| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Round PBKDF1 and PBKDF2 time-based iterations to multiples of 10000
instead of 8192.
Update the password hashing docs a bit.
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runs the KDF until at least that much time has passed, then returns
the number of interations used.
New parameter to the PKCS8 encryption routines which tells how long to
run the PBKDF. Defaults to 200 milliseconds, which is short enough
that it is unlikely to bother anyone but long enough to provide quite
reasonable security against cracking attacks. On a Core i7-860, 200
ms with PBKDF2/SHA-1 runs about 180K to 220K iterations (compare with
previous default of 10K).
New PBE interface, remove new_params/set_key and require all inputs
including the passphrase to be passed to the constructor.
Drop the PGP S2K as it is pretty weird and not really useful outside
of a full PGP implementation.
Drop the deprecated PKCS8::encrypt_key and PKCS8::encode functions.
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using a custom allocator. Currently our allocator just does new/delete
with a memset before deletion, and the mmap and mlock allocators have
been removed.
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really is only used by OpenPGP, and largely it was named S2K here
because the OpenPGP S2K was implemented years before the ones in PKCS
#5. We have a typedef of PBKDF to S2K, and an inlined get_s2k that
calls get_pbkdf for source compatability.
There doesn't seem to be any reason to have a forward for the renamed
s2k.h header - to actually use a PBKDF, you'd have to either include
lookup.h and call get_s2k / get_pbkdf, or else include an
algorithm-specific header and use it directly. In either case,
including s2k.h is neither necessary nor sufficient.
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