aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/src
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorlloyd <[email protected]>2012-01-28 06:51:44 +0000
committerlloyd <[email protected]>2012-01-28 06:51:44 +0000
commitada0998533c7b6b8eb782c494f8efdf5b6f7f712 (patch)
tree11ce3427ea06995b73fd248cb9417dd3aa837b53 /src
parentfd6a59f73b4b6d65966b61e8e7a8cda050a4ba43 (diff)
parentaa00e2879f90562bb06146726a602685d6051b6f (diff)
propagate from branch 'net.randombit.botan' (head 3f6b267bc00d2da1b5d36ca2215c3e1b6a40e796)
to branch 'net.randombit.botan.tls-state-machine' (head 7df407e6678bd51328c348fd2a665f20fb22d62d)
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r--src/asn1/ber_dec.cpp28
-rw-r--r--src/asn1/ber_dec.h63
-rw-r--r--src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.cpp18
-rw-r--r--src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.h6
-rw-r--r--src/codec/pem/pem.cpp13
-rw-r--r--src/codec/pem/pem.h58
-rw-r--r--src/credentials/credentials_manager.cpp118
-rw-r--r--src/credentials/credentials_manager.h143
-rw-r--r--src/credentials/info.txt1
-rw-r--r--src/filters/zlib/zlib.cpp31
-rw-r--r--src/filters/zlib/zlib.h16
-rw-r--r--src/kdf/prf_tls/info.txt1
-rw-r--r--src/kdf/prf_tls/prf_tls.cpp10
-rw-r--r--src/libstate/get_enc.cpp20
-rw-r--r--src/mac/hmac/hmac.h2
-rw-r--r--src/pubkey/ec_group/ec_group.h10
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/c_kex.cpp165
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/cert_req.cpp151
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/cert_ver.cpp98
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/finished.cpp100
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/hello.cpp331
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/rec_read.cpp260
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/rec_wri.cpp270
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/s_kex.cpp180
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_alerts.h54
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_client.cpp586
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_client.h73
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_connection.h36
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_handshake_hash.cpp70
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_magic.h192
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_messages.h297
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_policy.cpp118
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_policy.h63
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_record.h117
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_server.cpp494
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_server.h77
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_session_key.cpp170
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_session_key.h52
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_state.cpp59
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_state.h53
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_suites.cpp281
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/tls_suites.h42
-rw-r--r--src/tls/c_hello.cpp362
-rw-r--r--src/tls/c_kex.cpp357
-rw-r--r--src/tls/cert_req.cpp241
-rw-r--r--src/tls/cert_ver.cpp116
-rw-r--r--src/tls/finished.cpp103
-rw-r--r--src/tls/info.txt (renamed from src/ssl/info.txt)38
-rw-r--r--src/tls/next_protocol.cpp54
-rw-r--r--src/tls/rec_read.cpp351
-rw-r--r--src/tls/rec_wri.cpp297
-rw-r--r--src/tls/s_hello.cpp199
-rw-r--r--src/tls/s_kex.cpp234
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_alert.cpp115
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_alert.h97
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_channel.cpp300
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_channel.h139
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_ciphersuite.cpp311
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_ciphersuite.h57
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_client.cpp428
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_client.h73
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_exceptn.h (renamed from src/ssl/tls_exceptn.h)14
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_extensions.cpp506
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_extensions.h321
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_handshake_hash.cpp103
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_handshake_hash.h (renamed from src/ssl/tls_handshake_hash.h)23
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_handshake_state.cpp293
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_handshake_state.h112
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_magic.h145
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_messages.h441
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_policy.cpp279
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_policy.h128
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_reader.h (renamed from src/ssl/tls_reader.h)42
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_record.h144
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_server.cpp472
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_server.h74
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_session.cpp131
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_session.h174
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_session_key.cpp89
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_session_key.h52
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_session_manager.cpp96
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_session_manager.h114
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_version.cpp33
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_version.h87
-rw-r--r--src/utils/assert.cpp2
-rw-r--r--src/utils/assert.h10
-rw-r--r--src/utils/parsing.cpp13
-rw-r--r--src/utils/parsing.h10
-rw-r--r--src/utils/rounding.h18
-rw-r--r--src/utils/stl_util.h13
90 files changed, 8276 insertions, 4462 deletions
diff --git a/src/asn1/ber_dec.cpp b/src/asn1/ber_dec.cpp
index b31c7b903..4d800d471 100644
--- a/src/asn1/ber_dec.cpp
+++ b/src/asn1/ber_dec.cpp
@@ -141,7 +141,11 @@ size_t find_eoc(DataSource* ber)
void BER_Object::assert_is_a(ASN1_Tag type_tag, ASN1_Tag class_tag)
{
if(this->type_tag != type_tag || this->class_tag != class_tag)
- throw BER_Decoding_Error("Tag mismatch when decoding");
+ throw BER_Decoding_Error("Tag mismatch when decoding got " +
+ to_string(this->type_tag) + "/" +
+ to_string(this->class_tag) + " expected " +
+ to_string(type_tag) + "/" +
+ to_string(class_tag));
}
/*
@@ -400,6 +404,28 @@ BER_Decoder& BER_Decoder::decode(size_t& out,
}
/*
+* Decode a small BER encoded INTEGER
+*/
+u64bit BER_Decoder::decode_constrained_integer(ASN1_Tag type_tag,
+ ASN1_Tag class_tag,
+ size_t T_bytes)
+ {
+ if(T_bytes > 8)
+ throw BER_Decoding_Error("Can't decode small integer over 8 bytes");
+
+ BigInt integer;
+ decode(integer, type_tag, class_tag);
+
+ if(integer.bits() > 8*T_bytes)
+ throw BER_Decoding_Error("Decoded integer value larger than expected");
+
+ u64bit out = 0;
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != 8; ++i)
+ out = (out << 8) | integer.byte_at(8-i);
+ return out;
+ }
+
+/*
* Decode a BER encoded INTEGER
*/
BER_Decoder& BER_Decoder::decode(BigInt& out,
diff --git a/src/asn1/ber_dec.h b/src/asn1/ber_dec.h
index 5f79d3fc1..f8b8a704a 100644
--- a/src/asn1/ber_dec.h
+++ b/src/asn1/ber_dec.h
@@ -20,33 +20,61 @@ class BOTAN_DLL BER_Decoder
{
public:
BER_Object get_next_object();
- void push_back(const BER_Object&);
+ void push_back(const BER_Object& obj);
bool more_items() const;
BER_Decoder& verify_end();
BER_Decoder& discard_remaining();
- BER_Decoder start_cons(ASN1_Tag, ASN1_Tag = UNIVERSAL);
+ BER_Decoder start_cons(ASN1_Tag type_tag, ASN1_Tag class_tag = UNIVERSAL);
BER_Decoder& end_cons();
- BER_Decoder& raw_bytes(MemoryRegion<byte>&);
+ BER_Decoder& raw_bytes(MemoryRegion<byte>& v);
BER_Decoder& decode_null();
- BER_Decoder& decode(bool&);
- BER_Decoder& decode(size_t&);
- BER_Decoder& decode(class BigInt&);
- BER_Decoder& decode(MemoryRegion<byte>&, ASN1_Tag);
+ BER_Decoder& decode(bool& v);
+ BER_Decoder& decode(size_t& v);
+ BER_Decoder& decode(class BigInt& v);
+ BER_Decoder& decode(MemoryRegion<byte>& v, ASN1_Tag type_tag);
- BER_Decoder& decode(bool&, ASN1_Tag, ASN1_Tag = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
- BER_Decoder& decode(size_t&, ASN1_Tag, ASN1_Tag = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
- BER_Decoder& decode(class BigInt&,
- ASN1_Tag, ASN1_Tag = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
- BER_Decoder& decode(MemoryRegion<byte>&, ASN1_Tag,
- ASN1_Tag, ASN1_Tag = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
+ BER_Decoder& decode(bool& v,
+ ASN1_Tag type_tag,
+ ASN1_Tag class_tag = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
- BER_Decoder& decode(class ASN1_Object&);
+ BER_Decoder& decode(size_t& v,
+ ASN1_Tag type_tag,
+ ASN1_Tag class_tag = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
- BER_Decoder& decode_octet_string_bigint(class BigInt&);
+ BER_Decoder& decode(class BigInt& v,
+ ASN1_Tag type_tag,
+ ASN1_Tag class_tag = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
+
+ BER_Decoder& decode(MemoryRegion<byte>& v,
+ ASN1_Tag real_type,
+ ASN1_Tag type_tag,
+ ASN1_Tag class_tag = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
+
+ BER_Decoder& decode(class ASN1_Object& obj);
+
+ BER_Decoder& decode_octet_string_bigint(class BigInt& b);
+
+ u64bit decode_constrained_integer(ASN1_Tag type_tag,
+ ASN1_Tag class_tag,
+ size_t T_bytes);
+
+ template<typename T> BER_Decoder& decode_integer_type(T& out)
+ {
+ return decode_integer_type<T>(out, INTEGER, UNIVERSAL);
+ }
+
+ template<typename T>
+ BER_Decoder& decode_integer_type(T& out,
+ ASN1_Tag type_tag,
+ ASN1_Tag class_tag = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)
+ {
+ out = decode_constrained_integer(type_tag, class_tag, sizeof(out));
+ return (*this);
+ }
template<typename T>
BER_Decoder& decode_optional(T& out,
@@ -71,8 +99,9 @@ class BOTAN_DLL BER_Decoder
return (*this);
}
- BER_Decoder& decode_optional_string(MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- ASN1_Tag, u16bit);
+ BER_Decoder& decode_optional_string(MemoryRegion<byte>& out,
+ ASN1_Tag real_type,
+ u16bit type_no);
BER_Decoder(DataSource&);
BER_Decoder(const byte[], size_t);
diff --git a/src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.cpp b/src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.cpp
index 7d9370f2a..88aeebd77 100644
--- a/src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.cpp
+++ b/src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.cpp
@@ -296,6 +296,24 @@ bool X509_Certificate::operator==(const X509_Certificate& other) const
subject == other.subject);
}
+bool X509_Certificate::operator<(const X509_Certificate& other) const
+ {
+ /* If signature values are not equal, sort by lexicographic ordering of that */
+ if(sig != other.sig)
+ {
+ if(sig < other.sig)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * same signatures, highly unlikely case, revert to compare
+ * of entire contents
+ */
+
+ return to_string() < other.to_string();
+ }
+
/*
* X.509 Certificate Comparison
*/
diff --git a/src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.h b/src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.h
index 8798ef1c2..cd49aa02f 100644
--- a/src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.h
+++ b/src/cert/x509cert/x509cert.h
@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ class BOTAN_DLL X509_Certificate : public X509_Object
bool operator==(const X509_Certificate& other) const;
/**
+ * Impose an arbitrary (but consistent) ordering
+ * @return true if this is less than other by some unspecified criteria
+ */
+ bool operator<(const X509_Certificate& other) const;
+
+ /**
* Create a certificate from a data source providing the DER or
* PEM encoded certificate.
* @param source the data source
diff --git a/src/codec/pem/pem.cpp b/src/codec/pem/pem.cpp
index 005ec7310..52a22d8ef 100644
--- a/src/codec/pem/pem.cpp
+++ b/src/codec/pem/pem.cpp
@@ -110,6 +110,19 @@ SecureVector<byte> decode(DataSource& source, std::string& label)
return base64.read_all();
}
+SecureVector<byte> decode_check_label(const std::string& pem,
+ const std::string& label_want)
+ {
+ DataSource_Memory src(pem);
+ return decode_check_label(src, label_want);
+ }
+
+SecureVector<byte> decode(const std::string& pem, std::string& label)
+ {
+ DataSource_Memory src(pem);
+ return decode(src, label);
+ }
+
/*
* Search for a PEM signature
*/
diff --git a/src/codec/pem/pem.h b/src/codec/pem/pem.h
index d15bfe978..10267f029 100644
--- a/src/codec/pem/pem.h
+++ b/src/codec/pem/pem.h
@@ -14,18 +14,56 @@ namespace Botan {
namespace PEM_Code {
-/*
-* PEM Encoding/Decoding
+/**
+* Encode some binary data in PEM format
+*/
+BOTAN_DLL std::string encode(const byte der[],
+ size_t der_len,
+ const std::string& label,
+ size_t line_width = 64);
+
+/**
+* Encode some binary data in PEM format
*/
-BOTAN_DLL std::string encode(const byte[], size_t,
- const std::string&, size_t = 64);
-BOTAN_DLL std::string encode(const MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- const std::string&, size_t = 64);
+BOTAN_DLL std::string encode(const MemoryRegion<byte>& der,
+ const std::string& label,
+ size_t line_width = 64);
-BOTAN_DLL SecureVector<byte> decode(DataSource&, std::string&);
-BOTAN_DLL SecureVector<byte> decode_check_label(DataSource&,
- const std::string&);
-BOTAN_DLL bool matches(DataSource&, const std::string& = "",
+/**
+* Decode PEM data
+* @param label is set to the PEM label found for later inspection
+*/
+BOTAN_DLL SecureVector<byte> decode(DataSource& pem,
+ std::string& label);
+
+/**
+* Decode PEM data
+* @param label is set to the PEM label found for later inspection
+*/
+BOTAN_DLL SecureVector<byte> decode(const std::string& pem,
+ std::string& label);
+
+/**
+* Decode PEM data
+* @param label is what we expect the label to be
+*/
+BOTAN_DLL SecureVector<byte> decode_check_label(
+ DataSource& pem,
+ const std::string& label);
+
+/**
+* Decode PEM data
+* @param label is what we expect the label to be
+*/
+BOTAN_DLL SecureVector<byte> decode_check_label(
+ const std::string& pem,
+ const std::string& label);
+
+/**
+* Heuristic test for PEM data.
+*/
+BOTAN_DLL bool matches(DataSource& source,
+ const std::string& extra = "",
size_t search_range = 4096);
}
diff --git a/src/credentials/credentials_manager.cpp b/src/credentials/credentials_manager.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7ca6ac657
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/credentials/credentials_manager.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/*
+* Credentials Manager
+* (C) 2011,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+std::string Credentials_Manager::psk_identity_hint(const std::string&,
+ const std::string&)
+ {
+ return "";
+ }
+
+std::string Credentials_Manager::psk_identity(const std::string&,
+ const std::string&,
+ const std::string&)
+ {
+ return "";
+ }
+
+SymmetricKey Credentials_Manager::psk(const std::string&,
+ const std::string&,
+ const std::string& identity)
+ {
+ throw Internal_Error("No PSK set for identity " + identity);
+ }
+
+std::string Credentials_Manager::srp_identifier(const std::string&,
+ const std::string&)
+ {
+ return "";
+ }
+
+std::string Credentials_Manager::srp_password(const std::string&,
+ const std::string&,
+ const std::string&)
+ {
+ return "";
+ }
+
+bool Credentials_Manager::srp_verifier(const std::string&,
+ const std::string&,
+ const std::string&,
+ BigInt&,
+ BigInt&,
+ BigInt&,
+ MemoryRegion<byte>&,
+ bool)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+std::vector<X509_Certificate> Credentials_Manager::cert_chain(
+ const std::vector<std::string>&,
+ const std::string&,
+ const std::string&)
+ {
+ return std::vector<X509_Certificate>();
+ }
+
+std::vector<X509_Certificate> Credentials_Manager::cert_chain_single_type(
+ const std::string& cert_key_type,
+ const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context)
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> cert_types;
+ cert_types.push_back(cert_key_type);
+ return cert_chain(cert_types, type, context);
+ }
+
+Private_Key* Credentials_Manager::private_key_for(const X509_Certificate&,
+ const std::string&,
+ const std::string&)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+std::vector<X509_Certificate>
+Credentials_Manager::trusted_certificate_authorities(
+ const std::string&,
+ const std::string&)
+ {
+ return std::vector<X509_Certificate>();
+ }
+
+void Credentials_Manager::verify_certificate_chain(
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& cert_chain,
+ const std::string& purported_hostname)
+ {
+ if(cert_chain.empty())
+ throw std::invalid_argument("Certificate chain was empty");
+
+#if 0
+ X509_Store store;
+
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> CAs = trusted_certificate_authorities();
+
+ for(size_t i = 1; i != CAs.size(); ++i)
+ store.add_cert(CAs[i], true);
+ for(size_t i = 1; i != cert_chain.size(); ++i)
+ store.add_cert(cert_chain[i]);
+
+ X509_Code result = store.validate_cert(cert_chain[0], TLS_SERVER);
+
+ if(result != VERIFIED)
+ throw std::runtime_error("Certificate did not validate");
+
+ if(!cert_chain[0].matches_dns_name(purported_hostname))
+ throw std::runtime_error("Certificate did not match hostname");
+
+#endif
+ }
+
+}
diff --git a/src/credentials/credentials_manager.h b/src/credentials/credentials_manager.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7dc049722
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/credentials/credentials_manager.h
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/*
+* Credentials Manager
+* (C) 2011,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_CREDENTIALS_MANAGER_H__
+#define BOTAN_CREDENTIALS_MANAGER_H__
+
+#include <botan/x509cert.h>
+#include <botan/symkey.h>
+#include <string>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+class BigInt;
+
+/**
+* Interface for a credentials manager.
+*
+* A type is a fairly static value that represents the general nature
+* of the transaction occuring. Currently used values are "tls-client"
+* and "tls-server". Context represents a hostname, email address,
+* username, or other identifier.
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Credentials_Manager
+ {
+ public:
+ virtual ~Credentials_Manager() {}
+
+ virtual std::string psk_identity_hint(const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context);
+
+ /**
+ * @param identity_hint was passed by the server (but may be empty)
+ * @return the PSK identity we want to use
+ */
+ virtual std::string psk_identity(const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context,
+ const std::string& identity_hint);
+
+ /**
+ * @return the PSK used for identity
+ */
+ virtual SymmetricKey psk(const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context,
+ const std::string& identity);
+
+ /**
+ * @return identifier for client-side SRP auth, if available
+ for this type/context. Should return empty string
+ if password auth not desired/available.
+ */
+ virtual std::string srp_identifier(const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context);
+
+ /**
+ * @param identifier specifies what identifier we want the
+ * password for. This will be a value previously returned
+ * by srp_identifier.
+ * @return password for client-side SRP auth, if available
+ for this identifier/type/context.
+ */
+ virtual std::string srp_password(const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context,
+ const std::string& identifier);
+
+ /**
+ * Retrieve SRP verifier parameters
+ */
+ virtual bool srp_verifier(const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context,
+ const std::string& identifier,
+ BigInt& group_prime,
+ BigInt& group_generator,
+ BigInt& verifier,
+ MemoryRegion<byte>& salt,
+ bool generate_fake_on_unknown);
+
+ /**
+ * Return a cert chain we can use, ordered from leaf to root.
+ * Assumed that we can get the private key of the leaf with
+ * private_key_for
+ *
+ * @param cert_key_type is a set string representing the allowed
+ * key type ("RSA", "DSA", "ECDSA", etc) or empty if no
+ * preference.
+ */
+ virtual std::vector<X509_Certificate> cert_chain(
+ const std::vector<std::string>& cert_key_types,
+ const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context);
+
+ /**
+ * Return a cert chain we can use, ordered from leaf to root.
+ * Assumed that we can get the private key of the leaf with
+ * private_key_for
+ *
+ * @param cert_key_type is a set string representing the allowed
+ * key type ("RSA", "DSA", "ECDSA", etc) or empty if no
+ * preference.
+ */
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> cert_chain_single_type(
+ const std::string& cert_key_type,
+ const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context);
+
+ /**
+ * Return a list of the certificates of CAs that we trust in this
+ * type/context.
+ */
+ virtual std::vector<X509_Certificate> trusted_certificate_authorities(
+ const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context);
+
+ /**
+ * Check the certificate chain is valid up to a trusted root, and
+ * optionally (if hostname != "") that the hostname given is
+ * consistent with the leaf certificate.
+ *
+ * This function should throw an exception derived from
+ * std::exception with an informative what() result if the
+ * certificate chain cannot be verified.
+ */
+ virtual void verify_certificate_chain(
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& cert_chain,
+ const std::string& hostname = "");
+
+ /**
+ * @return private key associated with this certificate if we should
+ * use it with this context. cert was returned by cert_chain
+ * @note this object should retain ownership of the returned key;
+ * it should not be deleted by the caller.
+ */
+ virtual Private_Key* private_key_for(const X509_Certificate& cert,
+ const std::string& type,
+ const std::string& context);
+ };
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/credentials/info.txt b/src/credentials/info.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f6dcdd64d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/credentials/info.txt
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+define CREDENTIALS_MANAGER
diff --git a/src/filters/zlib/zlib.cpp b/src/filters/zlib/zlib.cpp
index 0f88b5558..517660e3b 100644
--- a/src/filters/zlib/zlib.cpp
+++ b/src/filters/zlib/zlib.cpp
@@ -91,10 +91,12 @@ class Zlib_Stream
/*
* Zlib_Compression Constructor
*/
-Zlib_Compression::Zlib_Compression(size_t l) :
- level((l >= 9) ? 9 : l), buffer(DEFAULT_BUFFERSIZE)
+Zlib_Compression::Zlib_Compression(size_t l, bool raw_deflate) :
+ level((l >= 9) ? 9 : l),
+ raw_deflate(raw_deflate),
+ buffer(DEFAULT_BUFFERSIZE),
+ zlib(0)
{
- zlib = 0;
}
/*
@@ -104,7 +106,17 @@ void Zlib_Compression::start_msg()
{
clear();
zlib = new Zlib_Stream;
- if(deflateInit(&(zlib->stream), level) != Z_OK)
+
+ int res = deflateInit2(&(zlib->stream),
+ level,
+ Z_DEFLATED,
+ (raw_deflate ? -15 : 15),
+ 8,
+ Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY);
+
+ if(res == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
+ throw Invalid_Argument("Bad setting in deflateInit2");
+ else if(res != Z_OK)
throw Memory_Exhaustion();
}
@@ -185,10 +197,12 @@ void Zlib_Compression::clear()
/*
* Zlib_Decompression Constructor
*/
-Zlib_Decompression::Zlib_Decompression() : buffer(DEFAULT_BUFFERSIZE)
+Zlib_Decompression::Zlib_Decompression(bool raw_deflate) :
+ raw_deflate(raw_deflate),
+ buffer(DEFAULT_BUFFERSIZE),
+ zlib(0),
+ no_writes(true)
{
- zlib = 0;
- no_writes = true;
}
/*
@@ -198,7 +212,8 @@ void Zlib_Decompression::start_msg()
{
clear();
zlib = new Zlib_Stream;
- if(inflateInit(&(zlib->stream)) != Z_OK)
+
+ if(inflateInit2(&(zlib->stream), (raw_deflate ? -15 : 15)) != Z_OK)
throw Memory_Exhaustion();
}
diff --git a/src/filters/zlib/zlib.h b/src/filters/zlib/zlib.h
index 77ec5eecc..60117f2bc 100644
--- a/src/filters/zlib/zlib.h
+++ b/src/filters/zlib/zlib.h
@@ -31,15 +31,20 @@ class BOTAN_DLL Zlib_Compression : public Filter
void flush();
/**
- @param level how much effort to use on compressing (0 to 9);
- higher levels are slower but tend to give better compression
+ * @param level how much effort to use on compressing (0 to 9);
+ * higher levels are slower but tend to give better
+ * compression
+ * @param raw_deflate if true no zlib header/trailer will be used
*/
- Zlib_Compression(size_t level = 6);
+ Zlib_Compression(size_t level = 6,
+ bool raw_deflate = false);
~Zlib_Compression() { clear(); }
private:
void clear();
const size_t level;
+ const bool raw_deflate;
+
SecureVector<byte> buffer;
class Zlib_Stream* zlib;
};
@@ -56,10 +61,13 @@ class BOTAN_DLL Zlib_Decompression : public Filter
void start_msg();
void end_msg();
- Zlib_Decompression();
+ Zlib_Decompression(bool raw_deflate = false);
~Zlib_Decompression() { clear(); }
private:
void clear();
+
+ const bool raw_deflate;
+
SecureVector<byte> buffer;
class Zlib_Stream* zlib;
bool no_writes;
diff --git a/src/kdf/prf_tls/info.txt b/src/kdf/prf_tls/info.txt
index 9531a6a83..113c92251 100644
--- a/src/kdf/prf_tls/info.txt
+++ b/src/kdf/prf_tls/info.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
define TLS_V10_PRF
+define TLS_V12_PRF
<requires>
hmac
diff --git a/src/kdf/prf_tls/prf_tls.cpp b/src/kdf/prf_tls/prf_tls.cpp
index 2b57cdd25..3790650b0 100644
--- a/src/kdf/prf_tls/prf_tls.cpp
+++ b/src/kdf/prf_tls/prf_tls.cpp
@@ -23,7 +23,15 @@ void P_hash(MemoryRegion<byte>& output,
const byte secret[], size_t secret_len,
const byte seed[], size_t seed_len)
{
- mac->set_key(secret, secret_len);
+ try
+ {
+ mac->set_key(secret, secret_len);
+ }
+ catch(Invalid_Key_Length)
+ {
+ throw Internal_Error("The premaster secret of " + to_string(secret_len) +
+ " bytes is too long for the PRF");
+ }
SecureVector<byte> A(seed, seed_len);
diff --git a/src/libstate/get_enc.cpp b/src/libstate/get_enc.cpp
index 6a87268e8..b7c9a7146 100644
--- a/src/libstate/get_enc.cpp
+++ b/src/libstate/get_enc.cpp
@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@ EMSA* get_emsa(const std::string& algo_spec)
#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_EMSA1)
if(request.algo_name() == "EMSA1" && request.arg_count() == 1)
+ {
+ if(request.arg(0) == "Raw")
+ return new EMSA_Raw;
return new EMSA1(af.make_hash_function(request.arg(0)));
+ }
#endif
#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_EMSA1_BSI)
@@ -195,14 +199,24 @@ KDF* get_kdf(const std::string& algo_spec)
return new X942_PRF(request.arg(0)); // OID
#endif
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_SSL_V3_PRF)
+ if(request.algo_name() == "SSL3-PRF" && request.arg_count() == 0)
+ return new SSL3_PRF;
+#endif
+
#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_V10_PRF)
if(request.algo_name() == "TLS-PRF" && request.arg_count() == 0)
return new TLS_PRF;
#endif
-#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_SSL_V3_PRF)
- if(request.algo_name() == "SSL3-PRF" && request.arg_count() == 0)
- return new SSL3_PRF;
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_V10_PRF)
+ if(request.algo_name() == "TLS-PRF" && request.arg_count() == 0)
+ return new TLS_PRF;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_V12_PRF)
+ if(request.algo_name() == "TLS-12-PRF" && request.arg_count() == 1)
+ return new TLS_12_PRF(af.make_mac("HMAC(" + request.arg(0) + ")"));
#endif
throw Algorithm_Not_Found(algo_spec);
diff --git a/src/mac/hmac/hmac.h b/src/mac/hmac/hmac.h
index b76a058f4..9de1bc7b5 100644
--- a/src/mac/hmac/hmac.h
+++ b/src/mac/hmac/hmac.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ class BOTAN_DLL HMAC : public MessageAuthenticationCode
Key_Length_Specification key_spec() const
{
- return Key_Length_Specification(0, 2*hash->hash_block_size());
+ return Key_Length_Specification(0, 512);
}
/**
diff --git a/src/pubkey/ec_group/ec_group.h b/src/pubkey/ec_group/ec_group.h
index b7b09985e..dadc9fba3 100644
--- a/src/pubkey/ec_group/ec_group.h
+++ b/src/pubkey/ec_group/ec_group.h
@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ class BOTAN_DLL EC_Group
* @param cofactor the cofactor
*/
EC_Group(const CurveGFp& curve,
- const PointGFp& base_point,
- const BigInt& order,
- const BigInt& cofactor) :
+ const PointGFp& base_point,
+ const BigInt& order,
+ const BigInt& cofactor) :
curve(curve),
base_point(base_point),
order(order),
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ class BOTAN_DLL EC_Group
EC_Group(const OID& oid);
/**
- * Create an EC domain from PEM encoding (as from PEM_encode),
- * or from an OID name (eg "secp16r1", or "1.3.132.0.8")
+ * Create an EC domain from PEM encoding (as from PEM_encode), or
+ * from an OID name (eg "secp256r1", or "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7")
* @param pem_or_oid PEM-encoded data, or an OID
*/
EC_Group(const std::string& pem_or_oid = "");
diff --git a/src/ssl/c_kex.cpp b/src/ssl/c_kex.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 0f20b819c..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/c_kex.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* Client Key Exchange Message
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
-#include <botan/pubkey.h>
-#include <botan/dh.h>
-#include <botan/rsa.h>
-#include <botan/rng.h>
-#include <botan/loadstor.h>
-#include <memory>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Create a new Client Key Exchange message
-*/
-Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer& writer,
- HandshakeHash& hash,
- const Public_Key* pub_key,
- Version_Code using_version,
- Version_Code pref_version)
- {
- include_length = true;
-
- if(const DH_PublicKey* dh_pub = dynamic_cast<const DH_PublicKey*>(pub_key))
- {
- DH_PrivateKey priv_key(rng, dh_pub->get_domain());
-
- PK_Key_Agreement ka(priv_key, "Raw");
-
- pre_master = ka.derive_key(0, dh_pub->public_value()).bits_of();
-
- key_material = priv_key.public_value();
- }
- else if(const RSA_PublicKey* rsa_pub = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PublicKey*>(pub_key))
- {
- pre_master = rng.random_vec(48);
- pre_master[0] = (pref_version >> 8) & 0xFF;
- pre_master[1] = (pref_version ) & 0xFF;
-
- PK_Encryptor_EME encryptor(*rsa_pub, "PKCS1v15");
-
- key_material = encryptor.encrypt(pre_master, rng);
-
- if(using_version == SSL_V3)
- include_length = false;
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument("Client_Key_Exchange: Key not RSA or DH");
-
- send(writer, hash);
- }
-
-/**
-* Read a Client Key Exchange message
-*/
-Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(const MemoryRegion<byte>& contents,
- const CipherSuite& suite,
- Version_Code using_version)
- {
- include_length = true;
-
- if(using_version == SSL_V3 && (suite.kex_type() == TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_RSA))
- include_length = false;
-
- deserialize(contents);
- }
-
-/**
-* Serialize a Client Key Exchange message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Client_Key_Exchange::serialize() const
- {
- if(include_length)
- {
- SecureVector<byte> buf;
- append_tls_length_value(buf, key_material, 2);
- return buf;
- }
- else
- return key_material;
- }
-
-/**
-* Deserialize a Client Key Exchange message
-*/
-void Client_Key_Exchange::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(include_length)
- {
- TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
- key_material = reader.get_range<byte>(2, 0, 65535);
- }
- else
- key_material = buf;
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the pre_master_secret
-*/
-SecureVector<byte>
-Client_Key_Exchange::pre_master_secret(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- const Private_Key* priv_key,
- Version_Code version)
- {
-
- if(const DH_PrivateKey* dh_priv = dynamic_cast<const DH_PrivateKey*>(priv_key))
- {
- try {
- PK_Key_Agreement ka(*dh_priv, "Raw");
-
- pre_master = ka.derive_key(0, key_material).bits_of();
- }
- catch(...)
