1 files changed, 290 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.cpp b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b39e6ac92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/modes/aead/gcm/gcm.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+/*
+* GCM Mode Encryption
+* (C) 2013 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/gcm.h>
+#include <botan/ctr.h>
+#include <botan/internal/xor_buf.h>
+#include <botan/loadstor.h>
+
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_GCM_CLMUL)
+  #include <botan/internal/clmul.h>
+  #include <botan/cpuid.h>
+#endif
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+void GHASH::gcm_multiply(secure_vector<byte>& x) const
+   {
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_GCM_CLMUL)
+   if(CPUID::has_clmul())
+      return gcm_multiply_clmul(&x[0], &m_H[0]);
+#endif
+
+   static const u64bit R = 0xE100000000000000;
+
+   u64bit H[2] = {
+      load_be<u64bit>(&m_H[0], 0),
+      load_be<u64bit>(&m_H[0], 1)
+   };
+
+   u64bit Z[2] = { 0, 0 };
+
+   // SSE2 might be useful here
+
+   for(size_t i = 0; i != 2; ++i)
+      {
+      const u64bit X = load_be<u64bit>(&x[0], i);
+
+      for(size_t j = 0; j != 64; ++j)
+         {
+         if((X >> (63-j)) & 1)
+            {
+            Z[0] ^= H[0];
+            Z[1] ^= H[1];
+            }
+
+         const u64bit r = (H[1] & 1) ? R : 0;
+
+         H[1] = (H[0] << 63) | (H[1] >> 1);
+         H[0] = (H[0] >> 1) ^ r;
+         }
+      }
+
+   store_be<u64bit>(&x[0], Z[0], Z[1]);
+   }
+
+void GHASH::ghash_update(secure_vector<byte>& ghash,
+                         const byte input[], size_t length)
+   {
+   const size_t BS = 16;
+
+   /*
+   This assumes if less than block size input then we're just on the
+   final block and should pad with zeros
+   */
+   while(length)
+      {
+      const size_t to_proc = std::min(length, BS);
+
+      xor_buf(&ghash[0], &input[0], to_proc);
+
+      gcm_multiply(ghash);
+
+      input += to_proc;
+      length -= to_proc;
+      }
+   }
+
+void GHASH::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length)
+   {
+   m_H.assign(key, key+length);
+   m_H_ad.resize(16);
+   m_ad_len = 0;
+   m_text_len = 0;
+   }
+
+void GHASH::start(const byte nonce[], size_t len)
+   {
+   m_nonce.assign(nonce, nonce + len);
+   m_ghash = m_H_ad;
+   }
+
+void GHASH::set_associated_data(const byte input[], size_t length)
+   {
+   zeroise(m_H_ad);
+
+   ghash_update(m_H_ad, input, length);
+   m_ad_len = length;
+   }
+
+void GHASH::update(const byte input[], size_t length)
+   {
+   BOTAN_ASSERT(m_ghash.size() == 16, "Key was set");
+
+   m_text_len += length;
+
+   ghash_update(m_ghash, input, length);
+   }
+
+void GHASH::add_final_block(secure_vector<byte>& hash,
+                            size_t ad_len, size_t text_len)
+   {
+   secure_vector<byte> final_block(16);
+   store_be<u64bit>(&final_block[0], 8*ad_len, 8*text_len);
+   ghash_update(hash, &final_block[0], final_block.size());
+   }
+
+secure_vector<byte> GHASH::final()
+   {
+   add_final_block(m_ghash, m_ad_len, m_text_len);
+
+   secure_vector<byte> mac;
+   mac.swap(m_ghash);
+
+   mac ^= m_nonce;
+   m_text_len = 0;
+   return mac;
+   }
+
+secure_vector<byte> GHASH::nonce_hash(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len)
+   {
+   BOTAN_ASSERT(m_ghash.size() == 0, "nonce_hash called during wrong time");
+   secure_vector<byte> y0(16);
+
+   ghash_update(y0, nonce, nonce_len);
+   add_final_block(y0, 0, nonce_len);
+
+   return y0;
+   }
+
+void GHASH::clear()
+   {
+   zeroise(m_H);
+   zeroise(m_H_ad);
+   m_ghash.clear();
+   m_text_len = m_ad_len = 0;
+   }
+
+/*
