diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/modes/aead')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/aead.cpp | 122 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/aead.h | 66 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/ccm.cpp | 266 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/ccm.h | 128 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/info.txt | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/eax/eax.cpp | 170 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/eax/eax.h | 114 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/eax/info.txt | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/clmul.cpp | 76 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/clmul.h | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/info.txt | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.cpp | 290 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.h | 150 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/info.txt | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/info.txt | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/info.txt | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/ocb.cpp | 432 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/ocb.h | 124 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/siv/info.txt | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/siv/siv.cpp | 180 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/modes/aead/siv/siv.h | 114 |
21 files changed, 2278 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/aead.cpp b/src/lib/modes/aead/aead.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..da860c26a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/aead.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* +* Interface for AEAD modes +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#include <botan/aead.h> +#include <botan/libstate.h> + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_CCM) + #include <botan/ccm.h> +#endif + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_EAX) + #include <botan/eax.h> +#endif + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_GCM) + #include <botan/gcm.h> +#endif + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_SIV) + #include <botan/siv.h> +#endif + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_OCB) + #include <botan/ocb.h> +#endif + +namespace Botan { + +AEAD_Mode* get_aead(const std::string& algo_spec, Cipher_Dir direction) + { + Algorithm_Factory& af = global_state().algorithm_factory(); + + const std::vector<std::string> algo_parts = split_on(algo_spec, '/'); + if(algo_parts.empty()) + throw Invalid_Algorithm_Name(algo_spec); + + if(algo_parts.size() < 2) + return nullptr; + + const std::string cipher_name = algo_parts[0]; + const BlockCipher* cipher = af.prototype_block_cipher(cipher_name); + if(!cipher) + return nullptr; + + const std::vector<std::string> mode_info = parse_algorithm_name(algo_parts[1]); + + if(mode_info.empty()) + return nullptr; + + const std::string mode_name = mode_info[0]; + + const size_t tag_size = (mode_info.size() > 1) ? to_u32bit(mode_info[1]) : cipher->block_size(); + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_CCM) + if(mode_name == "CCM-8") + { + if(direction == ENCRYPTION) + return new CCM_Encryption(cipher->clone(), 8, 3); + else + return new CCM_Decryption(cipher->clone(), 8, 3); + } + + if(mode_name == "CCM" || mode_name == "CCM-8") + { + const size_t L = (mode_info.size() > 2) ? to_u32bit(mode_info[2]) : 3; + + if(direction == ENCRYPTION) + return new CCM_Encryption(cipher->clone(), tag_size, L); + else + return new CCM_Decryption(cipher->clone(), tag_size, L); + } +#endif + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_EAX) + if(mode_name == "EAX") + { + if(direction == ENCRYPTION) + return new EAX_Encryption(cipher->clone(), tag_size); + else + return new EAX_Decryption(cipher->clone(), tag_size); + } +#endif + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_SIV) + if(mode_name == "SIV") + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(tag_size == 16, "Valid tag size for SIV"); + if(direction == ENCRYPTION) + return new SIV_Encryption(cipher->clone()); + else + return new SIV_Decryption(cipher->clone()); + } +#endif + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_GCM) + if(mode_name == "GCM") + { + if(direction == ENCRYPTION) + return new GCM_Encryption(cipher->clone(), tag_size); + else + return new GCM_Decryption(cipher->clone(), tag_size); + } +#endif + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_AEAD_OCB) + if(mode_name == "OCB") + { + if(direction == ENCRYPTION) + return new OCB_Encryption(cipher->clone(), tag_size); + else + return new OCB_Decryption(cipher->clone(), tag_size); + } +#endif + + return nullptr; + } + +} diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/aead.h b/src/lib/modes/aead/aead.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8df98fcad --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/aead.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* +* Interface for AEAD modes +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#ifndef BOTAN_AEAD_MODE_H__ +#define BOTAN_AEAD_MODE_H__ + +#include <botan/cipher_mode.h> + +namespace Botan { + +/** +* Interface for AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) +* modes. These modes provide both encryption and message +* authentication, and can authenticate additional per-message data +* which is not included in the ciphertext (for instance a sequence +* number). +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL AEAD_Mode : public Cipher_Mode + { + public: + bool authenticated() const override { return true; } + + /** + * Set associated data that is not included in the ciphertext but + * that should be authenticated. Must be called after set_key + * and before finish. + * + * Unless reset by another call, the associated data is kept + * between messages. Thus, if the AD does not change, calling + * once (after set_key) is the optimum. + * + * @param ad the associated data + * @param ad_len length of add in bytes + */ + virtual void set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len) = 0; + + template<typename Alloc> + void set_associated_data_vec(const std::vector<byte, Alloc>& ad) + { + set_associated_data(&ad[0], ad.size()); + } + + /** + * Default AEAD nonce size (a commonly supported value among AEAD + * modes, and large enough that random collisions are unlikely). + */ + size_t default_nonce_length() const override { return 12; } + + /** + * Return the size of the authentication tag used (in bytes) + */ + virtual size_t tag_size() const = 0; + }; + +/** +* Get an AEAD mode by name (eg "AES-128/GCM" or "Serpent/EAX") +*/ +BOTAN_DLL AEAD_Mode* get_aead(const std::string& name, Cipher_Dir direction); + +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/ccm.cpp b/src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/ccm.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..50fc38738 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/ccm.