- {
- /*
- * Something failed in the DH computation. To avoid possible
- * timing attacks, randomize the pre-master output and carry
- * on, allowing the protocol to fail later in the finished
- * checks.
- */
- pre_master = rng.random_vec(dh_priv->public_value().size());
- }
-
- return pre_master;
- }
- else if(const RSA_PrivateKey* rsa_priv = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PrivateKey*>(priv_key))
- {
- PK_Decryptor_EME decryptor(*rsa_priv, "PKCS1v15");
-
- try {
- pre_master = decryptor.decrypt(key_material);
-
- if(pre_master.size() != 48 ||
- make_u16bit(pre_master[0], pre_master[1]) != version)
- throw Decoding_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Secret corrupted");
- }
- catch(...)
- {
- pre_master = rng.random_vec(48);
- pre_master[0] = (version >> 8) & 0xFF;
- pre_master[1] = (version ) & 0xFF;
- }
-
- return pre_master;
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument("Client_Key_Exchange: Bad key for decrypt");
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the pre_master_secret
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Client_Key_Exchange::pre_master_secret() const
- {
- return pre_master;
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/cert_req.cpp b/src/ssl/cert_req.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index b8b2624bf..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/cert_req.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* Certificate Request Message
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
-#include <botan/der_enc.h>
-#include <botan/ber_dec.h>
-#include <botan/loadstor.h>
-#include <botan/secqueue.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Create a new Certificate Request message
-*/
-Certificate_Req::Certificate_Req(Record_Writer& writer,
- HandshakeHash& hash,
- const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& certs)
- {
- for(size_t i = 0; i != certs.size(); ++i)
- names.push_back(certs[i].subject_dn());
-
- // FIXME: should be able to choose what to ask for
- types.push_back(RSA_CERT);
- types.push_back(DSS_CERT);
-
- send(writer, hash);
- }
-
-/**
-* Serialize a Certificate Request message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Certificate_Req::serialize() const
- {
- SecureVector<byte> buf;
-
- append_tls_length_value(buf, types, 1);
-
- DER_Encoder encoder;
- for(size_t i = 0; i != names.size(); ++i)
- encoder.encode(names[i]);
-
- append_tls_length_value(buf, encoder.get_contents(), 2);
-
- return buf;
- }
-
-/**
-* Deserialize a Certificate Request message
-*/
-void Certificate_Req::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(buf.size() < 4)
- throw Decoding_Error("Certificate_Req: Bad certificate request");
-
- size_t types_size = buf[0];
-
- if(buf.size() < types_size + 3)
- throw Decoding_Error("Certificate_Req: Bad certificate request");
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != types_size; ++i)
- types.push_back(static_cast<Certificate_Type>(buf[i+1]));
-
- size_t names_size = make_u16bit(buf[types_size+2], buf[types_size+3]);
-
- if(buf.size() != names_size + types_size + 3)
- throw Decoding_Error("Certificate_Req: Bad certificate request");
-
- BER_Decoder decoder(&buf[types_size + 3], names_size);
-
- while(decoder.more_items())
- {
- X509_DN name;
- decoder.decode(name);
- names.push_back(name);
- }
- }
-
-/**
-* Create a new Certificate message
-*/
-Certificate::Certificate(Record_Writer& writer,
- const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& cert_list,
- HandshakeHash& hash)
- {
- certs = cert_list;
- send(writer, hash);
- }
-
-/**
-* Serialize a Certificate message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Certificate::serialize() const
- {
- SecureVector<byte> buf(3);
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != certs.size(); ++i)
- {
- SecureVector<byte> raw_cert = certs[i].BER_encode();
- const size_t cert_size = raw_cert.size();
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; ++i)
- buf.push_back(get_byte<u32bit>(i+1, cert_size));
- buf += raw_cert;
- }
-
- const size_t buf_size = buf.size() - 3;
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; ++i)
- buf[i] = get_byte<u32bit>(i+1, buf_size);
-
- return buf;
- }
-
-/**
-* Deserialize a Certificate message
-*/
-void Certificate::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(buf.size() < 3)
- throw Decoding_Error("Certificate: Message malformed");
-
- const size_t total_size = make_u32bit(0, buf[0], buf[1], buf[2]);
-
- SecureQueue queue;
- queue.write(&buf[3], buf.size() - 3);
-
- if(queue.size() != total_size)
- throw Decoding_Error("Certificate: Message malformed");
-
- while(queue.size())
- {
- if(queue.size() < 3)
- throw Decoding_Error("Certificate: Message malformed");
-
- byte len[3];
- queue.read(len, 3);
-
- const size_t cert_size = make_u32bit(0, len[0], len[1], len[2]);
- const size_t original_size = queue.size();
-
- X509_Certificate cert(queue);
- if(queue.size() + cert_size != original_size)
- throw Decoding_Error("Certificate: Message malformed");
- certs.push_back(cert);
- }
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/cert_ver.cpp b/src/ssl/cert_ver.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 3220a8c9e..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/cert_ver.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* Certificate Verify Message
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
-#include <botan/pubkey.h>
-#include <botan/rsa.h>
-#include <botan/dsa.h>
-#include <botan/loadstor.h>
-#include <memory>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Create a new Certificate Verify message
-*/
-Certificate_Verify::Certificate_Verify(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer& writer,
- HandshakeHash& hash,
- const Private_Key* priv_key)
- {
- std::string padding = "";
- Signature_Format format = IEEE_1363;
-
- if(priv_key->algo_name() == "RSA")
- padding = "EMSA3(TLS.Digest.0)";
- else if(priv_key->algo_name() == "DSA")
- {
- padding == "EMSA1(SHA-1)";
- format = DER_SEQUENCE;
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument(priv_key->algo_name() +
- " is invalid/unknown for TLS signatures");
-
- PK_Signer signer(*priv_key, padding, format);
-
- signature = signer.sign_message(hash.final(), rng);
- send(writer, hash);
- }
-
-/**
-* Serialize a Certificate Verify message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Certificate_Verify::serialize() const
- {
- SecureVector<byte> buf;
-
- const u16bit sig_len = signature.size();
- buf.push_back(get_byte(0, sig_len));
- buf.push_back(get_byte(1, sig_len));
- buf += signature;
-
- return buf;
- }
-
-/**
-* Deserialize a Certificate Verify message
-*/
-void Certificate_Verify::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
- signature = reader.get_range<byte>(2, 0, 65535);
- }
-
-/**
-* Verify a Certificate Verify message
-*/
-bool Certificate_Verify::verify(const X509_Certificate& cert,
- HandshakeHash& hash)
- {
- // FIXME: duplicate of Server_Key_Exchange::verify
-
- std::auto_ptr<Public_Key> key(cert.subject_public_key());
-
- std::string padding = "";
- Signature_Format format = IEEE_1363;
-
- if(key->algo_name() == "RSA")
- padding = "EMSA3(TLS.Digest.0)";
- else if(key->algo_name() == "DSA")
- {
- padding == "EMSA1(SHA-1)";
- format = DER_SEQUENCE;
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument(key->algo_name() +
- " is invalid/unknown for TLS signatures");
-
- PK_Verifier verifier(*key, padding, format);
- return verifier.verify_message(hash.final(), signature);
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/finished.cpp b/src/ssl/finished.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index d76fbd884..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/finished.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* Finished Message
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
-#include <botan/prf_tls.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Create a new Finished message
-*/
-Finished::Finished(Record_Writer& writer,
- Version_Code version, Connection_Side side,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& master_secret,
- HandshakeHash& hash)
- {
- verification_data = compute_verify(master_secret, hash, side, version);
- send(writer, hash);
- }
-
-/**
-* Serialize a Finished message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Finished::serialize() const
- {
- return verification_data;
- }
-
-/**
-* Deserialize a Finished message
-*/
-void Finished::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- verification_data = buf;
- }
-
-/**
-* Verify a Finished message
-*/
-bool Finished::verify(const MemoryRegion<byte>& secret, Version_Code version,
- const HandshakeHash& hash, Connection_Side side)
- {
- SecureVector<byte> computed = compute_verify(secret, hash, side, version);
- if(computed == verification_data)
- return true;
- return false;
- }
-
-/**
-* Compute the verify_data
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Finished::compute_verify(const MemoryRegion<byte>& secret,
- HandshakeHash hash,
- Connection_Side side,
- Version_Code version)
- {
- if(version == SSL_V3)
- {
- const byte SSL_CLIENT_LABEL[] = { 0x43, 0x4C, 0x4E, 0x54 };
- const byte SSL_SERVER_LABEL[] = { 0x53, 0x52, 0x56, 0x52 };
-
- SecureVector<byte> ssl3_finished;
-
- if(side == CLIENT)
- hash.update(SSL_CLIENT_LABEL, sizeof(SSL_CLIENT_LABEL));
- else
- hash.update(SSL_SERVER_LABEL, sizeof(SSL_SERVER_LABEL));
-
- return hash.final_ssl3(secret);
- }
- else if(version == TLS_V10 || version == TLS_V11)
- {
- const byte TLS_CLIENT_LABEL[] = {
- 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69,
- 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64 };
-
- const byte TLS_SERVER_LABEL[] = {
- 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69,
- 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64 };
-
- TLS_PRF prf;
-
- SecureVector<byte> input;
- if(side == CLIENT)
- input += std::make_pair(TLS_CLIENT_LABEL, sizeof(TLS_CLIENT_LABEL));
- else
- input += std::make_pair(TLS_SERVER_LABEL, sizeof(TLS_SERVER_LABEL));
- input += hash.final();
-
- return prf.derive_key(12, secret, input);
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument("Finished message: Unknown protocol version");
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/hello.cpp b/src/ssl/hello.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index ae0d9607b..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/hello.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,331 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Hello Messages
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/*
-* Encode and send a Handshake message
-*/
-void HandshakeMessage::send(Record_Writer& writer, HandshakeHash& hash) const
- {
- SecureVector<byte> buf = serialize();
- SecureVector<byte> send_buf(4);
-
- const size_t buf_size = buf.size();
-
- send_buf[0] = type();
-
- for(size_t i = 1; i != 4; ++i)
- send_buf[i] = get_byte<u32bit>(i, buf_size);
-
- send_buf += buf;
-
- hash.update(send_buf);
-
- writer.send(HANDSHAKE, &send_buf[0], send_buf.size());
- writer.flush();
- }
-
-/*
-* Create a new Hello Request message
-*/
-Hello_Request::Hello_Request(Record_Writer& writer)
- {
- HandshakeHash dummy; // FIXME: *UGLY*
- send(writer, dummy);
- }
-
-/*
-* Serialize a Hello Request message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Hello_Request::serialize() const
- {
- return SecureVector<byte>();
- }
-
-/*
-* Deserialize a Hello Request message
-*/
-void Hello_Request::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(buf.size())
- throw Decoding_Error("Hello_Request: Must be empty, and is not");
- }
-
-/*
-* Create a new Client Hello message
-*/
-Client_Hello::Client_Hello(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer& writer,
- const TLS_Policy& policy,
- HandshakeHash& hash)
- {
- c_random = rng.random_vec(32);
-
- suites = policy.ciphersuites();
- comp_algos = policy.compression();
- c_version = policy.pref_version();
-
- send(writer, hash);
- }
-
-/*
-* Serialize a Client Hello message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Client_Hello::serialize() const
- {
- SecureVector<byte> buf;
-
- buf.push_back(static_cast<byte>(c_version >> 8));
- buf.push_back(static_cast<byte>(c_version ));
- buf += c_random;
-
- append_tls_length_value(buf, sess_id, 1);
- append_tls_length_value(buf, suites, 2);
- append_tls_length_value(buf, comp_algos, 1);
-
- return buf;
- }
-
-void Client_Hello::deserialize_sslv2(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(buf.size() < 12 || buf[0] != 1)
- throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: SSLv2 hello corrupted");
-
- const size_t cipher_spec_len = make_u16bit(buf[3], buf[4]);
- const size_t sess_id_len = make_u16bit(buf[5], buf[6]);
- const size_t challenge_len = make_u16bit(buf[7], buf[8]);
-
- const size_t expected_size =
- (9 + sess_id_len + cipher_spec_len + challenge_len);
-
- if(buf.size() != expected_size)
- throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: SSLv2 hello corrupted");
-
- if(sess_id_len != 0 || cipher_spec_len % 3 != 0 ||
- (challenge_len < 16 || challenge_len > 32))
- {
- throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: SSLv2 hello corrupted");
- }
-
- for(size_t i = 9; i != 9 + cipher_spec_len; i += 3)
- {
- if(buf[i] != 0) // a SSLv2 cipherspec; ignore it
- continue;
-
- suites.push_back(make_u16bit(buf[i+1], buf[i+2]));
- }
-
- c_version = static_cast<Version_Code>(make_u16bit(buf[1], buf[2]));
-
- c_random.resize(challenge_len);
- copy_mem(&c_random[0], &buf[9+cipher_spec_len+sess_id_len], challenge_len);
- }
-
-/*
-* Deserialize a Client Hello message
-*/
-void Client_Hello::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(buf.size() == 0)
- throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: Packet corrupted");
-
- if(buf.size() < 41)
- throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: Packet corrupted");
-
- TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
-
- c_version = static_cast<Version_Code>(reader.get_u16bit());
- c_random = reader.get_fixed<byte>(32);
-
- sess_id = reader.get_range<byte>(1, 0, 32);
-
- suites = reader.get_range_vector<u16bit>(2, 1, 32767);
-
- comp_algos = reader.get_range_vector<byte>(1, 1, 255);
-
- if(reader.has_remaining())
- {
- const u16bit all_extn_size = reader.get_u16bit();
-
- if(reader.remaining_bytes() != all_extn_size)
- throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: Bad extension size");
-
- while(reader.has_remaining())
- {
- const u16bit extension_code = reader.get_u16bit();
- const u16bit extension_size = reader.get_u16bit();
-
- if(extension_code == TLSEXT_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
- {
- u16bit name_bytes = reader.get_u16bit();
-
- while(name_bytes)
- {
- byte name_type = reader.get_byte();
- name_bytes--;
-
- if(name_type == 0) // DNS
- {
- std::vector<byte> name =
- reader.get_range_vector<byte>(2, 1, 65535);
-
- requested_hostname.assign(
- reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&name[0]),
- name.size());
-
- name_bytes -= (2 + name.size());
- }
- else
- {
- reader.discard_next(name_bytes);
- name_bytes = 0;
- }
- }
- }
- else if(extension_code == TLSEXT_SRP_IDENTIFIER)
- {
- std::vector<byte> name = reader.get_range_vector<byte>(1, 1, 255);
-
- requested_srp_id.assign(
- reinterpret_cast<char*>(&name[0]),
- name.size());
- }
- else
- {
- reader.discard_next(extension_size);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
-/*
-* Check if we offered this ciphersuite
-*/
-bool Client_Hello::offered_suite(u16bit ciphersuite) const
- {
- for(size_t i = 0; i != suites.size(); ++i)
- if(suites[i] == ciphersuite)
- return true;
- return false;
- }
-
-/*
-* Create a new Server Hello message
-*/
-Server_Hello::Server_Hello(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer& writer,
- const TLS_Policy& policy,
- const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& certs,
- const Client_Hello& c_hello,
- Version_Code ver,
- HandshakeHash& hash)
- {
- bool have_rsa = false, have_dsa = false;
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != certs.size(); ++i)
- {
- Public_Key* key = certs[i].subject_public_key();
- if(key->algo_name() == "RSA")
- have_rsa = true;
-
- if(key->algo_name() == "DSA")
- have_dsa = true;
- }
-
- suite = policy.choose_suite(c_hello.ciphersuites(), have_rsa, have_dsa);
-
- if(suite == 0)
- throw TLS_Exception(PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- "Can't agree on a ciphersuite with client");
-
- comp_algo = policy.choose_compression(c_hello.compression_algos());
-
- s_version = ver;
- s_random = rng.random_vec(32);
-
- send(writer, hash);
- }
-
-/*
-* Serialize a Server Hello message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Server_Hello::serialize() const
- {
- SecureVector<byte> buf;
-
- buf.push_back(static_cast<byte>(s_version >> 8));
- buf.push_back(static_cast<byte>(s_version ));
- buf += s_random;
-
- append_tls_length_value(buf, sess_id, 1);
-
- buf.push_back(get_byte(0, suite));
- buf.push_back(get_byte(1, suite));
-
- buf.push_back(comp_algo);
-
- return buf;
- }
-
-/*
-* Deserialize a Server Hello message
-*/
-void Server_Hello::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(buf.size() < 38)
- throw Decoding_Error("Server_Hello: Packet corrupted");
-
- TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
-
- s_version = static_cast<Version_Code>(reader.get_u16bit());
-
- if(s_version != SSL_V3 && s_version != TLS_V10 && s_version != TLS_V11)
- {
- throw TLS_Exception(PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- "Server_Hello: Unsupported server version");
- }
-
- s_random = reader.get_fixed<byte>(32);
-
- sess_id = reader.get_range<byte>(1, 0, 32);
-
- suite = reader.get_u16bit();
-
- comp_algo = reader.get_byte();
- }
-
-/*
-* Create a new Server Hello Done message
-*/
-Server_Hello_Done::Server_Hello_Done(Record_Writer& writer,
- HandshakeHash& hash)
- {
- send(writer, hash);
- }
-
-/*
-* Serialize a Server Hello Done message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Server_Hello_Done::serialize() const
- {
- return SecureVector<byte>();
- }
-
-/*
-* Deserialize a Server Hello Done message
-*/
-void Server_Hello_Done::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(buf.size())
- throw Decoding_Error("Server_Hello_Done: Must be empty, and is not");
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/rec_read.cpp b/src/ssl/rec_read.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 7e295f8a4..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/rec_read.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Record Reading
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/tls_record.h>
-#include <botan/lookup.h>
-#include <botan/loadstor.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/*
-* Reset the state
-*/
-void Record_Reader::reset()
- {
- cipher.reset();
-
- delete mac;
- mac = 0;
-
- mac_size = 0;
- block_size = 0;
- iv_size = 0;
- major = minor = 0;
- seq_no = 0;
- }
-
-/*
-* Set the version to use
-*/
-void Record_Reader::set_version(Version_Code version)
- {
- if(version != SSL_V3 && version != TLS_V10 && version != TLS_V11)
- throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Reader: Invalid protocol version");
-
- major = (version >> 8) & 0xFF;
- minor = (version & 0xFF);
- }
-
-/*
-* Set the keys for reading
-*/
-void Record_Reader::set_keys(const CipherSuite& suite, const SessionKeys& keys,
- Connection_Side side)
- {
- cipher.reset();
- delete mac;
- mac = 0;
-
- SymmetricKey mac_key, cipher_key;
- InitializationVector iv;
-
- if(side == CLIENT)
- {
- cipher_key = keys.server_cipher_key();
- iv = keys.server_iv();
- mac_key = keys.server_mac_key();
- }
- else
- {
- cipher_key = keys.client_cipher_key();
- iv = keys.client_iv();
- mac_key = keys.client_mac_key();
- }
-
- const std::string cipher_algo = suite.cipher_algo();
- const std::string mac_algo = suite.mac_algo();
-
- if(have_block_cipher(cipher_algo))
- {
- cipher.append(get_cipher(
- cipher_algo + "/CBC/NoPadding",
- cipher_key, iv, DECRYPTION)
- );
- block_size = block_size_of(cipher_algo);
-
- if(major > 3 || (major == 3 && minor >= 2))
- iv_size = block_size;
- else
- iv_size = 0;
- }
- else if(have_stream_cipher(cipher_algo))
- {
- cipher.append(get_cipher(cipher_algo, cipher_key, DECRYPTION));
- block_size = 0;
- iv_size = 0;
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Reader: Unknown cipher " + cipher_algo);
-
- if(have_hash(mac_algo))
- {
- Algorithm_Factory& af = global_state().algorithm_factory();
-
- if(major == 3 && minor == 0)
- mac = af.make_mac("SSL3-MAC(" + mac_algo + ")");
- else
- mac = af.make_mac("HMAC(" + mac_algo + ")");
-
- mac->set_key(mac_key);
- mac_size = mac->output_length();
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Reader: Unknown hash " + mac_algo);
- }
-
-void Record_Reader::add_input(const byte input[], size_t input_size)
- {
- input_queue.write(input, input_size);
- }
-
-/*
-* Retrieve the next record
-*/
-size_t Record_Reader::get_record(byte& msg_type,
- MemoryRegion<byte>& output)
- {
- byte header[5] = { 0 };
-
- const size_t have_in_queue = input_queue.size();
-
- if(have_in_queue < sizeof(header))
- return (sizeof(header) - have_in_queue);
-
- /*
- * We peek first to make sure we have the full record
- */
- input_queue.peek(header, sizeof(header));
-
- // SSLv2-format client hello?
- if(header[0] & 0x80 && header[2] == 1 && header[3] == 3)
- {
- size_t record_len = make_u16bit(header[0], header[1]) & 0x7FFF;
-
- if(have_in_queue < record_len + 2)
- return (record_len + 2 - have_in_queue);
-
- msg_type = HANDSHAKE;
- output.resize(record_len + 4);
-
- input_queue.read(&output[2], record_len + 2);
- output[0] = CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2;
- output[1] = 0;
- output[2] = header[0] & 0x7F;
- output[3] = header[1];
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- if(header[0] != CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
- header[0] != ALERT &&
- header[0] != HANDSHAKE &&
- header[0] != APPLICATION_DATA)
- {
- throw TLS_Exception(UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
- "Record_Reader: Unknown record type");
- }
-
- const u16bit version = make_u16bit(header[1], header[2]);
- const u16bit record_len = make_u16bit(header[3], header[4]);
-
- if(major && (header[1] != major || header[2] != minor))
- throw TLS_Exception(PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- "Record_Reader: Got unexpected version");
-
- // If insufficient data, return without doing anything
- if(have_in_queue < (sizeof(header) + record_len))
- return (sizeof(header) + record_len - have_in_queue);
-
- SecureVector<byte> buffer(record_len);
-
- input_queue.read(header, sizeof(header)); // pull off the header
- input_queue.read(&buffer[0], buffer.size());
-
- /*
- * We are handshaking, no crypto to do so return as-is
- * TODO: Check msg_type to confirm a handshake?
- */
- if(mac_size == 0)
- {
- msg_type = header[0];
- output = buffer;
- return 0; // got a full record
- }
-
- // Otherwise, decrypt, check MAC, return plaintext
-
- cipher.process_msg(buffer);
- SecureVector<byte> plaintext = cipher.read_all(Pipe::LAST_MESSAGE);
-
- size_t pad_size = 0;
-
- if(block_size)
- {
- byte pad_value = plaintext[plaintext.size()-1];
- pad_size = pad_value + 1;
-
- /*
- * Check the padding; if it is wrong, then say we have 0 bytes of
- * padding, which should ensure that the MAC check below does not
- * suceed. This hides a timing channel.
