettimeofday. Remove the Timer class and timer.h. Remove the Timer& argument to the algorithm benchmark function.
* Rename/remove some secmem member variables for better matching with STLlloyd2009-11-171-3/+3
| | | | | | | | containers (specifically vector). Rename is_empty to empty Remove has_items Rename create to resize
* Remove the 'realname' attribute on all modules and cc/cpu/os info files.lloyd2009-10-291-2/+0
| | | | | Pretty much useless and unused, except for listing the module names in build.h and the short versions totally suffice for that.
* Remove all exception specifications. The way these are designed in C++ islloyd2009-10-222-2/+2
| | | | | | just too fragile and not that useful. Something like Java's checked exceptions might be nice, but simply killing the process entirely if an unexpected exception is thrown is not exactly useful for something trying to be robust.
* Split up util.h into 3 fileslloyd2009-09-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | - rounding.h (round_up, round_down) - workfactor.h (dl_work_factor) - timer.h (system_time) And update all users of the previous util.h
* Add a script that reads the output of print_deps.py and rewriteslloyd2009-07-151-0/+5
| | | | | | the info.txt files with the right module dependencies. Apply it across the codebase.
* Improve handling of low-entropy situations in HMAC_RNG and Randpool.lloyd2009-06-211-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | When a reseed is attempted, up to poll_bits attempts will be made, running in order through the set of available sources. So for instance if poll_bits is set to the default 256, then up to 256 polls will be performed (some of which might not provide any entropy, of course) before stopping; of course if the accumulators goal is achived before that point, then the polling stops. This should greatly help to resolve the recent rash of PRNG unseeded problems some people have been having.
* Thomas Moschny passed along a request from the Fedora packagers which camelloyd2009-03-302-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | up during the Fedora submission review, that each source file include some text about the license. One handy Perl script later and each file now has the line Distributed under the terms of the Botan license after the copyright notices. While I was in there modifying every file anyway, I also stripped out the remainder of the block comments (lots of astericks before and after the text); this is stylistic thing I picked up when I was first learning C++ but in retrospect it is not a good style as the structure makes it harder to modify comments (with the result that comments become fewer, shorter and are less likely to be updated, which are not good things).
* Remove the notion of counting entropy bits in HMAC_RNG or Randpool.lloyd2009-01-312-18/+8
| | | | | | | | | Instead simply consider the PRNG seeded if a poll kicked off from reseed met its goal, or if the user adds data. Doing anything else prevents creating (for instance) a PRNG seeded with 64 bits of entropy, which is unsafe for some purposes (key generation) but quite possibly safe enough for others (generating salts and such).
* Make Entropy_Accumulator a pure virtual to allow other accumulationlloyd2009-01-311-1/+1
| | | | | techniques, with the one using BufferedComputation being the new subclass with the charming name Entropy_Accumulator_BufferedComputation.
* Have Entropy_Accumulator dump everything into a BufferedComputation.lloyd2009-01-271-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Since both Randpool and HMAC_RNG fed the input into a MAC anyway, this works nicely. (It would be nicer to use tr1::function but, argh, don't want to fully depend on TR1 quite yet. C++0x cannot come soon enough). This avoids requiring to do run length encoding, it just dumps everything as-is into the MAC. This ensures the buffer is not a potential narrow pipe for the entropy (for instance, one might imagine an entropy source which outputs one random byte every 16 bytes, and the rest some repeating pattern - using a 16 byte buffer, you would only get 8 bits of entropy total, no matter how many times you sampled).
* Major change in RNG semantics: you must call reseed before callinglloyd2009-01-271-6/+1
| | | | randomize, or PRNG_Unseeded will be thrown.
