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* Make the process running entropy source much faster by running multiple commandslloyd2013-11-091-39/+0
| | | | | | | in parallel. On my laptop, a reseed using only process running takes .22 s wall clock in trunk and .06 s with this change - and that's after increasing the amount we read by 5 times (by reducing the entropy estimate per byte from .005 bits to 1/1024 bits).
* Use size_t instead of u32bit in entropy and rnglloyd2010-10-121-1/+1
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* Clean up the unix process running entropy source a little bit. Tweaklloyd2010-09-031-1/+1
| | | | | | priorities slightly, pushing netstat -s and netstat -an higher since they change freqently and don't have a huge amount of output. Use the -n flag with lsof, which inhibits name lookups which we don't need.
* Make many more headers internal-only.lloyd2009-12-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes for the amalgamation generator for internal headers. Remove BOTAN_DLL exporting macros from all internal-only headers; the classes/functions there don't need to be exported, and avoiding the PIC/GOT indirection can be a big win. Add missing BOTAN_DLLs where necessary, mostly gfpmath and cvc For GCC, use -fvisibility=hidden and set BOTAN_DLL to the visibility __attribute__ to export those classes/functions.
* Full working amalgamation build, plus internal-only headers concept.lloyd2009-12-161-1/+1
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* Thomas Moschny passed along a request from the Fedora packagers which camelloyd2009-03-301-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | up during the Fedora submission review, that each source file include some text about the license. One handy Perl script later and each file now has the line Distributed under the terms of the Botan license after the copyright notices. While I was in there modifying every file anyway, I also stripped out the remainder of the block comments (lots of astericks before and after the text); this is stylistic thing I picked up when I was first learning C++ but in retrospect it is not a good style as the structure makes it harder to modify comments (with the result that comments become fewer, shorter and are less likely to be updated, which are not good things).
* Check in a branch with a major redesign on how entropy polling is performed.lloyd2009-01-271-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Combine the fast and slow polls, into a single poll() operation. Instead of being given a buffer to write output into, the EntropySource is passed an Entropy_Accumulator. This handles the RLE encoding that xor_into_buf used to do. It also contains a cached I/O buffer so entropy sources do not individually need to allocate memory for that with each poll. When data is added to the accumulator, the source specifies an estimate of the number of bits of entropy per byte, as a double. This is tracked in the accumulator. Once the estimated entropy hits a target (set by the constructor), the accumulator's member function predicate polling_goal_achieved flips to true. This signals to the PRNG that it can stop performing polling on sources, also polls that take a long time periodically check this flag and return immediately. The Win32 and BeOS entropy sources have been updated, but blindly; testing is needed. The test_es example program has been modified: now it polls twice and outputs the XOR of the two collected results. That helps show if the output is consistent across polls (not a good thing). I have noticed on the Unix entropy source, occasionally there are many 0x00 bytes in the output, which is not optimal. This also needs to be investigated. The RLE is not actually RLE anymore. It works well for non-random inputs (ASCII text, etc), but I noticed that when /dev/random output was fed into it, the output buffer would end up being RR01RR01RR01 where RR is a random byte and 00 is the byte count. The buffer sizing also needs to be examined carefully. It might be useful to choose a prime number for the size to XOR stuff into, to help ensure an even distribution of entropy across the entire buffer space. Or: feed it all into a hash function? This change should (perhaps with further modifications) help WRT the concerns Zack W raised about the RNG on the monotone-dev list.
* Change unix_procs entropy source to be a plain EntropySource instead oflloyd2008-11-231-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | a Buffered_EntropySource. Data used in the poll is directly accumulated into the output buffer using XOR, wrapping around as needed. The implementation uses xor_into_buf from xor_buf.h This is simpler and more convincingly secure than the method used by Buffered_EntropySource. In particular the collected data is persisted in the buffer there much longer than needed. It is also much harder for entropy sources to signal errors or a failure to collected data using Buffered_EntropySource. And, with the simple xor_into_buf function, it is actually quite easy to remove without major changes.
* Substantially change Randpool's reseed logic. Now when a reseedlloyd2008-10-271-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | is requested, Randpool will first do a fast poll on each entropy source that has been registered. It will count these poll results towards the collected entropy count, with a maximum of 96 contributed bits of entropy per poll (only /dev/random reaches this, others measure at 50-60 bits typically), and a maximum of 256 for sum contribution of the fast polls. Then it will attempt slow polls of all devices until it thinks enough entropy has been collected (using the rather naive entropy_estimate function). It will count any slow poll for no more than 256 bits (100 or so is typical for every poll but /dev/random), and will attempt to collect at least 512 bits of (estimated/guessed) entropy. This tends to cause Randpool to use significantly more sources. Previously it was common, especially on systems with a /dev/random, for only one or a few sources to be used. This change helps assure that even if /dev/random and company are broken or compromised the RNG output remains secure (assuming at least some amount of entropy unguessable by the attacker can be collected via other sources). Also change AutoSeeded_RNG do an automatic poll/seed when it is created.
* Add BOTAN_DLL macro to public class definitions that were missing it.lloyd2008-10-091-1/+1
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* Move all modules into src/ directorylloyd2008-09-281-0/+35