- *
- * This particular countermeasure is recommended in the TLS 1.2
- * spec (RFC 5246) in section 6.2.3.2
- */
- if(version == SSL_V3)
- {
- if(pad_value > block_size)
- pad_size = 0;
- }
- else
- {
- bool padding_good = true;
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != pad_size; ++i)
- if(plaintext[plaintext.size()-i-1] != pad_value)
- padding_good = false;
-
- if(!padding_good)
- pad_size = 0;
- }
- }
-
- if(plaintext.size() < mac_size + pad_size + iv_size)
- throw Decoding_Error("Record_Reader: Record truncated");
-
- const size_t mac_offset = plaintext.size() - (mac_size + pad_size);
- SecureVector<byte> received_mac(&plaintext[mac_offset],
- mac_size);
-
- const u16bit plain_length = plaintext.size() - (mac_size + pad_size + iv_size);
-
- mac->update_be(seq_no);
- mac->update(header[0]); // msg_type
-
- if(version != SSL_V3)
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 2; ++i)
- mac->update(get_byte(i, version));
-
- mac->update_be(plain_length);
- mac->update(&plaintext[iv_size], plain_length);
-
- ++seq_no;
-
- SecureVector<byte> computed_mac = mac->final();
-
- if(received_mac != computed_mac)
- throw TLS_Exception(BAD_RECORD_MAC, "Record_Reader: MAC failure");
-
- msg_type = header[0];
-
- output.resize(plain_length);
- copy_mem(&output[0], &plaintext[iv_size], plain_length);
- return 0;
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/rec_wri.cpp b/src/ssl/rec_wri.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 59dead3cd..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/rec_wri.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,270 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Record Writing
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/tls_record.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
-#include <botan/lookup.h>
-#include <botan/loadstor.h>
-#include <botan/libstate.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Record_Writer Constructor
-*/
-Record_Writer::Record_Writer(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> out) :
- output_fn(out),
- buffer(DEFAULT_BUFFERSIZE)
- {
- mac = 0;
- reset();
- }
-
-/**
-* Reset the state
-*/
-void Record_Writer::reset()
- {
- cipher.reset();
-
- delete mac;
- mac = 0;
-
- zeroise(buffer);
- buf_pos = 0;
-
- major = minor = buf_type = 0;
- block_size = 0;
- mac_size = 0;
- iv_size = 0;
-
- seq_no = 0;
- }
-
-/**
-* Set the version to use
-*/
-void Record_Writer::set_version(Version_Code version)
- {
- if(version != SSL_V3 && version != TLS_V10 && version != TLS_V11)
- throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Writer: Invalid protocol version");
-
- major = (version >> 8) & 0xFF;
- minor = (version & 0xFF);
- }
-
-/**
-* Set the keys for writing
-*/
-void Record_Writer::set_keys(const CipherSuite& suite, const SessionKeys& keys,
- Connection_Side side)
- {
- cipher.reset();
- delete mac;
- mac = 0;
-
- SymmetricKey mac_key, cipher_key;
- InitializationVector iv;
-
- if(side == CLIENT)
- {
- cipher_key = keys.client_cipher_key();
- iv = keys.client_iv();
- mac_key = keys.client_mac_key();
- }
- else
- {
- cipher_key = keys.server_cipher_key();
- iv = keys.server_iv();
- mac_key = keys.server_mac_key();
- }
-
- const std::string cipher_algo = suite.cipher_algo();
- const std::string mac_algo = suite.mac_algo();
-
- if(have_block_cipher(cipher_algo))
- {
- cipher.append(get_cipher(
- cipher_algo + "/CBC/NoPadding",
- cipher_key, iv, ENCRYPTION)
- );
- block_size = block_size_of(cipher_algo);
-
- if(major > 3 || (major == 3 && minor >= 2))
- iv_size = block_size;
- else
- iv_size = 0;
- }
- else if(have_stream_cipher(cipher_algo))
- {
- cipher.append(get_cipher(cipher_algo, cipher_key, ENCRYPTION));
- block_size = 0;
- iv_size = 0;
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Writer: Unknown cipher " + cipher_algo);
-
- if(have_hash(mac_algo))
- {
- Algorithm_Factory& af = global_state().algorithm_factory();
-
- if(major == 3 && minor == 0)
- mac = af.make_mac("SSL3-MAC(" + mac_algo + ")");
- else
- mac = af.make_mac("HMAC(" + mac_algo + ")");
-
- mac->set_key(mac_key);
- mac_size = mac->output_length();
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Writer: Unknown hash " + mac_algo);
- }
-
-/**
-* Send one or more records to the other side
-*/
-void Record_Writer::send(byte type, const byte input[], size_t length)
- {
- if(type != buf_type)
- flush();
-
- const size_t BUFFER_SIZE = buffer.size();
- buf_type = type;
-
- // FIXME: compression right here
-
- buffer.copy(buf_pos, input, length);
- if(buf_pos + length >= BUFFER_SIZE)
- {
- send_record(buf_type, &buffer[0], length);
- input += (BUFFER_SIZE - buf_pos);
- length -= (BUFFER_SIZE - buf_pos);
- while(length >= BUFFER_SIZE)
- {
- send_record(buf_type, input, BUFFER_SIZE);
- input += BUFFER_SIZE;
- length -= BUFFER_SIZE;
- }
- buffer.copy(input, length);
- buf_pos = 0;
- }
- buf_pos += length;
- }
-
-/**
-* Split buffer into records, and send them all
-*/
-void Record_Writer::flush()
- {
- const byte* buf_ptr = &buffer[0];
- size_t offset = 0;
-
- while(offset != buf_pos)
- {
- size_t record_size = buf_pos - offset;
- if(record_size > MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE)
- record_size = MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE;
-
- send_record(buf_type, buf_ptr + offset, record_size);
- offset += record_size;
- }
- buf_type = 0;
- buf_pos = 0;
- }
-
-/**
-* Encrypt and send the record
-*/
-void Record_Writer::send_record(byte type, const byte buf[], size_t length)
- {
- if(length >= MAX_COMPRESSED_SIZE)
- throw TLS_Exception(INTERNAL_ERROR,
- "Record_Writer: Compressed packet is too big");
-
- if(mac_size == 0)
- send_record(type, major, minor, buf, length);
- else
- {
- mac->update_be(seq_no);
- mac->update(type);
-
- if(major > 3 || (major == 3 && minor != 0))
- {
- mac->update(major);
- mac->update(minor);
- }
-
- mac->update(get_byte<u16bit>(0, length));
- mac->update(get_byte<u16bit>(1, length));
- mac->update(buf, length);
-
- SecureVector<byte> buf_mac = mac->final();
-
- // TODO: This could all use a single buffer
- cipher.start_msg();
-
- if(iv_size)
- {
- RandomNumberGenerator& rng = global_state().global_rng();
-
- SecureVector<byte> random_iv(iv_size);
-
- rng.randomize(&random_iv[0], random_iv.size());
-
- cipher.write(random_iv);
- }
-
- cipher.write(buf, length);
- cipher.write(buf_mac);
-
- if(block_size)
- {
- size_t pad_val =
- (block_size - (1 + length + buf_mac.size())) % block_size;
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != pad_val + 1; ++i)
- cipher.write(pad_val);
- }
- cipher.end_msg();
-
- SecureVector<byte> output = cipher.read_all(Pipe::LAST_MESSAGE);
-
- send_record(type, major, minor, &output[0], output.size());
-
- seq_no++;
- }
- }
-
-/**
-* Send a final record packet
-*/
-void Record_Writer::send_record(byte type, byte major, byte minor,
- const byte out[], size_t length)
- {
- if(length >= MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE)
- throw TLS_Exception(INTERNAL_ERROR,
- "Record_Writer: Record is too big");
-
- byte header[5] = { type, major, minor, 0 };
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 2; ++i)
- header[i+3] = get_byte<u16bit>(i, length);
-
- output_fn(header, 5);
- output_fn(out, length);
- }
-
-/**
-* Send an alert
-*/
-void Record_Writer::alert(Alert_Level level, Alert_Type type)
- {
- byte alert[2] = { level, type };
- send(ALERT, alert, sizeof(alert));
- flush();
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/s_kex.cpp b/src/ssl/s_kex.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 1e7de31d0..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/s_kex.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* Server Key Exchange Message
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
-#include <botan/pubkey.h>
-#include <botan/dh.h>
-#include <botan/rsa.h>
-#include <botan/dsa.h>
-#include <botan/loadstor.h>
-#include <memory>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Create a new Server Key Exchange message
-*/
-Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer& writer,
- const Public_Key* kex_key,
- const Private_Key* priv_key,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& c_random,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& s_random,
- HandshakeHash& hash)
- {
- const DH_PublicKey* dh_pub = dynamic_cast<const DH_PublicKey*>(kex_key);
- const RSA_PublicKey* rsa_pub = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PublicKey*>(kex_key);
-
- if(dh_pub)
- {
- params.push_back(dh_pub->get_domain().get_p());
- params.push_back(dh_pub->get_domain().get_g());
- params.push_back(BigInt::decode(dh_pub->public_value()));
- }
- else if(rsa_pub)
- {
- params.push_back(rsa_pub->get_n());
- params.push_back(rsa_pub->get_e());
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument("Bad key for TLS key exchange: not DH or RSA");
-
-
- std::string padding = "";
- Signature_Format format = IEEE_1363;
-
- if(priv_key->algo_name() == "RSA")
- padding = "EMSA3(TLS.Digest.0)";
- else if(priv_key->algo_name() == "DSA")
- {
- padding = "EMSA1(SHA-1)";
- format = DER_SEQUENCE;
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument(priv_key->algo_name() +
- " is invalid/unknown for TLS signatures");
-
- PK_Signer signer(*priv_key, padding, format);
-
- signer.update(c_random);
- signer.update(s_random);
- signer.update(serialize_params());
- signature = signer.signature(rng);
-
- send(writer, hash);
- }
-
-/**
-* Serialize a Server Key Exchange message
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Server_Key_Exchange::serialize() const
- {
- SecureVector<byte> buf = serialize_params();
- append_tls_length_value(buf, signature, 2);
- return buf;
- }
-
-/**
-* Serialize the ServerParams structure
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> Server_Key_Exchange::serialize_params() const
- {
- SecureVector<byte> buf;
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != params.size(); ++i)
- append_tls_length_value(buf, BigInt::encode(params[i]), 2);
-
- return buf;
- }
-
-/**
-* Deserialize a Server Key Exchange message
-*/
-void Server_Key_Exchange::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(buf.size() < 6)
- throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Packet corrupted");
-
- SecureVector<byte> values[4];
- size_t so_far = 0;
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 4; ++i)
- {
- const u16bit len = make_u16bit(buf[so_far], buf[so_far+1]);
- so_far += 2;
-
- if(len + so_far > buf.size())
- throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Packet corrupted");
-
- values[i].resize(len);
- copy_mem(&values[i][0], &buf[so_far], len);
- so_far += len;
-
- if(i == 2 && so_far == buf.size())
- break;
- }
-
- params.push_back(BigInt::decode(values[0]));
- params.push_back(BigInt::decode(values[1]));
- if(values[3].size())
- {
- params.push_back(BigInt::decode(values[2]));
- signature = values[3];
- }
- else
- signature = values[2];
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the public key
-*/
-Public_Key* Server_Key_Exchange::key() const
- {
- if(params.size() == 2)
- return new RSA_PublicKey(params[0], params[1]);
- else if(params.size() == 3)
- return new DH_PublicKey(DL_Group(params[0], params[1]), params[2]);
- else
- throw Internal_Error("Server_Key_Exchange::key: No key set");
- }
-
-/**
-* Verify a Server Key Exchange message
-*/
-bool Server_Key_Exchange::verify(const X509_Certificate& cert,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& c_random,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& s_random) const
- {
-
- std::auto_ptr<Public_Key> key(cert.subject_public_key());
-
- std::string padding = "";
- Signature_Format format = IEEE_1363;
-
- if(key->algo_name() == "RSA")
- padding = "EMSA3(TLS.Digest.0)";
- else if(key->algo_name() == "DSA")
- {
- padding == "EMSA1(SHA-1)";
- format = DER_SEQUENCE;
- }
- else
- throw Invalid_Argument(key->algo_name() +
- " is invalid/unknown for TLS signatures");
-
- PK_Verifier verifier(*key, padding, format);
-
- SecureVector<byte> params_got = serialize_params();
- verifier.update(c_random);
- verifier.update(s_random);
- verifier.update(params_got);
-
- return verifier.check_signature(signature);
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_alerts.h b/src/ssl/tls_alerts.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 241599aa8..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_alerts.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* Alert Message
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_ALERT_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_ALERT_H__
-
-#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* SSL/TLS Alert Message
-*/
-class Alert
- {
- public:
- /**
- * @return if this alert is a fatal one or not
- */
- bool is_fatal() const { return fatal; }
-
- /**
- * @return type of alert
- */
- Alert_Type type() const { return type_code; }
-
- /**
- * Deserialize an Alert message
- * @param buf the serialized alert
- */
- Alert(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
- {
- if(buf.size() != 2)
- throw Decoding_Error("Alert: Bad size for alert message");
-
- if(buf[0] == 1) fatal = false;
- else if(buf[0] == 2) fatal = true;
- else
- throw Decoding_Error("Alert: Bad type code for alert level");
-
- type_code = static_cast<Alert_Type>(buf[1]);
- }
- private:
- bool fatal;
- Alert_Type type_code;
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_client.cpp b/src/ssl/tls_client.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index a136752fd..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_client.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,586 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Client
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/tls_client.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_alerts.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_state.h>
-#include <botan/loadstor.h>
-#include <botan/rsa.h>
-#include <botan/dsa.h>
-#include <botan/dh.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-namespace {
-
-/**
-* Verify the state transition is allowed
-* FIXME: checks are wrong for session reuse (add a flag for that)
-*/
-void client_check_state(Handshake_Type new_msg, Handshake_State* state)
- {
- class State_Transition_Error : public Unexpected_Message
- {
- public:
- State_Transition_Error(const std::string& err) :
- Unexpected_Message("State transition error from " + err) {}
- };
-
- if(new_msg == HELLO_REQUEST)
- {
- if(state->client_hello)
- throw State_Transition_Error("HelloRequest");
- }
- else if(new_msg == SERVER_HELLO)
- {
- if(!state->client_hello || state->server_hello)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ServerHello");
- }
- else if(new_msg == CERTIFICATE)
- {
- if(!state->server_hello || state->server_kex ||
- state->cert_req || state->server_hello_done)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ServerCertificate");
- }
- else if(new_msg == SERVER_KEX)
- {
- if(!state->server_hello || state->server_kex ||
- state->cert_req || state->server_hello_done)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ServerKeyExchange");
- }
- else if(new_msg == CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
- {
- if(!state->server_certs || state->cert_req || state->server_hello_done)
- throw State_Transition_Error("CertificateRequest");
- }
- else if(new_msg == SERVER_HELLO_DONE)
- {
- if(!state->server_hello || state->server_hello_done)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ServerHelloDone");
- }
- else if(new_msg == HANDSHAKE_CCS)
- {
- if(!state->client_finished || state->server_finished)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ServerChangeCipherSpec");
- }
- else if(new_msg == FINISHED)
- {
- if(!state->got_server_ccs)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ServerFinished");
- }
- else
- throw Unexpected_Message("Unexpected message in handshake");
- }
-
-}
-
-/**
-* TLS Client Constructor
-*/
-TLS_Client::TLS_Client(std::tr1::function<size_t (byte[], size_t)> input_fn,
- std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> output_fn,
- const TLS_Policy& policy,
- RandomNumberGenerator& rng) :
- input_fn(input_fn),
- policy(policy),
- rng(rng),
- writer(output_fn)
- {
- initialize();
- }
-
-void TLS_Client::add_client_cert(const X509_Certificate& cert,
- Private_Key* cert_key)
- {
- certs.push_back(std::make_pair(cert, cert_key));
- }
-
-/**
-* TLS Client Destructor
-*/
-TLS_Client::~TLS_Client()
- {
- close();
- for(size_t i = 0; i != certs.size(); i++)
- delete certs[i].second;
- delete state;
- }
-
-/**
-* Initialize a TLS client connection
-*/
-void TLS_Client::initialize()
- {
- std::string error_str;
- Alert_Type error_type = NO_ALERT_TYPE;
-
- try {
- state = 0;
- active = false;
- writer.set_version(policy.pref_version());
- do_handshake();
- }
- catch(TLS_Exception& e)
- {
- error_str = e.what();
- error_type = e.type();
- }
- catch(std::exception& e)
- {
- error_str = e.what();
- error_type = HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- }
-
- if(error_type != NO_ALERT_TYPE)
- {
- if(active)
- {
- active = false;
- reader.reset();
-
- writer.alert(FATAL, error_type);
- writer.reset();
- }
-
- if(state)
- {
- delete state;
- state = 0;
- }
-
- throw Stream_IO_Error("TLS_Client: Handshake failed: " + error_str);
- }
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the peer's certificate chain
-*/
-std::vector<X509_Certificate> TLS_Client::peer_cert_chain() const
- {
- return peer_certs;
- }
-
-/**
-* Write to a TLS connection
-*/
-void TLS_Client::write(const byte buf[], size_t length)
- {
- if(!active)
- throw TLS_Exception(INTERNAL_ERROR,
- "TLS_Client::write called while closed");
-
- writer.send(APPLICATION_DATA, buf, length);
- }
-
-/**
-* Read from a TLS connection
-*/
-size_t TLS_Client::read(byte out[], size_t length)
- {
- if(!active)
- return 0;
-
- writer.flush();
-
- while(read_buf.size() == 0)
- {
- state_machine();
- if(active == false)
- break;
- }
-
- size_t got = std::min<size_t>(read_buf.size(), length);
- read_buf.read(out, got);
- return got;
- }
-
-/**
-* Close a TLS connection
-*/
-void TLS_Client::close()
- {
- close(WARNING, CLOSE_NOTIFY);
- }
-
-/**
-* Check connection status
-*/
-bool TLS_Client::is_closed() const
- {
- if(!active)
- return true;
- return false;
- }
-
-/**
-* Close a TLS connection
-*/
-void TLS_Client::close(Alert_Level level, Alert_Type alert_code)
- {
- if(active)
- {
- try {
- writer.alert(level, alert_code);
- writer.flush();
- }
- catch(...) {}
-
- active = false;
- }
- }
-
-/**
-* Iterate the TLS state machine
-*/
-void TLS_Client::state_machine()
- {
- byte rec_type = CONNECTION_CLOSED;
- SecureVector<byte> record(1024);
-
- size_t bytes_needed = reader.get_record(rec_type, record);
-
- while(bytes_needed)
- {
- size_t to_get = std::min<size_t>(record.size(), bytes_needed);
- size_t got = input_fn(&record[0], to_get);
-
- if(got == 0)
- {
- rec_type = CONNECTION_CLOSED;
- break;
- }
-
- reader.add_input(&record[0], got);
-
- bytes_needed = reader.get_record(rec_type, record);
- }
-
- if(rec_type == CONNECTION_CLOSED)
- {
- active = false;
- reader.reset();
- writer.reset();
- }
- else if(rec_type == APPLICATION_DATA)
- {
- if(active)
- read_buf.write(&record[0], record.size());
- else
- throw Unexpected_Message("Application data before handshake done");
- }
- else if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE || rec_type == CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- read_handshake(rec_type, record);
- else if(rec_type == ALERT)
- {
- Alert alert(record);
-
- if(alert.is_fatal() || alert.type() == CLOSE_NOTIFY)
- {
- if(alert.type() == CLOSE_NOTIFY)
- writer.alert(WARNING, CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-
- reader.reset();
- writer.reset();
- active = false;
- if(state)
- {
- delete state;
- state = 0;
- }
- }
- }
- else
- throw Unexpected_Message("Unknown message type received");
- }
-
-/**
-* Split up and process handshake messages
-*/
-void TLS_Client::read_handshake(byte rec_type,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& rec_buf)
- {
- if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE)
- state->queue.write(&rec_buf[0], rec_buf.size());
-
- while(true)
- {
- Handshake_Type type = HANDSHAKE_NONE;
- SecureVector<byte> contents;
-
- if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE)
- {
- if(state->queue.size() >= 4)
- {
- byte head[4] = { 0 };
- state->queue.peek(head, 4);
-
- const size_t length = make_u32bit(0, head[1], head[2], head[3]);
-
- if(state->queue.size() >= length + 4)
- {
- type = static_cast<Handshake_Type>(head[0]);
- contents.resize(length);
- state->queue.read(head, 4);
- state->queue.read(&contents[0], contents.size());
- }
- }
- }
- else if(rec_type == CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- {
- if(state->queue.size() == 0 && rec_buf.size() == 1 && rec_buf[0] == 1)
- type = HANDSHAKE_CCS;
- else
- throw Decoding_Error("Malformed ChangeCipherSpec message");
- }
- else
- throw Decoding_Error("Unknown message type in handshake processing");
-
- if(type == HANDSHAKE_NONE)
- break;
-
- process_handshake_msg(type, contents);
-
- if(type == HANDSHAKE_CCS || !state)
- break;
- }
- }
-
-/**
-* Process a handshake message
-*/
-void TLS_Client::process_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type type,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& contents)
- {
- rng.add_entropy(&contents[0], contents.size());
-
- if(type == HELLO_REQUEST)
- {
- if(state == 0)
- state = new Handshake_State();
- else
- return;
- }
-
- if(state == 0)
- throw Unexpected_Message("Unexpected handshake message");
-
- if(type != HANDSHAKE_CCS && type != HELLO_REQUEST && type != FINISHED)
- {
- state->hash.update(static_cast<byte>(type));
- const size_t record_length = contents.size();
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; i++)
- state->hash.update(get_byte<u32bit>(i+1, record_length));
- state->hash.update(contents);
- }
-
- if(type == HELLO_REQUEST)
- {
- client_check_state(type, state);
-
- Hello_Request hello_request(contents);
- state->client_hello = new Client_Hello(rng, writer, policy, state->hash);
- }
- else if(type == SERVER_HELLO)
- {
- client_check_state(type, state);
-
- state->server_hello = new Server_Hello(contents);
-
- if(!state->client_hello->offered_suite(
- state->server_hello->ciphersuite()
- )
- )
- throw TLS_Exception(HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- "TLS_Client: Server replied with bad ciphersuite");
-
- state->version = state->server_hello->version();
-
- if(state->version > state->client_hello->version())
- throw TLS_Exception(HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- "TLS_Client: Server replied with bad version");
-
- if(state->version < policy.min_version())
- throw TLS_Exception(PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- "TLS_Client: Server is too old for specified policy");
-
- writer.set_version(state->version);
- reader.set_version(state->version);
-
- state->suite = CipherSuite(state->server_hello->ciphersuite());
- }
- else if(type == CERTIFICATE)
- {
- client_check_state(type, state);
-
- if(state->suite.sig_type() == TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ANON)
- throw Unexpected_Message("Recived certificate from anonymous server");
-
- state->server_certs = new Certificate(contents);
-
- peer_certs = state->server_certs->cert_chain();
- if(peer_certs.size() == 0)
- throw TLS_Exception(HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- "TLS_Client: No certificates sent by server");
-
- if(!policy.check_cert(peer_certs))
- throw TLS_Exception(BAD_CERTIFICATE,
- "TLS_Client: Server certificate is not valid");
-
- state->kex_pub = peer_certs[0].subject_public_key();
-
- bool is_dsa = false, is_rsa = false;
-
- if(dynamic_cast<DSA_PublicKey*>(state->kex_pub))
- is_dsa = true;
- else if(dynamic_cast<RSA_PublicKey*>(state->kex_pub))
- is_rsa = true;
- else
- throw TLS_Exception(UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
- "Unknown key type received in server kex");
-
- if((is_dsa && state->suite.sig_type() != TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_DSA) ||
- (is_rsa && state->suite.sig_type() != TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA))
- throw TLS_Exception(ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- "Certificate key type did not match ciphersuite");
- }
- else if(type == SERVER_KEX)
- {
- client_check_state(type, state);
-
- if(state->suite.kex_type() == TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX)
- throw Unexpected_Message("Unexpected key exchange from server");
-
- state->server_kex = new Server_Key_Exchange(contents);
-
- if(state->kex_pub)
- delete state->kex_pub;
-
- state->kex_pub = state->server_kex->key();
-
- bool is_dh = false, is_rsa = false;
-
- if(dynamic_cast<DH_PublicKey*>(state->kex_pub))
- is_dh = true;
- else if(dynamic_cast<RSA_PublicKey*>(state->kex_pub))
- is_rsa = true;
- else
- throw TLS_Exception(HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- "Unknown key type received in server kex");
-
- if((is_dh && state->suite.kex_type() != TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH) ||
- (is_rsa && state->suite.kex_type() != TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_RSA))
- throw TLS_Exception(ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- "Certificate key type did not match ciphersuite");
-
- if(state->suite.sig_type() != TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ANON)
- {
- if(!state->server_kex->verify(peer_certs[0],
- state->client_hello->random(),
- state->server_hello->random()))
- throw TLS_Exception(DECRYPT_ERROR,
- "Bad signature on server key exchange");
- }
- }
- else if(type == CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
- {
- client_check_state(type, state);
-
- state->cert_req = new Certificate_Req(contents);
- state->do_client_auth = true;
- }
- else if(type == SERVER_HELLO_DONE)
- {
- client_check_state(type, state);
-
- state->server_hello_done = new Server_Hello_Done(contents);
-
- if(state->do_client_auth)
- {
- std::vector<X509_Certificate> send_certs;
-
- std::vector<Certificate_Type> types =
- state->cert_req->acceptable_types();
-
- // FIXME: Fill in useful certs here, if any
- state->client_certs = new Certificate(writer, send_certs,
- state->hash);
- }
-
- state->client_kex =
- new Client_Key_Exchange(rng, writer, state->hash,
- state->kex_pub, state->version,
- state->client_hello->version());
-
- if(state->do_client_auth)
- {
- Private_Key* key_matching_cert = 0; // FIXME
- state->client_verify = new Certificate_Verify(rng,
- writer, state->hash,
- key_matching_cert);
- }
-
- state->keys = SessionKeys(state->suite, state->version,
- state->client_kex->pre_master_secret(),
- state->client_hello->random(),
- state->server_hello->random());
-
- writer.send(CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1);
- writer.flush();
-
- writer.set_keys(state->suite, state->keys, CLIENT);
-
- state->client_finished = new Finished(writer, state->version, CLIENT,
- state->keys.master_secret(),
- state->hash);
- }
- else if(type == HANDSHAKE_CCS)
- {
- client_check_state(type, state);
-
- reader.set_keys(state->suite, state->keys, CLIENT);
- state->got_server_ccs = true;
- }
- else if(type == FINISHED)
- {
- client_check_state(type, state);
-
- state->server_finished = new Finished(contents);
-
- if(!state->server_finished->verify(state->keys.master_secret(),
- state->version, state->hash, SERVER))
- throw TLS_Exception(DECRYPT_ERROR,
- "Finished message didn't verify");
-
- delete state;
- state = 0;
- active = true;
- }
- else
- throw Unexpected_Message("Unknown handshake message received");
- }
-
-/**
-* Perform a client-side TLS handshake
-*/
-void TLS_Client::do_handshake()
- {
- state = new Handshake_State;
-
- state->client_hello = new Client_Hello(rng, writer, policy, state->hash);
-
- while(true)
- {
- if(active && !state)
- break;
- if(!active && !state)
- throw TLS_Exception(HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, "TLS_Client: Handshake failed (do_handshake)");
-
- state_machine();
- }
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_client.h b/src/ssl/tls_client.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7d2ce9cda..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_client.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Client
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_CLIENT_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_CLIENT_H__
-
-#include <botan/tls_connection.h>
-#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
-#include <botan/tls_record.h>
-#include <vector>
-#include <string>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* SSL/TLS Client
-*/
-class BOTAN_DLL TLS_Client : public TLS_Connection
- {
- public:
- size_t read(byte buf[], size_t buf_len);
- void write(const byte buf[], size_t buf_len);
-
- void close();
- bool is_closed() const;
-
- std::vector<X509_Certificate> peer_cert_chain() const;
-
- void add_client_cert(const X509_Certificate& cert,
- Private_Key* cert_key);
-
- TLS_Client(std::tr1::function<size_t (byte[], size_t)> input_fn,
- std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> output_fn,
- const TLS_Policy& policy,
- RandomNumberGenerator& rng);
-
- ~TLS_Client();
- private:
- void close(Alert_Level, Alert_Type);
-
- size_t get_pending_socket_input(byte output[], size_t length);
-
- void initialize();
- void do_handshake();
-
- void state_machine();
- void read_handshake(byte, const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
- void process_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type, const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- std::tr1::function<size_t (byte[], size_t)> input_fn;
-
- const TLS_Policy& policy;
- RandomNumberGenerator& rng;
-
- Record_Writer writer;
- Record_Reader reader;
-
- std::vector<X509_Certificate> peer_certs;
- std::vector<std::pair<X509_Certificate, Private_Key*> > certs;
-
- class Handshake_State* state;
- SecureVector<byte> session_id;
- SecureQueue read_buf;
- bool active;
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_connection.h b/src/ssl/tls_connection.h
deleted file mode 100644
index bbefa2114..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_connection.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Connection
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_CONNECTION_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_CONNECTION_H__
-
-#include <botan/x509cert.h>
-#include <vector>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* TLS Connection
-*/
-class BOTAN_DLL TLS_Connection
- {
- public:
- virtual size_t read(byte[], size_t) = 0;
- virtual void write(const byte[], size_t) = 0;
- size_t read(byte& in) { return read(&in, 1); }
- void write(byte out) { write(&out, 1); }
-
- virtual std::vector<X509_Certificate> peer_cert_chain() const = 0;
-
- virtual void close() = 0;
-
- virtual ~TLS_Connection() {}
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_handshake_hash.cpp b/src/ssl/tls_handshake_hash.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 7c1e2e385..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_handshake_hash.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Handshake Hash
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
-#include <botan/md5.h>
-#include <botan/sha160.h>
-#include <memory>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Return a TLS Handshake Hash
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> HandshakeHash::final()
- {
- MD5 md5;
- SHA_160 sha1;
-
- md5.update(data);
- sha1.update(data);
-
- SecureVector<byte> output;
- output += md5.final();
- output += sha1.final();
- return output;
- }
-
-/**
-* Return a SSLv3 Handshake Hash
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> HandshakeHash::final_ssl3(const MemoryRegion<byte>& secret)
- {
- const byte PAD_INNER = 0x36, PAD_OUTER = 0x5C;
-
- MD5 md5;
- SHA_160 sha1;
-
- md5.update(data);
- sha1.update(data);
-
- md5.update(secret);
- sha1.update(secret);
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 48; ++i)
- md5.update(PAD_INNER);
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 40; ++i)
- sha1.update(PAD_INNER);
-
- SecureVector<byte> inner_md5 = md5.final(), inner_sha1 = sha1.final();
-
- md5.update(secret);
- sha1.update(secret);
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 48; ++i)
- md5.update(PAD_OUTER);
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 40; ++i)
- sha1.update(PAD_OUTER);
- md5.update(inner_md5);
- sha1.update(inner_sha1);
-
- SecureVector<byte> output;
- output += md5.final();
- output += sha1.final();
- return output;
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_magic.h b/src/ssl/tls_magic.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 00898738e..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_magic.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* SSL/TLS Protocol Constants
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_PROTOCOL_MAGIC_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_PROTOCOL_MAGIC_H__
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Protocol Constants for SSL/TLS
-*/
-enum Size_Limits {
- MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE = 16*1024,
- MAX_COMPRESSED_SIZE = MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE + 1024,
- MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE = MAX_COMPRESSED_SIZE + 1024
-};
-
-enum Version_Code {
- NO_VERSION_SET = 0x0000,
- SSL_V3 = 0x0300,
- TLS_V10 = 0x0301,
- TLS_V11 = 0x0302
-};
-
-enum Connection_Side { CLIENT, SERVER };
-
-enum Record_Type {
- CONNECTION_CLOSED = 0,
-
- CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC = 20,
- ALERT = 21,
- HANDSHAKE = 22,
- APPLICATION_DATA = 23
-};
-
-enum Handshake_Type {
- HELLO_REQUEST = 0,
- CLIENT_HELLO = 1,
- CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2 = 255, // not a wire value
- SERVER_HELLO = 2,
- CERTIFICATE = 11,
- SERVER_KEX = 12,
- CERTIFICATE_REQUEST = 13,
- SERVER_HELLO_DONE = 14,
- CERTIFICATE_VERIFY = 15,
- CLIENT_KEX = 16,
- FINISHED = 20,
-
- HANDSHAKE_CCS = 100,
- HANDSHAKE_NONE = 101
-};
-
-enum Alert_Level {
- WARNING = 1,
- FATAL = 2
-};
-
-enum Alert_Type {
- CLOSE_NOTIFY = 0,
- UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE = 10,
- BAD_RECORD_MAC = 20,
- DECRYPTION_FAILED = 21,
- RECORD_OVERFLOW = 22,
- DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE = 30,
- HANDSHAKE_FAILURE = 40,
- BAD_CERTIFICATE = 42,
- UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE = 43,
- CERTIFICATE_REVOKED = 44,
- CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED = 45,
- CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN = 46,
- ILLEGAL_PARAMETER = 47,
- UNKNOWN_CA = 48,
- ACCESS_DENIED = 49,
- DECODE_ERROR = 50,
- DECRYPT_ERROR = 51,
- EXPORT_RESTRICTION = 60,
- PROTOCOL_VERSION = 70,
- INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY = 71,
- INTERNAL_ERROR = 80,
- USER_CANCELED = 90,
- NO_RENEGOTIATION = 100,
-
- UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY = 115,
-
- NO_ALERT_TYPE = 0xFFFF
-};
-
-enum Certificate_Type {
- RSA_CERT = 1,
- DSS_CERT = 2,
- DH_RSA_CERT = 3,
- DH_DSS_CERT = 4
-};
-
-enum Ciphersuite_Code {
- TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 = 0x0004,
- TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0x0005,
-
- TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0x000A,
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x002F,
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0035,
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x003C,
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x003D,
- TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = 0x0096,
-
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0x0013,
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x0032,
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0038,
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x0040,
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x006A,
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = 0x0099,
-
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0x0016,
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x0033,
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0039,
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x0067,
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x006B,
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = 0x009A,
-
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0xC007,
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0xC008,
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC009,
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC00A,
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0xC023,
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = 0xC024,
-
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0xC011,
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0xC012,
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC013,
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC014,
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0xC027,
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = 0xC028
-};
-
-/*
-* Form of the ciphersuites broken down by field instead of
-* being randomly assigned codepoints.
