diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/tls/tls_cbc/tls_cbc.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tls/tls_cbc/tls_cbc.cpp | 13 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tls_cbc/tls_cbc.cpp b/src/lib/tls/tls_cbc/tls_cbc.cpp index 69aa9725d..e0e631cc7 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tls_cbc/tls_cbc.cpp +++ b/src/lib/tls/tls_cbc/tls_cbc.cpp @@ -211,9 +211,6 @@ void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<uint8_t>& buffer, size_t } } -namespace { - - /* * Checks the TLS padding. Returns 0 if the padding is invalid (we * count the padding_length field as part of the padding size so a @@ -225,7 +222,7 @@ namespace { * Returning 0 in the error case should ensure the MAC check will fail. * This approach is suggested in section 6.2.3.2 of RFC 5246. */ -uint16_t check_tls_padding(const uint8_t record[], size_t record_len) +uint16_t check_tls_cbc_padding(const uint8_t record[], size_t record_len) { /* * TLS v1.0 and up require all the padding bytes be the same value @@ -246,8 +243,6 @@ uint16_t check_tls_padding(const uint8_t record[], size_t record_len) return CT::select<uint16_t>(pad_invalid_mask, 0, pad_byte + 1); } -} - void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption::cbc_decrypt_record(uint8_t record_contents[], size_t record_len) { BOTAN_ASSERT(record_len % block_size() == 0, @@ -315,7 +310,7 @@ size_t TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption::output_length(size_t) const * no compressions are performed. * * Note that the padding validation in Botan is always performed over -* min(plen,256) bytes, see the function check_tls_padding. This differs +* min(plen,256) bytes, see the function check_tls_cbc_padding. This differs * from the countermeasure described in the paper. * * Note that the padding length padlen does also count the last byte @@ -406,7 +401,7 @@ void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<uint8_t>& buffer, size_t cbc_decrypt_record(record_contents, enc_size); // 0 if padding was invalid, otherwise 1 + padding_bytes - uint16_t pad_size = check_tls_padding(record_contents, enc_size); + uint16_t pad_size = check_tls_cbc_padding(record_contents, enc_size); // No oracle here, whoever sent us this had the key since MAC check passed if(pad_size == 0) @@ -426,7 +421,7 @@ void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<uint8_t>& buffer, size_t CT::poison(record_contents, record_len); // 0 if padding was invalid, otherwise 1 + padding_bytes - uint16_t pad_size = check_tls_padding(record_contents, record_len); + uint16_t pad_size = check_tls_cbc_padding(record_contents, record_len); /* This mask is zero if there is not enough room in the packet to get a valid MAC. |