diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/pk_pad/eme_oaep/oaep.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/pk_pad/eme_oaep/oaep.cpp | 28 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_oaep/oaep.cpp b/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_oaep/oaep.cpp index f58254fdd..ef2fb81bb 100644 --- a/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_oaep/oaep.cpp +++ b/src/lib/pk_pad/eme_oaep/oaep.cpp @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ namespace Botan { /* * OAEP Pad Operation */ -secure_vector<byte> OAEP::pad(const byte in[], size_t in_length, +secure_vector<uint8_t> OAEP::pad(const uint8_t in[], size_t in_length, size_t key_length, RandomNumberGenerator& rng) const { @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ secure_vector<byte> OAEP::pad(const byte in[], size_t in_length, throw Invalid_Argument("OAEP: Input is too large"); } - secure_vector<byte> out(key_length); + secure_vector<uint8_t> out(key_length); rng.randomize(out.data(), m_Phash.size()); @@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ secure_vector<byte> OAEP::pad(const byte in[], size_t in_length, /* * OAEP Unpad Operation */ -secure_vector<byte> OAEP::unpad(byte& valid_mask, - const byte in[], size_t in_length) const +secure_vector<uint8_t> OAEP::unpad(uint8_t& valid_mask, + const uint8_t in[], size_t in_length) const { /* Must be careful about error messages here; if an attacker can @@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ secure_vector<byte> OAEP::unpad(byte& valid_mask, Therefore, the first byte can always be skipped safely. */ - byte skip_first = CT::is_zero<byte>(in[0]) & 0x01; + uint8_t skip_first = CT::is_zero<uint8_t>(in[0]) & 0x01; - secure_vector<byte> input(in + skip_first, in + in_length); + secure_vector<uint8_t> input(in + skip_first, in + in_length); CT::poison(input.data(), input.size()); @@ -87,26 +87,26 @@ secure_vector<byte> OAEP::unpad(byte& valid_mask, &input[hlen], input.size() - hlen); size_t delim_idx = 2 * hlen; - byte waiting_for_delim = 0xFF; - byte bad_input = 0; + uint8_t waiting_for_delim = 0xFF; + uint8_t bad_input = 0; for(size_t i = delim_idx; i < input.size(); ++i) { - const byte zero_m = CT::is_zero<byte>(input[i]); - const byte one_m = CT::is_equal<byte>(input[i], 1); + const uint8_t zero_m = CT::is_zero<uint8_t>(input[i]); + const uint8_t one_m = CT::is_equal<uint8_t>(input[i], 1); - const byte add_m = waiting_for_delim & zero_m; + const uint8_t add_m = waiting_for_delim & zero_m; bad_input |= waiting_for_delim & ~(zero_m | one_m); - delim_idx += CT::select<byte>(add_m, 1, 0); + delim_idx += CT::select<uint8_t>(add_m, 1, 0); waiting_for_delim &= zero_m; } // If we never saw any non-zero byte, then it's not valid input bad_input |= waiting_for_delim; - bad_input |= CT::is_equal<byte>(same_mem(&input[hlen], m_Phash.data(), hlen), false); + bad_input |= CT::is_equal<uint8_t>(same_mem(&input[hlen], m_Phash.data(), hlen), false); CT::unpoison(input.data(), input.size()); CT::unpoison(&bad_input, 1); @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ secure_vector<byte> OAEP::unpad(byte& valid_mask, valid_mask = ~bad_input; - secure_vector<byte> output(input.begin() + delim_idx + 1, input.end()); + secure_vector<uint8_t> output(input.begin() + delim_idx + 1, input.end()); CT::cond_zero_mem(bad_input, output.data(), output.size()); return output; |