-*/
-enum TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos {
- TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_MASK = 0xFF000000,
- TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ANON = 0x01000000,
- TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA = 0x02000000,
- TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_DSA = 0x03000000,
- TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ECDSA = 0x04000000,
-
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_MASK = 0x00FF0000,
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX = 0x00010000,
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_RSA = 0x00020000,
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH = 0x00030000,
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH = 0x00040000,
-
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_MASK = 0x0000FF00,
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_MD5 = 0x00000100,
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 = 0x00000200,
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256 = 0x00000300,
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA384 = 0x00000400,
-
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_MASK = 0x000000FF,
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_RC4_128 = 0x00000001,
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC = 0x00000002,
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC = 0x00000003,
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC = 0x00000004,
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_SEED_CBC = 0x00000005
-};
-
-enum Compression_Algo {
- NO_COMPRESSION = 0x00
-};
-
-enum TLS_Handshake_Extension_Type {
- TLSEXT_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION = 0,
- TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH = 1,
- TLSEXT_CLIENT_CERT_URL = 2,
- TLSEXT_TRUSTED_CA_KEYS = 3,
- TLSEXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC = 4,
-
- TLSEXT_USABLE_ELLIPTIC_CURVES = 10,
- TLSEXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS = 11,
-
- TLSEXT_SRP_IDENTIFIER = 12,
-
- TLSEXT_CERTIFICATE_TYPES = 9,
- TLSEXT_SESSION_TICKET = 35
-};
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_messages.h b/src/ssl/tls_messages.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e7eaa56e1..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_messages.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Messages
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_MESSAGES_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_MESSAGES_H__
-
-#include <botan/tls_record.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
-#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
-#include <botan/bigint.h>
-#include <botan/pkcs8.h>
-#include <botan/x509cert.h>
-#include <vector>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* TLS Handshake Message Base Class
-*/
-class HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- void send(Record_Writer&, HandshakeHash&) const;
-
- virtual Handshake_Type type() const = 0;
-
- virtual ~HandshakeMessage() {}
- private:
- HandshakeMessage& operator=(const HandshakeMessage&) { return (*this); }
- virtual SecureVector<byte> serialize() const = 0;
- virtual void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&) = 0;
- };
-
-/**
-* Client Hello Message
-*/
-class Client_Hello : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return CLIENT_HELLO; }
- Version_Code version() const { return c_version; }
- const SecureVector<byte>& session_id() const { return sess_id; }
- std::vector<u16bit> ciphersuites() const { return suites; }
- std::vector<byte> compression_algos() const { return comp_algos; }
-
- const SecureVector<byte>& random() const { return c_random; }
-
- std::string hostname() const { return requested_hostname; }
-
- std::string srp_identifier() const { return requested_srp_id; }
-
- bool offered_suite(u16bit) const;
-
- Client_Hello(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer&, const TLS_Policy&, HandshakeHash&);
-
- Client_Hello(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
- Handshake_Type type)
- {
- if(type == CLIENT_HELLO)
- deserialize(buf);
- else
- deserialize_sslv2(buf);
- }
-
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
- void deserialize_sslv2(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- Version_Code c_version;
- SecureVector<byte> sess_id, c_random;
- std::vector<u16bit> suites;
- std::vector<byte> comp_algos;
- std::string requested_hostname;
- std::string requested_srp_id;
- };
-
-/**
-* Client Key Exchange Message
-*/
-class Client_Key_Exchange : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return CLIENT_KEX; }
-
- SecureVector<byte> pre_master_secret() const;
-
- SecureVector<byte> pre_master_secret(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- const Private_Key* key,
- Version_Code version);
-
- Client_Key_Exchange(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer& output,
- HandshakeHash& hash,
- const Public_Key* my_key,
- Version_Code using_version,
- Version_Code pref_version);
-
- Client_Key_Exchange(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
- const CipherSuite& suite,
- Version_Code using_version);
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- SecureVector<byte> key_material, pre_master;
- bool include_length;
- };
-
-/**
-* Certificate Message
-*/
-class Certificate : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return CERTIFICATE; }
- std::vector<X509_Certificate> cert_chain() const { return certs; }
-
- Certificate(Record_Writer&, const std::vector<X509_Certificate>&,
- HandshakeHash&);
- Certificate(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf) { deserialize(buf); }
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
- std::vector<X509_Certificate> certs;
- };
-
-/**
-* Certificate Request Message
-*/
-class Certificate_Req : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; }
-
- std::vector<Certificate_Type> acceptable_types() const { return types; }
- std::vector<X509_DN> acceptable_CAs() const { return names; }
-
- /* TODO
- Certificate_Req(Record_Writer&, HandshakeHash&,
- const X509_Certificate&);
- */
- Certificate_Req(Record_Writer&, HandshakeHash&,
- const std::vector<X509_Certificate>&);
-
- Certificate_Req(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf) { deserialize(buf); }
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- std::vector<X509_DN> names;
- std::vector<Certificate_Type> types;
- };
-
-/**
-* Certificate Verify Message
-*/
-class Certificate_Verify : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; }
-
- bool verify(const X509_Certificate&, HandshakeHash&);
-
- Certificate_Verify(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer&, HandshakeHash&,
- const Private_Key*);
-
- Certificate_Verify(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf) { deserialize(buf); }
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- SecureVector<byte> signature;
- };
-
-/**
-* Finished Message
-*/
-class Finished : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return FINISHED; }
-
- bool verify(const MemoryRegion<byte>&, Version_Code,
- const HandshakeHash&, Connection_Side);
-
- Finished(Record_Writer&, Version_Code, Connection_Side,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>&, HandshakeHash&);
- Finished(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf) { deserialize(buf); }
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- SecureVector<byte> compute_verify(const MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- HandshakeHash, Connection_Side,
- Version_Code);
-
- Connection_Side side;
- SecureVector<byte> verification_data;
- };
-
-/**
-* Hello Request Message
-*/
-class Hello_Request : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return HELLO_REQUEST; }
-
- Hello_Request(Record_Writer&);
- Hello_Request(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf) { deserialize(buf); }
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
- };
-
-/**
-* Server Hello Message
-*/
-class Server_Hello : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return SERVER_HELLO; }
- Version_Code version() { return s_version; }
- const SecureVector<byte>& session_id() const { return sess_id; }
- u16bit ciphersuite() const { return suite; }
- byte compression_algo() const { return comp_algo; }
-
- const SecureVector<byte>& random() const { return s_random; }
-
- Server_Hello(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer&, const TLS_Policy&,
- const std::vector<X509_Certificate>&,
- const Client_Hello&, Version_Code, HandshakeHash&);
-
- Server_Hello(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf) { deserialize(buf); }
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- Version_Code s_version;
- SecureVector<byte> sess_id, s_random;
- u16bit suite;
- byte comp_algo;
- };
-
-/**
-* Server Key Exchange Message
-*/
-class Server_Key_Exchange : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return SERVER_KEX; }
- Public_Key* key() const;
-
- bool verify(const X509_Certificate&, const MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>&) const;
-
- Server_Key_Exchange(RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- Record_Writer&, const Public_Key*,
- const Private_Key*, const MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>&, HandshakeHash&);
-
- Server_Key_Exchange(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf) { deserialize(buf); }
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- SecureVector<byte> serialize_params() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- std::vector<BigInt> params;
- SecureVector<byte> signature;
- };
-
-/**
-* Server Hello Done Message
-*/
-class Server_Hello_Done : public HandshakeMessage
- {
- public:
- Handshake_Type type() const { return SERVER_HELLO_DONE; }
-
- Server_Hello_Done(Record_Writer&, HandshakeHash&);
- Server_Hello_Done(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf) { deserialize(buf); }
- private:
- SecureVector<byte> serialize() const;
- void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_policy.cpp b/src/ssl/tls_policy.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index b73ff7850..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_policy.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* Policies for TLS
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
-#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/*
-* Return allowed ciphersuites
-*/
-std::vector<u16bit> TLS_Policy::ciphersuites() const
- {
- return suite_list(allow_static_rsa(), allow_edh_rsa(), allow_edh_dsa());
- }
-
-/*
-* Return allowed ciphersuites
-*/
-std::vector<u16bit> TLS_Policy::suite_list(bool use_rsa,
- bool use_edh_rsa,
- bool use_edh_dsa) const
- {
- std::vector<u16bit> suites;
-
- if(use_edh_dsa)
- {
- suites.push_back(TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA);
- }
-
- if(use_edh_rsa)
- {
- suites.push_back(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA);
- }
-
- if(use_rsa)
- {
- suites.push_back(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA);
- suites.push_back(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5);
- }
-
- if(suites.size() == 0)
- throw TLS_Exception(INTERNAL_ERROR,
- "TLS_Policy error: All ciphersuites disabled");
-
- return suites;
- }
-
-/*
-* Return allowed compression algorithms
-*/
-std::vector<byte> TLS_Policy::compression() const
- {
- std::vector<byte> algs;
- algs.push_back(NO_COMPRESSION);
- return algs;
- }
-
-/*
-* Choose which ciphersuite to use
-*/
-u16bit TLS_Policy::choose_suite(const std::vector<u16bit>& c_suites,
- bool have_rsa,
- bool have_dsa) const
- {
- bool use_static_rsa = allow_static_rsa() && have_rsa;
- bool use_edh_rsa = allow_edh_rsa() && have_rsa;
- bool use_edh_dsa = allow_edh_dsa() && have_dsa;
-
- std::vector<u16bit> s_suites = suite_list(use_static_rsa, use_edh_rsa,
- use_edh_dsa);
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != s_suites.size(); ++i)
- for(size_t j = 0; j != c_suites.size(); ++j)
- if(s_suites[i] == c_suites[j])
- return s_suites[i];
-
- return 0;
- }
-
-/*
-* Choose which compression algorithm to use
-*/
-byte TLS_Policy::choose_compression(const std::vector<byte>& c_comp) const
- {
- std::vector<byte> s_comp = compression();
-
- for(size_t i = 0; i != s_comp.size(); ++i)
- for(size_t j = 0; j != c_comp.size(); ++j)
- if(s_comp[i] == c_comp[j])
- return s_comp[i];
-
- return NO_COMPRESSION;
- }
-
-/*
-* Return the group to use for empheral DH
-*/
-DL_Group TLS_Policy::dh_group() const
- {
- return DL_Group("modp/ietf/1024");
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_policy.h b/src/ssl/tls_policy.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 461164d2f..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_policy.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* Policies
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_POLICY_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_POLICY_H__
-
-#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
-#include <botan/x509cert.h>
-#include <botan/dl_group.h>
-#include <vector>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* TLS Policy Base Class
-* Inherit and overload as desired to suite local policy concerns
-*/
-class BOTAN_DLL TLS_Policy
- {
- public:
- std::vector<u16bit> ciphersuites() const;
- virtual std::vector<byte> compression() const;
-
- virtual u16bit choose_suite(const std::vector<u16bit>& client_suites,
- bool rsa_ok,
- bool dsa_ok) const;
-
- virtual byte choose_compression(const std::vector<byte>& client) const;
-
- virtual bool allow_static_rsa() const { return true; }
- virtual bool allow_edh_rsa() const { return true; }
- virtual bool allow_edh_dsa() const { return true; }
- virtual bool require_client_auth() const { return false; }
-
- virtual DL_Group dh_group() const;
- virtual size_t rsa_export_keysize() const { return 512; }
-
- /*
- * @return the minimum version that we will negotiate
- */
- virtual Version_Code min_version() const { return SSL_V3; }
-
- /*
- * @return the version we would prefer to negotiate
- */
- virtual Version_Code pref_version() const { return TLS_V11; }
-
- virtual bool check_cert(const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& cert_chain) const = 0;
-
- virtual ~TLS_Policy() {}
- private:
- virtual std::vector<u16bit> suite_list(bool use_rsa,
- bool use_edh_rsa,
- bool use_edh_dsa) const;
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_record.h b/src/ssl/tls_record.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 09fd921c6..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_record.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Record Handling
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_RECORDS_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_RECORDS_H__
-
-#include <botan/tls_session_key.h>
-#include <botan/tls_suites.h>
-#include <botan/pipe.h>
-#include <botan/mac.h>
-#include <botan/secqueue.h>
-#include <vector>
-
-#if defined(BOTAN_USE_STD_TR1)
-
-#if defined(BOTAN_BUILD_COMPILER_IS_MSVC)
- #include <functional>
-#else
- #include <tr1/functional>
-#endif
-
-#elif defined(BOTAN_USE_BOOST_TR1)
- #include <boost/tr1/functional.hpp>
-#else
- #error "No TR1 library defined for use"
-#endif
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-using namespace std::tr1::placeholders;
-
-/**
-* TLS Record Writer
-*/
-class BOTAN_DLL Record_Writer
- {
- public:
- void send(byte type, const byte input[], size_t length);
- void send(byte type, byte val) { send(type, &val, 1); }
-
- void flush();
-
- void alert(Alert_Level, Alert_Type);
-
- void set_keys(const CipherSuite&, const SessionKeys&, Connection_Side);
-
- void set_version(Version_Code);
-
- void reset();
-
- Record_Writer(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> output_fn);
-
- ~Record_Writer() { delete mac; }
- private:
- void send_record(byte type, const byte input[], size_t length);
- void send_record(byte type, byte major, byte minor,
- const byte input[], size_t length);
-
- std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> output_fn;
- Pipe cipher;
- MessageAuthenticationCode* mac;
-
- SecureVector<byte> buffer;
- size_t buf_pos;
-
- size_t block_size, mac_size, iv_size;
-
- u64bit seq_no;
- byte major, minor, buf_type;
- };
-
-/**
-* TLS Record Reader
-*/
-class BOTAN_DLL Record_Reader
- {
- public:
- void add_input(const byte input[], size_t input_size);
-
- /**
- * @param msg_type (output variable)
- * @param buffer (output variable)
- * @return Number of bytes still needed (minimum), or 0 if success
- */
- size_t get_record(byte& msg_type,
- MemoryRegion<byte>& buffer);
-
- SecureVector<byte> get_record(byte& msg_type);
-
- void set_keys(const CipherSuite& suite,
- const SessionKeys& keys,
- Connection_Side side);
-
- void set_version(Version_Code version);
-
- void reset();
-
- Record_Reader() { mac = 0; reset(); }
-
- ~Record_Reader() { delete mac; }
- private:
- SecureQueue input_queue;
-
- Pipe cipher;
- MessageAuthenticationCode* mac;
- size_t block_size, mac_size, iv_size;
- u64bit seq_no;
- byte major, minor;
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_server.cpp b/src/ssl/tls_server.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 8964be3d7..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_server.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,494 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Server
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/tls_server.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_alerts.h>
-#include <botan/internal/tls_state.h>
-#include <botan/loadstor.h>
-#include <botan/rsa.h>
-#include <botan/dh.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-namespace {
-
-/*
-* Choose what version to respond with
-*/
-Version_Code choose_version(Version_Code client, Version_Code minimum)
- {
- if(client < minimum)
- throw TLS_Exception(PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- "Client version is unacceptable by policy");
-
- if(client == SSL_V3 || client == TLS_V10 || client == TLS_V11)
- return client;
- return TLS_V11;
- }
-
-// FIXME: checks are wrong for session reuse (add a flag for that)
-/*
-* Verify the state transition is allowed
-*/
-void server_check_state(Handshake_Type new_msg, Handshake_State* state)
- {
- class State_Transition_Error : public Unexpected_Message
- {
- public:
- State_Transition_Error(const std::string& err) :
- Unexpected_Message("State transition error from " + err) {}
- };
-
- if(new_msg == CLIENT_HELLO || new_msg == CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2)
- {
- if(state->server_hello)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ClientHello");
- }
- else if(new_msg == CERTIFICATE)
- {
- if(!state->do_client_auth || !state->cert_req ||
- !state->server_hello_done || state->client_kex)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ClientCertificate");
- }
- else if(new_msg == CLIENT_KEX)
- {
- if(!state->server_hello_done || state->client_verify ||
- state->got_client_ccs)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ClientKeyExchange");
- }
- else if(new_msg == CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
- {
- if(!state->cert_req || !state->client_certs || !state->client_kex ||
- state->got_client_ccs)
- throw State_Transition_Error("CertificateVerify");
- }
- else if(new_msg == HANDSHAKE_CCS)
- {
- if(!state->client_kex || state->client_finished)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ClientChangeCipherSpec");
- }
- else if(new_msg == FINISHED)
- {
- if(!state->got_client_ccs)
- throw State_Transition_Error("ClientFinished");
- }
- else
- throw Unexpected_Message("Unexpected message in handshake");
- }
-
-}
-
-/*
-* TLS Server Constructor
-*/
-TLS_Server::TLS_Server(std::tr1::function<size_t (byte[], size_t)> input_fn,
- std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> output_fn,
- const TLS_Policy& policy,
- RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- const X509_Certificate& cert,
- const Private_Key& cert_key) :
- input_fn(input_fn),
- policy(policy),
- rng(rng),
- writer(output_fn)
- {
- state = 0;
-
- cert_chain.push_back(cert);
- private_key = PKCS8::copy_key(cert_key, rng);
-
- try {
- active = false;
- writer.set_version(TLS_V10);
- do_handshake();
- active = true;
- }
- catch(std::exception& e)
- {
- if(state)
- {
- delete state;
- state = 0;
- }
-
- writer.alert(FATAL, HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- throw Stream_IO_Error(std::string("TLS_Server: Handshake failed: ") +
- e.what());
- }
- }
-
-/*
-* TLS Server Destructor
-*/
-TLS_Server::~TLS_Server()
- {
- close();
- delete private_key;
- delete state;
- }
-
-/*
-* Return the peer's certificate chain
-*/
-std::vector<X509_Certificate> TLS_Server::peer_cert_chain() const
- {
- return peer_certs;
- }
-
-/*
-* Write to a TLS connection
-*/
-void TLS_Server::write(const byte buf[], size_t length)
- {
- if(!active)
- throw Internal_Error("TLS_Server::write called while closed");
-
- writer.send(APPLICATION_DATA, buf, length);
- }
-
-/*
-* Read from a TLS connection
-*/
-size_t TLS_Server::read(byte out[], size_t length)
- {
- if(!active)
- throw Internal_Error("TLS_Server::read called while closed");
-
- writer.flush();
-
- while(read_buf.size() == 0)
- {
- state_machine();
- if(active == false)
- break;
- }
-
- size_t got = std::min<size_t>(read_buf.size(), length);
- read_buf.read(out, got);
- return got;
- }
-
-/*
-* Check connection status
-*/
-bool TLS_Server::is_closed() const
- {
- if(!active)
- return true;
- return false;
- }
-
-/*
-* Close a TLS connection
-*/
-void TLS_Server::close()
- {
- close(WARNING, CLOSE_NOTIFY);
- }
-
-/*
-* Close a TLS connection
-*/
-void TLS_Server::close(Alert_Level level, Alert_Type alert_code)
- {
- if(active)
- {
- try {
- active = false;
- writer.alert(level, alert_code);
- writer.flush();
- }
- catch(...) {}
- }
- }
-
-/*
-* Iterate the TLS state machine
-*/
-void TLS_Server::state_machine()
- {
- byte rec_type = CONNECTION_CLOSED;
- SecureVector<byte> record(1024);
-
- size_t bytes_needed = reader.get_record(rec_type, record);
-
- while(bytes_needed)
- {
- size_t to_get = std::min<size_t>(record.size(), bytes_needed);
- size_t got = input_fn(&record[0], to_get);
-
- if(got == 0)
- {
- rec_type = CONNECTION_CLOSED;
- break;
- }
-
- reader.add_input(&record[0], got);
-
- bytes_needed = reader.get_record(rec_type, record);
- }
-
- if(rec_type == CONNECTION_CLOSED)
- {
- active = false;
- reader.reset();
- writer.reset();
- }
- else if(rec_type == APPLICATION_DATA)
- {
- if(active)
- read_buf.write(&record[0], record.size());
- else
- throw Unexpected_Message("Application data before handshake done");
- }
- else if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE || rec_type == CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- read_handshake(rec_type, record);
- else if(rec_type == ALERT)
- {
- Alert alert(record);
-
- if(alert.is_fatal() || alert.type() == CLOSE_NOTIFY)
- {
- if(alert.type() == CLOSE_NOTIFY)
- writer.alert(WARNING, CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-
- reader.reset();
- writer.reset();
- active = false;
- }
- }
- else
- throw Unexpected_Message("Unknown message type received");
- }
-
-/*
-* Split up and process handshake messages
-*/
-void TLS_Server::read_handshake(byte rec_type,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& rec_buf)
- {
- if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE)
- {
- if(!state)
- state = new Handshake_State;
- state->queue.write(&rec_buf[0], rec_buf.size());
- }
-
- while(true)
- {
- Handshake_Type type = HANDSHAKE_NONE;
- SecureVector<byte> contents;
-
- if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE)
- {
- if(state->queue.size() >= 4)
- {
- byte head[4] = { 0 };
- state->queue.peek(head, 4);
-
- const size_t length = make_u32bit(0, head[1], head[2], head[3]);
-
- if(state->queue.size() >= length + 4)
- {
- type = static_cast<Handshake_Type>(head[0]);
- contents.resize(length);
- state->queue.read(head, 4);
- state->queue.read(&contents[0], contents.size());
- }
- }
- }
- else if(rec_type == CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- {
- if(state->queue.size() == 0 && rec_buf.size() == 1 && rec_buf[0] == 1)
- type = HANDSHAKE_CCS;
- else
- throw Decoding_Error("Malformed ChangeCipherSpec message");
- }
- else
- throw Decoding_Error("Unknown message type in handshake processing");
-
- if(type == HANDSHAKE_NONE)
- break;
-
- process_handshake_msg(type, contents);
-
- if(type == HANDSHAKE_CCS || !state)
- break;
- }
- }
-
-/*
-* Process a handshake message
-*/
-void TLS_Server::process_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type type,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& contents)
- {
- rng.add_entropy(&contents[0], contents.size());
-
- if(state == 0)
- throw Unexpected_Message("Unexpected handshake message");
-
- if(type != HANDSHAKE_CCS && type != FINISHED)
- {
- if(type != CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2)
- {
- state->hash.update(static_cast<byte>(type));
-
- const size_t record_length = contents.size();
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; i++)
- state->hash.update(get_byte<u32bit>(i+1, record_length));
- }
-
- state->hash.update(contents);
- }
-
- if(type == CLIENT_HELLO || type == CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2)
- {
- server_check_state(type, state);
-
- state->client_hello = new Client_Hello(contents, type);
-
- client_requested_hostname = state->client_hello->hostname();
-
- state->version = choose_version(state->client_hello->version(),
- policy.min_version());
-
- writer.set_version(state->version);
- reader.set_version(state->version);
-
- state->server_hello = new Server_Hello(rng, writer,
- policy, cert_chain,
- *(state->client_hello),
- state->version, state->hash);
-
- state->suite = CipherSuite(state->server_hello->ciphersuite());
-
- if(state->suite.sig_type() != TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ANON)
- {
- // FIXME: should choose certs based on sig type
- state->server_certs = new Certificate(writer, cert_chain,
- state->hash);
- }
-
- state->kex_priv = PKCS8::copy_key(*private_key, rng);
- if(state->suite.kex_type() != TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX)
- {
- if(state->suite.kex_type() == TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_RSA)
- {
- state->kex_priv = new RSA_PrivateKey(rng,
- policy.rsa_export_keysize());
- }
- else if(state->suite.kex_type() == TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH)
- {
- state->kex_priv = new DH_PrivateKey(rng, policy.dh_group());
- }
- else
- throw Internal_Error("TLS_Server: Unknown ciphersuite kex type");
-
- state->server_kex =
- new Server_Key_Exchange(rng, writer,
- state->kex_priv, private_key,
- state->client_hello->random(),
- state->server_hello->random(),
- state->hash);
- }
-
- if(policy.require_client_auth())
- {
- state->do_client_auth = true;
- throw Internal_Error("Client auth not implemented");
- // FIXME: send client auth request here
- }
-
- state->server_hello_done = new Server_Hello_Done(writer, state->hash);
- }
- else if(type == CERTIFICATE)
- {
- server_check_state(type, state);
- // FIXME: process this
- }
- else if(type == CLIENT_KEX)
- {
- server_check_state(type, state);
-
- state->client_kex = new Client_Key_Exchange(contents, state->suite,
- state->version);
-
- SecureVector<byte> pre_master =
- state->client_kex->pre_master_secret(rng, state->kex_priv,
- state->server_hello->version());
-
- state->keys = SessionKeys(state->suite, state->version, pre_master,
- state->client_hello->random(),
- state->server_hello->random());
- }
- else if(type == CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
- {
- server_check_state(type, state);
- // FIXME: process this
- }
- else if(type == HANDSHAKE_CCS)
- {
- server_check_state(type, state);
-
- reader.set_keys(state->suite, state->keys, SERVER);
- state->got_client_ccs = true;
- }
- else if(type == FINISHED)
- {
- server_check_state(type, state);
-
- state->client_finished = new Finished(contents);
-
- if(!state->client_finished->verify(state->keys.master_secret(),
- state->version, state->hash, CLIENT))
- throw TLS_Exception(DECRYPT_ERROR,
- "Finished message didn't verify");
-
- state->hash.update(static_cast<byte>(type));
-
- const size_t record_length = contents.size();
- for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; i++)
- state->hash.update(get_byte<u32bit>(i+1, record_length));
-
- state->hash.update(contents);
-
- writer.send(CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1);
- writer.flush();
-
- writer.set_keys(state->suite, state->keys, SERVER);
-
- state->server_finished = new Finished(writer, state->version, SERVER,
- state->keys.master_secret(),
- state->hash);
-
- delete state;
- state = 0;
- active = true;
- }
- else
- throw Unexpected_Message("Unknown handshake message received");
- }
-
-/*
-* Perform a server-side TLS handshake
-*/
-void TLS_Server::do_handshake()
- {
- while(true)
- {
- if(active && !state)
- break;
-
- state_machine();
-
- if(!active && !state)
- throw TLS_Exception(HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, "TLS_Server: Handshake failed");
- }
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_server.h b/src/ssl/tls_server.h
deleted file mode 100644
index a6b0f9cb4..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_server.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Server
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_SERVER_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_SERVER_H__
-
-#include <botan/tls_connection.h>
-#include <botan/tls_record.h>
-#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
-#include <vector>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* TLS Server
-*/
-class BOTAN_DLL TLS_Server : public TLS_Connection
- {
- public:
- size_t read(byte buf[], size_t buf_len);
- void write(const byte buf[], size_t buf_len);
-
- std::vector<X509_Certificate> peer_cert_chain() const;
-
- std::string requested_hostname() const
- { return client_requested_hostname; }
-
- void close();
- bool is_closed() const;
-
- /*
- * FIXME: support cert chains (!)
- * FIXME: support anonymous servers
- */
- TLS_Server(std::tr1::function<size_t (byte[], size_t)> input_fn,
- std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> output_fn,
- const TLS_Policy& policy,
- RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
- const X509_Certificate& cert,
- const Private_Key& cert_key);
-
- ~TLS_Server();
- private:
- void close(Alert_Level, Alert_Type);
-
- void do_handshake();
- void state_machine();
- void read_handshake(byte, const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- void process_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type, const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- std::tr1::function<size_t (byte[], size_t)> input_fn;
-
- const TLS_Policy& policy;
- RandomNumberGenerator& rng;
-
- Record_Writer writer;
- Record_Reader reader;
-
- // FIXME: rename to match TLS_Client
- std::vector<X509_Certificate> cert_chain, peer_certs;
- Private_Key* private_key;
-
- class Handshake_State* state;
- SecureVector<byte> session_id;
- SecureQueue read_buf;
- std::string client_requested_hostname;
- bool active;
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_session_key.cpp b/src/ssl/tls_session_key.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 7c75d1758..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_session_key.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Session Key
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/tls_session_key.h>
-#include <botan/prf_ssl3.h>
-#include <botan/prf_tls.h>
-#include <botan/lookup.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Return the client cipher key
-*/
-SymmetricKey SessionKeys::client_cipher_key() const
- {
- return c_cipher;
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the server cipher key
-*/
-SymmetricKey SessionKeys::server_cipher_key() const
- {
- return s_cipher;
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the client MAC key
-*/
-SymmetricKey SessionKeys::client_mac_key() const
- {
- return c_mac;
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the server MAC key
-*/
-SymmetricKey SessionKeys::server_mac_key() const
- {
- return s_mac;
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the client cipher IV
-*/
-InitializationVector SessionKeys::client_iv() const
- {
- return c_iv;
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the server cipher IV
-*/
-InitializationVector SessionKeys::server_iv() const
- {
- return s_iv;
- }
-
-/**
-* Return the TLS master secret
-*/
-SecureVector<byte> SessionKeys::master_secret() const
- {
- return master_sec;
- }
-
-/**
-* Generate SSLv3 session keys
-*/
-SymmetricKey SessionKeys::ssl3_keygen(size_t prf_gen,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& pre_master,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& client_random,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& server_random)
- {
- SSL3_PRF prf;
-
- SecureVector<byte> salt;
- salt += client_random;
- salt += server_random;
-
- master_sec = prf.derive_key(48, pre_master, salt);
-
- salt.clear();
- salt += server_random;
- salt += client_random;
-
- return prf.derive_key(prf_gen, master_sec, salt);
- }
-
-/**
-* Generate TLS 1.0 session keys
-*/
-SymmetricKey SessionKeys::tls1_keygen(size_t prf_gen,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& pre_master,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& client_random,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& server_random)
- {
- const byte MASTER_SECRET_MAGIC[] = {
- 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x63, 0x72, 0x65,
- 0x74 };
- const byte KEY_GEN_MAGIC[] = {
- 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6F,
- 0x6E };
-
- TLS_PRF prf;
-
- SecureVector<byte> salt;
- salt += std::make_pair(MASTER_SECRET_MAGIC, sizeof(MASTER_SECRET_MAGIC));
- salt += client_random;
- salt += server_random;
-
- master_sec = prf.derive_key(48, pre_master, salt);
-
- salt.clear();
- salt += std::make_pair(KEY_GEN_MAGIC, sizeof(KEY_GEN_MAGIC));
- salt += server_random;
- salt += client_random;
-
- return prf.derive_key(prf_gen, master_sec, salt);
- }
-
-/**
-* SessionKeys Constructor
-*/
-SessionKeys::SessionKeys(const CipherSuite& suite, Version_Code version,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& pre_master_secret,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& c_random,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>& s_random)
- {
- if(version != SSL_V3 && version != TLS_V10 && version != TLS_V11)
- throw Invalid_Argument("SessionKeys: Unknown version code");
-
- const size_t mac_keylen = output_length_of(suite.mac_algo());
- const size_t cipher_keylen = suite.cipher_keylen();
-
- size_t cipher_ivlen = 0;
- if(have_block_cipher(suite.cipher_algo()))
- cipher_ivlen = block_size_of(suite.cipher_algo());
-
- const size_t prf_gen = 2 * (mac_keylen + cipher_keylen + cipher_ivlen);
-
- SymmetricKey keyblock = (version == SSL_V3) ?
