| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Combine the fast and slow polls, into a single poll() operation.
Instead of being given a buffer to write output into, the EntropySource is
passed an Entropy_Accumulator. This handles the RLE encoding that xor_into_buf
used to do. It also contains a cached I/O buffer so entropy sources do not
individually need to allocate memory for that with each poll. When data
is added to the accumulator, the source specifies an estimate of the number
of bits of entropy per byte, as a double. This is tracked in the accumulator.
Once the estimated entropy hits a target (set by the constructor), the
accumulator's member function predicate polling_goal_achieved flips to true.
This signals to the PRNG that it can stop performing polling on sources,
also polls that take a long time periodically check this flag and return
immediately.
The Win32 and BeOS entropy sources have been updated, but blindly; testing
is needed.
The test_es example program has been modified: now it polls twice and outputs
the XOR of the two collected results. That helps show if the output is consistent
across polls (not a good thing). I have noticed on the Unix entropy source,
occasionally there are many 0x00 bytes in the output, which is not optimal.
This also needs to be investigated.
The RLE is not actually RLE anymore. It works well for non-random inputs
(ASCII text, etc), but I noticed that when /dev/random output was fed into
it, the output buffer would end up being RR01RR01RR01 where RR is a random
byte and 00 is the byte count.
The buffer sizing also needs to be examined carefully. It might be useful
to choose a prime number for the size to XOR stuff into, to help ensure an
even distribution of entropy across the entire buffer space. Or: feed it
all into a hash function?
This change should (perhaps with further modifications) help WRT the
concerns Zack W raised about the RNG on the monotone-dev list.
|
|
|
|
| |
pollers that grab basic statistical data to 32 bytes.
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
is requested, Randpool will first do a fast poll on each entropy
source that has been registered. It will count these poll results
towards the collected entropy count, with a maximum of 96
contributed bits of entropy per poll (only /dev/random reaches
this, others measure at 50-60 bits typically), and a maximum of
256 for sum contribution of the fast polls.
Then it will attempt slow polls of all devices until it thinks enough
entropy has been collected (using the rather naive entropy_estimate
function). It will count any slow poll for no more than 256 bits (100 or
so is typical for every poll but /dev/random), and will attempt to collect
at least 512 bits of (estimated/guessed) entropy.
This tends to cause Randpool to use significantly more
sources. Previously it was common, especially on systems with a
/dev/random, for only one or a few sources to be used. This
change helps assure that even if /dev/random and company are
broken or compromised the RNG output remains secure (assuming at
least some amount of entropy unguessable by the attacker can be
collected via other sources).
Also change AutoSeeded_RNG do an automatic poll/seed when it is
created.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
fd327b29aa542e0ad5ff6d37d8392321670f0369)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.modularized' (head 3f8d05493d4b192243fdc8a7f518ed1013c3be54)
|
|
|
|
|
| |
them modules now. In any case there is no distinction so info.txt seems
better.
|
| |
|
|
|