+* GCM_Mode Constructor
+*/
+GCM_Mode::GCM_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, size_t tag_size) :
+   m_tag_size(tag_size),
+   m_cipher_name(cipher->name())
+   {
+   if(cipher->block_size() != BS)
+      throw std::invalid_argument("GCM requires a 128 bit cipher so cannot be used with " +
+                                  cipher->name());
+
+   m_ghash.reset(new GHASH);
+
+   m_ctr.reset(new CTR_BE(cipher)); // CTR_BE takes ownership of cipher
+
+   if(m_tag_size != 8 && m_tag_size != 16)
+      throw Invalid_Argument(name() + ": Bad tag size " + std::to_string(m_tag_size));
+   }
+
+void GCM_Mode::clear()
+   {
+   m_ctr->clear();
+   m_ghash->clear();
+   }
+
+std::string GCM_Mode::name() const
+   {
+   return (m_cipher_name + "/GCM");
+   }
+
+size_t GCM_Mode::update_granularity() const
+   {
+   return 4096; // CTR-BE's internal block size
+   }
+
+Key_Length_Specification GCM_Mode::key_spec() const
+   {
+   return m_ctr->key_spec();
+   }
+
+void GCM_Mode::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t keylen)
+   {
+   m_ctr->set_key(key, keylen);
+
+   const std::vector<byte> zeros(BS);
+   m_ctr->set_iv(&zeros[0], zeros.size());
+
+   secure_vector<byte> H(BS);
+   m_ctr->encipher(H);
+   m_ghash->set_key(H);
+   }
+
+void GCM_Mode::set_associated_data(const byte ad[], size_t ad_len)
+   {
+   m_ghash->set_associated_data(ad, ad_len);
+   }
+
+secure_vector<byte> GCM_Mode::start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len)
+   {
+   if(!valid_nonce_length(nonce_len))
+      throw Invalid_IV_Length(name(), nonce_len);
+
+   secure_vector<byte> y0(BS);
+
+   if(nonce_len == 12)
+      {
+      copy_mem(&y0[0], nonce, nonce_len);
+      y0[15] = 1;
+      }
+   else
+      {
+      y0 = m_ghash->nonce_hash(nonce, nonce_len);
+      }
+
+   m_ctr->set_iv(&y0[0], y0.size());
+
+   secure_vector<byte> m_enc_y0(BS);
+   m_ctr->encipher(m_enc_y0);
+
+   m_ghash->start(&m_enc_y0[0], m_enc_y0.size());
+
+   return secure_vector<byte>();
+   }
+
+void GCM_Encryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset)
+   {
+   BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane");
+   const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset;
+   byte* buf = &buffer[offset];
+
+   m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, sz);
+   m_ghash->update(buf, sz);
+   }
+
+void GCM_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset)
+   {
+   update(buffer, offset);
+   auto mac = m_ghash->final();
+   buffer += std::make_pair(&mac[0], tag_size());
+   }
+
+void GCM_Decryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset)
+   {
+   BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane");
+   const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset;
+   byte* buf = &buffer[offset];
+
+   m_ghash->update(buf, sz);
+   m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, sz);
+   }
+
+void GCM_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset)
+   {
+   BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane");
+   const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset;
+   byte* buf = &buffer[offset];
+
+   BOTAN_ASSERT(sz >= tag_size(), "Have the tag as part of final input");
+
+   const size_t remaining = sz - tag_size();
+
+   // handle any final input before the tag
+   if(remaining)
+      {
+      m_ghash->update(buf, remaining);
+      m_ctr->cipher(buf, buf, remaining);
+      }
+
+   auto mac = m_ghash->final();
+
+   const byte* included_tag = &buffer[remaining];
+
+   if(!same_mem(&mac[0], included_tag, tag_size()))
+      throw Integrity_Failure("GCM tag check failed");
+
+   buffer.resize(offset + remaining);
+   }
+
+}