- ssl3_keygen(prf_gen, pre_master_secret, c_random, s_random) :
- tls1_keygen(prf_gen, pre_master_secret, c_random, s_random);
-
- const byte* key_data = keyblock.begin();
-
- c_mac = SymmetricKey(key_data, mac_keylen);
- key_data += mac_keylen;
-
- s_mac = SymmetricKey(key_data, mac_keylen);
- key_data += mac_keylen;
-
- c_cipher = SymmetricKey(key_data, cipher_keylen);
- key_data += cipher_keylen;
-
- s_cipher = SymmetricKey(key_data, cipher_keylen);
- key_data += cipher_keylen;
-
- c_iv = InitializationVector(key_data, cipher_ivlen);
- key_data += cipher_ivlen;
-
- s_iv = InitializationVector(key_data, cipher_ivlen);
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_session_key.h b/src/ssl/tls_session_key.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 51397984b..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_session_key.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Session Key
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_SESSION_KEYS_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_SESSION_KEYS_H__
-
-#include <botan/tls_suites.h>
-#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h>
-#include <botan/symkey.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* TLS Session Keys
-*/
-class BOTAN_DLL SessionKeys
- {
- public:
- SymmetricKey client_cipher_key() const;
- SymmetricKey server_cipher_key() const;
-
- SymmetricKey client_mac_key() const;
- SymmetricKey server_mac_key() const;
-
- InitializationVector client_iv() const;
- InitializationVector server_iv() const;
-
- SecureVector<byte> master_secret() const;
-
- SessionKeys() {}
- SessionKeys(const CipherSuite&, Version_Code, const MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>&, const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
- private:
- SymmetricKey ssl3_keygen(size_t, const MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
- SymmetricKey tls1_keygen(size_t, const MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>&,
- const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
-
- SecureVector<byte> master_sec;
- SymmetricKey c_cipher, s_cipher, c_mac, s_mac;
- InitializationVector c_iv, s_iv;
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_state.cpp b/src/ssl/tls_state.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 6aaf5e201..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_state.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Handshaking
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/internal/tls_state.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Initialize the SSL/TLS Handshake State
-*/
-Handshake_State::Handshake_State()
- {
- client_hello = 0;
- server_hello = 0;
- server_certs = 0;
- server_kex = 0;
- cert_req = 0;
- server_hello_done = 0;
-
- client_certs = 0;
- client_kex = 0;
- client_verify = 0;
- client_finished = 0;
- server_finished = 0;
-
- kex_pub = 0;
- kex_priv = 0;
-
- do_client_auth = got_client_ccs = got_server_ccs = false;
- version = SSL_V3;
- }
-
-/**
-* Destroy the SSL/TLS Handshake State
-*/
-Handshake_State::~Handshake_State()
- {
- delete client_hello;
- delete server_hello;
- delete server_certs;
- delete server_kex;
- delete cert_req;
- delete server_hello_done;
-
- delete client_certs;
- delete client_kex;
- delete client_verify;
- delete client_finished;
- delete server_finished;
-
- delete kex_pub;
- delete kex_priv;
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_state.h b/src/ssl/tls_state.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e2728198f..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_state.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Handshake State
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_HANDSHAKE_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_HANDSHAKE_H__
-
-#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
-#include <botan/secqueue.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* SSL/TLS Handshake State
-*/
-class Handshake_State
- {
- public:
- Client_Hello* client_hello;
- Server_Hello* server_hello;
- Certificate* server_certs;
- Server_Key_Exchange* server_kex;
- Certificate_Req* cert_req;
- Server_Hello_Done* server_hello_done;
-
- Certificate* client_certs;
- Client_Key_Exchange* client_kex;
- Certificate_Verify* client_verify;
- Finished* client_finished;
- Finished* server_finished;
-
- Public_Key* kex_pub;
- Private_Key* kex_priv;
-
- CipherSuite suite;
- SessionKeys keys;
- HandshakeHash hash;
-
- SecureQueue queue;
-
- Version_Code version;
- bool got_client_ccs, got_server_ccs, do_client_auth;
-
- Handshake_State();
- ~Handshake_State();
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_suites.cpp b/src/ssl/tls_suites.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 07cbec608..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_suites.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* TLS Cipher Suites
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#include <botan/tls_suites.h>
-#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Convert an SSL/TLS ciphersuite to algorithm fields
-*/
-TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos CipherSuite::lookup_ciphersuite(u16bit suite)
- {
- if(suite == TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_MD5 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_RC4_128);
-
- if(suite == TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_RC4_128);
-
- if(suite == TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_SEED_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_NOKEX |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_DSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_DSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_DSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_SEED_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_DSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_DSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_DSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_SEED_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_DH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ECDSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_RC4_128);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ECDSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ECDSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ECDSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ECDSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ECDSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA384 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_RC4_128);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_RSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ECDSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC);
-
- if(suite == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384)
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_ECDSA |
- TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_ECDH |
- TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA384 |
- TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC);
-
- return TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(0);
- }
-
-namespace {
-
-std::pair<std::string, size_t> cipher_code_to_name(TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos algo)
- {
- if((algo & TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_MASK) == TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_RC4_128)
- return std::make_pair("ARC4", 16);
-
- if((algo & TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_MASK) == TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC)
- return std::make_pair("3DES", 24);
-
- if((algo & TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_MASK) == TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES128_CBC)
- return std::make_pair("AES-128", 16);
-
- if((algo & TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_MASK) == TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_AES256_CBC)
- return std::make_pair("AES-256", 32);
-
- if((algo & TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_MASK) == TLS_ALGO_CIPHER_SEED_CBC)
- return std::make_pair("SEED", 16);
-
- throw TLS_Exception(INTERNAL_ERROR,
- "CipherSuite: Unknown cipher type " + to_string(algo));
- }
-
-std::string mac_code_to_name(TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos algo)
- {
- if((algo & TLS_ALGO_MAC_MASK) == TLS_ALGO_MAC_MD5)
- return "MD5";
-
- if((algo & TLS_ALGO_MAC_MASK) == TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA1)
- return "SHA-1";
-
- if((algo & TLS_ALGO_MAC_MASK) == TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA256)
- return "SHA-256";
-
- if((algo & TLS_ALGO_MAC_MASK) == TLS_ALGO_MAC_SHA384)
- return "SHA-384";
-
- throw TLS_Exception(INTERNAL_ERROR,
- "CipherSuite: Unknown MAC type " + to_string(algo));
- }
-
-}
-
-/**
-* CipherSuite Constructor
-*/
-CipherSuite::CipherSuite(u16bit suite_code)
- {
- if(suite_code == 0)
- return;
-
- TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos algos = lookup_ciphersuite(suite_code);
-
- if(algos == 0)
- throw Invalid_Argument("Unknown ciphersuite: " + to_string(suite_code));
-
- sig_algo = TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(algos & TLS_ALGO_SIGNER_MASK);
-
- kex_algo = TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos(algos & TLS_ALGO_KEYEXCH_MASK);
-
- std::pair<std::string, size_t> cipher_info = cipher_code_to_name(algos);
-
- cipher = cipher_info.first;
- cipher_key_length = cipher_info.second;
-
- mac = mac_code_to_name(algos);
- }
-
-}
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_suites.h b/src/ssl/tls_suites.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 8d6db0e8b..000000000
--- a/src/ssl/tls_suites.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-/*
-* Cipher Suites
-* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
-*
-* Released under the terms of the Botan license
-*/
-
-#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_CIPHERSUITES_H__
-#define BOTAN_TLS_CIPHERSUITES_H__
-
-#include <botan/types.h>
-#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
-#include <string>
-
-namespace Botan {
-
-/**
-* Ciphersuite Information
-*/
-class BOTAN_DLL CipherSuite
- {
- public:
- static TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos lookup_ciphersuite(u16bit suite);
-
- std::string cipher_algo() const { return cipher; }
- std::string mac_algo() const { return mac; }
-
- size_t cipher_keylen() const { return cipher_key_length; }
-
- TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos kex_type() const { return kex_algo; }
- TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos sig_type() const { return sig_algo; }
-
- CipherSuite(u16bit = 0);
- private:
- TLS_Ciphersuite_Algos kex_algo, sig_algo;
- std::string cipher, mac;
- size_t cipher_key_length;
- };
-
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/c_hello.cpp b/src/tls/c_hello.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ecb6f43d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/c_hello.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+/*
+* TLS Hello Request and Client Hello Messages
+* (C) 2004-2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_session_key.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_extensions.h>
+#include <botan/tls_record.h>
+#include <botan/internal/stl_util.h>
+#include <botan/time.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+MemoryVector<byte> make_hello_random(RandomNumberGenerator& rng)
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf(32);
+ const u32bit time32 = system_time();
+ store_be(time32, buf);
+ rng.randomize(&buf[4], buf.size() - 4);
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Encode and send a Handshake message
+*/
+void Handshake_Message::send(Record_Writer& writer, Handshake_Hash& hash) const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf = serialize();
+ MemoryVector<byte> send_buf(4);
+
+ const size_t buf_size = buf.size();
+
+ send_buf[0] = type();
+
+ for(size_t i = 1; i != 4; ++i)
+ send_buf[i] = get_byte<u32bit>(i, buf_size);
+
+ send_buf += buf;
+
+ hash.update(send_buf);
+
+ writer.send(HANDSHAKE, &send_buf[0], send_buf.size());
+ }
+
+/*
+* Create a new Hello Request message
+*/
+Hello_Request::Hello_Request(Record_Writer& writer)
+ {
+ Handshake_Hash dummy; // FIXME: *UGLY*
+ send(writer, dummy);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Deserialize a Hello Request message
+*/
+Hello_Request::Hello_Request(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
+ {
+ if(buf.size())
+ throw Decoding_Error("Hello_Request: Must be empty, and is not");
+ }
+
+/*
+* Serialize a Hello Request message
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> Hello_Request::serialize() const
+ {
+ return MemoryVector<byte>();
+ }
+
+/*
+* Create a new Client Hello message
+*/
+Client_Hello::Client_Hello(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& reneg_info,
+ bool next_protocol,
+ const std::string& hostname,
+ const std::string& srp_identifier) :
+ m_version(policy.pref_version()),
+ m_random(make_hello_random(rng)),
+ m_suites(policy.ciphersuite_list((srp_identifier != ""))),
+ m_comp_methods(policy.compression()),
+ m_hostname(hostname),
+ m_srp_identifier(srp_identifier),
+ m_next_protocol(next_protocol),
+ m_fragment_size(0),
+ m_secure_renegotiation(true),
+ m_renegotiation_info(reneg_info)
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> hashes = policy.allowed_hashes();
+ std::vector<std::string> sigs = policy.allowed_signature_methods();
+
+ m_supported_curves = policy.allowed_ecc_curves();
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != hashes.size(); ++i)
+ for(size_t j = 0; j != sigs.size(); ++j)
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair(hashes[i], sigs[j]));
+
+ send(writer, hash);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Create a new Client Hello message
+*/
+Client_Hello::Client_Hello(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const Session& session,
+ bool next_protocol) :
+ m_version(session.version()),
+ m_session_id(session.session_id()),
+ m_random(make_hello_random(rng)),
+ m_hostname(session.sni_hostname()),
+ m_srp_identifier(session.srp_identifier()),
+ m_next_protocol(next_protocol),
+ m_fragment_size(session.fragment_size()),
+ m_secure_renegotiation(session.secure_renegotiation())
+ {
+ m_suites.push_back(session.ciphersuite_code());
+ m_comp_methods.push_back(session.compression_method());
+
+ // set m_supported_algos + m_supported_curves here?
+
+ send(writer, hash);
+ }
+
+Client_Hello::Client_Hello(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf, Handshake_Type type)
+ {
+ m_next_protocol = false;
+ m_secure_renegotiation = false;
+ m_fragment_size = 0;
+
+ if(type == CLIENT_HELLO)
+ deserialize(buf);
+ else
+ deserialize_sslv2(buf);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Serialize a Client Hello message
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> Client_Hello::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf;
+
+ buf.push_back(m_version.major_version());
+ buf.push_back(m_version.minor_version());
+ buf += m_random;
+
+ append_tls_length_value(buf, m_session_id, 1);
+ append_tls_length_value(buf, m_suites, 2);
+ append_tls_length_value(buf, m_comp_methods, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * May not want to send extensions at all in some cases.
+ * If so, should include SCSV value (if reneg info is empty, if
+ * not we are renegotiating with a modern server and should only
+ * send that extension.
+ */
+
+ Extensions extensions;
+
+ // Initial handshake
+ if(m_renegotiation_info.empty())
+ {
+ extensions.add(new Renegotation_Extension(m_renegotiation_info));
+ extensions.add(new Server_Name_Indicator(m_hostname));
+ extensions.add(new SRP_Identifier(m_srp_identifier));
+ extensions.add(new Supported_Elliptic_Curves(m_supported_curves));
+
+ if(m_version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ extensions.add(new Signature_Algorithms(m_supported_algos));
+
+ if(m_next_protocol)
+ extensions.add(new Next_Protocol_Notification());
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // renegotiation
+ extensions.add(new Renegotation_Extension(m_renegotiation_info));
+ }
+
+ buf += extensions.serialize();
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+void Client_Hello::deserialize_sslv2(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
+ {
+ if(buf.size() < 12 || buf[0] != 1)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: SSLv2 hello corrupted");
+
+ const size_t cipher_spec_len = make_u16bit(buf[3], buf[4]);
+ const size_t m_session_id_len = make_u16bit(buf[5], buf[6]);
+ const size_t challenge_len = make_u16bit(buf[7], buf[8]);
+
+ const size_t expected_size =
+ (9 + m_session_id_len + cipher_spec_len + challenge_len);
+
+ if(buf.size() != expected_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: SSLv2 hello corrupted");
+
+ if(m_session_id_len != 0 || cipher_spec_len % 3 != 0 ||
+ (challenge_len < 16 || challenge_len > 32))
+ {
+ throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: SSLv2 hello corrupted");
+ }
+
+ for(size_t i = 9; i != 9 + cipher_spec_len; i += 3)
+ {
+ if(buf[i] != 0) // a SSLv2 cipherspec; ignore it
+ continue;
+
+ m_suites.push_back(make_u16bit(buf[i+1], buf[i+2]));
+ }
+
+ m_version = Protocol_Version(buf[1], buf[2]);
+
+ m_random.resize(challenge_len);
+ copy_mem(&m_random[0], &buf[9+cipher_spec_len+m_session_id_len], challenge_len);
+
+ m_secure_renegotiation =
+ value_exists(m_suites, static_cast<u16bit>(TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV));
+ }
+
+/*
+* Deserialize a Client Hello message
+*/
+void Client_Hello::deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
+ {
+ if(buf.size() == 0)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: Packet corrupted");
+
+ if(buf.size() < 41)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Client_Hello: Packet corrupted");
+
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
+
+ const byte major_version = reader.get_byte();
+ const byte minor_version = reader.get_byte();
+
+ m_version = Protocol_Version(major_version, minor_version);
+
+ m_random = reader.get_fixed<byte>(32);
+
+ m_session_id = reader.get_range<byte>(1, 0, 32);
+
+ m_suites = reader.get_range_vector<u16bit>(2, 1, 32767);
+
+ m_comp_methods = reader.get_range_vector<byte>(1, 1, 255);
+
+ Extensions extensions(reader);
+
+ if(Server_Name_Indicator* sni = extensions.get<Server_Name_Indicator>())
+ {
+ m_hostname = sni->host_name();
+ }
+
+ if(SRP_Identifier* srp = extensions.get<SRP_Identifier>())
+ {
+ m_srp_identifier = srp->identifier();
+ }
+
+ if(Next_Protocol_Notification* npn = extensions.get<Next_Protocol_Notification>())
+ {
+ if(!npn->protocols().empty())
+ throw Decoding_Error("Client sent non-empty NPN extension");
+
+ m_next_protocol = true;
+ }
+
+ if(Maximum_Fragment_Length* frag = extensions.get<Maximum_Fragment_Length>())
+ {
+ m_fragment_size = frag->fragment_size();
+ }
+
+ if(Renegotation_Extension* reneg = extensions.get<Renegotation_Extension>())
+ {
+ // checked by Client / Server as they know the handshake state
+ m_secure_renegotiation = true;
+ m_renegotiation_info = reneg->renegotiation_info();
+ }
+
+ if(Supported_Elliptic_Curves* ecc = extensions.get<Supported_Elliptic_Curves>())
+ m_supported_curves = ecc->curves();
+
+ if(Signature_Algorithms* sigs = extensions.get<Signature_Algorithms>())
+ {
+ m_supported_algos = sigs->supported_signature_algorthms();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if(m_version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ /*
+ The rule for when a TLS 1.2 client not sending the extension
+ is strange; in theory, the server is supposed to act as if
+ the client had sent only SHA-1 using whatever signature
+ algorithm we end up negotiating. Right here, we don't know
+ what we'll end up negotiating (depends on policy), but we do
+ know that we'll only negotiate something the client sent, so
+ we can safely say it supports everything here and know that
+ we'll filter it out later.
+ */
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "RSA"));
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "DSA"));
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "ECDSA"));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // For versions before TLS 1.2, insert fake values for the old defaults
+
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("TLS.Digest.0", "RSA"));
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "DSA"));
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "ECDSA"));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(value_exists(m_suites, static_cast<u16bit>(TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV)))
+ {
+ /*
+ * Clients are allowed to send both the extension and the SCSV
+ * though it is not recommended. If it did, require that the
+ * extension value be empty.
+ */
+ if(m_secure_renegotiation)
+ {
+ if(!m_renegotiation_info.empty())
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Client send SCSV and non-empty extension");
+ }
+ }
+
+ m_secure_renegotiation = true;
+ m_renegotiation_info.clear();
+ }
+ }
+
+/*
+* Check if we offered this ciphersuite
+*/
+bool Client_Hello::offered_suite(u16bit ciphersuite) const
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_suites.size(); ++i)
+ if(m_suites[i] == ciphersuite)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/c_kex.cpp b/src/tls/c_kex.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..58e458e81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/c_kex.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+/*
+* Client Key Exchange Message
+* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_extensions.h>
+#include <botan/internal/assert.h>
+#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
+#include <botan/pubkey.h>
+#include <botan/dh.h>
+#include <botan/ecdh.h>
+#include <botan/rsa.h>
+#include <botan/rng.h>
+#include <botan/loadstor.h>
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+namespace {
+
+SecureVector<byte> strip_leading_zeros(const MemoryRegion<byte>& input)
+ {
+ size_t leading_zeros = 0;
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != input.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(input[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ ++leading_zeros;
+ }
+
+ SecureVector<byte> output(&input[leading_zeros],
+ input.size() - leading_zeros);
+ return output;
+ }
+
+}
+
+/*
+* Create a new Client Key Exchange message
+*/
+Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_State* state,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& peer_certs,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng)
+ {
+ const std::string kex_algo = state->suite.kex_algo();
+
+ if(kex_algo == "PSK")
+ {
+ std::string identity_hint = "";
+
+ if(state->server_kex)
+ {
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(state->server_kex->params());
+ identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);
+ }
+
+ const std::string hostname = state->client_hello->sni_hostname();
+
+ const std::string psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client",
+ hostname,
+ identity_hint);
+
+ append_tls_length_value(key_material, psk_identity, 2);
+
+ SymmetricKey psk = creds.psk("tls-client", hostname, psk_identity);
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> zeros(psk.length());
+
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, zeros, 2);
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
+ }
+ else if(state->server_kex)
+ {
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(state->server_kex->params());
+
+ SymmetricKey psk;
+
+ if(kex_algo == "DHE_PSK" || kex_algo == "ECDHE_PSK")
+ {
+ std::string identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);
+
+ const std::string hostname = state->client_hello->sni_hostname();
+
+ const std::string psk_identity = creds.psk_identity("tls-client",
+ hostname,
+ identity_hint);
+
+ append_tls_length_value(key_material, psk_identity, 2);
+
+ psk = creds.psk("tls-client", hostname, psk_identity);
+ }
+
+ if(kex_algo == "DH" || kex_algo == "DHE_PSK")
+ {
+ BigInt p = BigInt::decode(reader.get_range<byte>(2, 1, 65535));
+ BigInt g = BigInt::decode(reader.get_range<byte>(2, 1, 65535));
+ BigInt Y = BigInt::decode(reader.get_range<byte>(2, 1, 65535));
+
+ if(reader.remaining_bytes())
+ throw Decoding_Error("Bad params size for DH key exchange");
+
+ DL_Group group(p, g);
+
+ if(!group.verify_group(rng, true))
+ throw Internal_Error("DH group failed validation, possible attack");
+
+ DH_PublicKey counterparty_key(group, Y);
+
+ // FIXME Check that public key is residue?
+
+ DH_PrivateKey priv_key(rng, group);
+
+ PK_Key_Agreement ka(priv_key, "Raw");
+
+ SecureVector<byte> dh_secret = strip_leading_zeros(
+ ka.derive_key(0, counterparty_key.public_value()).bits_of());
+
+ if(kex_algo == "DH")
+ pre_master = dh_secret;
+ else
+ {
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, dh_secret, 2);
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
+ }
+
+ append_tls_length_value(key_material, priv_key.public_value(), 2);
+ }
+ else if(kex_algo == "ECDH" || kex_algo == "ECDHE_PSK")
+ {
+ const byte curve_type = reader.get_byte();
+
+ if(curve_type != 3)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Server sent non-named ECC curve");
+
+ const u16bit curve_id = reader.get_u16bit();
+
+ const std::string name = Supported_Elliptic_Curves::curve_id_to_name(curve_id);
+
+ if(name == "")
+ throw Decoding_Error("Server sent unknown named curve " + to_string(curve_id));
+
+ EC_Group group(name);
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> ecdh_key = reader.get_range<byte>(1, 1, 255);
+
+ ECDH_PublicKey counterparty_key(group, OS2ECP(ecdh_key, group.get_curve()));
+
+ ECDH_PrivateKey priv_key(rng, group);
+
+ PK_Key_Agreement ka(priv_key, "Raw");
+
+ SecureVector<byte> ecdh_secret = ka.derive_key(0, counterparty_key.public_value()).bits_of();
+
+ if(kex_algo == "ECDH")
+ pre_master = ecdh_secret;
+ else
+ {
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, ecdh_secret, 2);
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
+ }
+
+ append_tls_length_value(key_material, priv_key.public_value(), 1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown kex " +
+ kex_algo);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // No server key exchange msg better mean RSA kex + RSA key in cert
+
+ if(kex_algo != "RSA")
+ throw Unexpected_Message("No server kex but negotiated kex " + kex_algo);
+
+ if(peer_certs.empty())
+ throw Internal_Error("No certificate and no server key exchange");
+
+ std::auto_ptr<Public_Key> pub_key(peer_certs[0].subject_public_key());
+
+ if(const RSA_PublicKey* rsa_pub = dynamic_cast<const RSA_PublicKey*>(pub_key.get()))
+ {
+ const Protocol_Version pref_version = state->client_hello->version();
+
+ pre_master = rng.random_vec(48);
+ pre_master[0] = pref_version.major_version();
+ pre_master[1] = pref_version.minor_version();
+
+ PK_Encryptor_EME encryptor(*rsa_pub, "PKCS1v15");
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> encrypted_key = encryptor.encrypt(pre_master, rng);
+
+ if(state->version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ key_material = encrypted_key; // no length field
+ else
+ append_tls_length_value(key_material, encrypted_key, 2);
+ }
+ else
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Expected a RSA key in server cert but got " +
+ pub_key->algo_name());
+ }
+
+ send(writer, state->hash);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Read a Client Key Exchange message
+*/
+Client_Key_Exchange::Client_Key_Exchange(const MemoryRegion<byte>& contents,
+ const Handshake_State* state,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng)
+ {
+ const std::string kex_algo = state->suite.kex_algo();
+
+ if(kex_algo == "RSA")
+ {
+ BOTAN_ASSERT(state->server_certs && !state->server_certs->cert_chain().empty(),
+ "No server certificate to use for RSA");
+
+ const Private_Key* private_key = state->server_rsa_kex_key;
+
+ if(!private_key)
+ throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA kex but no server kex key set");
+
+ if(!dynamic_cast<const RSA_PrivateKey*>(private_key))
+ throw Internal_Error("Expected RSA key but got " + private_key->algo_name());
+
+ PK_Decryptor_EME decryptor(*private_key, "PKCS1v15");
+
+ Protocol_Version client_version = state->client_hello->version();
+
+ try
+ {
+ if(state->version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ pre_master = decryptor.decrypt(contents);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(contents);
+ pre_master = decryptor.decrypt(reader.get_range<byte>(2, 0, 65535));
+ }
+
+ if(pre_master.size() != 48 ||
+ client_version.major_version() != pre_master[0] ||
+ client_version.minor_version() != pre_master[1])
+ {
+ throw Decoding_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Secret corrupted");
+ }
+ }
+ catch(...)
+ {
+ // Randomize the hide timing channel
+ pre_master = rng.random_vec(48);
+ pre_master[0] = client_version.major_version();
+ pre_master[1] = client_version.minor_version();
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(contents);
+
+ SymmetricKey psk;
+
+ if(kex_algo == "PSK" || kex_algo == "DHE_PSK" || kex_algo == "ECDHE_PSK")
+ {
+ const std::string psk_identity = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);
+
+ psk = creds.psk("tls-server",
+ state->client_hello->sni_hostname(),
+ psk_identity);
+
+ if(psk.length() == 0)
+ {
+ if(policy.hide_unknown_users())
+ psk = SymmetricKey(rng, 16);
+ else
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
+ "No PSK for identifier " + psk_identity);
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if(kex_algo == "PSK")
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> zeros(psk.length());
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, zeros, 2);
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
+ }
+ else if(kex_algo == "DH" || kex_algo == "DHE_PSK" ||
+ kex_algo == "ECDH" || kex_algo == "ECDHE_PSK")
+ {
+ const Private_Key& private_key = state->server_kex->server_kex_key();
+
+ const PK_Key_Agreement_Key* ka_key =
+ dynamic_cast<const PK_Key_Agreement_Key*>(&private_key);
+
+ if(!ka_key)
+ throw Internal_Error("Expected key agreement key type but got " +
+ private_key.algo_name());
+
+ try
+ {
+ PK_Key_Agreement ka(*ka_key, "Raw");
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> client_pubkey;
+
+ if(ka_key->algo_name() == "DH")
+ client_pubkey = reader.get_range<byte>(2, 0, 65535);
+ else
+ client_pubkey = reader.get_range<byte>(1, 0, 255);
+
+ SecureVector<byte> shared_secret = ka.derive_key(0, client_pubkey).bits_of();
+
+ if(ka_key->algo_name() == "DH")
+ shared_secret = strip_leading_zeros(shared_secret);
+
+ if(kex_algo == "DHE_PSK" || kex_algo == "ECDHE_PSK")
+ {
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, shared_secret, 2);
+ append_tls_length_value(pre_master, psk.bits_of(), 2);
+ }
+ else
+ pre_master = shared_secret;
+ }
+ catch(std::exception &e)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Something failed in the DH computation. To avoid possible
+ * timing attacks, randomize the pre-master output and carry
+ * on, allowing the protocol to fail later in the finished
+ * checks.
+ */
+ pre_master = rng.random_vec(ka_key->public_value().size());
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ throw Internal_Error("Client_Key_Exchange: Unknown kex type " + kex_algo);
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/cert_req.cpp b/src/tls/cert_req.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f400a36d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/cert_req.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+/*
+* Certificate Request Message
+* (C) 2004-2006,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_extensions.h>
+#include <botan/der_enc.h>
+#include <botan/ber_dec.h>
+#include <botan/loadstor.h>
+#include <botan/secqueue.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+namespace {
+
+std::string cert_type_code_to_name(byte code)
+ {
+ switch(code)
+ {
+ case 1:
+ return "RSA";
+ case 2:
+ return "DSA";
+ case 64:
+ return "ECDSA";
+ default:
+ return ""; // DH or something else
+ }
+ }
+
+byte cert_type_name_to_code(const std::string& name)
+ {
+ if(name == "RSA")
+ return 1;
+ if(name == "DSA")
+ return 2;
+ if(name == "ECDSA")
+ return 64;
+
+ throw Invalid_Argument("Unknown cert type " + name);
+ }
+
+}
+
+/**
+* Create a new Certificate Request message
+*/
+Certificate_Req::Certificate_Req(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& ca_certs,
+ Protocol_Version version)
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != ca_certs.size(); ++i)
+ names.push_back(ca_certs[i].subject_dn());
+
+ cert_key_types.push_back("RSA");
+ cert_key_types.push_back("DSA");
+ cert_key_types.push_back("ECDSA");
+
+ if(version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> hashes = policy.allowed_hashes();
+ std::vector<std::string> sigs = policy.allowed_signature_methods();
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != hashes.size(); ++i)
+ for(size_t j = 0; j != sigs.size(); ++j)
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair(hashes[i], sigs[j]));
+ }
+
+ send(writer, hash);
+ }
+
+/**
+* Deserialize a Certificate Request message
+*/
+Certificate_Req::Certificate_Req(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
+ Protocol_Version version)
+ {
+ if(buf.size() < 4)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Certificate_Req: Bad certificate request");
+
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
+
+ std::vector<byte> cert_type_codes = reader.get_range_vector<byte>(1, 1, 255);
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != cert_type_codes.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ const std::string cert_type_name = cert_type_code_to_name(cert_type_codes[i]);
+
+ if(cert_type_name == "") // something we don't know
+ continue;
+
+ cert_key_types.push_back(cert_type_name);
+ }
+
+ if(version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ std::vector<byte> sig_hash_algs = reader.get_range_vector<byte>(2, 2, 65534);
+
+ if(sig_hash_algs.size() % 2 != 0)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Bad length for signature IDs in certificate request");
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != sig_hash_algs.size(); i += 2)
+ {
+ std::string hash = Signature_Algorithms::hash_algo_name(sig_hash_algs[i]);
+ std::string sig = Signature_Algorithms::sig_algo_name(sig_hash_algs[i+1]);
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair(hash, sig));
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // The hardcoded settings from previous protocol versions
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("TLS.Digest.0", "RSA"));
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "DSA"));
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair("SHA-1", "ECDSA"));
+ }
+
+ u16bit purported_size = reader.get_u16bit();
+
+ if(reader.remaining_bytes() != purported_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Inconsistent length in certificate request");
+
+ while(reader.has_remaining())
+ {
+ std::vector<byte> name_bits = reader.get_range_vector<byte>(2, 0, 65535);
+
+ BER_Decoder decoder(&name_bits[0], name_bits.size());
+ X509_DN name;
+ decoder.decode(name);
+ names.push_back(name);
+ }
+ }
+
+/**
+* Serialize a Certificate Request message
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> Certificate_Req::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf;
+
+ std::vector<byte> cert_types;
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != cert_key_types.size(); ++i)
+ cert_types.push_back(cert_type_name_to_code(cert_key_types[i]));
+
+ append_tls_length_value(buf, cert_types, 1);
+
+ if(!m_supported_algos.empty())
+ {
+ buf += Signature_Algorithms(m_supported_algos).serialize();
+ }
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != names.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ DER_Encoder encoder;
+ encoder.encode(names[i]);
+
+ append_tls_length_value(buf, encoder.get_contents(), 2);
+ }
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+/**
+* Create a new Certificate message
+*/
+Certificate::Certificate(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& cert_list)
+ {
+ certs = cert_list;
+ send(writer, hash);
+ }
+
+/**
+* Deserialize a Certificate message
+*/
+Certificate::Certificate(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
+ {
+ if(buf.size() < 3)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Certificate: Message malformed");
+
+ const size_t total_size = make_u32bit(0, buf[0], buf[1], buf[2]);
+
+ SecureQueue queue;
+ queue.write(&buf[3], buf.size() - 3);
+
+ if(queue.size() != total_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Certificate: Message malformed");
+
+ while(queue.size())
+ {
+ if(queue.size() < 3)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Certificate: Message malformed");
+
+ byte len[3];
+ queue.read(len, 3);
+
+ const size_t cert_size = make_u32bit(0, len[0], len[1], len[2]);
+ const size_t original_size = queue.size();
+
+ X509_Certificate cert(queue);
+ if(queue.size() + cert_size != original_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Certificate: Message malformed");
+ certs.push_back(cert);
+ }
+ }
+
+/**
+* Serialize a Certificate message
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> Certificate::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf(3);
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != certs.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> raw_cert = certs[i].BER_encode();
+ const size_t cert_size = raw_cert.size();
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; ++i)
+ buf.push_back(get_byte<u32bit>(i+1, cert_size));
+ buf += raw_cert;
+ }
+
+ const size_t buf_size = buf.size() - 3;
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; ++i)
+ buf[i] = get_byte<u32bit>(i+1, buf_size);
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/cert_ver.cpp b/src/tls/cert_ver.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..791635b17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/cert_ver.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/*
+* Certificate Verify Message
+* (C) 2004,2006,2011,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_extensions.h>
+#include <botan/internal/assert.h>
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/*
+* Create a new Certificate Verify message
+*/
+Certificate_Verify::Certificate_Verify(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_State* state,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const Private_Key* priv_key)
+ {
+ BOTAN_ASSERT_NONNULL(priv_key);
+
+ std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =
+ state->choose_sig_format(priv_key, hash_algo, sig_algo, true);
+
+ PK_Signer signer(*priv_key, format.first, format.second);
+
+ if(state->version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ SecureVector<byte> md5_sha = state->hash.final_ssl3(
+ state->keys.master_secret());
+
+ if(priv_key->algo_name() == "DSA")
+ signature = signer.sign_message(&md5_sha[16], md5_sha.size()-16, rng);
+ else
+ signature = signer.sign_message(md5_sha, rng);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ signature = signer.sign_message(state->hash.get_contents(), rng);
+ }
+
+ send(writer, state->hash);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Deserialize a Certificate Verify message
+*/
+Certificate_Verify::Certificate_Verify(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
+ Protocol_Version version)
+ {
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
+
+ if(version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ hash_algo = Signature_Algorithms::hash_algo_name(reader.get_byte());
+ sig_algo = Signature_Algorithms::sig_algo_name(reader.get_byte());
+ }
+
+ signature = reader.get_range<byte>(2, 0, 65535);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Serialize a Certificate Verify message
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> Certificate_Verify::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf;
+
+ if(hash_algo != "" && sig_algo != "")
+ {
+ buf.push_back(Signature_Algorithms::hash_algo_code(hash_algo));
+ buf.push_back(Signature_Algorithms::sig_algo_code(sig_algo));
+ }
+
+ const u16bit sig_len = signature.size();
+ buf.push_back(get_byte(0, sig_len));
+ buf.push_back(get_byte(1, sig_len));
+ buf += signature;
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Verify a Certificate Verify message
+*/
+bool Certificate_Verify::verify(const X509_Certificate& cert,
+ Handshake_State* state)
+ {
+ std::auto_ptr<Public_Key> key(cert.subject_public_key());
+
+ std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =
+ state->understand_sig_format(key.get(), hash_algo, sig_algo, true);
+
+ PK_Verifier verifier(*key, format.first, format.second);
+
+ if(state->version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ SecureVector<byte> md5_sha = state->hash.final_ssl3(
+ state->keys.master_secret());
+
+ return verifier.verify_message(&md5_sha[16], md5_sha.size()-16,
+ &signature[0], signature.size());
+ }
+
+ return verifier.verify_message(state->hash.get_contents(), signature);
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/finished.cpp b/src/tls/finished.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..18cc51b96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/finished.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+* Finished Message
+* (C) 2004-2006,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+namespace {
+
+/*
+* Compute the verify_data
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> finished_compute_verify(Handshake_State* state,
+ Connection_Side side)
+ {
+ if(state->version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ const byte SSL_CLIENT_LABEL[] = { 0x43, 0x4C, 0x4E, 0x54 };
+ const byte SSL_SERVER_LABEL[] = { 0x53, 0x52, 0x56, 0x52 };
+
+ Handshake_Hash hash = state->hash; // don't modify state
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> ssl3_finished;
+
+ if(side == CLIENT)
+ hash.update(SSL_CLIENT_LABEL, sizeof(SSL_CLIENT_LABEL));
+ else
+ hash.update(SSL_SERVER_LABEL, sizeof(SSL_SERVER_LABEL));
+
+ return hash.final_ssl3(state->keys.master_secret());
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ const byte TLS_CLIENT_LABEL[] = {
+ 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69,
+ 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64 };
+
+ const byte TLS_SERVER_LABEL[] = {
+ 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69,
+ 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64 };
+
+ std::auto_ptr<KDF> prf(state->protocol_specific_prf());
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> input;
+ if(side == CLIENT)
+ input += std::make_pair(TLS_CLIENT_LABEL, sizeof(TLS_CLIENT_LABEL));
+ else
+ input += std::make_pair(TLS_SERVER_LABEL, sizeof(TLS_SERVER_LABEL));
+
+ input += state->hash.final(state->version, state->suite.mac_algo());
+
+ return prf->derive_key(12, state->keys.master_secret(), input);
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+/*
+* Create a new Finished message
+*/
+Finished::Finished(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_State* state,
+ Connection_Side side)
+ {
+ verification_data = finished_compute_verify(state, side);
+ send(writer, state->hash);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Serialize a Finished message
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> Finished::serialize() const
+ {
+ return verification_data;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Deserialize a Finished message
+*/
+Finished::Finished(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
+ {
+ verification_data = buf;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Verify a Finished message
+*/
+bool Finished::verify(Handshake_State* state,
+ Connection_Side side)
+ {
+ return (verification_data == finished_compute_verify(state, side));
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/ssl/info.txt b/src/tls/info.txt
index f920a733d..31ce43c1e 100644
--- a/src/ssl/info.txt
+++ b/src/tls/info.txt
@@ -1,48 +1,60 @@
-define SSL_TLS
+define TLS
<comment>
-The SSL/TLS code is complex, new, and not yet reviewed, there may be
+The TLS code is complex, new, and not yet reviewed, there may be
serious bugs or security issues.
