| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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6332543aa5a8a4cc13662008ff9ac0f0016d9a4d)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.cxx11' (head 5517c9f8f6d1990f269afb94f569a97a80c5a5f4)
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was not the right size for a signature (following DSA). This would
silently convert to an empty vector which we would treat as a valid
message on the return. However the EMSA checks will always fail so not
a huge problem.
While checking this out I noticed that an empty value for EMSA4 would
result in us reading memory we didn't own.
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exceptions thrown in end_msg (for instance in CBC decryption when the
padding is bad) more or less screwed up the pipe completely. Allowing
reset here at least allows an escape hatch.
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-ivb_rdrnd_cpuid option to toggle the bit off and on. Fortunately on
Intel processors the bit we were actually checking is also enabled by
Ivy Bridge. However it is also used on AMD Bulldozer processors to
signal half-precision floating point support so we could false
positive there.
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didn't work on older GCC/binutils. Instead hardcode the expression for
rdrand %eax, which should work everywhere. Also, avoid including immintrin.h
unless we're going to use it, to avoid problems with older compilers that
lack that header (this caused build failures under GCC 3.4.6).
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isn't working here anyway, but also broke DSA servers.
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caused huge performance issues with DSA/ECDSA signing performance.
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implement Camellia's F function. Roughtly 60 - 80% speedup on Nehalem.
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processors. Tested using SDE on Linux with GCC 4.6, Intel C++ 11.1,
and Clang 3.0, all using the inline asm variant. I do not know if
current Visual C++ has the intrinsics available or not, so it's only
marked as available for those compilers at the moment.
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secmem.h. Mostly replaced by assign or copy_mem.
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with a custom allocator; remove the 3 argument version of
MemoryRegion::copy, replacing with freestanding buffer_insert
function.
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was using this, so no other changes needed.
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a4741cd07f50a9e1b29b0dd97c6fb8697c038ade)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.cxx11' (head 116e5ff139c07000be431e07d3472cc8f3919b91)
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494c5d548ce3f370c2b771ca6b11e5f41e720da2)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.tls-state-machine' (head b2cd26ff6f093caa79aecb2d674205f45b6aadff)
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fdbd3afd02bcb9b4a7702a922581580297add684)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.tls-state-machine' (head 5f2f96b909365dc6e0faeccc7fa59470721e807a)
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50fa70d871f837c3c3338fabf5fb45649669aabf)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.tls-state-machine' (head 2358daac57db0411e62da2ef5a484468cb9307b7)
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update. Increase DHE group size from 1536 to 2048 bits, which per
NIST/ECRYPT should be good to 2030 or so.
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renegotiation or not.
Save the hostname in the client so we can pull the session from the
session manager.
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channel, except NPN which is strictly a per-connection extension.
Makes life easier for servers. OpenSSL seems to behave the same way.
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resumption, which would cause failures if doing a renegotiation under
the same session (eg to refresh keys).
The peer_certs variable was not set until after the Session object was
created, meaning the session (or session ticket) would not include
client certs. Worse, they would be included in the next session saved,
so if a client presented one cert, then renegotiated and presented
another one, the first cert would be associated with the second
session!
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nothing meaningful to compare to.
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in response to a certificate request.
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encoded CA DN has a length field but also the entire block has one.
This caused decoding errors if we requested a certificate and sent one
or more DNs to request particular CAs. The decoding side had it correct.
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the peer are automatically responded to. TLS::Channel::heartbeat can
initiate a new heartbeat if the peer allows it. Heartbeat replies are
passed back to the application processing function with an Alert value
of HEARTBEAT_PAYLOAD (a 'fake' value, 256, which is out of range of
the valid TLS alert space), along with the sent payload.
The RFC requires us to have no more than one heartbeat 'in flight' at
a time, ie without getting a response (or a timeout in the case of
DTLS). Currently we do not prevent an application from requesting
more.
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Add SRP hooks in the examples
Fix next protocol support in the tls_server example.
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058444ec216dd9690938c82922d911df2da535b4)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.tls-state-machine' (head 54985e112aecb7b7c98a7dace924a2f704e6c9c1)
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Initial outline of server side SRP support. Need to figure out how to
transfer the v, b, B params from the server key exchange message to
the client key exchange. The DH variants do this by passing a
Private_Key via server_kex_key call, but wrapping SRP params in a
Private_Key really doesn't feel right. Not sure what to do here.
Possibly both SRP and DH should return a Key_Exchange_Material* that a
client key exchange knows how to dynamic cast on.
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1.0.1, only the certificate versions tested currently as OpenSSL
doesn't support anon SRP.
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91305e3daaae9ea8a1786daf058d961991c68251)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.tls-state-machine' (head 474a00b316f5b21a4e56033d4d990d87d9d3eed6)
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Make ciphersuite_list a free standing function
Now the Policy interface only contains actual policy hooks (no
non-virtual functions). Though choose_curve is a little dubious.
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seconds and report that value to the client in the NewSessionTicket
message. After that point, a session ticket is ignored and a full
renegotiation is forced.
Only send a new session ticket on a new session, or on a resumed
session where the client indicated it supports session tickets but for
whatever reason didn't send one in the hello. Perhaps in this case, we
should also remove the session from the session manager?
Clean up server selection of the ciphersuite a bit, all in an anon
function in tls_server instead of scattered over Server, Policy, and
Server_Hello.
Add Session::session_age and Session_Manager::session_lifetime
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against OpenSSL.
One big issue that needs to be resolved is that with these
ciphersuites available to be negotiated, we want to make sure they
only are used when the application/user expects them to. Problem is
that PSK and SRP are "anonymous" but authenticated via the shared
secret. We need to be able to distinguish these on a policy
level. Otherwise a MITM could simply offer anon DH, which would be
somewhat unfortunate. A client could detect this in the handshake
callback, but might not.
In the short term to ensure this doesn't occur, disable both anon DH
and PSK/SRP in the default policy.
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previously negotiating any MD5-based ciphersuite in TLS 1.2 would
cause MAC failures as the master secret would come out differently due
to using the wrong PRF.
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integer->info mapping to tls_suite_info.cpp which is mostly
autogenerated by a Python script from the IANA parameters file.
The SRP method now uses kex "SRP_SHA" which is what the RFC calls it.
(And hypothetically, SRP_SHA256 might be defined at some point and
we'd need to be able to distinguish them).
Remove IDEA ciphersuite; we don't want to require IDEA be available
due to the European patent still being valid (IIRC), but I didn't want
to have to hand-edit the autogenerated switch with an #if check. Not a
huge issue though as most sites don't support it anyway.
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Camellia exposed by the OpenSSL module is parameterized by the key
length, much as AES is, while the version in the main source uses a
single name/type for all variants. For consistency, convert to using a
key length parameterized name in our version as well. In the future
this might allow for better loop unrolling, etc but currently we don't
make use of that.
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was broken, and after fixing that and trying to compile the module it
becamse clear that the Qt mutex did not work at all with recent Qt
versions. Taking this as a clear indicator that it is not being used,
remove it.
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All reported by Patrick Pelletier.
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and '50fa70d871f837c3c3338fabf5fb45649669aabf'
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list of maintainer mode flags. It produces some very useful warnings,
but also a lot of noisy junk that I really don't care about.
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and 'bc49da394c675517b140a404c19094020d6e9d40'
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rather than one past the end. Reported by Stuart Maclean on the
mailing list.
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