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Since this matters for some extensions
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- BoGo sends unparseable OCSP responses, so we have to accomodate for
this by delaying decoding until verification and simply ignoring
OCSP responses that we can't parse.
- Check that there is no trailing garbage at the end of various messages.
- Don't send empty SNI
- Check the TLS record header versions (previously ignored)
- For CBC 1/n-1 splitting split every record instead of just first.
I think this is not a problem but it is what BoGo expects.
- New Channel::application_protocol virtual (previously was
implemented on both Client and Server but not shared).
- Changes to resumption version handling.
- Fix server version selection when newer versions are disabled.
New policy hooks added in service of BoGo:
- maximum_certificate_chain_size gives the maximum cert chain in bytes
that we'll accept.
- allow_resumption_for_renegotiation specifies if a renegotiation
attempt can be simply (re-)resumed instead.
- abort_handshake_on_undesired_renegotiation - previously we just
ignored it with a warning alert. Now behavior is configurable.
- request_client_certificate_authentication
- require_client_certificate_authentication
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In the resumption case it would use that extension for any ECC ciphersuite,
but is only allowed to do so if the client sent the extension.
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GH #1186
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It was never supported and never will be. Removing negotiation entirely
simplifies the code a bit.
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Don't postpone the verification of a server certificate if certificate
status messages are not expected in client handshake. When using an
external crypto device it may be necessary to verify the certificate
before using the public key for verification of the signature in the
server key exchange message.
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Don't send EC point format extension in server hello unless an EC
suite was negotiated *and* the client sent the extension.
Fix server FFDHE logic, this effectively disabled DHE ciphersuites
for clients without FFDHE extension.
Use unexpected_message alert in case of an unexpected message.
(Previously an internal_error alert was sent.)
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TLS::Callbacks::inspect_handshake_message() allows applications
to inspect all handshake messages, but this requires
access to the types in tls_messages.h. As a matter of fact,
this also exports tls_extensions.h as a public header.
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Renames a couple of functions for somewhat better name consistency,
eg make_u32bit becomes make_uint32. The old typedefs remain for now
since probably lots of application code uses them.
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Several sites including oracle.com seem to send extension 11
(point format) even if we (the client) did not send it. Then the
handshake fails. To workaround this problem, simply always send this
extension as the client, instead of only sending it if we wished to
support compressed points.
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which recently landed on master.
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- Undid changes replacing Hanshake_IO, Handshake_Hash with
Handshake_Info.
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-reduced number of parameters in various methods
-reduced cyclomatic complexity (McCabe-Metric)
-removed "TLSEXT_HEARTBEAT_SUPPORT" from tls_extensions.h (leftover
from heartbeat extension removal?)
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Introduced a countermeasure against the logjam attack
Short TLS records (AES-CBC) now return BAD_RECORD_MAC
Fixed a compatibility problem with OpenSSL and TLS 1.0 (BEAST countermeasure)
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The signature of the alert callback remains unchanged to avoid
breaking applications, though now the buffer parameter is never set.
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fix PVS-Studio perfomance warnings
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Interop tested with mbed TLS
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Update license header line to specify the terms and refer to the file,
neither of which it included before.
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Github issue 27.
Refactor server hello handling to make it easier to handle other extensions.
The manual specified that 224 bit NIST primes were disabled by default
for TLS but they were not. Additionaly disable the 256k1 curve and
reorder the remaining curves by size.
Rewrite the max fragment length extension code to roughly what an
ideal compiler would have turned the original code into, using a
switch instead of a lookup into a small constant std::map.
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