| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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* fixes for deprecated constructions in c++11 and later (explicit rule of 3/5 or implicit rule of 0 and other violations)
* `default` specifier instead of `{}` in some places(probably all)
* removal of unreachable code (for example `return` after `throw`)
* removal of compilation unit only visible, but not used functions
* fix for `throw()` specifier - used instead `BOTAN_NOEXCEPT`
* removed not needed semicolons
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Currently untested by TLS crosstalk tests because it is not
supported on the server side.
Exposes the rest of TLS message types to application.
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TLS::Callbacks::inspect_handshake_message() allows applications
to inspect all handshake messages, but this requires
access to the types in tls_messages.h. As a matter of fact,
this also exports tls_extensions.h as a public header.
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Renames a couple of functions for somewhat better name consistency,
eg make_u32bit becomes make_uint32. The old typedefs remain for now
since probably lots of application code uses them.
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Tested against BoringSSL (as client + server) and google.com (as client).
Fix a stupid crashing bug in NewHope's BoringSSL mode.
Remove unneeded error return from curve25519_donna - always returned 0.
Default policy prefers ChaChaPoly1305 over GCM and CECPQ1 over ECDH/DH, which
means the default no-extra-configuration ciphersuite (for Botan client speaking
to Botan server) is a ciphersuite which is both implemented in constant time
on all platforms and (hopefully) provides post quantum security. Good Things.
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TLS message parsing:
- CertificateVerify
- HelloVerify
- ClientHello (with extensions)
- ServerHello (with extensions)
- NewSessionTicket
- Alert
TLS message processing:
- HelloVerify
TLS Policy tests
Unit tests with TLS client authentication
Added test_throws method that checks the correct exception message.
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decoding.
If the client sent a signature_algorithms extension, we should negotiate a ciphersuite in
the shared union of the ciphersuite list and the extension, instead of ignoring it.
Found by Juraj Somorovsky GH #619
The TLS v1.2 spec says that clients should only send the signature_algorithms
extension in a hello for that version. Enforce that when decoding client hellos
to prevent this extension from confusing a v1.0 negotiation.
TLS v1.2 spec says ANON signature type is prohibited in the signature_algorithms extension
in the client hello. Prohibit it.
Reorder the TLS extensions in the client hello so there is no chance an empty extension is
the last extension in the list. Some implementations apparently reject such hellos, even
(perhaps especially) when they do not recognize the extension, this bug was mentioned on
the ietf-tls mailing list a while back.
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which recently landed on master.
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- Undid changes replacing Hanshake_IO, Handshake_Hash with
Handshake_Info.
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-reduced number of parameters in various methods
-reduced cyclomatic complexity (McCabe-Metric)
-removed "TLSEXT_HEARTBEAT_SUPPORT" from tls_extensions.h (leftover
from heartbeat extension removal?)
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Adds copyright notices for Juraj Somorovsky and Christian Mainka of Hackmanit
for the changes in 7c7fcecbe6a and 6d327f879c
Add Policy::check_peer_key_acceptable which lets the app set an arbitrary
callback for examining keys - both the end entity signature keys from
certificates and the peer PFS public keys. Default impl checks that the
algorithm size matches the min keylength. This centralizes this logic
and lets the application do interesting things.
Adds a policy for ECDSA group size checks.
Increases default policy minimums to 2048 RSA and 256 ECC.
(Maybe I'm an optimist after all.)
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Introduced a countermeasure against the logjam attack
Short TLS records (AES-CBC) now return BAD_RECORD_MAC
Fixed a compatibility problem with OpenSSL and TLS 1.0 (BEAST countermeasure)
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* --policy works for TLS Server and TLS Client
* Example policy BSI_TR-02102-2.txt
* Fine granular configuration for TLS 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and DTLS 1.0 and 1.2
* Minimum ecdh and rsa group size
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Previously the signature hashes and algos info was used to set the v1.2
signature_algorithms extension, but if the counterparty ignored the
extension and sent something else, we wouldn't notice.
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explicit.
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Remove SRP_SHA from the default policy, since normal applications do
not need it.
Removes nullptr initializers of unique_ptrs in the Server_Key_Exchange
constructor, that's the default unique_ptr already.
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The signature of the alert callback remains unchanged to avoid
breaking applications, though now the buffer parameter is never set.
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In some cases this can offer better optimization, via devirtualization.
And it lets the user know the class is not intended for derivation.
Some discussion in GH #402
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Interop tested with mbed TLS
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Only botan-cli, botan-tests and the FFI module depend on PKCS8
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Update license header line to specify the terms and refer to the file,
neither of which it included before.
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Github issue 27.
Refactor server hello handling to make it easier to handle other extensions.
The manual specified that 224 bit NIST primes were disabled by default
for TLS but they were not. Additionaly disable the 256k1 curve and
reorder the remaining curves by size.
Rewrite the max fragment length extension code to roughly what an
ideal compiler would have turned the original code into, using a
switch instead of a lookup into a small constant std::map.
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offer. Previously the client only checked a couple of special cases.
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