* Check in a branch with a major redesign on how entropy polling is performed.lloyd2009-01-272-95/+67
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Combine the fast and slow polls, into a single poll() operation. Instead of being given a buffer to write output into, the EntropySource is passed an Entropy_Accumulator. This handles the RLE encoding that xor_into_buf used to do. It also contains a cached I/O buffer so entropy sources do not individually need to allocate memory for that with each poll. When data is added to the accumulator, the source specifies an estimate of the number of bits of entropy per byte, as a double. This is tracked in the accumulator. Once the estimated entropy hits a target (set by the constructor), the accumulator's member function predicate polling_goal_achieved flips to true. This signals to the PRNG that it can stop performing polling on sources, also polls that take a long time periodically check this flag and return immediately. The Win32 and BeOS entropy sources have been updated, but blindly; testing is needed. The test_es example program has been modified: now it polls twice and outputs the XOR of the two collected results. That helps show if the output is consistent across polls (not a good thing). I have noticed on the Unix entropy source, occasionally there are many 0x00 bytes in the output, which is not optimal. This also needs to be investigated. The RLE is not actually RLE anymore. It works well for non-random inputs (ASCII text, etc), but I noticed that when /dev/random output was fed into it, the output buffer would end up being RR01RR01RR01 where RR is a random byte and 00 is the byte count. The buffer sizing also needs to be examined carefully. It might be useful to choose a prime number for the size to XOR stuff into, to help ensure an even distribution of entropy across the entire buffer space. Or: feed it all into a hash function? This change should (perhaps with further modifications) help WRT the concerns Zack W raised about the RNG on the monotone-dev list.
* In Randpool and HMAC_RNG, zeroize the I/O buffer used for holding polledlloyd2008-11-231-0/+2
| | | | randomness data after the contents have been fed into the MAC.
* Drop use of entropy estimation in Randpool for the same reason as HMAC_RNG.lloyd2008-11-111-16/+20
| | | | | | As with HMAC_RNG, instead assume one bit of conditional entropy per byte of polled material. Since they are no longer used, drop the entropy estimation routines entirely.
* Split base.h into block_cipher.h and stream_cipher.hlloyd2008-11-081-1/+1
| | | | | | It turned out many files were including base.h merely to get other includes (like types.h, secmem.h, and exceptn.h). Those have been changed to directly include the files containing the declarations that code needs.
* Move declaration of MessageAuthenticationCode base class to mac.h (from base.h)lloyd2008-11-081-0/+1
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* Move Entropy_Estimator to utils/entropy.h (from anon namespace in HMAC_RNGlloyd2008-11-061-11/+15
| | | | | implementation), remove freestanding estimate_entropy function, change Randpool to use entropy estimator.
* Substantially change Randpool's reseed logic. Now when a reseedlloyd2008-10-271-2/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | is requested, Randpool will first do a fast poll on each entropy source that has been registered. It will count these poll results towards the collected entropy count, with a maximum of 96 contributed bits of entropy per poll (only /dev/random reaches this, others measure at 50-60 bits typically), and a maximum of 256 for sum contribution of the fast polls. Then it will attempt slow polls of all devices until it thinks enough entropy has been collected (using the rather naive entropy_estimate function). It will count any slow poll for no more than 256 bits (100 or so is typical for every poll but /dev/random), and will attempt to collect at least 512 bits of (estimated/guessed) entropy. This tends to cause Randpool to use significantly more sources. Previously it was common, especially on systems with a /dev/random, for only one or a few sources to be used. This change helps assure that even if /dev/random and company are broken or compromised the RNG output remains secure (assuming at least some amount of entropy unguessable by the attacker can be collected via other sources). Also change AutoSeeded_RNG do an automatic poll/seed when it is created.
* Remove lookup from Randpool, HMAC, CMAC, CBC-MAC, TLS-PRF, and PBKDF2lloyd2008-09-302-10/+14
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* Rename all modinfo.txt files to info.txt, since they are all (none) oflloyd2008-09-291-0/+0
| | | | | them modules now. In any case there is no distinction so info.txt seems better.
* Move all modules into src/ directorylloyd2008-09-283-0/+280