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-rw-r--r--src/lib/entropy/rdseed/rdseed.cpp12
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/entropy/rdseed/rdseed.cpp b/src/lib/entropy/rdseed/rdseed.cpp
index 8bdd79a1d..91306769d 100644
--- a/src/lib/entropy/rdseed/rdseed.cpp
+++ b/src/lib/entropy/rdseed/rdseed.cpp
@@ -22,16 +22,6 @@ void Intel_Rdseed::poll(Entropy_Accumulator& accum)
if(!CPUID::has_rdseed())
return;
- /*
- Don't consider rdseed as contributing any entropy to the poll. It doesn't
- make sense to trust uninspectible hardware.
-
- Even if backdoored, rdseed cannot harm us because the HMAC_RNG poll process
- is designed to handle arbitrarily large amounts of attacker known/chosen
- input (or even a reseed where every bit we reseeded with was attacker chosen),
- as long as at least one seed occurred with enough unknown-to-attacker entropy.
- */
- const double ENTROPY_ESTIMATE = 0.0;
const size_t RDSEED_POLLS = 32;
for(size_t i = 0; i != RDSEED_POLLS; ++i)
@@ -49,7 +39,7 @@ void Intel_Rdseed::poll(Entropy_Accumulator& accum)
#endif
if(cf == 1)
- accum.add(r, ENTROPY_ESTIMATE);
+ accum.add(r, BOTAN_ENTROPY_ESTIMATE_HARDWARE_RNG);
}
}