diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/pk_pad')
-rw-r--r-- | src/pk_pad/eme1/eme1.cpp | 40 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/src/pk_pad/eme1/eme1.cpp b/src/pk_pad/eme1/eme1.cpp index d99ffaf58..9eab16d6c 100644 --- a/src/pk_pad/eme1/eme1.cpp +++ b/src/pk_pad/eme1/eme1.cpp @@ -1,12 +1,13 @@ /* -* EME1 -* (C) 1999-2007 Jack Lloyd +* EME1 (aka OAEP) +* (C) 1999-2010 Jack Lloyd * * Distributed under the terms of the Botan license */ #include <botan/eme1.h> #include <botan/mgf1.h> +#include <botan/mem_ops.h> #include <memory> namespace Botan { @@ -50,11 +51,17 @@ SecureVector<byte> EME1::unpad(const byte in[], u32bit in_length, find the secret key, as described in "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 v2.0", James Manger, Crypto 2001 + + Also have to be careful about timing attacks! Pointed out by Falko + Strenzke. */ key_length /= 8; + + // Invalid input: truncate to zero length input, causing later + // checks to fail if(in_length > key_length) - throw Decoding_Error("Invalid EME1 encoding"); + in_length = 0; SecureVector<byte> tmp(key_length); tmp.copy(key_length - in_length, in, in_length); @@ -62,20 +69,29 @@ SecureVector<byte> EME1::unpad(const byte in[], u32bit in_length, mgf->mask(tmp + HASH_LENGTH, tmp.size() - HASH_LENGTH, tmp, HASH_LENGTH); mgf->mask(tmp, HASH_LENGTH, tmp + HASH_LENGTH, tmp.size() - HASH_LENGTH); - for(u32bit j = 0; j != Phash.size(); ++j) - if(tmp[j+HASH_LENGTH] != Phash[j]) - throw Decoding_Error("Invalid EME1 encoding"); + const bool phash_ok = same_mem(&tmp[HASH_LENGTH], &Phash[0], Phash.size()); - for(u32bit j = HASH_LENGTH + Phash.size(); j != tmp.size(); ++j) + bool delim_ok = true; + u32bit delim_idx = 0; + + // Is this vulnerable to timing attacks? + for(u32bit i = HASH_LENGTH + Phash.size(); i != tmp.size(); ++i) { - if(tmp[j] && tmp[j] != 0x01) - throw Decoding_Error("Invalid EME1 encoding"); - if(tmp[j] && tmp[j] == 0x01) + if(tmp[i] && !delim_idx) { - SecureVector<byte> retval(tmp + j + 1, tmp.size() - j - 1); - return retval; + if(tmp[i] == 0x01) + delim_idx = i; + else + delim_ok = false; } } + + if(delim_idx && delim_ok && phash_ok) + { + return SecureVector<byte>(tmp + delim_idx + 1, + tmp.size() - delim_idx - 1); + } + throw Decoding_Error("Invalid EME1 encoding"); } |