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +/* +* CCM Mode Encryption +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#include <botan/ccm.h> +#include <botan/parsing.h> +#include <botan/internal/xor_buf.h> +#include <algorithm> + +namespace Botan { + +/* +* CCM_Mode Constructor +*/ +CCM_Mode::CCM_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size, size_t L) : + m_tag_size(tag_size), + m_L(L), + m_cipher(cipher) + { + if(m_cipher->block_size() != BS) + throw std::invalid_argument(m_cipher->name() + " cannot be used with CCM mode"); + + if(L < 2 || L > 8) + throw std::invalid_argument("Invalid CCM L value " + std::to_string(L)); + + if(tag_size < 4 || tag_size > 16 || tag_size % 2 != 0) + throw std::invalid_argument("invalid CCM tag length " + std::to_string(tag_size)); + } + +void CCM_Mode::clear() + { + m_cipher.reset(); + m_msg_buf.clear(); + m_ad_buf.clear(); + } + +std::string CCM_Mode::name() const + { + return (m_cipher->name() + "/CCM(" + std::to_string(tag_size()) + "," + std::to_string(L())) + ")"; + } + +bool CCM_Mode::valid_nonce_length(size_t n) const + { + return (n == (15-L())); + } + +size_t CCM_Mode::default_nonce_length() const + { + return (15-L()); + } + +size_t CCM_Mode::update_granularity() const + { + /* + This value does not particularly matter as regardless CCM_Mode::update + buffers all input, so in theory this could be 1. However as for instance + Transformation_Filter creates update_granularity() byte buffers, use a + somewhat large size to avoid bouncing on a tiny buffer. + */ + return m_cipher->parallel_bytes(); + } + +Key_Length_Specification CCM_Mode::key_spec() const + { + return m_cipher->key_spec(); + } + +void CCM_Mode::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) + { + m_cipher->set_key(key, length); + } + +void CCM_Mode::set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t length) + { + m_ad_buf.clear(); + + if(length) + { + // FIXME: support larger AD using length encoding rules + BOTAN_ASSERT(length < (0xFFFF - 0xFF), "Supported CCM AD length"); + + m_ad_buf.push_back(get_byte<u16bit>(0, length)); + m_ad_buf.push_back(get_byte<u16bit>(1, length)); + m_ad_buf += std::make_pair(ad, length); + while(m_ad_buf.size() % BS) + m_ad_buf.push_back(0); // pad with zeros to full block size + } + } + +secure_vector<byte> CCM_Mode::start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) + { + if(!valid_nonce_length(nonce_len)) + throw Invalid_IV_Length(name(), nonce_len); + + m_nonce.assign(nonce, nonce + nonce_len); + m_msg_buf.clear(); + + return secure_vector<byte>(); + } + +void CCM_Mode::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + m_msg_buf.insert(m_msg_buf.end(), buf, buf + sz); + buffer.resize(offset); // truncate msg + } + +void CCM_Mode::encode_length(size_t len, byte out[]) + { + const size_t len_bytes = L(); + + BOTAN_ASSERT(len_bytes < sizeof(size_t), "Length field fits"); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != len_bytes; ++i) + out[i] = get_byte(sizeof(size_t)-i, len); + + BOTAN_ASSERT((len >> (len_bytes*8)) == 0, "Message length fits in field"); + } + +void CCM_Mode::inc(secure_vector<byte>& C) + { + for(size_t i = 0; i != C.size(); ++i) + if(++C[C.size()-i-1]) + break; + } + +secure_vector<byte> CCM_Mode::format_b0(size_t sz) + { + secure_vector<byte> B0(BS); + + const byte b_flags = (m_ad_buf.size() ? 64 : 0) + (((tag_size()/2)-1) << 3) + (L()-1); + + B0[0] = b_flags; + copy_mem(&B0[1], &m_nonce[0], m_nonce.size()); + encode_length(sz, &B0[m_nonce.size()+1]); + + return B0; + } + +secure_vector<byte> CCM_Mode::format_c0() + { + secure_vector<byte> C(BS); + + const byte a_flags = L()-1; + + C[0] = a_flags; + copy_mem(&C[1], &m_nonce[0], m_nonce.size()); + + return C; + } + +void CCM_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + + buffer.insert(buffer.begin() + offset, msg_buf().begin(), msg_buf().end()); + + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + const secure_vector<byte>& ad = ad_buf(); + BOTAN_ASSERT(ad.size() % BS == 0, "AD is block size multiple"); + + const BlockCipher& E = cipher(); + + secure_vector<byte> T(BS); + E.encrypt(format_b0(sz), T); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != ad.size(); i += BS) + { + xor_buf(&T[0], &ad[i], BS); + E.encrypt(T); + } + + secure_vector<byte> C = format_c0(); + secure_vector<byte> S0(BS); + E.encrypt(C, S0); + inc(C); + + secure_vector<byte> X(BS); + + const byte* buf_end = &buf[sz]; + + while(buf != buf_end) + { + const size_t to_proc = std::min<size_t>(BS, buf_end - buf); + + xor_buf(&T[0], buf, to_proc); + E.encrypt(T); + + E.encrypt(C, X); + xor_buf(buf, &X[0], to_proc); + inc(C); + + buf += to_proc; + } + + T ^= S0; + + buffer += std::make_pair(&T[0], tag_size()); + } + +void CCM_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + + buffer.insert(buffer.begin() + offset, msg_buf().begin(), msg_buf().end()); + + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + BOTAN_ASSERT(sz >= tag_size(), "We have the tag"); + + const secure_vector<byte>& ad = ad_buf(); + BOTAN_ASSERT(ad.size() % BS == 0, "AD is block size multiple"); + + const BlockCipher& E = cipher(); + + secure_vector<byte> T(BS); + E.encrypt(format_b0(sz - tag_size()), T); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != ad.size(); i += BS) + { + xor_buf(&T[0], &ad[i], BS); + E.encrypt(T); + } + + secure_vector<byte> C = format_c0(); + + secure_vector<byte> S0(BS); + E.encrypt(C, S0); + inc(C); + + secure_vector<byte> X(BS); + + const byte* buf_end = &buf[sz - tag_size()]; + + while(buf != buf_end) + { + const size_t to_proc = std::min<size_t>(BS, buf_end - buf); + + E.encrypt(C, X); + xor_buf(buf, &X[0], to_proc); + inc(C); + + xor_buf(&T[0], buf, to_proc); + E.encrypt(T); + + buf += to_proc; + } + + T ^= S0; + + if(!same_mem(&T[0], buf_end, tag_size())) + throw Integrity_Failure("CCM tag check failed"); + + buffer.resize(buffer.size() - tag_size()); + } + +} diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/ccm.h b/src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/ccm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..87dd5805c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/ccm.h @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* +* CCM Mode +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#ifndef BOTAN_AEAD_CCM_H__ +#define BOTAN_AEAD_CCM_H__ + +#include <botan/aead.h> +#include <botan/block_cipher.h> +#include <botan/stream_cipher.h> +#include <botan/mac.h> +#include <memory> + +namespace Botan { + +/** +* Base class for CCM encryption and decryption +* @see RFC 3610 +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL CCM_Mode : public AEAD_Mode + { + public: + secure_vector<byte> start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) override; + + void update(secure_vector<byte>& blocks, size_t offset = 0) override; + + void set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len) override; + + std::string name() const override; + + size_t update_granularity() const; + + Key_Length_Specification key_spec() const override; + + bool valid_nonce_length(size_t) const override; + + size_t default_nonce_length() const override; + + void clear(); + + size_t tag_size() const { return m_tag_size; } + + protected: + const size_t BS = 16; // intrinsic to CCM definition + + CCM_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size, size_t L); + + size_t L() const { return m_L; } + + const BlockCipher& cipher() const { return *m_cipher; } + + void encode_length(size_t len, byte out[]); + + void inc(secure_vector<byte>& C); + + const secure_vector<byte>& ad_buf() const { return m_ad_buf; } + + secure_vector<byte>& msg_buf() { return m_msg_buf; } + + secure_vector<byte> format_b0(size_t msg_size); + secure_vector<byte> format_c0(); + private: + void