| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
so for compatability with keys that were encrypted with an empty
passphrase we probably want to support it as well.
In PBKDF2, don't reject empty passphrases out of hand; simply call
set_key and if the underlying MAC cannot use the key, throw an
informative exception. This will also be more helpful in the case that
someone tries using another MAC (say, CMAC) with a block cipher that
only supports keys of specific sizes.
In HMAC, allow zero-length keys. This is not really optimal in the
sense of allowing the user to do something dumb, but a 1 byte key
would be pretty dumb as well and we already allowed that.
Add a test vector using an empty passphrase generated by OpenSSL
|
|
|
really is only used by OpenPGP, and largely it was named S2K here
because the OpenPGP S2K was implemented years before the ones in PKCS
#5. We have a typedef of PBKDF to S2K, and an inlined get_s2k that
calls get_pbkdf for source compatability.
There doesn't seem to be any reason to have a forward for the renamed
s2k.h header - to actually use a PBKDF, you'd have to either include
lookup.h and call get_s2k / get_pbkdf, or else include an
algorithm-specific header and use it directly. In either case,
including s2k.h is neither necessary nor sufficient.
|