</comment>
uses_tr1 yes
<header:public>
+tls_alert.h
+tls_channel.h
tls_client.h
-tls_connection.h
tls_exceptn.h
tls_magic.h
tls_policy.h
tls_record.h
tls_server.h
-tls_session_key.h
-tls_suites.h
+tls_session.h
+tls_session_manager.h
+tls_ciphersuite.h
+tls_version.h
</header:public>
<header:internal>
-tls_alerts.h
+tls_extensions.h
tls_handshake_hash.h
+tls_handshake_state.h
tls_messages.h
tls_reader.h
-tls_state.h
+tls_session_key.h
</header:internal>
<source>
+tls_alert.cpp
+c_hello.cpp
c_kex.cpp
cert_req.cpp
cert_ver.cpp
finished.cpp
-tls_handshake_hash.cpp
-hello.cpp
+next_protocol.cpp
rec_read.cpp
rec_wri.cpp
+s_hello.cpp
s_kex.cpp
+tls_channel.cpp
tls_client.cpp
+tls_extensions.cpp
+tls_handshake_hash.cpp
+tls_handshake_state.cpp
tls_policy.cpp
tls_server.cpp
+tls_session.cpp
tls_session_key.cpp
-tls_state.cpp
-tls_suites.cpp
+tls_session_manager.cpp
+tls_ciphersuite.cpp
+tls_version.cpp
</source>
<requires>
@@ -52,6 +64,8 @@ asn1
des
dh
dsa
+ecdh
+ecdsa
eme_pkcs
emsa3
filters
@@ -61,7 +75,9 @@ prf_ssl3
prf_tls
rng
rsa
+seed
sha1
+sha2_32
ssl3mac
x509cert
</requires>
diff --git a/src/tls/next_protocol.cpp b/src/tls/next_protocol.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..97b072440
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/next_protocol.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+* Next Protocol Negotation
+* (C) 2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_extensions.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+Next_Protocol::Next_Protocol(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const std::string& protocol) :
+ m_protocol(protocol)
+ {
+ send(writer, hash);
+ }
+
+Next_Protocol::Next_Protocol(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
+ {
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
+
+ m_protocol = reader.get_string(1, 0, 255);
+
+ reader.get_range_vector<byte>(1, 0, 255); // padding, ignored
+ }
+
+MemoryVector<byte> Next_Protocol::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf;
+
+ append_tls_length_value(buf,
+ reinterpret_cast<const byte*>(m_protocol.data()),
+ m_protocol.size(),
+ 1);
+
+ const byte padding_len = 32 - ((m_protocol.size() + 2) % 32);
+
+ buf.push_back(padding_len);
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != padding_len; ++i)
+ buf.push_back(0);
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/rec_read.cpp b/src/tls/rec_read.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d1fab4692
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/rec_read.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+/*
+* TLS Record Reading
+* (C) 2004-2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_record.h>
+#include <botan/lookup.h>
+#include <botan/loadstor.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_session_key.h>
+#include <botan/internal/rounding.h>
+#include <botan/internal/assert.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+Record_Reader::Record_Reader() :
+ m_readbuf(TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE),
+ m_mac(0)
+ {
+ reset();
+ set_maximum_fragment_size(0);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Reset the state
+*/
+void Record_Reader::reset()
+ {
+ m_macbuf.clear();
+
+ zeroise(m_readbuf);
+ m_readbuf_pos = 0;
+
+ m_cipher.reset();
+
+ delete m_mac;
+ m_mac = 0;
+
+ m_block_size = 0;
+ m_iv_size = 0;
+ m_version = Protocol_Version();
+ m_seq_no = 0;
+ set_maximum_fragment_size(0);
+ }
+
+void Record_Reader::set_maximum_fragment_size(size_t max_fragment)
+ {
+ if(max_fragment == 0)
+ m_max_fragment = MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE;
+ else
+ m_max_fragment = clamp(max_fragment, 128, MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Set the version to use
+*/
+void Record_Reader::set_version(Protocol_Version version)
+ {
+ m_version = version;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Set the keys for reading
+*/
+void Record_Reader::activate(Connection_Side side,
+ const Ciphersuite& suite,
+ const Session_Keys& keys,
+ byte compression_method)
+ {
+ m_cipher.reset();
+ delete m_mac;
+ m_mac = 0;
+ m_seq_no = 0;
+
+ if(compression_method != NO_COMPRESSION)
+ throw Internal_Error("Negotiated unknown compression algorithm");
+
+ SymmetricKey mac_key, cipher_key;
+ InitializationVector iv;
+
+ if(side == CLIENT)
+ {
+ cipher_key = keys.server_cipher_key();
+ iv = keys.server_iv();
+ mac_key = keys.server_mac_key();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ cipher_key = keys.client_cipher_key();
+ iv = keys.client_iv();
+ mac_key = keys.client_mac_key();
+ }
+
+ const std::string cipher_algo = suite.cipher_algo();
+ const std::string mac_algo = suite.mac_algo();
+
+ if(have_block_cipher(cipher_algo))
+ {
+ m_cipher.append(get_cipher(
+ cipher_algo + "/CBC/NoPadding",
+ cipher_key, iv, DECRYPTION)
+ );
+ m_block_size = block_size_of(cipher_algo);
+
+ if(m_version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V11)
+ m_iv_size = m_block_size;
+ else
+ m_iv_size = 0;
+ }
+ else if(have_stream_cipher(cipher_algo))
+ {
+ m_cipher.append(get_cipher(cipher_algo, cipher_key, DECRYPTION));
+ m_block_size = 0;
+ m_iv_size = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Reader: Unknown cipher " + cipher_algo);
+
+ if(have_hash(mac_algo))
+ {
+ Algorithm_Factory& af = global_state().algorithm_factory();
+
+ if(m_version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ m_mac = af.make_mac("SSL3-MAC(" + mac_algo + ")");
+ else
+ m_mac = af.make_mac("HMAC(" + mac_algo + ")");
+
+ m_mac->set_key(mac_key);
+ m_macbuf.resize(m_mac->output_length());
+ }
+ else
+ throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Reader: Unknown hash " + mac_algo);
+ }
+
+size_t Record_Reader::fill_buffer_to(const byte*& input,
+ size_t& input_size,
+ size_t& input_consumed,
+ size_t desired)
+ {
+ if(desired <= m_readbuf_pos)
+ return 0; // already have it
+
+ const size_t space_available = (m_readbuf.size() - m_readbuf_pos);
+ const size_t taken = std::min(input_size, desired - m_readbuf_pos);
+
+ if(taken > space_available)
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::RECORD_OVERFLOW,
+ "Record is larger than allowed maximum size");
+
+ copy_mem(&m_readbuf[m_readbuf_pos], input, taken);
+ m_readbuf_pos += taken;
+ input_consumed += taken;
+ input_size -= taken;
+ input += taken;
+
+ return (desired - m_readbuf_pos); // how many bytes do we still need?
+ }
+
+/*
+* Retrieve the next record
+*/
+size_t Record_Reader::add_input(const byte input_array[], size_t input_sz,
+ size_t& consumed,
+ byte& msg_type,
+ MemoryVector<byte>& msg)
+ {
+ const byte* input = &input_array[0];
+
+ consumed = 0;
+
+ if(m_readbuf_pos < TLS_HEADER_SIZE) // header incomplete?
+ {
+ if(size_t needed = fill_buffer_to(input, input_sz, consumed, TLS_HEADER_SIZE))
+ return needed;
+
+ BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(m_readbuf_pos, TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
+ "Have an entire header");
+ }
+
+ // Possible SSLv2 format client hello
+ if((!m_mac) && (m_readbuf[0] & 0x80) && (m_readbuf[2] == 1))
+ {
+ if(m_readbuf[3] == 0 && m_readbuf[4] == 2)
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ "Client claims to only support SSLv2, rejecting");
+
+ if(m_readbuf[3] >= 3) // SSLv2 mapped TLS hello, then?
+ {
+ size_t record_len = make_u16bit(m_readbuf[0], m_readbuf[1]) & 0x7FFF;
+
+ if(size_t needed = fill_buffer_to(input, input_sz, consumed, record_len + 2))
+ return needed;
+
+ BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(m_readbuf_pos, (record_len + 2),
+ "Have the entire SSLv2 hello");
+
+ msg_type = HANDSHAKE;
+
+ msg.resize(record_len + 4);
+
+ // Fake v3-style handshake message wrapper
+ msg[0] = CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2;
+ msg[1] = 0;
+ msg[2] = m_readbuf[0] & 0x7F;
+ msg[3] = m_readbuf[1];
+
+ copy_mem(&msg[4], &m_readbuf[2], m_readbuf_pos - 2);
+ m_readbuf_pos = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(m_readbuf[0] != CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+ m_readbuf[0] != ALERT &&
+ m_readbuf[0] != HANDSHAKE &&
+ m_readbuf[0] != APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ throw Unexpected_Message(
+ "Unknown record type " + to_string(m_readbuf[0]) + " from counterparty");
+ }
+
+ const size_t record_len = make_u16bit(m_readbuf[3], m_readbuf[4]);
+
+ if(m_version.major_version())
+ {
+ if(m_readbuf[1] != m_version.major_version() ||
+ m_readbuf[2] != m_version.minor_version())
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ "Got unexpected version from counterparty");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(record_len > MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE)
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::RECORD_OVERFLOW,
+ "Got message that exceeds maximum size");
+
+ if(size_t needed = fill_buffer_to(input, input_sz, consumed,
+ TLS_HEADER_SIZE + record_len))
+ return needed;
+
+ BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<size_t>(TLS_HEADER_SIZE) + record_len,
+ m_readbuf_pos,
+ "Have the full record");
+
+ // Null mac means no encryption either, only valid during handshake
+ if(!m_mac)
+ {
+ if(m_readbuf[0] != CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+ m_readbuf[0] != ALERT &&
+ m_readbuf[0] != HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ throw Decoding_Error("Invalid msg type received during handshake");
+ }
+
+ msg_type = m_readbuf[0];
+ msg.resize(record_len);
+ copy_mem(&msg[0], &m_readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE], record_len);
+
+ m_readbuf_pos = 0;
+ return 0; // got a full record
+ }
+
+ // Otherwise, decrypt, check MAC, return plaintext
+
+ // FIXME: avoid memory allocation by processing in place
+ m_cipher.process_msg(&m_readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE], record_len);
+ size_t got_back = m_cipher.read(&m_readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE], record_len, Pipe::LAST_MESSAGE);
+ BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(got_back, record_len, "Cipher encrypted full amount");
+
+ BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(m_cipher.remaining(Pipe::LAST_MESSAGE), 0,
+ "Cipher had no remaining inputs");
+
+ size_t pad_size = 0;
+
+ if(m_block_size)
+ {
+ byte pad_value = m_readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + (record_len-1)];
+ pad_size = pad_value + 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Check the padding; if it is wrong, then say we have 0 bytes of
+ * padding, which should ensure that the MAC check below does not
+ * succeed. This hides a timing channel.
+ *
+ * This particular countermeasure is recommended in the TLS 1.2
+ * spec (RFC 5246) in section 6.2.3.2
+ */
+ if(m_version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ if(pad_value > m_block_size)
+ pad_size = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ bool padding_good = true;
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != pad_size; ++i)
+ if(m_readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + (record_len-i-1)] != pad_value)
+ padding_good = false;
+
+ if(!padding_good)
+ pad_size = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ const size_t mac_pad_iv_size = m_macbuf.size() + pad_size + m_iv_size;
+
+ if(record_len < mac_pad_iv_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Record sent with invalid length");
+
+ const u16bit plain_length = record_len - mac_pad_iv_size;
+
+ if(plain_length > m_max_fragment)
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::RECORD_OVERFLOW, "Plaintext record is too large");
+
+ m_mac->update_be(m_seq_no);
+ m_mac->update(m_readbuf[0]); // msg_type
+
+ if(m_version != Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ m_mac->update(m_version.major_version());
+ m_mac->update(m_version.minor_version());
+ }
+
+ m_mac->update_be(plain_length);
+ m_mac->update(&m_readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + m_iv_size], plain_length);
+
+ ++m_seq_no;
+
+ m_mac->final(m_macbuf);
+
+ const size_t mac_offset = record_len - (m_macbuf.size() + pad_size);
+
+ if(!same_mem(&m_readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + mac_offset], &m_macbuf[0], m_macbuf.size()))
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BAD_RECORD_MAC, "Message authentication failure");
+
+ msg_type = m_readbuf[0];
+
+ msg.resize(plain_length);
+ copy_mem(&msg[0], &m_readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + m_iv_size], plain_length);
+ m_readbuf_pos = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/rec_wri.cpp b/src/tls/rec_wri.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..602d25397
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/rec_wri.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/*
+* TLS Record Writing
+* (C) 2004-2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_record.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_session_key.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
+#include <botan/lookup.h>
+#include <botan/internal/rounding.h>
+#include <botan/internal/assert.h>
+#include <botan/loadstor.h>
+#include <botan/libstate.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/*
+* Record_Writer Constructor
+*/
+Record_Writer::Record_Writer(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> out) :
+ m_output_fn(out), m_writebuf(TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE)
+ {
+ m_mac = 0;
+ reset();
+ set_maximum_fragment_size(0);
+ }
+
+void Record_Writer::set_maximum_fragment_size(size_t max_fragment)
+ {
+ if(max_fragment == 0)
+ m_max_fragment = MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE;
+ else
+ m_max_fragment = clamp(max_fragment, 128, MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Reset the state
+*/
+void Record_Writer::reset()
+ {
+ set_maximum_fragment_size(0);
+ m_cipher.reset();
+
+ delete m_mac;
+ m_mac = 0;
+
+ m_version = Protocol_Version();
+ m_block_size = 0;
+ m_mac_size = 0;
+ m_iv_size = 0;
+
+ m_seq_no = 0;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Set the version to use
+*/
+void Record_Writer::set_version(Protocol_Version version)
+ {
+ m_version = version;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Set the keys for writing
+*/
+void Record_Writer::activate(Connection_Side side,
+ const Ciphersuite& suite,
+ const Session_Keys& keys,
+ byte compression_method)
+ {
+ m_cipher.reset();
+ delete m_mac;
+ m_mac = 0;
+
+ if(compression_method != NO_COMPRESSION)
+ throw Internal_Error("Negotiated unknown compression algorithm");
+
+ /*
+ RFC 4346:
+ A sequence number is incremented after each record: specifically,
+ the first record transmitted under a particular connection state
+ MUST use sequence number 0
+ */
+ m_seq_no = 0;
+
+ SymmetricKey mac_key, cipher_key;
+ InitializationVector iv;
+
+ if(side == CLIENT)
+ {
+ cipher_key = keys.client_cipher_key();
+ iv = keys.client_iv();
+ mac_key = keys.client_mac_key();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ cipher_key = keys.server_cipher_key();
+ iv = keys.server_iv();
+ mac_key = keys.server_mac_key();
+ }
+
+ const std::string cipher_algo = suite.cipher_algo();
+ const std::string mac_algo = suite.mac_algo();
+
+ if(have_block_cipher(cipher_algo))
+ {
+ m_cipher.append(get_cipher(
+ cipher_algo + "/CBC/NoPadding",
+ cipher_key, iv, ENCRYPTION)
+ );
+ m_block_size = block_size_of(cipher_algo);
+
+ if(m_version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V11)
+ m_iv_size = m_block_size;
+ else
+ m_iv_size = 0;
+ }
+ else if(have_stream_cipher(cipher_algo))
+ {
+ m_cipher.append(get_cipher(cipher_algo, cipher_key, ENCRYPTION));
+ m_block_size = 0;
+ m_iv_size = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Writer: Unknown cipher " + cipher_algo);
+
+ if(have_hash(mac_algo))
+ {
+ Algorithm_Factory& af = global_state().algorithm_factory();
+
+ if(m_version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ m_mac = af.make_mac("SSL3-MAC(" + mac_algo + ")");
+ else
+ m_mac = af.make_mac("HMAC(" + mac_algo + ")");
+
+ m_mac->set_key(mac_key);
+ m_mac_size = m_mac->output_length();
+ }
+ else
+ throw Invalid_Argument("Record_Writer: Unknown hash " + mac_algo);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Send one or more records to the other side
+*/
+void Record_Writer::send(byte type, const byte input[], size_t length)
+ {
+ if(length == 0)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If using CBC mode in SSLv3/TLS v1.0, send a single byte of
+ * plaintext to randomize the (implicit) IV of the following main
+ * block. If using a stream cipher, or TLS v1.1, this isn't
+ * necessary.
+ *
+ * An empty record also works but apparently some implementations do
+ * not like this (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=665814)
+ *
+ * See http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt for background.
+ */
+ if((type == APPLICATION) && (m_block_size > 0) && (m_iv_size == 0))
+ {
+ send_record(type, &input[0], 1);
+ input += 1;
+ length -= 1;
+ }
+
+ while(length)
+ {
+ const size_t sending = std::min(length, m_max_fragment);
+ send_record(type, &input[0], sending);
+
+ input += sending;
+ length -= sending;
+ }
+ }
+
+/*
+* Encrypt and send the record
+*/
+void Record_Writer::send_record(byte type, const byte input[], size_t length)
+ {
+ if(length >= MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE)
+ throw Internal_Error("Record_Writer: Compressed packet is too big");
+
+ if(m_mac_size == 0) // initial unencrypted handshake records
+ {
+ const byte header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE] = {
+ type,
+ m_version.major_version(),
+ m_version.minor_version(),
+ get_byte<u16bit>(0, length),
+ get_byte<u16bit>(1, length)
+ };
+
+ m_output_fn(header, TLS_HEADER_SIZE);
+ m_output_fn(input, length);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ m_mac->update_be(m_seq_no);
+ m_mac->update(type);
+
+ if(m_version != Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ m_mac->update(m_version.major_version());
+ m_mac->update(m_version.minor_version());
+ }
+
+ m_mac->update(get_byte<u16bit>(0, length));
+ m_mac->update(get_byte<u16bit>(1, length));
+ m_mac->update(input, length);
+
+ const size_t buf_size = round_up(m_iv_size + length +
+ m_mac->output_length() +
+ (m_block_size ? 1 : 0),
+ m_block_size);
+
+ if(buf_size >= MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE)
+ throw Internal_Error("Record_Writer: Record is too big");
+
+ BOTAN_ASSERT(m_writebuf.size() >= TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE,
+ "Write buffer is big enough");
+
+ // TLS record header
+ m_writebuf[0] = type;
+ m_writebuf[1] = m_version.major_version();
+ m_writebuf[2] = m_version.minor_version();
+ m_writebuf[3] = get_byte<u16bit>(0, buf_size);
+ m_writebuf[4] = get_byte<u16bit>(1, buf_size);
+
+ byte* buf_write_ptr = &m_writebuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE];
+
+ if(m_iv_size)
+ {
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng = global_state().global_rng();
+ rng.randomize(buf_write_ptr, m_iv_size);
+ buf_write_ptr += m_iv_size;
+ }
+
+ copy_mem(buf_write_ptr, input, length);
+ buf_write_ptr += length;
+
+ m_mac->final(buf_write_ptr);
+ buf_write_ptr += m_mac->output_length();
+
+ if(m_block_size)
+ {
+ const size_t pad_val =
+ buf_size - (m_iv_size + length + m_mac->output_length() + 1);
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != pad_val + 1; ++i)
+ {
+ *buf_write_ptr = pad_val;
+ buf_write_ptr += 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // FIXME: this could be done in-place without copying
+ m_cipher.process_msg(&m_writebuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE], buf_size);
+
+ const size_t ctext_size = m_cipher.remaining(Pipe::LAST_MESSAGE);
+
+ BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(ctext_size, buf_size, "Cipher encrypted full amount");
+
+ if(ctext_size > MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE)
+ throw Internal_Error("Produced ciphertext larger than protocol allows");
+
+ m_cipher.read(&m_writebuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE], ctext_size, Pipe::LAST_MESSAGE);
+
+ BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(m_cipher.remaining(Pipe::LAST_MESSAGE), 0,
+ "No data remains in pipe");
+
+ m_output_fn(&m_writebuf[0], TLS_HEADER_SIZE + buf_size);
+
+ m_seq_no++;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Send an alert
+*/
+void Record_Writer::send_alert(const Alert& alert)
+ {
+ const byte alert_bits[2] = { alert.is_fatal() ? 2 : 1,
+ alert.type() };
+
+ send(ALERT, alert_bits, sizeof(alert_bits));
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/s_hello.cpp b/src/tls/s_hello.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0ad78fc5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/s_hello.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+;/*
+* TLS Server Hello and Server Hello Done
+* (C) 2004-2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_session_key.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_extensions.h>
+#include <botan/tls_record.h>
+#include <botan/internal/stl_util.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/*
+* Create a new Server Hello message
+*/
+Server_Hello::Server_Hello(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ Protocol_Version version,
+ const Client_Hello& c_hello,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& available_cert_types,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ bool client_has_secure_renegotiation,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& reneg_info,
+ bool client_has_npn,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& next_protocols,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng) :
+ s_version(version),
+ m_session_id(rng.random_vec(32)),
+ s_random(make_hello_random(rng)),
+ m_fragment_size(c_hello.fragment_size()),
+ m_secure_renegotiation(client_has_secure_renegotiation),
+ m_renegotiation_info(reneg_info),
+ m_next_protocol(client_has_npn),
+ m_next_protocols(next_protocols)
+ {
+ suite = policy.choose_suite(
+ c_hello.ciphersuites(),
+ available_cert_types,
+ policy.choose_curve(c_hello.supported_ecc_curves()) != "",
+ false);
+
+ if(suite == 0)
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Can't agree on a ciphersuite with client");
+
+ comp_method = policy.choose_compression(c_hello.compression_methods());
+
+ send(writer, hash);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Create a new Server Hello message
+*/
+Server_Hello::Server_Hello(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_id,
+ Protocol_Version ver,
+ u16bit ciphersuite,
+ byte compression,
+ size_t max_fragment_size,
+ bool client_has_secure_renegotiation,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& reneg_info,
+ bool client_has_npn,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& next_protocols,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng) :
+ s_version(ver),
+ m_session_id(session_id),
+ s_random(make_hello_random(rng)),
+ suite(ciphersuite),
+ comp_method(compression),
+ m_fragment_size(max_fragment_size),
+ m_secure_renegotiation(client_has_secure_renegotiation),
+ m_renegotiation_info(reneg_info),
+ m_next_protocol(client_has_npn),
+ m_next_protocols(next_protocols)
+ {
+ send(writer, hash);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Deserialize a Server Hello message
+*/
+Server_Hello::Server_Hello(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
+ {
+ m_secure_renegotiation = false;
+ m_next_protocol = false;
+
+ if(buf.size() < 38)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Server_Hello: Packet corrupted");
+
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
+
+ const byte major_version = reader.get_byte();
+ const byte minor_version = reader.get_byte();
+
+ s_version = Protocol_Version(major_version, minor_version);
+
+ if(s_version != Protocol_Version::SSL_V3 &&
+ s_version != Protocol_Version::TLS_V10 &&
+ s_version != Protocol_Version::TLS_V11 &&
+ s_version != Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ "Server_Hello: Unsupported server version");
+ }
+
+ s_random = reader.get_fixed<byte>(32);
+
+ m_session_id = reader.get_range<byte>(1, 0, 32);
+
+ suite = reader.get_u16bit();
+
+ comp_method = reader.get_byte();
+
+ Extensions extensions(reader);
+
+ if(Renegotation_Extension* reneg = extensions.get<Renegotation_Extension>())
+ {
+ // checked by Client / Server as they know the handshake state
+ m_secure_renegotiation = true;
+ m_renegotiation_info = reneg->renegotiation_info();
+ }
+
+ if(Next_Protocol_Notification* npn = extensions.get<Next_Protocol_Notification>())
+ {
+ m_next_protocols = npn->protocols();
+ m_next_protocol = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+/*
+* Serialize a Server Hello message
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> Server_Hello::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf;
+
+ buf.push_back(s_version.major_version());
+ buf.push_back(s_version.minor_version());
+ buf += s_random;
+
+ append_tls_length_value(buf, m_session_id, 1);
+
+ buf.push_back(get_byte(0, suite));
+ buf.push_back(get_byte(1, suite));
+
+ buf.push_back(comp_method);
+
+ Extensions extensions;
+
+ if(m_secure_renegotiation)
+ extensions.add(new Renegotation_Extension(m_renegotiation_info));
+
+ if(m_fragment_size != 0)
+ extensions.add(new Maximum_Fragment_Length(m_fragment_size));
+
+ if(m_next_protocol)
+ extensions.add(new Next_Protocol_Notification(m_next_protocols));
+
+ buf += extensions.serialize();
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Create a new Server Hello Done message
+*/
+Server_Hello_Done::Server_Hello_Done(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash)
+ {
+ send(writer, hash);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Deserialize a Server Hello Done message
+*/
+Server_Hello_Done::Server_Hello_Done(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
+ {
+ if(buf.size())
+ throw Decoding_Error("Server_Hello_Done: Must be empty, and is not");
+ }
+
+/*
+* Serialize a Server Hello Done message
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> Server_Hello_Done::serialize() const
+ {
+ return MemoryVector<byte>();
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/s_kex.cpp b/src/tls/s_kex.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f25205e99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/s_kex.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+/*
+* Server Key Exchange Message
+* (C) 2004-2010,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_extensions.h>
+#include <botan/internal/assert.h>
+#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
+#include <botan/loadstor.h>
+#include <botan/pubkey.h>
+#include <botan/dh.h>
+#include <botan/ecdh.h>
+#include <botan/rsa.h>
+#include <botan/oids.h>
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* Create a new Server Key Exchange message
+*/
+Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_State* state,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const Private_Key* signing_key) :
+ m_kex_key(0)
+ {
+ const std::string kex_algo = state->suite.kex_algo();
+
+ if(kex_algo == "PSK" || kex_algo == "DHE_PSK" || kex_algo == "ECDHE_PSK")
+ {
+ std::string identity_hint =
+ creds.psk_identity_hint("tls-server",
+ state->client_hello->sni_hostname());
+
+ append_tls_length_value(m_params, identity_hint, 2);
+ }
+
+ if(kex_algo == "DH" || kex_algo == "DHE_PSK")
+ {
+ std::auto_ptr<DH_PrivateKey> dh(new DH_PrivateKey(rng, policy.dh_group()));
+
+ append_tls_length_value(m_params, BigInt::encode(dh->get_domain().get_p()), 2);
+ append_tls_length_value(m_params, BigInt::encode(dh->get_domain().get_g()), 2);
+ append_tls_length_value(m_params, dh->public_value(), 2);
+ m_kex_key = dh.release();
+ }
+ else if(kex_algo == "ECDH" || kex_algo == "ECDHE_PSK")
+ {
+ const std::vector<std::string>& curves =
+ state->client_hello->supported_ecc_curves();
+
+ if(curves.empty())
+ throw Internal_Error("Client sent no ECC extension but we negotiated ECDH");
+
+ const std::string curve_name = policy.choose_curve(curves);
+
+ if(curve_name == "")
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Could not agree on an ECC curve with the client");
+
+ EC_Group ec_group(curve_name);
+
+ std::auto_ptr<ECDH_PrivateKey> ecdh(new ECDH_PrivateKey(rng, ec_group));
+
+ const std::string ecdh_domain_oid = ecdh->domain().get_oid();
+ const std::string domain = OIDS::lookup(OID(ecdh_domain_oid));
+
+ if(domain == "")
+ throw Internal_Error("Could not find name of ECDH domain " + ecdh_domain_oid);
+
+ const u16bit named_curve_id = Supported_Elliptic_Curves::name_to_curve_id(domain);
+
+ m_params.push_back(3); // named curve
+ m_params.push_back(get_byte(0, named_curve_id));
+ m_params.push_back(get_byte(1, named_curve_id));
+
+ append_tls_length_value(m_params, ecdh->public_value(), 1);
+
+ m_kex_key = ecdh.release();
+ }
+ else if(kex_algo != "PSK")
+ throw Internal_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unknown kex type " + kex_algo);
+
+ if(state->suite.sig_algo() != "")
+ {
+ BOTAN_ASSERT(signing_key, "No signing key set");
+
+ std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =
+ state->choose_sig_format(signing_key, m_hash_algo, m_sig_algo, false);
+
+ PK_Signer signer(*signing_key, format.first, format.second);
+
+ signer.update(state->client_hello->random());
+ signer.update(state->server_hello->random());
+ signer.update(params());
+ m_signature = signer.signature(rng);
+ }
+
+ send(writer, state->hash);
+ }
+
+/**
+* Deserialize a Server Key Exchange message
+*/
+Server_Key_Exchange::Server_Key_Exchange(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
+ const std::string& kex_algo,
+ const std::string& sig_algo,
+ Protocol_Version version) :
+ m_kex_key(0)
+ {
+ if(buf.size() < 6)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Packet corrupted");
+
+ TLS_Data_Reader reader(buf);
+
+ /*
+ * We really are just serializing things back to what they were
+ * before, but unfortunately to know where the signature is we need
+ * to be able to parse the whole thing anyway.