key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) override; + + const size_t m_tag_size; + const size_t m_L; + + std::unique_ptr<BlockCipher> m_cipher; + secure_vector<byte> m_nonce, m_msg_buf, m_ad_buf; + }; + +/** +* CCM Encryption +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL CCM_Encryption : public CCM_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher a 128-bit block cipher + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be (even values + * between 4 and 16 are accepted) + * @param L length of L parameter. The total message length + * must be less than 2**L bytes, and the nonce is 15-L bytes. + */ + CCM_Encryption(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size = 16, size_t L = 3) : + CCM_Mode(cipher, tag_size, L) {} + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { return input_length + tag_size(); } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return 0; } + }; + +/** +* CCM Decryption +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL CCM_Decryption : public CCM_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher a 128-bit block cipher + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be (even values + * between 4 and 16 are accepted) + * @param L length of L parameter. The total message length + * must be less than 2**L bytes, and the nonce is 15-L bytes. + */ + CCM_Decryption(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size = 16, size_t L = 3) : + CCM_Mode(cipher, tag_size, L) {} + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(input_length > tag_size(), "Sufficient input"); + return input_length - tag_size(); + } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return tag_size(); } + }; + +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/info.txt b/src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/info.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ee8373caf --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/ccm/info.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +define AEAD_CCM 20131128 diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/eax/eax.cpp b/src/lib/modes/aead/eax/eax.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..249bf5f7e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/eax/eax.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +/* +* EAX Mode Encryption +* (C) 1999-2007 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#include <botan/eax.h> +#include <botan/cmac.h> +#include <botan/ctr.h> +#include <botan/parsing.h> +#include <botan/internal/xor_buf.h> +#include <algorithm> + +namespace Botan { + +namespace { + +/* +* EAX MAC-based PRF +*/ +secure_vector<byte> eax_prf(byte tag, size_t block_size, + MessageAuthenticationCode& mac, + const byte in[], size_t length) + { + for(size_t i = 0; i != block_size - 1; ++i) + mac.update(0); + mac.update(tag); + mac.update(in, length); + return mac.final(); + } + +} + +/* +* EAX_Mode Constructor +*/ +EAX_Mode::EAX_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size) : + m_tag_size(tag_size ? tag_size : cipher->block_size()), + m_cipher(cipher), + m_ctr(new CTR_BE(m_cipher->clone())), + m_cmac(new CMAC(m_cipher->clone())) + { + if(m_tag_size < 8 || m_tag_size > m_cmac->output_length()) + throw Invalid_Argument(name() + ": Bad tag size " + std::to_string(tag_size)); + } + +void EAX_Mode::clear() + { + m_cipher.reset(); + m_ctr.reset(); + m_cmac.reset(); + zeroise(m_ad_mac); + zeroise(m_nonce_mac); + } + +std::string EAX_Mode::name() const + { + return (m_cipher->name() + "/EAX"); + } + +size_t EAX_Mode::update_granularity() const + { + return 8 * m_cipher->parallel_bytes(); + } + +Key_Length_Specification EAX_Mode::key_spec() const + { + return m_cipher->key_spec(); + } + +/* +* Set the EAX key +*/ +void EAX_Mode::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) + { + /* + * These could share the key schedule, which is one nice part of EAX, + * but it's much easier to ignore that here... + */ + m_ctr->set_key(key, length); + m_cmac->set_key(key, length); + + m_ad_mac = eax_prf(1, block_size(), *m_cmac, nullptr, 0); + } + +/* +* Set the EAX associated data +*/ +void EAX_Mode::set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t length) + { + m_ad_mac = eax_prf(1, block_size(), *m_cmac, ad, length); + } + +secure_vector<byte> EAX_Mode::start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) + { + if(!valid_nonce_length(nonce_len)) + throw Invalid_IV_Length(name(), nonce_len); + + m_nonce_mac = eax_prf(0, block_size(), *m_cmac, nonce, nonce_len); + + m_ctr->set_iv(&m_nonce_mac[0], m_nonce_mac.size()); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != block_size() - 1; ++i) + m_cmac->update(0); + m_cmac->update(2); + + return secure_vector<byte>(); + } + +void EAX_Encryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, sz); + m_cmac->update(buf, sz); + } + +void EAX_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + update(buffer, offset); + + secure_vector<byte> data_mac = m_cmac->final(); + xor_buf(data_mac, m_nonce_mac, data_mac.size()); + xor_buf(data_mac, m_ad_mac, data_mac.size()); + + buffer += std::make_pair(&data_mac[0], tag_size()); + } + +void EAX_Decryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + m_cmac->update(buf, sz); + m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, sz); + } + +void EAX_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + BOTAN_ASSERT(sz >= tag_size(), "Have the tag as part of final input"); + + const size_t remaining = sz - tag_size(); + + if(remaining) + { + m_cmac->update(buf, remaining); + m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, remaining); + } + + const byte* included_tag = &buf[remaining]; + + secure_vector<byte> mac = m_cmac->final(); + mac ^= m_nonce_mac; + mac ^= m_ad_mac; + + if(!same_mem(&mac[0], included_tag, tag_size())) + throw Integrity_Failure("EAX tag check failed"); + + buffer.resize(offset + remaining); + } + +} diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/eax/eax.h b/src/lib/modes/aead/eax/eax.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..224fb5298 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/eax/eax.h @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* +* EAX Mode +* (C) 1999-2007,2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#ifndef BOTAN_AEAD_EAX_H__ +#define BOTAN_AEAD_EAX_H__ + +#include <botan/aead.h> +#include <botan/block_cipher.h> +#include <botan/stream_cipher.h> +#include <botan/mac.h> +#include <memory> + +namespace Botan { + +/** +* EAX base class +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL EAX_Mode : public AEAD_Mode + { + public: + secure_vector<byte> start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) override; + + void set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len) override; + + std::string name() const override; + + size_t update_granularity() const; + + Key_Length_Specification key_spec() const override; + + // EAX supports arbitrary nonce lengths + bool valid_nonce_length(size_t) const override { return true; } + + size_t tag_size() const { return m_tag_size; } + + void clear(); + protected: + void key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) override; + + /** + * @param cipher the cipher to use + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be + */ + EAX_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size); + + size_t block_size() const { return m_cipher->block_size(); } + + size_t m_tag_size; + + std::unique_ptr<BlockCipher> m_cipher; + std::unique_ptr<StreamCipher> m_ctr; + std::unique_ptr<MessageAuthenticationCode> m_cmac; + + secure_vector<byte> m_ad_mac; + + secure_vector<byte> m_nonce_mac; + }; + +/** +* EAX Encryption +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL EAX_Encryption : public EAX_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher a 128-bit block cipher + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be + */ + EAX_Encryption(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size = 0) : + EAX_Mode(cipher, tag_size) {} + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { return input_length + tag_size(); } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return 0; } + + void update(secure_vector<byte>& blocks, size_t offset = 0) override; + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + }; + +/** +* EAX Decryption +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL EAX_Decryption : public EAX_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher a 128-bit block cipher + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be + */ + EAX_Decryption(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size = 0) : + EAX_Mode(cipher, tag_size) {} + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(input_length > tag_size(), "Sufficient input"); + return input_length - tag_size(); + } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return tag_size(); } + + void update(secure_vector<byte>& blocks, size_t offset = 0) override; + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + }; + +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/eax/info.txt b/src/lib/modes/aead/eax/info.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..75775fa16 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/eax/info.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +define AEAD_EAX 20131128 + +<requires> +block +cmac +ctr +</requires> diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/clmul.cpp b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/clmul.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cc6d581e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/clmul.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* +* CLMUL hook +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#include <botan/internal/clmul.h> +#include <immintrin.h> + +namespace Botan { + +void gcm_multiply_clmul(byte x[16], const byte H[16]) + { + /* + * Algorithms 1 and 5 from Intel's CLMUL guide + */ + const __m128i BSWAP_MASK = _mm_set_epi8(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15); + + __m128i a = _mm_loadu_si128(reinterpret_cast<const __m128i*>(&x[0])); + __m128i b = _mm_loadu_si128(reinterpret_cast<const __m128i*>(&H[0])); + + a = _mm_shuffle_epi8(a, BSWAP_MASK); + b = _mm_shuffle_epi8(b, BSWAP_MASK); + + __m128i T0, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5; + + T0 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x00); + T1 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x01); + T2 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x10); + T3 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x11); + + T1 = _mm_xor_si128(T1, T2); + T2 = _mm_slli_si128(T1, 8); + T1 = _mm_srli_si128(T1, 8); + T0 = _mm_xor_si128(T0, T2); + T3 = _mm_xor_si128(T3, T1); + + T4 = _mm_srli_epi32(T0, 31); + T0 = _mm_slli_epi32(T0, 1); + + T5 = _mm_srli_epi32(T3, 31); + T3 = _mm_slli_epi32(T3, 1); + + T2 = _mm_srli_si128(T4, 12); + T5 = _mm_slli_si128(T5, 4); + T4 = _mm_slli_si128(T4, 4); + T0 = _mm_or_si128(T0, T4); + T3 = _mm_or_si128(T3, T5); + T3 = _mm_or_si128(T3, T2); + + T4 = _mm_slli_epi32(T0, 31); + T5 = _mm_slli_epi32(T0, 30); + T2 = _mm_slli_epi32(T0, 25); + + T4 = _mm_xor_si128(T4, T5); + T4 = _mm_xor_si128(T4, T2); + T5 = _mm_srli_si128(T4, 4); + T3 = _mm_xor_si128(T3, T5); + T4 = _mm_slli_si128(T4, 12); + T0 = _mm_xor_si128(T0, T4); + T3 = _mm_xor_si128(T3, T0); + + T4 = _mm_srli_epi32(T0, 1); + T1 = _mm_srli_epi32(T0, 2); + T2 = _mm_srli_epi32(T0, 7); + T3 = _mm_xor_si128(T3, T1); + T3 = _mm_xor_si128(T3, T2); + T3 = _mm_xor_si128(T3, T4); + + T3 = _mm_shuffle_epi8(T3, BSWAP_MASK); + + _mm_storeu_si128(reinterpret_cast<__m128i*>(&x[0]), T3); + } + +} diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/clmul.h b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/clmul.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ba197f2f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/clmul.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* +* CLMUL hook +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#include <botan/types.h> + +namespace Botan { + +void gcm_multiply_clmul(byte x[16], const byte H[16]); + +} diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/info.txt b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/info.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8a21b6ac2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/clmul/info.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + +define GCM_CLMUL 20131227 + +need_isa clmul,ssse3 + +<header:internal> +clmul.h +</header:internal> diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.cpp b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b39e6ac92 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +/* +* GCM Mode Encryption +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#include <botan/gcm.h> +#include <botan/ctr.h> +#include <botan/internal/xor_buf.h> +#include <botan/loadstor.h> + +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_GCM_CLMUL) + #include <botan/internal/clmul.h> + #include <botan/cpuid.h> +#endif + +namespace Botan { + +void GHASH::gcm_multiply(secure_vector<byte>& x) const + { +#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_GCM_CLMUL) + if(CPUID::has_clmul()) + return gcm_multiply_clmul(&x[0], &m_H[0]); +#endif + + static const u64bit R = 0xE100000000000000; + + u64bit H[2] = { + load_be<u64bit>(&m_H[0], 0), + load_be<u64bit>(&m_H[0], 1) + }; + + u64bit Z[2] = { 0, 0 }; + + // SSE2 might be useful here + + for(size_t i = 0; i != 2; ++i) + { + const u64bit X = load_be<u64bit>(&x[0], i); + + for(size_t j = 0; j != 64; ++j) + { + if((X >> (63-j)) & 1) + { + Z[0] ^= H[0]; + Z[1] ^= H[1]; + } + + const u64bit r = (H[1] & 1) ? R : 0; + + H[1] = (H[0] << 63) | (H[1] >> 1); + H[0] = (H[0] >> 1) ^ r; + } + } + + store_be<u64bit>(&x[0], Z[0], Z[1]); + } + +void GHASH::ghash_update(secure_vector<byte>& ghash, + const byte input[], size_t length) + { + const size_t BS = 16; + + /* + This assumes if less than block size input then we're just on the + final block and should pad with zeros + */ + while(length) + { + const size_t to_proc = std::min(length, BS); + + xor_buf(&ghash[0], &input[0], to_proc); + + gcm_multiply(ghash); + + input += to_proc; + length -= to_proc; + } + } + +void GHASH::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) + { + m_H.assign(key, key+length); + m_H_ad.resize(16); + m_ad_len = 0; + m_text_len = 0; + } + +void GHASH::start(const byte nonce[], size_t len) + { + m_nonce.assign(nonce, nonce + len); + m_ghash = m_H_ad; + } + +void GHASH::set_associated_data(const byte input[], size_t length) + { + zeroise(m_H_ad); + + ghash_update(m_H_ad, input, length); + m_ad_len = length; + } + +void GHASH::update(const byte input[], size_t length) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(m_ghash.size() == 16, "Key was set"); + + m_text_len += length; + + ghash_update(m_ghash, input, length); + } + +void GHASH::add_final_block(secure_vector<byte>& hash, + size_t ad_len, size_t text_len) + { + secure_vector<byte> final_block(16); + store_be<u64bit>(&final_block[0], 8*ad_len, 8*text_len); + ghash_update(hash, &final_block[0], final_block.size()); + } + +secure_vector<byte> GHASH::final() + { + add_final_block(m_ghash, m_ad_len, m_text_len); + + secure_vector<byte> mac; + mac.swap(m_ghash); + + mac ^= m_nonce; + m_text_len = 0; + return mac; + } + +secure_vector<byte> GHASH::nonce_hash(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(m_ghash.size() == 0, "nonce_hash called during wrong time"); + secure_vector<byte> y0(16); + + ghash_update(y0, nonce, nonce_len); + add_final_block(y0, 0, nonce_len); + + return y0; + } + +void GHASH::clear() + { + zeroise(m_H); + zeroise(m_H_ad); + m_ghash.clear(); + m_text_len = m_ad_len = 0; + } + +/* +* GCM_Mode Constructor +*/ +GCM_Mode::GCM_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size) : + m_tag_size(tag_size), + m_cipher_name(cipher->name()) + { + if(cipher->block_size() != BS) + throw std::invalid_argument("GCM requires a 128 bit cipher so cannot be used with " + + cipher->name()); + + m_ghash.reset(new GHASH); + + m_ctr.reset(new CTR_BE(cipher)); // CTR_BE takes ownership of cipher + + if(m_tag_size != 8 && m_tag_size != 16) + throw Invalid_Argument(name() + ": Bad tag size " + std::to_string(m_tag_size)); + } + +void GCM_Mode::clear() + { + m_ctr->clear(); + m_ghash->clear(); + } + +std::string GCM_Mode::name() const + { + return (m_cipher_name + "/GCM"); + } + +size_t GCM_Mode::update_granularity() const + { + return 4096; // CTR-BE's internal block size + } + +Key_Length_Specification GCM_Mode::key_spec() const + { + return m_ctr->key_spec(); + } + +void GCM_Mode::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t keylen) + { + m_ctr->set_key(key, keylen); + + const std::vector<byte> zeros(BS); + m_ctr->set_iv(&zeros[0], zeros.size()); + + secure_vector<byte> H(BS); + m_ctr->encipher(H); + m_ghash->set_key(H); + } + +void GCM_Mode::set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len) + { + m_ghash->set_associated_data(ad, ad_len); + } + +secure_vector<byte> GCM_Mode::start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) + { + if(!valid_nonce_length(nonce_len)) + throw Invalid_IV_Length(name(), nonce_len); + + secure_vector<byte> y0(BS); + + if(nonce_len == 12) + { + copy_mem(&y0[0], nonce, nonce_len); + y0[15] = 1; + } + else + { + y0 = m_ghash->nonce_hash(nonce, nonce_len); + } + + m_ctr->set_iv(&y0[0], y0.size()); + + secure_vector<byte> m_enc_y0(BS); + m_ctr->encipher(m_enc_y0); + + m_ghash->start(&m_enc_y0[0], m_enc_y0.size()); + + return secure_vector<byte>(); + } + +void GCM_Encryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, sz); + m_ghash->update(buf, sz); + } + +void GCM_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + update(buffer, offset); + auto mac = m_ghash->final(); + buffer += std::make_pair(&mac[0], tag_size()); + } + +void GCM_Decryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + m_ghash->update(buf, sz); + m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, sz); + } + +void GCM_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + BOTAN_ASSERT(sz >= tag_size(), "Have the tag as part of final input"); + + const size_t remaining = sz - tag_size(); + + // handle any final input before the tag + if(remaining) + { + m_ghash->update(buf, remaining); + m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, remaining); + } + + auto mac = m_ghash->final(); + + const byte* included_tag = &buffer[remaining]; + + if(!same_mem(&mac[0], included_tag, tag_size())) + throw Integrity_Failure("GCM tag check failed"); + + buffer.resize(offset + remaining); + } + +} diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.h b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..12d66a3d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.h @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* +* GCM Mode +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#ifndef BOTAN_AEAD_GCM_H__ +#define BOTAN_AEAD_GCM_H__ + +#include <botan/aead.h> +#include <botan/block_cipher.h> +#include <botan/stream_cipher.h> +#include <memory> + +namespace Botan { + +class GHASH; + +/** +* GCM Mode +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL GCM_Mode : public AEAD_Mode + { + public: + secure_vector<byte> start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) override; + + void set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len) override; + + std::string name() const override; + + size_t update_granularity() const; + + Key_Length_Specification key_spec() const override; + + // GCM supports arbitrary nonce lengths + bool valid_nonce_length(size_t) const override { return true; } + + size_t tag_size() const { return m_tag_size; } + + void clear(); + protected: + void key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) override; + + GCM_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size); + + const size_t BS = 16; + + const size_t m_tag_size; + const std::string m_cipher_name; + + std::unique_ptr<StreamCipher> m_ctr; + std::unique_ptr<GHASH> m_ghash; + }; + +/** +* GCM Encryption +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL GCM_Encryption : public GCM_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher the 128 bit block cipher to use + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be + */ + GCM_Encryption(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size = 16) : + GCM_Mode(cipher, tag_size) {} + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { return input_length + tag_size(); } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return 0; } + + void update(secure_vector<byte>& blocks, size_t offset = 0) override; + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + }; + +/** +* GCM Decryption +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL GCM_Decryption : public GCM_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher the 128 bit block cipher to use + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be + */ + GCM_Decryption(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size = 16) : + GCM_Mode(cipher, tag_size) {} + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(input_length > tag_size(), "Sufficient input"); + return input_length - tag_size(); + } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return tag_size(); } + + void update(secure_vector<byte>& blocks, size_t offset = 0) override; + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + }; + +/** +* GCM's GHASH +* Maybe a Transform? +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL GHASH : public SymmetricAlgorithm + { + public: + void set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len); + + secure_vector<byte> nonce_hash(const byte nonce[], size_t len); + + void start(const byte nonce[], size_t len); + + /* + * Assumes input len is multiple of 16 + */ + void update(const byte in[], size_t len); + + secure_vector<byte> final(); + + Key_Length_Specification key_spec() const { return Key_Length_Specification(16); } + + void clear(); + + std::string name() const { return "GHASH"; } + private: + void key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t key_len) override; + + void gcm_multiply(secure_vector<byte>& x) const; + + void ghash_update(secure_vector<byte>& x, + const byte input[], size_t input_len); + + void add_final_block(secure_vector<byte>& x, + size_t ad_len, size_t pt_len); + + secure_vector<byte> m_H; + secure_vector<byte> m_H_ad; + secure_vector<byte> m_nonce; + secure_vector<byte> m_ghash; + size_t m_ad_len = 0, m_text_len = 0; + }; + +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/info.txt b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/info.