+ */
+
+ if(kex_algo == "PSK" || kex_algo == "DHE_PSK" || kex_algo == "ECDHE_PSK")
+ {
+ const std::string identity_hint = reader.get_string(2, 0, 65535);
+ append_tls_length_value(m_params, identity_hint, 2);
+ }
+
+ if(kex_algo == "DH" || kex_algo == "DHE_PSK")
+ {
+ // 3 bigints, DH p, g, Y
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; ++i)
+ {
+ BigInt v = BigInt::decode(reader.get_range<byte>(2, 1, 65535));
+ append_tls_length_value(m_params, BigInt::encode(v), 2);
+ }
+ }
+ else if(kex_algo == "ECDH" || kex_algo == "ECDHE_PSK")
+ {
+ const byte curve_type = reader.get_byte();
+
+ if(curve_type != 3)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Server sent non-named ECC curve");
+
+ const u16bit curve_id = reader.get_u16bit();
+
+ const std::string name = Supported_Elliptic_Curves::curve_id_to_name(curve_id);
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> ecdh_key = reader.get_range<byte>(1, 1, 255);
+
+ if(name == "")
+ throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Server sent unknown named curve " +
+ to_string(curve_id));
+
+ m_params.push_back(curve_type);
+ m_params.push_back(get_byte(0, curve_id));
+ m_params.push_back(get_byte(1, curve_id));
+ append_tls_length_value(m_params, ecdh_key, 1);
+ }
+ else if(kex_algo != "PSK")
+ throw Decoding_Error("Server_Key_Exchange: Unsupported kex type " + kex_algo);
+
+ if(sig_algo != "")
+ {
+ if(version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ m_hash_algo = Signature_Algorithms::hash_algo_name(reader.get_byte());
+ m_sig_algo = Signature_Algorithms::sig_algo_name(reader.get_byte());
+ }
+
+ m_signature = reader.get_range<byte>(2, 0, 65535);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+/**
+* Serialize a Server Key Exchange message
+*/
+MemoryVector<byte> Server_Key_Exchange::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf = params();
+
+ if(m_signature.size())
+ {
+ // This should be an explicit version check
+ if(m_hash_algo != "" && m_sig_algo != "")
+ {
+ buf.push_back(Signature_Algorithms::hash_algo_code(m_hash_algo));
+ buf.push_back(Signature_Algorithms::sig_algo_code(m_sig_algo));
+ }
+
+ append_tls_length_value(buf, m_signature, 2);
+ }
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+/**
+* Verify a Server Key Exchange message
+*/
+bool Server_Key_Exchange::verify(const X509_Certificate& cert,
+ Handshake_State* state) const
+ {
+ std::auto_ptr<Public_Key> key(cert.subject_public_key());
+
+ std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format> format =
+ state->understand_sig_format(key.get(), m_hash_algo, m_sig_algo, false);
+
+ PK_Verifier verifier(*key, format.first, format.second);
+
+ verifier.update(state->client_hello->random());
+ verifier.update(state->server_hello->random());
+ verifier.update(params());
+
+ return verifier.check_signature(m_signature);
+ }
+
+const Private_Key& Server_Key_Exchange::server_kex_key() const
+ {
+ BOTAN_ASSERT(m_kex_key, "Key is non-NULL");
+ return *m_kex_key;
+ }
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_alert.cpp b/src/tls/tls_alert.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b526eeac3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_alert.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+* Alert Message
+* (C) 2004-2006,2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_alert.h>
+#include <botan/exceptn.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+Alert::Alert(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf)
+ {
+ if(buf.size() != 2)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Alert: Bad size " + to_string(buf.size()) +
+ " for alert message");
+
+ if(buf[0] == 1) fatal = false;
+ else if(buf[0] == 2) fatal = true;
+ else
+ throw Decoding_Error("Alert: Bad code for alert level");
+
+ const byte dc = buf[1];
+
+ /*
+ * This is allowed by the specification but is not allocated and we're
+ * using it internally as a special 'no alert' type.
+ */
+ if(dc == 255)
+ throw Internal_Error("Alert: description code 255, rejecting");
+
+ type_code = static_cast<Type>(dc);
+ }
+
+std::string Alert::type_string() const
+ {
+ switch(type())
+ {
+ case CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+ return "close_notify";
+ case UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+ return "unexpected_message";
+ case BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+ return "bad_record_mac";
+ case DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+ return "decryption_failed";
+ case RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+ return "record_overflow";
+ case DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+ return "decompression_failure";
+ case HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+ return "handshake_failure";
+ case NO_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "no_certificate";
+ case BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "bad_certificate";
+ case UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "unsupported_certificate";
+ case CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+ return "certificate_revoked";
+ case CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+ return "certificate_expired";
+ case CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+ return "certificate_unknown";
+ case ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+ return "illegal_parameter";
+ case UNKNOWN_CA:
+ return "unknown_ca";
+ case ACCESS_DENIED:
+ return "access_denied";
+ case DECODE_ERROR:
+ return "decode_error";
+ case DECRYPT_ERROR:
+ return "decrypt_error";
+ case EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+ return "export_restriction";
+ case PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+ return "protocol_version";
+ case INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+ return "insufficient_security";
+ case INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ return "internal_error";
+ case USER_CANCELED:
+ return "user_canceled";
+ case NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+ return "no_renegotiation";
+
+ case UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+ return "unsupported_extension";
+ case UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+ return "unrecognized_name";
+
+ case UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+ return "unknown_psk_identity";
+
+ case NULL_ALERT:
+ return "";
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is effectively the default case for the switch above, but we
+ * leave it out so that when an alert type is added to the enum the
+ * compiler can warn us that it is not included in the switch
+ * statement.
+ */
+ return "unrecognized_alert_" + to_string(type());
+ }
+
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_alert.h b/src/tls/tls_alert.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0446a8c30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_alert.h
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/*
+* Alert Message
+* (C) 2004-2006,2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_ALERT_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_ALERT_H__
+
+#include <botan/secmem.h>
+#include <string>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* SSL/TLS Alert Message
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Alert
+ {
+ public:
+ enum Type {
+ CLOSE_NOTIFY = 0,
+ UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE = 10,
+ BAD_RECORD_MAC = 20,
+ DECRYPTION_FAILED = 21,
+ RECORD_OVERFLOW = 22,
+ DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE = 30,
+ HANDSHAKE_FAILURE = 40,
+ NO_CERTIFICATE = 41, // SSLv3 only
+ BAD_CERTIFICATE = 42,
+ UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE = 43,
+ CERTIFICATE_REVOKED = 44,
+ CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED = 45,
+ CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN = 46,
+ ILLEGAL_PARAMETER = 47,
+ UNKNOWN_CA = 48,
+ ACCESS_DENIED = 49,
+ DECODE_ERROR = 50,
+ DECRYPT_ERROR = 51,
+ EXPORT_RESTRICTION = 60,
+ PROTOCOL_VERSION = 70,
+ INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY = 71,
+ INTERNAL_ERROR = 80,
+ USER_CANCELED = 90,
+ NO_RENEGOTIATION = 100,
+
+ UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION = 110,
+ UNRECOGNIZED_NAME = 112,
+
+ UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY = 115,
+
+ NULL_ALERT = 255
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * @return true iff this alert is non-empty
+ */
+ bool is_valid() const { return (type_code != NULL_ALERT); }
+
+ /**
+ * @return if this alert is a fatal one or not
+ */
+ bool is_fatal() const { return fatal; }
+
+ /**
+ * @return type of alert
+ */
+ Type type() const { return type_code; }
+
+ /**
+ * @return type of alert
+ */
+ std::string type_string() const;
+
+ /**
+ * Deserialize an Alert message
+ * @param buf the serialized alert
+ */
+ Alert(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf);
+
+ Alert(Type alert_type, bool is_fatal = false) :
+ fatal(is_fatal), type_code(alert_type) {}
+
+ Alert() : fatal(false), type_code(NULL_ALERT) {}
+ private:
+ bool fatal;
+ Type type_code;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_channel.cpp b/src/tls/tls_channel.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d737ef237
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_channel.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+/*
+* TLS Channels
+* (C) 2011-2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_channel.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/assert.h>
+#include <botan/loadstor.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+Channel::Channel(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> socket_output_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t, Alert)> proc_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<bool (const Session&)> handshake_complete) :
+ proc_fn(proc_fn),
+ handshake_fn(handshake_complete),
+ writer(socket_output_fn),
+ state(0),
+ handshake_completed(false),
+ connection_closed(false)
+ {
+ }
+
+Channel::~Channel()
+ {
+ delete state;
+ state = 0;
+ }
+
+size_t Channel::received_data(const byte buf[], size_t buf_size)
+ {
+ try
+ {
+ while(buf_size)
+ {
+ byte rec_type = CONNECTION_CLOSED;
+ MemoryVector<byte> record;
+ size_t consumed = 0;
+
+ const size_t needed = reader.add_input(buf, buf_size,
+ consumed,
+ rec_type, record);
+
+ buf += consumed;
+ buf_size -= consumed;
+
+ BOTAN_ASSERT(buf_size == 0 || needed == 0,
+ "Got a full record or consumed all input");
+
+ if(buf_size == 0 && needed != 0)
+ return needed; // need more data to complete record
+
+ if(rec_type == APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ if(handshake_completed)
+ {
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL among others sends empty records in versions
+ * before TLS v1.1 in order to randomize the IV of the
+ * following record. Avoid spurious callbacks.
+ */
+ if(record.size() > 0)
+ proc_fn(&record[0], record.size(), Alert());
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ throw Unexpected_Message("Application data before handshake done");
+ }
+ }
+ else if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE || rec_type == CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ read_handshake(rec_type, record);
+ }
+ else if(rec_type == ALERT)
+ {
+ Alert alert_msg(record);
+
+ alert_notify(alert_msg);
+
+ proc_fn(0, 0, alert_msg);
+
+ if(alert_msg.type() == Alert::CLOSE_NOTIFY)
+ {
+ if(connection_closed)
+ reader.reset();
+ else
+ send_alert(Alert(Alert::CLOSE_NOTIFY)); // reply in kind
+ }
+ else if(alert_msg.is_fatal())
+ {
+ // delete state immediately
+ connection_closed = true;
+
+ delete state;
+ state = 0;
+
+ writer.reset();
+ reader.reset();
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ throw Unexpected_Message("Unknown TLS message type " +
+ to_string(rec_type) + " received");
+ }
+
+ return 0; // on a record boundary
+ }
+ catch(TLS_Exception& e)
+ {
+ send_alert(Alert(e.type(), true));
+ throw;
+ }
+ catch(Decoding_Error& e)
+ {
+ send_alert(Alert(Alert::DECODE_ERROR, true));
+ throw;
+ }
+ catch(Internal_Error& e)
+ {
+ send_alert(Alert(Alert::INTERNAL_ERROR, true));
+ throw;
+ }
+ catch(std::exception& e)
+ {
+ send_alert(Alert(Alert::INTERNAL_ERROR, true));
+ throw;
+ }
+ }
+
+/*
+* Split up and process handshake messages
+*/
+void Channel::read_handshake(byte rec_type,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& rec_buf)
+ {
+ if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ if(!state)
+ state = new Handshake_State;
+ state->queue.write(&rec_buf[0], rec_buf.size());
+ }
+
+ while(true)
+ {
+ Handshake_Type type = HANDSHAKE_NONE;
+ MemoryVector<byte> contents;
+
+ if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ if(state->queue.size() >= 4)
+ {
+ byte head[4] = { 0 };
+ state->queue.peek(head, 4);
+
+ const size_t length = make_u32bit(0, head[1], head[2], head[3]);
+
+ if(state->queue.size() >= length + 4)
+ {
+ type = static_cast<Handshake_Type>(head[0]);
+ contents.resize(length);
+ state->queue.read(head, 4);
+ state->queue.read(&contents[0], contents.size());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if(rec_type == CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ if(state->queue.size() == 0 && rec_buf.size() == 1 && rec_buf[0] == 1)
+ type = HANDSHAKE_CCS;
+ else
+ throw Decoding_Error("Malformed ChangeCipherSpec message");
+ }
+ else
+ throw Decoding_Error("Unknown message type in handshake processing");
+
+ if(type == HANDSHAKE_NONE)
+ break;
+
+ process_handshake_msg(type, contents);
+
+ if(type == HANDSHAKE_CCS || !state)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+void Channel::send(const byte buf[], size_t buf_size)
+ {
+ if(!is_active())
+ throw std::runtime_error("Data cannot be sent on inactive TLS connection");
+
+ writer.send(APPLICATION_DATA, buf, buf_size);
+ }
+
+void Channel::send_alert(const Alert& alert)
+ {
+ if(alert.is_valid() && !connection_closed)
+ {
+ try
+ {
+ writer.send_alert(alert);
+ }
+ catch(...) { /* swallow it */ }
+ }
+
+ if(!connection_closed && (alert.type() == Alert::CLOSE_NOTIFY || alert.is_fatal()))
+ {
+ connection_closed = true;
+
+ delete state;
+ state = 0;
+
+ writer.reset();
+ }
+ }
+
+void Channel::Secure_Renegotiation_State::update(Client_Hello* client_hello)
+ {
+ if(initial_handshake)
+ {
+ secure_renegotiation = client_hello->secure_renegotiation();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if(secure_renegotiation != client_hello->secure_renegotiation())
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Client changed its mind about secure renegotiation");
+ }
+
+ if(client_hello->secure_renegotiation())
+ {
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& data = client_hello->renegotiation_info();
+
+ if(initial_handshake)
+ {
+ if(!data.empty())
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Client sent renegotiation data on initial handshake");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if(data != for_client_hello())
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Client sent bad renegotiation data");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+void Channel::Secure_Renegotiation_State::update(Server_Hello* server_hello)
+ {
+ if(initial_handshake)
+ {
+ /* If the client offered but server rejected, then this toggles
+ * secure_renegotiation to off
+ */
+ secure_renegotiation = server_hello->secure_renegotiation();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if(secure_renegotiation != server_hello->secure_renegotiation())
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Server changed its mind about secure renegotiation");
+ }
+
+ if(secure_renegotiation)
+ {
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& data = server_hello->renegotiation_info();
+
+ if(initial_handshake)
+ {
+ if(!data.empty())
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Server sent renegotiation data on initial handshake");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if(data != for_server_hello())
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Server sent bad renegotiation data");
+ }
+ }
+
+ initial_handshake = false;
+ }
+
+void Channel::Secure_Renegotiation_State::update(Finished* client_finished,
+ Finished* server_finished)
+ {
+ client_verify = client_finished->verify_data();
+ server_verify = server_finished->verify_data();
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_channel.h b/src/tls/tls_channel.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa171ca4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_channel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/*
+* TLS Channel
+* (C) 2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_CHANNEL_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_CHANNEL_H__
+
+#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
+#include <botan/tls_record.h>
+#include <botan/tls_session.h>
+#include <botan/tls_alert.h>
+#include <botan/x509cert.h>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* Generic interface for TLS endpoint
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Channel
+ {
+ public:
+ /**
+ * Inject TLS traffic received from counterparty
+ * @return a hint as the how many more bytes we need to process the
+ * current record (this may be 0 if on a record boundary)
+ */
+ virtual size_t received_data(const byte buf[], size_t buf_size);
+
+ /**
+ * Inject plaintext intended for counterparty
+ */
+ virtual void send(const byte buf[], size_t buf_size);
+
+ /**
+ * Send a close notification alert
+ */
+ void close() { send_alert(Alert(Alert::CLOSE_NOTIFY)); }
+
+ /**
+ * @return true iff the connection is active for sending application data
+ */
+ bool is_active() const { return handshake_completed && !is_closed(); }
+
+ /**
+ * @return true iff the connection has been definitely closed
+ */
+ bool is_closed() const { return connection_closed; }
+
+ /**
+ * Attempt to renegotiate the session
+ */
+ virtual void renegotiate() = 0;
+
+ /**
+ * @return certificate chain of the peer (may be empty)
+ */
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> peer_cert_chain() const { return peer_certs; }
+
+ Channel(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> socket_output_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t, Alert)> proc_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<bool (const Session&)> handshake_complete);
+
+ virtual ~Channel();
+ protected:
+
+ /**
+ * Send a TLS alert message. If the alert is fatal, the
+ * internal state (keys, etc) will be reset
+ * @param level is warning or fatal
+ * @param type is the type of alert
+ */
+ void send_alert(const Alert& alert);
+
+ virtual void read_handshake(byte rec_type,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& rec_buf);
+
+ virtual void process_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type type,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& contents) = 0;
+
+ virtual void alert_notify(const Alert& alert) = 0;
+
+ std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t, Alert)> proc_fn;
+ std::tr1::function<bool (const Session&)> handshake_fn;
+
+ Record_Writer writer;
+ Record_Reader reader;
+
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> peer_certs;
+
+ class Handshake_State* state;
+
+ class Secure_Renegotiation_State
+ {
+ public:
+ Secure_Renegotiation_State() : initial_handshake(true),
+ secure_renegotiation(false)
+ {}
+
+ void update(class Client_Hello* client_hello);
+ void update(class Server_Hello* server_hello);
+
+ void update(class Finished* client_finished,
+ class Finished* server_finished);
+
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& for_client_hello() const
+ { return client_verify; }
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> for_server_hello() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf = client_verify;
+ buf += server_verify;
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+ bool supported() const { return secure_renegotiation; }
+ bool renegotiation() const { return !initial_handshake; }
+ private:
+ bool initial_handshake;
+ bool secure_renegotiation;
+ MemoryVector<byte> client_verify, server_verify;
+ };
+
+ Secure_Renegotiation_State secure_renegotiation;
+
+ bool handshake_completed;
+ bool connection_closed;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_ciphersuite.cpp b/src/tls/tls_ciphersuite.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..26b52f749
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_ciphersuite.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+/*
+* TLS Cipher Suites
+* (C) 2004-2010,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_ciphersuite.h>
+#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
+#include <botan/parsing.h>
+#include <sstream>
+#include <stdexcept>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* Convert an SSL/TLS ciphersuite to algorithm fields
+*/
+Ciphersuite Ciphersuite::lookup_ciphersuite(u16bit suite)
+ {
+ switch(static_cast<Ciphersuite_Code>(suite))
+ {
+ // RSA ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "RSA", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "RSA", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "RSA", "SHA-256", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "RSA", "SHA-256", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "RSA", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "RSA", "SHA-1", "ARC4", 16);
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "RSA", "MD5", "ARC4", 16);
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "RSA", "SHA-1", "SEED", 16);
+
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_IDEA)
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "RSA", "SHA-1", "IDEA", 16);
+#endif
+
+ // DH/DSS ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "DH", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "DH", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "DH", "SHA-256", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "DH", "SHA-256", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "DH", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "DH", "SHA-1", "ARC4", 16);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "DH", "SHA-1", "SEED", 16);
+
+ // DH/RSA ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "DH", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "DH", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "DH", "SHA-256", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "DH", "SHA-256", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "DH", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "DH", "SHA-1", "SEED", 16);
+
+ // ECDH/RSA ciphersuites
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "ECDH", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "ECDH", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "ECDH", "SHA-256", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "ECDH", "SHA-384", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "ECDH", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "ECDH", "SHA-1", "ARC4", 16);
+
+ // ECDH/ECDSA ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("ECDSA", "ECDH", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("ECDSA", "ECDH", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("ECDSA", "ECDH", "SHA-256", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return Ciphersuite("ECDSA", "ECDH", "SHA-384", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("ECDSA", "ECDH", "SHA-1", "ARC4", 16);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("ECDSA", "ECDH", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ // PSK ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "PSK", "SHA-1", "ARC4", 16);
+
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "PSK", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "PSK", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "PSK", "SHA-256", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "PSK", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "PSK", "SHA-384", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ // PSK+DH ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "DHE_PSK", "SHA-1", "ARC4", 16);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "DHE_PSK", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "DHE_PSK", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "DHE_PSK", "SHA-256", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "DHE_PSK", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "DHE_PSK", "SHA-384", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ // PSK+ECDH ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "ECDHE_PSK", "SHA-1", "ARC4", 16);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "ECDHE_PSK", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "ECDHE_PSK", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "ECDHE_PSK", "SHA-256", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "ECDHE_PSK", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "ECDHE_PSK", "SHA-384", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ // SRP ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "SRP", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "SRP", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("", "SRP", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ // SRP/RSA ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "SRP", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "SRP", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("RSA", "SRP", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ // SRP/DSA ciphersuites
+
+ case TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "SRP", "SHA-1", "AES-128", 16);
+
+ case TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "SRP", "SHA-1", "AES-256", 32);
+
+ case TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return Ciphersuite("DSA", "SRP", "SHA-1", "3DES", 24);
+
+ // Signaling ciphersuite values
+
+ case TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV:
+ return Ciphersuite();
+ }
+
+ return Ciphersuite(); // some unknown ciphersuite
+ }
+
+std::string Ciphersuite::to_string() const
+ {
+ if(m_cipher_keylen == 0)
+ throw std::runtime_error("Ciphersuite::to_string - no value set");
+
+ std::ostringstream out;
+
+ out << "TLS_";
+
+ if(kex_algo() != "RSA")
+ {
+ if(kex_algo() == "DH")
+ out << "DHE";
+ else if(kex_algo() == "ECDH")
+ out << "ECDHE";
+ else if(kex_algo() == "SRP")
+ out << "SRP_SHA";
+ else
+ out << kex_algo();
+
+ out << '_';
+ }
+
+ if(sig_algo() == "DSA")
+ out << "DSS_";
+ else if(sig_algo() != "")
+ out << sig_algo() << '_';
+
+ out << "WITH_";
+
+ if(cipher_algo() == "ARC4")
+ {
+ out << "RC4_128_";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if(cipher_algo() == "3DES")
+ out << "3DES_EDE";
+ else
+ out << replace_char(cipher_algo(), '-', '_');
+
+ out << "_CBC_";
+ }
+
+ if(mac_algo() == "SHA-1")
+ out << "SHA";
+ else if(mac_algo() == "SHA-256")
+ out << "SHA256";
+ else if(mac_algo() == "SHA-384")
+ out << "SHA384";
+ else
+ out << mac_algo();
+
+ return out.str();
+ }
+
+Ciphersuite::Ciphersuite(const std::string& sig_algo,
+ const std::string& kex_algo,
+ const std::string& mac_algo,
+ const std::string& cipher_algo,
+ size_t cipher_algo_keylen) :
+ m_sig_algo(sig_algo),
+ m_kex_algo(kex_algo),
+ m_mac_algo(mac_algo),
+ m_cipher_algo(cipher_algo),
+ m_cipher_keylen(cipher_algo_keylen)
+ {
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_ciphersuite.h b/src/tls/tls_ciphersuite.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f0acc1497
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_ciphersuite.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+* TLS Cipher Suites
+* (C) 2004-2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_CIPHER_SUITES_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_CIPHER_SUITES_H__
+
+#include <botan/types.h>
+#include <string>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* Ciphersuite Information
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Ciphersuite
+ {
+ public:
+ static Ciphersuite lookup_ciphersuite(u16bit suite);
+
+ /**
+ * Formats the ciphersuite back to an RFC-style ciphersuite string
+ */
+ std::string to_string() const;
+
+ std::string kex_algo() const { return m_kex_algo; }
+ std::string sig_algo() const { return m_sig_algo; }
+
+ std::string cipher_algo() const { return m_cipher_algo; }
+ std::string mac_algo() const { return m_mac_algo; }
+
+ size_t cipher_keylen() const { return m_cipher_keylen; }
+
+ bool valid() const { return (m_cipher_keylen > 0); }
+
+ Ciphersuite() : m_cipher_keylen(0) {}
+
+ Ciphersuite(const std::string& sig_algo,
+ const std::string& kex_algo,
+ const std::string& mac_algo,
+ const std::string& cipher_algo,
+ size_t cipher_algo_keylen);
+ private:
+ std::string m_sig_algo, m_kex_algo, m_mac_algo, m_cipher_algo;
+ size_t m_cipher_keylen;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_client.cpp b/src/tls/tls_client.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c7b50abc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_client.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+/*
+* TLS Client
+* (C) 2004-2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_client.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/stl_util.h>
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/*
+* TLS Client Constructor
+*/
+Client::Client(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> output_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t, Alert)> proc_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<bool (const Session&)> handshake_fn,
+ Session_Manager& session_manager,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const std::string& hostname,
+ std::tr1::function<std::string (std::vector<std::string>)> next_protocol) :
+ Channel(output_fn, proc_fn, handshake_fn),
+ policy(policy),
+ rng(rng),
+ session_manager(session_manager),
+ creds(creds)
+ {
+ writer.set_version(Protocol_Version::SSL_V3);
+
+ state = new Handshake_State;
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_HELLO);
+
+ state->client_npn_cb = next_protocol;
+
+ const std::string srp_identifier = creds.srp_identifier("tls-client", hostname);
+
+ const bool send_npn_request = static_cast<bool>(next_protocol);
+
+ if(hostname != "")
+ {
+ Session session_info;
+ if(session_manager.load_from_host_info(hostname, 0, session_info))
+ {
+ if(session_info.srp_identifier() == srp_identifier)
+ {
+ state->client_hello = new Client_Hello(
+ writer,
+ state->hash,
+ rng,
+ session_info,
+ send_npn_request);
+
+ state->resume_master_secret = session_info.master_secret();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!state->client_hello) // not resuming
+ {
+ state->client_hello = new Client_Hello(
+ writer,
+ state->hash,
+ policy,
+ rng,
+ secure_renegotiation.for_client_hello(),
+ send_npn_request,
+ hostname,
+ srp_identifier);
+ }
+
+ secure_renegotiation.update(state->client_hello);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Send a new client hello to renegotiate
+*/
+void Client::renegotiate()
+ {
+ if(state)
+ return; // currently in handshake
+
+ state = new Handshake_State;
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_HELLO);
+
+ state->client_hello = new Client_Hello(writer, state->hash, policy, rng,
+ secure_renegotiation.for_client_hello());
+
+ secure_renegotiation.update(state->client_hello);
+ }
+
+void Client::alert_notify(const Alert& alert)
+ {
+ if(alert.type() == Alert::NO_RENEGOTIATION)
+ {
+ if(handshake_completed && state)
+ {
+ delete state;
+ state = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+/*
+* Process a handshake message
+*/
+void Client::process_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type type,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& contents)
+ {
+ if(state == 0)
+ throw Unexpected_Message("Unexpected handshake message from server");
+
+ if(type == HELLO_REQUEST)
+ {
+ Hello_Request hello_request(contents);
+
+ // Ignore request entirely if we are currently negotiating a handshake
+ if(state->client_hello)
+ return;
+
+ if(!secure_renegotiation.supported() && policy.require_secure_renegotiation())
+ {
+ delete state;
+ state = 0;
+
+ // RFC 5746 section 4.2
+ send_alert(Alert(Alert::NO_RENEGOTIATION));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_HELLO);
+ state->client_hello = new Client_Hello(writer, state->hash, policy, rng,
+ secure_renegotiation.for_client_hello());
+
+ secure_renegotiation.update(state->client_hello);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ state->confirm_transition_to(type);
+
+ if(type != HANDSHAKE_CCS && type != FINISHED)
+ state->hash.update(type, contents);
+
+ if(type == SERVER_HELLO)
+ {
+ state->server_hello = new Server_Hello(contents);
+
+ if(!state->client_hello->offered_suite(state->server_hello->ciphersuite()))
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Server replied with ciphersuite we didn't send");
+ }
+
+ if(!value_exists(state->client_hello->compression_methods(),
+ state->server_hello->compression_method()))
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Server replied with compression method we didn't send");
+ }
+
+ if(!state->client_hello->next_protocol_notification() &&
+ state->server_hello->next_protocol_notification())
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Server sent next protocol but we didn't request it");
+ }
+
+ state->version = state->server_hello->version();
+
+ writer.set_version(state->version);
+ reader.set_version(state->version);
+
+ secure_renegotiation.update(state->server_hello);
+
+ state->suite = Ciphersuite::lookup_ciphersuite(state->server_hello->ciphersuite());
+
+ if(!state->server_hello->session_id().empty() &&
+ (state->server_hello->session_id() == state->client_hello->session_id()))
+ {
+ // successful resumption
+
+ /*
+ * In this case, we offered the version used in the original
+ * session, and the server must resume with the same version.
+ */
+ if(state->server_hello->version() != state->client_hello->version())
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Server resumed session but with wrong version");
+
+ state->keys = Session_Keys(state,
+ state->resume_master_secret,
+ true);
+
+ state->set_expected_next(HANDSHAKE_CCS);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // new session
+
+ if(state->version > state->client_hello->version())
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Client: Server replied with bad version");
+ }
+
+ if(state->version < policy.min_version())
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ "Client: Server is too old for specified policy");
+ }
+
+ if(state->suite.sig_algo() != "")
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(CERTIFICATE);
+ }
+ else if(state->suite.kex_algo() == "PSK")
+ {
+ /* PSK is anonymous so no certificate/cert req message is
+ ever sent. The server may or may not send a server kex,
+ depending on if it has an identity hint for us.
+
+ DHE_PSK always sends a server key exchange for the DH
+ exchange portion.