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cf5f68bb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/info.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +define AEAD_GCM 20131128 + +<requires> +block +ctr +</requires> diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/info.txt b/src/lib/modes/aead/info.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..102f05b7b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/info.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +define AEAD_MODES 20131128 diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/info.txt b/src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/info.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..be4cefdd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/info.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +define AEAD_OCB 20131128 + +<requires> +block +cmac +</requires> diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/ocb.cpp b/src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/ocb.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fd66bb2e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/ocb.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,432 @@ +/* +* OCB Mode +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#include <botan/ocb.h> +#include <botan/cmac.h> +#include <botan/internal/xor_buf.h> +#include <botan/internal/bit_ops.h> +#include <algorithm> + +namespace Botan { + +namespace { + +const size_t BS = 16; // intrinsic to OCB definition + +} + +// Has to be in Botan namespace so unique_ptr can reference it +class L_computer + { + public: + L_computer(const BlockCipher& cipher) + { + m_L_star.resize(cipher.block_size()); + cipher.encrypt(m_L_star); + m_L_dollar = poly_double(star()); + m_L.push_back(poly_double(dollar())); + } + + const secure_vector<byte>& star() const { return m_L_star; } + + const secure_vector<byte>& dollar() const { return m_L_dollar; } + + const secure_vector<byte>& operator()(size_t i) const { return get(i); } + + const secure_vector<byte>& compute_offsets(secure_vector<byte>& offset, + size_t block_index, + size_t blocks) const + { + m_offset_buf.resize(blocks*BS); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != blocks; ++i) + { // could be done in parallel + offset ^= get(ctz(block_index + 1 + i)); + copy_mem(&m_offset_buf[BS*i], &offset[0], BS); + } + + return m_offset_buf; + } + + private: + const secure_vector<byte>& get(size_t i) const + { + while(m_L.size() <= i) + m_L.push_back(poly_double(m_L.back())); + + return m_L.at(i); + } + + secure_vector<byte> poly_double(const secure_vector<byte>& in) const + { + return CMAC::poly_double(in, 0x87); + } + + secure_vector<byte> m_L_dollar, m_L_star; + mutable std::vector<secure_vector<byte>> m_L; + mutable secure_vector<byte> m_offset_buf; + }; + +namespace { + +/* +* OCB's HASH +*/ +secure_vector<byte> ocb_hash(const L_computer& L, + const BlockCipher& cipher, + const byte ad[], size_t ad_len) + { + secure_vector<byte> sum(BS); + secure_vector<byte> offset(BS); + + secure_vector<byte> buf(BS); + + const size_t ad_blocks = (ad_len / BS); + const size_t ad_remainder = (ad_len % BS); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != ad_blocks; ++i) + { + // this loop could run in parallel + offset ^= L(ctz(i+1)); + + buf = offset; + xor_buf(&buf[0], &ad[BS*i], BS); + + cipher.encrypt(buf); + + sum ^= buf; + } + + if(ad_remainder) + { + offset ^= L.star(); + + buf = offset; + xor_buf(&buf[0], &ad[BS*ad_blocks], ad_remainder); + buf[ad_len % BS] ^= 0x80; + + cipher.encrypt(buf); + + sum ^= buf; + } + + return sum; + } + +} + +OCB_Mode::OCB_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size) : + m_cipher(cipher), + m_checksum(m_cipher->parallel_bytes()), + m_offset(BS), + m_ad_hash(BS), + m_tag_size(tag_size) + { + if(m_cipher->block_size() != BS) + throw std::invalid_argument("OCB requires a 128 bit cipher so cannot be used with " + + m_cipher->name()); + + if(m_tag_size != 8 && m_tag_size != 12 && m_tag_size != 16) + throw std::invalid_argument("OCB cannot produce a " + std::to_string(m_tag_size) + + " byte tag"); + + } + +OCB_Mode::~OCB_Mode() { /* for unique_ptr destructor */ } + +void OCB_Mode::clear() + { + m_cipher.reset(); + m_L.reset(); + + zeroise(m_ad_hash); + zeroise(m_offset); + zeroise(m_checksum); + } + +bool OCB_Mode::valid_nonce_length(size_t length) const + { + return (length > 0 && length < 16); + } + +std::string OCB_Mode::name() const + { + return m_cipher->name() + "/OCB"; // include tag size + } + +size_t OCB_Mode::update_granularity() const + { + return m_cipher->parallel_bytes(); + } + +Key_Length_Specification OCB_Mode::key_spec() const + { + return m_cipher->key_spec(); + } + +void OCB_Mode::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) + { + m_cipher->set_key(key, length); + m_L.reset(new L_computer(*m_cipher)); + } + +void OCB_Mode::set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(m_L, "A key was set"); + m_ad_hash = ocb_hash(*m_L, *m_cipher, &ad[0], ad_len); + } + +secure_vector<byte> +OCB_Mode::update_nonce(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(nonce_len < BS, "Nonce is less than 128 bits"); + + secure_vector<byte> nonce_buf(BS); + + copy_mem(&nonce_buf[BS - nonce_len], nonce, nonce_len); + nonce_buf[0] = ((tag_size() * 8) % 128) << 1; + nonce_buf[BS - nonce_len - 1] = 1; + + const byte bottom = nonce_buf[15] & 0x3F; + nonce_buf[15] &= 0xC0; + + const bool need_new_stretch = (m_last_nonce != nonce_buf); + + if(need_new_stretch) + { + m_last_nonce = nonce_buf; + + m_cipher->encrypt(nonce_buf); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != 8; ++i) + nonce_buf.push_back(nonce_buf[i] ^ nonce_buf[i+1]); + + m_stretch = nonce_buf; + } + + // now set the offset from stretch and bottom + + const size_t shift_bytes = bottom / 8; + const size_t shift_bits = bottom % 8; + + secure_vector<byte> offset(BS); + for(size_t i = 0; i != BS; ++i) + { + offset[i] = (m_stretch[i+shift_bytes] << shift_bits); + offset[i] |= (m_stretch[i+shift_bytes+1] >> (8-shift_bits)); + } + + return offset; + } + +secure_vector<byte> OCB_Mode::start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) + { + if(!valid_nonce_length(nonce_len)) + throw Invalid_IV_Length(name(), nonce_len); + + BOTAN_ASSERT(m_L, "A key was set"); + + m_offset = update_nonce(nonce, nonce_len); + zeroise(m_checksum); + m_block_index = 0; + + return secure_vector<byte>(); + } + +void OCB_Encryption::encrypt(byte buffer[], size_t blocks) + { + const L_computer& L = *m_L; // convenient name + + const size_t par_blocks = m_checksum.size() / BS; + + while(blocks) + { + const size_t proc_blocks = std::min(blocks, par_blocks); + const size_t proc_bytes = proc_blocks * BS; + + const auto& offsets = L.compute_offsets(m_offset, m_block_index, proc_blocks); + + xor_buf(&m_checksum[0], &buffer[0], proc_bytes); + + xor_buf(&buffer[0], &offsets[0], proc_bytes); + m_cipher->encrypt_n(&buffer[0], &buffer[0], proc_blocks); + xor_buf(&buffer[0], &offsets[0], proc_bytes); + + buffer += proc_bytes; + blocks -= proc_blocks; + m_block_index += proc_blocks; + } + } + +void OCB_Encryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + BOTAN_ASSERT(sz % BS == 0, "Input length is an even number of blocks"); + + encrypt(buf, sz / BS); + } + +void OCB_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + if(sz) + { + const size_t final_full_blocks = sz / BS; + const size_t remainder_bytes = sz - (final_full_blocks * BS); + + encrypt(buf, final_full_blocks); + + if(remainder_bytes) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(remainder_bytes < BS, "Only a partial block left"); + byte* remainder = &buf[sz - remainder_bytes]; + + xor_buf(&m_checksum[0], &remainder[0], remainder_bytes); + m_checksum[remainder_bytes] ^= 0x80; + + m_offset ^= m_L->star(); // Offset_* + + secure_vector<byte> buf(BS); + m_cipher->encrypt(m_offset, buf); + xor_buf(&remainder[0], &buf[0], remainder_bytes); + } + } + + secure_vector<byte> checksum(BS); + + // fold checksum + for(size_t i = 0; i != m_checksum.size(); ++i) + checksum[i % checksum.size()] ^= m_checksum[i]; + + // now compute the tag + secure_vector<byte> mac = m_offset; + mac ^= checksum; + mac ^= m_L->dollar(); + + m_cipher->encrypt(mac); + + mac ^= m_ad_hash; + + buffer += std::make_pair(&mac[0], tag_size()); + + zeroise(m_checksum); + zeroise(m_offset); + m_block_index = 0; + } + +void OCB_Decryption::decrypt(byte buffer[], size_t blocks) + { + const L_computer& L = *m_L; // convenient name + + const size_t par_bytes = m_cipher->parallel_bytes(); + + BOTAN_ASSERT(par_bytes % BS == 0, "Cipher is parallel in full blocks"); + + const size_t par_blocks = par_bytes / BS; + + while(blocks) + { + const size_t proc_blocks = std::min(blocks, par_blocks); + const size_t proc_bytes = proc_blocks * BS; + + const auto& offsets = L.compute_offsets(m_offset, m_block_index, proc_blocks); + + xor_buf(&buffer[0], &offsets[0], proc_bytes); + m_cipher->decrypt_n(&buffer[0], &buffer[0], proc_blocks); + xor_buf(&buffer[0], &offsets[0], proc_bytes); + + xor_buf(&m_checksum[0], &buffer[0], proc_bytes); + + buffer += proc_bytes; + blocks -= proc_blocks; + m_block_index += proc_blocks; + } + } + +void OCB_Decryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + BOTAN_ASSERT(sz % BS == 0, "Input length is an even number of blocks"); + + decrypt(buf, sz / BS); + } + +void OCB_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + BOTAN_ASSERT(sz >= tag_size(), "We have the tag"); + + const size_t remaining = sz - tag_size(); + + if(remaining) + { + const size_t final_full_blocks = remaining / BS; + const size_t final_bytes = remaining - (final_full_blocks * BS); + + decrypt(&buf[0], final_full_blocks); + + if(final_bytes) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(final_bytes < BS, "Only a partial block left"); + + byte* remainder = &buf[remaining - final_bytes]; + + m_offset ^= m_L->star(); // Offset_* + + secure_vector<byte> pad(BS); + m_cipher->encrypt(m_offset, pad); // P_* + + xor_buf(&remainder[0], &pad[0], final_bytes); + + xor_buf(&m_checksum[0], &remainder[0], final_bytes); + m_checksum[final_bytes] ^= 0x80; + } + } + + secure_vector<byte> checksum(BS); + + // fold checksum + for(size_t i = 0; i != m_checksum.size(); ++i) + checksum[i % checksum.size()] ^= m_checksum[i]; + + // compute the mac + secure_vector<byte> mac = m_offset; + mac ^= checksum; + mac ^= m_L->dollar(); + + m_cipher->encrypt(mac); + + mac ^= m_ad_hash; + + // reset state + zeroise(m_checksum); + zeroise(m_offset); + m_block_index = 0; + + // compare mac + const byte* included_tag = &buf[remaining]; + + if(!same_mem(&mac[0], included_tag, tag_size())) + throw Integrity_Failure("OCB tag check failed"); + + // remove tag from end of message + buffer.resize(remaining + offset); + } + +} diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/ocb.h b/src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/ocb.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e7d042de3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/ocb/ocb.h @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* +* OCB Mode +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#ifndef BOTAN_AEAD_OCB_H__ +#define BOTAN_AEAD_OCB_H__ + +#include <botan/aead.h> +#include <botan/block_cipher.h> +#include <botan/buf_filt.h> +#include <memory> + +namespace Botan { + +class L_computer; + +/** +* OCB Mode (base class for OCB_Encryption and OCB_Decryption). Note +* that OCB is patented, but is freely licensed in some circumstances. +* +* @see "The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm" internet draft + http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03 +* @see Free Licenses http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb/license.htm +* @see OCB home page http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL OCB_Mode : public AEAD_Mode + { + public: + secure_vector<byte> start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) override; + + void set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len) override; + + std::string name() const override; + + size_t update_granularity() const; + + Key_Length_Specification key_spec() const override; + + bool valid_nonce_length(size_t) const override; + + size_t tag_size() const { return m_tag_size; } + + void clear(); + + ~OCB_Mode(); + protected: + /** + * @param cipher the 128-bit block cipher to use + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be + */ + OCB_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size); + + void key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) override; + + // fixme make these private + std::unique_ptr<BlockCipher> m_cipher; + std::unique_ptr<L_computer> m_L; + + size_t m_block_index = 0; + + secure_vector<byte> m_checksum; + secure_vector<byte> m_offset; + secure_vector<byte> m_ad_hash; + private: + secure_vector<byte> update_nonce(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len); + + size_t m_tag_size = 0; + secure_vector<byte> m_last_nonce; + secure_vector<byte> m_stretch; + }; + +class BOTAN_DLL OCB_Encryption : public OCB_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher the 128-bit block cipher to use + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be + */ + OCB_Encryption(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size = 16) : + OCB_Mode(cipher, tag_size) {} + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { return input_length + tag_size(); } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return 0; } + + void update(secure_vector<byte>& blocks, size_t offset = 0) override; + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + private: + void encrypt(byte input[], size_t blocks); + }; + +class BOTAN_DLL OCB_Decryption : public OCB_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher the 128-bit block cipher to use + * @param tag_size is how big the auth tag will be + */ + OCB_Decryption(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size = 16) : + OCB_Mode(cipher, tag_size) {} + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(input_length > tag_size(), "Sufficient input"); + return input_length - tag_size(); + } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return tag_size(); } + + void update(secure_vector<byte>& blocks, size_t offset = 0) override; + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + private: + void decrypt(byte input[], size_t blocks); + }; + +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/siv/info.txt b/src/lib/modes/aead/siv/info.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b1e38568e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/siv/info.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +define AEAD_SIV 20131202 + +load_on auto diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/siv/siv.cpp b/src/lib/modes/aead/siv/siv.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a89c3dd08 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/siv/siv.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* +* SIV Mode Encryption +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#include <botan/siv.h> +#include <botan/cmac.h> +#include <botan/ctr.h> +#include <botan/parsing.h> +#include <botan/internal/xor_buf.h> +#include <algorithm> + +namespace Botan { + +SIV_Mode::SIV_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher) : + m_name(cipher->name() + "/SIV"), + m_ctr(new CTR_BE(cipher->clone())), + m_cmac(new CMAC(cipher)) + { + } + +void SIV_Mode::clear() + { + m_ctr.reset(); + m_nonce.clear(); + m_msg_buf.clear(); + m_ad_macs.clear(); + } + +std::string SIV_Mode::name() const + { + return m_name; + } + +bool SIV_Mode::valid_nonce_length(size_t) const + { + return true; + } + +size_t SIV_Mode::update_granularity() const + { + /* + This value does not particularly matter as regardless SIV_Mode::update + buffers all input, so in theory this could be 1. However as for instance + Transformation_Filter creates update_granularity() byte buffers, use a + somewhat large size to avoid bouncing on a tiny buffer. + */ + return 128; + } + +Key_Length_Specification SIV_Mode::key_spec() const + { + return m_cmac->key_spec().multiple(2); + } + +void SIV_Mode::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) + { + const size_t keylen = length / 2; + m_cmac->set_key(key, keylen); + m_ctr->set_key(key + keylen, keylen); + m_ad_macs.clear(); + } + +void SIV_Mode::set_associated_data_n(size_t n, const byte ad[], size_t length) + { + if(n >= m_ad_macs.size()) + m_ad_macs.resize(n+1); + + m_ad_macs[n] = m_cmac->process(ad, length); + } + +secure_vector<byte> SIV_Mode::start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) + { + if(!valid_nonce_length(nonce_len)) + throw Invalid_IV_Length(name(), nonce_len); + + if(nonce_len) + m_nonce = m_cmac->process(nonce, nonce_len); + else + m_nonce.clear(); + + m_msg_buf.clear(); + + return secure_vector<byte>(); + } + +void SIV_Mode::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + m_msg_buf.insert(m_msg_buf.end(), buf, buf + sz); + buffer.resize(offset); // truncate msg + } + +secure_vector<byte> SIV_Mode::S2V(const byte* text, size_t text_len) + { + const byte zero[16] = { 0 }; + + secure_vector<byte> V = cmac().process(zero, 16); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != m_ad_macs.size(); ++i) + { + V = CMAC::poly_double(V, 0x87); + V ^= m_ad_macs[i]; + } + + if(m_nonce.size()) + { + V = CMAC::poly_double(V, 0x87); + V ^= m_nonce; + } + + if(text_len < 16) + { + V = CMAC::poly_double(V, 0x87); + xor_buf(&V[0], text, text_len); + V[text_len] ^= 0x80; + return cmac().process(V); + } + + cmac().update(text, text_len - 16); + xor_buf(&V[0], &text[text_len - 16], 16); + cmac().update(V); + + return cmac().final(); + } + +void SIV_Mode::set_ctr_iv(secure_vector<byte> V) + { + V[8] &= 0x7F; + V[12] &= 0x7F; + + ctr().set_iv(&V[0], V.size()); + } + +void SIV_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + + buffer.insert(buffer.begin() + offset, msg_buf().begin(), msg_buf().end()); + + secure_vector<byte> V = S2V(&buffer[offset], buffer.size() - offset); + + buffer.insert(buffer.begin() + offset, V.begin(), V.end()); + + set_ctr_iv(V); + ctr().cipher1(&buffer[offset + V.size()], buffer.size() - offset - V.size()); + } + +void SIV_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + + buffer.insert(buffer.begin() + offset, msg_buf().begin(), msg_buf().end()); + + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + + BOTAN_ASSERT(sz >= tag_size(), "We have the tag"); + + secure_vector<byte> V(&buffer[offset], &buffer[offset + 16]); + + set_ctr_iv(V); + + ctr().cipher(&buffer[offset + V.size()], + &buffer[offset], + buffer.size() - offset - V.size()); + + secure_vector<byte> T = S2V(&buffer[offset], buffer.size() - offset - V.size()); + + if(T != V) + throw Integrity_Failure("SIV tag check failed"); + + buffer.resize(buffer.size() - tag_size()); + } + +} diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/siv/siv.h b/src/lib/modes/aead/siv/siv.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..31df4d049 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/siv/siv.h @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* +* SIV Mode +* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#ifndef BOTAN_AEAD_SIV_H__ +#define BOTAN_AEAD_SIV_H__ + +#include <botan/aead.h> +#include <botan/block_cipher.h> +#include <botan/stream_cipher.h> +#include <botan/mac.h> +#include <memory> + +namespace Botan { + +/** +* Base class for SIV encryption and decryption (@see RFC 5297) +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL SIV_Mode : public AEAD_Mode + { + public: + secure_vector<byte> start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) override; + + void update(secure_vector<byte>& blocks, size_t offset = 0) override; + + void set_associated_data_n(size_t n, const byte ad[], size_t ad_len); + + void set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len) override + { + set_associated_data_n(0, ad, ad_len); + } + + std::string name() const override; + + size_t update_granularity() const; + + Key_Length_Specification key_spec() const override; + + bool valid_nonce_length(size_t) const override; + + void clear(); + + size_t tag_size() const { return 16; } + + protected: + SIV_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher); + + StreamCipher& ctr() { return *m_ctr; } + + void set_ctr_iv(secure_vector<byte> V); + + secure_vector<byte>& msg_buf() { return m_msg_buf; } + + secure_vector<byte> S2V(const byte text[], size_t text_len); + private: + MessageAuthenticationCode& cmac() { return *m_cmac; } + + void key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) override; + + const std::string m_name; + + std::unique_ptr<StreamCipher> m_ctr; + std::unique_ptr<MessageAuthenticationCode> m_cmac; + secure_vector<byte> m_nonce, m_msg_buf; + std::vector<secure_vector<byte>> m_ad_macs; + }; + +/** +* SIV Encryption +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL SIV_Encryption : public SIV_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher a block cipher + */ + SIV_Encryption(BlockCipher* cipher) : SIV_Mode(cipher) {} + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { return input_length + tag_size(); } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return 0; } + }; + +/** +* SIV Decryption +*/ +class BOTAN_DLL SIV_Decryption : public SIV_Mode + { + public: + /** + * @param cipher a 128-bit block cipher + */ + SIV_Decryption(BlockCipher* cipher) : SIV_Mode(cipher) {} + + void finish(secure_vector<byte>& final_block, size_t offset = 0) override; + + size_t output_length(size_t input_length) const override + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(input_length > tag_size(), "Sufficient input"); + return input_length - tag_size(); + } + + size_t minimum_final_size() const override { return tag_size(); } + }; + +} + +#endif |