+ */
+
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_KEX);
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_HELLO_DONE);
+ }
+ else if(state->suite.kex_algo() != "RSA")
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_KEX);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); // optional
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_HELLO_DONE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if(type == CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ if(state->suite.kex_algo() != "RSA")
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_KEX);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); // optional
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_HELLO_DONE);
+ }
+
+ state->server_certs = new Certificate(contents);
+
+ peer_certs = state->server_certs->cert_chain();
+ if(peer_certs.size() == 0)
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ "Client: No certificates sent by server");
+
+ try
+ {
+ creds.verify_certificate_chain(peer_certs,
+ state->client_hello->sni_hostname());
+ }
+ catch(std::exception& e)
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BAD_CERTIFICATE, e.what());
+ }
+
+ std::auto_ptr<Public_Key> peer_key(peer_certs[0].subject_public_key());
+
+ if(peer_key->algo_name() != state->suite.sig_algo())
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ "Certificate key type did not match ciphersuite");
+ }
+ else if(type == SERVER_KEX)
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); // optional
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_HELLO_DONE);
+
+ state->server_kex = new Server_Key_Exchange(contents,
+ state->suite.kex_algo(),
+ state->suite.sig_algo(),
+ state->version);
+
+ if(state->suite.sig_algo() != "")
+ {
+ if(!state->server_kex->verify(peer_certs[0], state))
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::DECRYPT_ERROR,
+ "Bad signature on server key exchange");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if(type == CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(SERVER_HELLO_DONE);
+ state->cert_req = new Certificate_Req(contents, state->version);
+ }
+ else if(type == SERVER_HELLO_DONE)
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(HANDSHAKE_CCS);
+
+ state->server_hello_done = new Server_Hello_Done(contents);
+
+ if(state->received_handshake_msg(CERTIFICATE_REQUEST))
+ {
+ const std::vector<std::string>& types =
+ state->cert_req->acceptable_cert_types();
+
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> client_certs =
+ creds.cert_chain(types,
+ "tls-client",
+ state->client_hello->sni_hostname());
+
+ state->client_certs = new Certificate(writer,
+ state->hash,
+ client_certs);
+ }
+
+ state->client_kex =
+ new Client_Key_Exchange(writer,
+ state,
+ creds,
+ peer_certs,
+ rng);
+
+ state->keys = Session_Keys(state,
+ state->client_kex->pre_master_secret(),
+ false);
+
+ if(state->received_handshake_msg(CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) &&
+ !state->client_certs->empty())
+ {
+ Private_Key* private_key =
+ creds.private_key_for(state->client_certs->cert_chain()[0],
+ "tls-client",
+ state->client_hello->sni_hostname());
+
+ state->client_verify = new Certificate_Verify(writer,
+ state,
+ rng,
+ private_key);
+ }
+
+ writer.send(CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1);
+
+ writer.activate(CLIENT, state->suite, state->keys,
+ state->server_hello->compression_method());
+
+ if(state->server_hello->next_protocol_notification())
+ {
+ const std::string protocol =
+ state->client_npn_cb(state->server_hello->next_protocols());
+
+ state->next_protocol = new Next_Protocol(writer, state->hash, protocol);
+ }
+
+ state->client_finished = new Finished(writer, state, CLIENT);
+ }
+ else if(type == HANDSHAKE_CCS)
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(FINISHED);
+
+ reader.activate(CLIENT, state->suite, state->keys,
+ state->server_hello->compression_method());
+ }
+ else if(type == FINISHED)
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(HELLO_REQUEST);
+
+ state->server_finished = new Finished(contents);
+
+ if(!state->server_finished->verify(state, SERVER))
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::DECRYPT_ERROR,
+ "Finished message didn't verify");
+
+ state->hash.update(type, contents);
+
+ if(!state->client_finished) // session resume case
+ {
+ writer.send(CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1);
+
+ writer.activate(CLIENT, state->suite, state->keys,
+ state->server_hello->compression_method());
+
+ state->client_finished = new Finished(writer, state, CLIENT);
+ }
+
+ Session session_info(
+ state->server_hello->session_id(),
+ state->keys.master_secret(),
+ state->server_hello->version(),
+ state->server_hello->ciphersuite(),
+ state->server_hello->compression_method(),
+ CLIENT,
+ secure_renegotiation.supported(),
+ state->server_hello->fragment_size(),
+ peer_certs,
+ state->client_hello->sni_hostname(),
+ ""
+ );
+
+ if(handshake_fn(session_info))
+ session_manager.save(session_info);
+ else
+ session_manager.remove_entry(session_info.session_id());
+
+ secure_renegotiation.update(state->client_finished, state->server_finished);
+
+ delete state;
+ state = 0;
+ handshake_completed = true;
+ }
+ else
+ throw Unexpected_Message("Unknown handshake message received");
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_client.h b/src/tls/tls_client.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5528f4c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_client.h
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+* TLS Client
+* (C) 2004-2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_CLIENT_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_CLIENT_H__
+
+#include <botan/tls_channel.h>
+#include <botan/tls_session_manager.h>
+#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* SSL/TLS Client
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Client : public Channel
+ {
+ public:
+ /**
+ * Set up a new TLS client session
+ * @param socket_output_fn is called with data for the outbound socket
+ * @param proc_fn is called when new data (application or alerts) is received
+ * @param handshake_complete is called when a handshake is completed
+ * @param session_manager manages session state
+ * @param creds manages application/user credentials
+ * @param policy specifies other connection policy information
+ * @param rng a random number generator
+ * @param servername the server's DNS name, if known
+ * @param next_protocol allows the client to specify what the next
+ * protocol will be. For more information read
+ * http://technotes.googlecode.com/git/nextprotoneg.html.
+ *
+ * If the function is not empty, NPN will be negotiated
+ * and if the server supports NPN the function will be
+ * called with the list of protocols the server advertised;
+ * the client should return the protocol it would like to use.
+ */
+ Client(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> socket_output_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t, Alert)> proc_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<bool (const Session&)> handshake_complete,
+ Session_Manager& session_manager,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const std::string& servername = "",
+ std::tr1::function<std::string (std::vector<std::string>)> next_protocol =
+ std::tr1::function<std::string (std::vector<std::string>)>());
+
+ void renegotiate();
+ private:
+ void process_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type type,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& contents);
+
+ void alert_notify(const Alert& alert);
+
+ const Policy& policy;
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng;
+ Session_Manager& session_manager;
+ Credentials_Manager& creds;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_exceptn.h b/src/tls/tls_exceptn.h
index 37b9c0d27..ad19c6c9d 100644
--- a/src/ssl/tls_exceptn.h
+++ b/src/tls/tls_exceptn.h
@@ -9,24 +9,26 @@
#define BOTAN_TLS_EXCEPTION_H__
#include <botan/exceptn.h>
-#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
+#include <botan/tls_alert.h>
namespace Botan {
+namespace TLS {
+
/**
* Exception Base Class
*/
class BOTAN_DLL TLS_Exception : public Exception
{
public:
- Alert_Type type() const throw() { return alert_type; }
+ Alert::Type type() const throw() { return alert_type; }
- TLS_Exception(Alert_Type type,
+ TLS_Exception(Alert::Type type,
const std::string& err_msg = "Unknown error") :
Exception(err_msg), alert_type(type) {}
private:
- Alert_Type alert_type;
+ Alert::Type alert_type;
};
/**
@@ -35,9 +37,11 @@ class BOTAN_DLL TLS_Exception : public Exception
struct BOTAN_DLL Unexpected_Message : public TLS_Exception
{
Unexpected_Message(const std::string& err) :
- TLS_Exception(UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, err) {}
+ TLS_Exception(Alert::UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, err) {}
};
}
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_extensions.cpp b/src/tls/tls_extensions.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5d345cc9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_extensions.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+/*
+* TLS Extensions
+* (C) 2011,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_extensions.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_reader.h>
+#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+namespace {
+
+Extension* make_extension(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit code,
+ u16bit size)
+ {
+ switch(code)
+ {
+ case TLSEXT_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION:
+ return new Server_Name_Indicator(reader, size);
+
+ case TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
+ return new Maximum_Fragment_Length(reader, size);
+
+ case TLSEXT_SRP_IDENTIFIER:
+ return new SRP_Identifier(reader, size);
+
+ case TLSEXT_USABLE_ELLIPTIC_CURVES:
+ return new Supported_Elliptic_Curves(reader, size);
+
+ case TLSEXT_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION:
+ return new Renegotation_Extension(reader, size);
+
+ case TLSEXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS:
+ return new Signature_Algorithms(reader, size);
+
+ case TLSEXT_NEXT_PROTOCOL:
+ return new Next_Protocol_Notification(reader, size);
+
+ default:
+ return 0; // not known
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+Extensions::Extensions(TLS_Data_Reader& reader)
+ {
+ if(reader.has_remaining())
+ {
+ const u16bit all_extn_size = reader.get_u16bit();
+
+ if(reader.remaining_bytes() != all_extn_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Bad extension size");
+
+ while(reader.has_remaining())
+ {
+ const u16bit extension_code = reader.get_u16bit();
+ const u16bit extension_size = reader.get_u16bit();
+
+ Extension* extn = make_extension(reader,
+ extension_code,
+ extension_size);
+
+ if(extn)
+ this->add(extn);
+ else // unknown/unhandled extension
+ reader.discard_next(extension_size);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+MemoryVector<byte> Extensions::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf(2); // 2 bytes for length field
+
+ for(std::map<Handshake_Extension_Type, Extension*>::const_iterator i = extensions.begin();
+ i != extensions.end(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(i->second->empty())
+ continue;
+
+ const u16bit extn_code = i->second->type();
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> extn_val = i->second->serialize();
+
+ buf.push_back(get_byte(0, extn_code));
+ buf.push_back(get_byte(1, extn_code));
+
+ buf.push_back(get_byte<u16bit>(0, extn_val.size()));
+ buf.push_back(get_byte<u16bit>(1, extn_val.size()));
+
+ buf += extn_val;
+ }
+
+ const u16bit extn_size = buf.size() - 2;
+
+ buf[0] = get_byte(0, extn_size);
+ buf[1] = get_byte(1, extn_size);
+
+ // avoid sending a completely empty extensions block
+ if(buf.size() == 2)
+ return MemoryVector<byte>();
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+Extensions::~Extensions()
+ {
+ for(std::map<Handshake_Extension_Type, Extension*>::const_iterator i = extensions.begin();
+ i != extensions.end(); ++i)
+ {
+ delete i->second;
+ }
+
+ extensions.clear();
+ }
+
+Server_Name_Indicator::Server_Name_Indicator(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This is used by the server to confirm that it knew the name
+ */
+ if(extension_size == 0)
+ return;
+
+ u16bit name_bytes = reader.get_u16bit();
+
+ if(name_bytes + 2 != extension_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Bad encoding of SNI extension");
+
+ while(name_bytes)
+ {
+ byte name_type = reader.get_byte();
+ name_bytes--;
+
+ if(name_type == 0) // DNS
+ {
+ sni_host_name = reader.get_string(2, 1, 65535);
+ name_bytes -= (2 + sni_host_name.size());
+ }
+ else // some other unknown name type
+ {
+ reader.discard_next(name_bytes);
+ name_bytes = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+MemoryVector<byte> Server_Name_Indicator::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf;
+
+ size_t name_len = sni_host_name.size();
+
+ buf.push_back(get_byte<u16bit>(0, name_len+3));
+ buf.push_back(get_byte<u16bit>(1, name_len+3));
+ buf.push_back(0); // DNS
+
+ buf.push_back(get_byte<u16bit>(0, name_len));
+ buf.push_back(get_byte<u16bit>(1, name_len));
+
+ buf += std::make_pair(
+ reinterpret_cast<const byte*>(sni_host_name.data()),
+ sni_host_name.size());
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+SRP_Identifier::SRP_Identifier(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size)
+ {
+ srp_identifier = reader.get_string(1, 1, 255);
+
+ if(srp_identifier.size() + 1 != extension_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Bad encoding for SRP identifier extension");
+ }
+
+MemoryVector<byte> SRP_Identifier::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf;
+
+ const byte* srp_bytes =
+ reinterpret_cast<const byte*>(srp_identifier.data());
+
+ append_tls_length_value(buf, srp_bytes, srp_identifier.size(), 1);
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+Renegotation_Extension::Renegotation_Extension(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size)
+ {
+ reneg_data = reader.get_range<byte>(1, 0, 255);
+
+ if(reneg_data.size() + 1 != extension_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Bad encoding for secure renegotiation extn");
+ }
+
+MemoryVector<byte> Renegotation_Extension::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf;
+ append_tls_length_value(buf, reneg_data, 1);
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+size_t Maximum_Fragment_Length::fragment_size() const
+ {
+ switch(val)
+ {
+ case 1:
+ return 512;
+ case 2:
+ return 1024;
+ case 3:
+ return 2048;
+ case 4:
+ return 4096;
+ default:
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ "Bad value in maximum fragment extension");
+ }
+ }
+
+Maximum_Fragment_Length::Maximum_Fragment_Length(size_t max_fragment)
+ {
+ if(max_fragment == 512)
+ val = 1;
+ else if(max_fragment == 1024)
+ val = 2;
+ else if(max_fragment == 2048)
+ val = 3;
+ else if(max_fragment == 4096)
+ val = 4;
+ else
+ throw std::invalid_argument("Bad setting " + to_string(max_fragment) +
+ " for maximum fragment size");
+ }
+
+Maximum_Fragment_Length::Maximum_Fragment_Length(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size)
+ {
+ if(extension_size != 1)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Bad size for maximum fragment extension");
+ val = reader.get_byte();
+ }
+
+Next_Protocol_Notification::Next_Protocol_Notification(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size)
+ {
+ if(extension_size == 0)
+ return; // empty extension
+
+ size_t bytes_remaining = extension_size;
+
+ while(bytes_remaining)
+ {
+ const std::string p = reader.get_string(1, 0, 255);
+
+ if(bytes_remaining < p.size() + 1)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Bad encoding for next protocol extension");
+
+ bytes_remaining -= (p.size() + 1);
+
+ m_protocols.push_back(p);
+ }
+ }
+
+MemoryVector<byte> Next_Protocol_Notification::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf;
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_protocols.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ const std::string p = m_protocols[i];
+
+ if(p != "")
+ append_tls_length_value(buf,
+ reinterpret_cast<const byte*>(p.data()),
+ p.size(),
+ 1);
+ }
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+std::string Supported_Elliptic_Curves::curve_id_to_name(u16bit id)
+ {
+ switch(id)
+ {
+ case 15:
+ return "secp160k1";
+ case 16:
+ return "secp160r1";
+ case 17:
+ return "secp160r2";
+ case 18:
+ return "secp192k1";
+ case 19:
+ return "secp192r1";
+ case 20:
+ return "secp224k1";
+ case 21:
+ return "secp224r1";
+ case 22:
+ return "secp256k1";
+ case 23:
+ return "secp256r1";
+ case 24:
+ return "secp384r1";
+ case 25:
+ return "secp521r1";
+ default:
+ return ""; // something we don't know or support
+ }
+ }
+
+u16bit Supported_Elliptic_Curves::name_to_curve_id(const std::string& name)
+ {
+ if(name == "secp160k1")
+ return 15;
+ if(name == "secp160r1")
+ return 16;
+ if(name == "secp160r2")
+ return 17;
+ if(name == "secp192k1")
+ return 18;
+ if(name == "secp192r1")
+ return 19;
+ if(name == "secp224k1")
+ return 20;
+ if(name == "secp224r1")
+ return 21;
+ if(name == "secp256k1")
+ return 22;
+ if(name == "secp256r1")
+ return 23;
+ if(name == "secp384r1")
+ return 24;
+ if(name == "secp521r1")
+ return 25;
+
+ throw Invalid_Argument("name_to_curve_id unknown name " + name);
+ }
+
+MemoryVector<byte> Supported_Elliptic_Curves::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf(2);
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_curves.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ const u16bit id = name_to_curve_id(m_curves[i]);
+ buf.push_back(get_byte(0, id));
+ buf.push_back(get_byte(1, id));
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = get_byte<u16bit>(0, buf.size()-2);
+ buf[1] = get_byte<u16bit>(1, buf.size()-2);
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+Supported_Elliptic_Curves::Supported_Elliptic_Curves(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size)
+ {
+ u16bit len = reader.get_u16bit();
+
+ if(len + 2 != extension_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Inconsistent length field in elliptic curve list");
+
+ if(len % 2 == 1)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Elliptic curve list of strange size");
+
+ len /= 2;
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != len; ++i)
+ {
+ const u16bit id = reader.get_u16bit();
+ const std::string name = curve_id_to_name(id);
+
+ if(name != "")
+ m_curves.push_back(name);
+ }
+ }
+
+std::string Signature_Algorithms::hash_algo_name(byte code)
+ {
+ switch(code)
+ {
+ // code 1 is MD5 - ignore it
+
+ case 2:
+ return "SHA-1";
+ case 3:
+ return "SHA-224";
+ case 4:
+ return "SHA-256";
+ case 5:
+ return "SHA-384";
+ case 6:
+ return "SHA-512";
+ default:
+ return "";
+ }
+ }
+
+byte Signature_Algorithms::hash_algo_code(const std::string& name)
+ {
+ if(name == "SHA-1")
+ return 2;
+
+ if(name == "SHA-224")
+ return 3;
+
+ if(name == "SHA-256")
+ return 4;
+
+ if(name == "SHA-384")
+ return 5;
+
+ if(name == "SHA-512")
+ return 6;
+
+ throw Internal_Error("Unknown hash ID " + name + " for signature_algorithms");
+ }
+
+std::string Signature_Algorithms::sig_algo_name(byte code)
+ {
+ switch(code)
+ {
+ case 1:
+ return "RSA";
+ case 2:
+ return "DSA";
+ case 3:
+ return "ECDSA";
+ default:
+ return "";
+ }
+ }
+
+byte Signature_Algorithms::sig_algo_code(const std::string& name)
+ {
+ if(name == "RSA")
+ return 1;
+
+ if(name == "DSA")
+ return 2;
+
+ if(name == "ECDSA")
+ return 3;
+
+ throw Internal_Error("Unknown sig ID " + name + " for signature_algorithms");
+ }
+
+MemoryVector<byte> Signature_Algorithms::serialize() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> buf(2);
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_supported_algos.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(m_supported_algos[i].second == "")
+ continue;
+
+ buf.push_back(hash_algo_code(m_supported_algos[i].first));
+ buf.push_back(sig_algo_code(m_supported_algos[i].second));
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = get_byte<u16bit>(0, buf.size()-2);
+ buf[1] = get_byte<u16bit>(1, buf.size()-2);
+
+ return buf;
+ }
+
+Signature_Algorithms::Signature_Algorithms(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size)
+ {
+ u16bit len = reader.get_u16bit();
+
+ if(len + 2 != extension_size)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Bad encoding on signature algorithms extension");
+
+ while(len)
+ {
+ const std::string hash_code = hash_algo_name(reader.get_byte());
+ const std::string sig_code = sig_algo_name(reader.get_byte());
+
+ len -= 2;
+
+ // If not something we know, ignore it completely
+ if(hash_code == "" || sig_code == "")
+ continue;
+
+ m_supported_algos.push_back(std::make_pair(hash_code, sig_code));
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_extensions.h b/src/tls/tls_extensions.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..180216b8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_extensions.h
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+/*
+* TLS Extensions
+* (C) 2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_EXTENSIONS_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_EXTENSIONS_H__
+
+#include <botan/secmem.h>
+#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
+#include <vector>
+#include <string>
+#include <map>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+class TLS_Data_Reader;
+
+enum Handshake_Extension_Type {
+ TLSEXT_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION = 0,
+ TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH = 1,
+ TLSEXT_CLIENT_CERT_URL = 2,
+ TLSEXT_TRUSTED_CA_KEYS = 3,
+ TLSEXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC = 4,
+
+ TLSEXT_CERTIFICATE_TYPES = 9,
+ TLSEXT_USABLE_ELLIPTIC_CURVES = 10,
+ TLSEXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS = 11,
+ TLSEXT_SRP_IDENTIFIER = 12,
+ TLSEXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS = 13,
+
+ TLSEXT_SESSION_TICKET = 35,
+
+ TLSEXT_NEXT_PROTOCOL = 13172,
+
+ TLSEXT_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION = 65281,
+};
+
+/**
+* Base class representing a TLS extension of some kind
+*/
+class Extension
+ {
+ public:
+ virtual Handshake_Extension_Type type() const = 0;
+
+ virtual MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const = 0;
+
+ virtual bool empty() const = 0;
+
+ virtual ~Extension() {}
+ };
+
+/**
+* Server Name Indicator extension (RFC 3546)
+*/
+class Server_Name_Indicator : public Extension
+ {
+ public:
+ static Handshake_Extension_Type static_type()
+ { return TLSEXT_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION; }
+
+ Handshake_Extension_Type type() const { return static_type(); }
+
+ Server_Name_Indicator(const std::string& host_name) :
+ sni_host_name(host_name) {}
+
+ Server_Name_Indicator(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size);
+
+ std::string host_name() const { return sni_host_name; }
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ bool empty() const { return sni_host_name == ""; }
+ private:
+ std::string sni_host_name;
+ };
+
+/**
+* SRP identifier extension (RFC 5054)
+*/
+class SRP_Identifier : public Extension
+ {
+ public:
+ static Handshake_Extension_Type static_type()
+ { return TLSEXT_SRP_IDENTIFIER; }
+
+ Handshake_Extension_Type type() const { return static_type(); }
+
+ SRP_Identifier(const std::string& identifier) :
+ srp_identifier(identifier) {}
+
+ SRP_Identifier(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size);
+
+ std::string identifier() const { return srp_identifier; }
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ bool empty() const { return srp_identifier == ""; }
+ private:
+ std::string srp_identifier;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Renegotiation Indication Extension (RFC 5746)
+*/
+class Renegotation_Extension : public Extension
+ {
+ public:
+ static Handshake_Extension_Type static_type()
+ { return TLSEXT_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION; }
+
+ Handshake_Extension_Type type() const { return static_type(); }
+
+ Renegotation_Extension() {}
+
+ Renegotation_Extension(const MemoryRegion<byte>& bits) :
+ reneg_data(bits) {}
+
+ Renegotation_Extension(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size);
+
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& renegotiation_info() const
+ { return reneg_data; }
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ bool empty() const { return false; } // always send this
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> reneg_data;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation Extension (RFC 4366 sec 3.2)
+*/
+class Maximum_Fragment_Length : public Extension
+ {
+ public:
+ static Handshake_Extension_Type static_type()
+ { return TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH; }
+
+ Handshake_Extension_Type type() const { return static_type(); }
+
+ bool empty() const { return val != 0; }
+
+ size_t fragment_size() const;
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const
+ {
+ return MemoryVector<byte>(&val, 1);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * @param max_fragment specifies what maximum fragment size to
+ * advertise. Currently must be one of 512, 1024, 2048, or
+ * 4096.
+ */
+ Maximum_Fragment_Length(size_t max_fragment);
+
+ Maximum_Fragment_Length(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size);
+
+ private:
+ byte val;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Next Protocol Negotiation
+* http://technotes.googlecode.com/git/nextprotoneg.html
+*
+* This implementation requires the semantics defined in the Google
+* spec (implemented in Chromium); the internet draft leaves the format
+* unspecified.
+*/
+class Next_Protocol_Notification : public Extension
+ {
+ public:
+ static Handshake_Extension_Type static_type()
+ { return TLSEXT_NEXT_PROTOCOL; }
+
+ Handshake_Extension_Type type() const { return static_type(); }
+
+ const std::vector<std::string>& protocols() const
+ { return m_protocols; }
+
+ /**
+ * Empty extension, used by client
+ */
+ Next_Protocol_Notification() {}
+
+ /**
+ * List of protocols, used by server
+ */
+ Next_Protocol_Notification(const std::vector<std::string>& protocols) :
+ m_protocols(protocols) {}
+
+ Next_Protocol_Notification(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size);
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ bool empty() const { return false; }
+ private:
+ std::vector<std::string> m_protocols;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Supported Elliptic Curves Extension (RFC 4492)
+*/
+class Supported_Elliptic_Curves : public Extension
+ {
+ public:
+ static Handshake_Extension_Type static_type()
+ { return TLSEXT_USABLE_ELLIPTIC_CURVES; }
+
+ Handshake_Extension_Type type() const { return static_type(); }
+
+ static std::string curve_id_to_name(u16bit id);
+ static u16bit name_to_curve_id(const std::string& name);
+
+ const std::vector<std::string>& curves() const { return m_curves; }
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ Supported_Elliptic_Curves(const std::vector<std::string>& curves) :
+ m_curves(curves) {}
+
+ Supported_Elliptic_Curves(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size);
+
+ bool empty() const { return m_curves.empty(); }
+ private:
+ std::vector<std::string> m_curves;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Signature Algorithms Extension for TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)
+*/
+class Signature_Algorithms : public Extension
+ {
+ public:
+ static Handshake_Extension_Type static_type()
+ { return TLSEXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS; }
+
+ Handshake_Extension_Type type() const { return static_type(); }
+
+ static std::string hash_algo_name(byte code);
+ static byte hash_algo_code(const std::string& name);
+
+ static std::string sig_algo_name(byte code);
+ static byte sig_algo_code(const std::string& name);
+
+ std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> >
+ supported_signature_algorthms() const
+ {
+ return m_supported_algos;
+ }
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ bool empty() const { return false; }
+
+ Signature_Algorithms(const std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> >& algos) :
+ m_supported_algos(algos) {}
+
+ Signature_Algorithms(TLS_Data_Reader& reader,
+ u16bit extension_size);
+ private:
+ std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> > m_supported_algos;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Represents a block of extensions in a hello message
+*/
+class Extensions
+ {
+ public:
+ template<typename T>
+ T* get() const
+ {
+ Handshake_Extension_Type type = T::static_type();
+
+ std::map<Handshake_Extension_Type, Extension*>::const_iterator i =
+ extensions.find(type);
+
+ if(i != extensions.end())
+ return dynamic_cast<T*>(i->second);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ void add(Extension* extn)
+ {
+ delete extensions[extn->type()]; // or hard error if already exists?
+ extensions[extn->type()] = extn;
+ }
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ Extensions() {}
+
+ Extensions(TLS_Data_Reader& reader); // deserialize
+
+ ~Extensions();
+ private:
+ Extensions(const Extensions&) {}
+ Extensions& operator=(const Extensions&) { return (*this); }
+
+ std::map<Handshake_Extension_Type, Extension*> extensions;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_handshake_hash.cpp b/src/tls/tls_handshake_hash.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61295a95c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_handshake_hash.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+* TLS Handshake Hash
+* (C) 2004-2006,2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
+#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h>
+#include <botan/libstate.h>
+#include <botan/hash.h>
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+void Handshake_Hash::update(Handshake_Type handshake_type,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& handshake_msg)
+ {
+ update(static_cast<byte>(handshake_type));
+
+ const size_t record_length = handshake_msg.size();
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != 3; i++)
+ update(get_byte<u32bit>(i+1, record_length));
+
+ update(handshake_msg);
+ }
+
+/**
+* Return a TLS Handshake Hash
+*/
+SecureVector<byte> Handshake_Hash::final(Protocol_Version version,
+ const std::string& mac_algo)
+ {
+ Algorithm_Factory& af = global_state().algorithm_factory();
+
+ std::auto_ptr<HashFunction> hash;
+
+ if(version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V10 || version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V11)
+ {
+ hash.reset(af.make_hash_function("TLS.Digest.0"));
+ }
+ else if(version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ if(mac_algo == "SHA-1" || mac_algo == "SHA-256")
+ hash.reset(af.make_hash_function("SHA-256"));
+ else
+ hash.reset(af.make_hash_function(mac_algo));
+ }
+ else
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ "Unknown version for handshake hashes");
+
+ hash->update(data);
+ return hash->final();
+ }
+
+/**
+* Return a SSLv3 Handshake Hash
+*/
+SecureVector<byte> Handshake_Hash::final_ssl3(const MemoryRegion<byte>& secret)
+ {
+ const byte PAD_INNER = 0x36, PAD_OUTER = 0x5C;
+
+ Algorithm_Factory& af = global_state().algorithm_factory();
+
+ std::auto_ptr<HashFunction> md5(af.make_hash_function("MD5"));
+ std::auto_ptr<HashFunction> sha1(af.make_hash_function("SHA-1"));
+
+ md5->update(data);
+ sha1->update(data);
+
+ md5->update(secret);
+ sha1->update(secret);
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != 48; ++i)
+ md5->update(PAD_INNER);
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != 40; ++i)
+ sha1->update(PAD_INNER);
+
+ SecureVector<byte> inner_md5 = md5->final(), inner_sha1 = sha1->final();
+
+ md5->update(secret);
+ sha1->update(secret);
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != 48; ++i)
+ md5->update(PAD_OUTER);
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != 40; ++i)
+ sha1->update(PAD_OUTER);
+
+ md5->update(inner_md5);
+ sha1->update(inner_sha1);
+
+ SecureVector<byte> output;
+ output += md5->final();
+ output += sha1->final();
+ return output;
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_handshake_hash.h b/src/tls/tls_handshake_hash.h
index cea612a71..c13f97aa8 100644
--- a/src/ssl/tls_handshake_hash.h
+++ b/src/tls/tls_handshake_hash.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* TLS Handshake Hash
-* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
+* (C) 2004-2006,2011 Jack Lloyd
*
* Released under the terms of the Botan license
*/
@@ -9,15 +9,19 @@
#define BOTAN_TLS_HANDSHAKE_HASH_H__
#include <botan/secmem.h>
+#include <botan/tls_version.h>
+#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
namespace Botan {
+namespace TLS {
+
using namespace Botan;
/**
* TLS Handshake Hash
*/
-class HandshakeHash
+class Handshake_Hash
{
public:
void update(const byte in[], size_t length)
@@ -29,12 +33,23 @@ class HandshakeHash
void update(byte in)
{ data.push_back(in); }
- SecureVector<byte> final();
- SecureVector<byte> final_ssl3(const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
+ void update(Handshake_Type handshake_type,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& handshake_msg);
+
+ SecureVector<byte> final(Protocol_Version version,
+ const std::string& mac_algo);
+
+ SecureVector<byte> final_ssl3(const MemoryRegion<byte>& master_secret);
+
+ const SecureVector<byte>& get_contents() const
+ { return data; }
+
private:
SecureVector<byte> data;
};
}
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_handshake_state.cpp b/src/tls/tls_handshake_state.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9087031b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_handshake_state.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+/*
+* TLS Handshaking
+* (C) 2004-2006,2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/assert.h>
+#include <botan/lookup.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+namespace {
+
+u32bit bitmask_for_handshake_type(Handshake_Type type)
+ {
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case HELLO_REQUEST:
+ return (1 << 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Same code point for both client hello styles
+ */
+ case CLIENT_HELLO:
+ case CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2:
+ return (1 << 1);
+
+ case SERVER_HELLO:
+ return (1 << 2);
+
+ case CERTIFICATE:
+ return (1 << 3);
+
+ case SERVER_KEX:
+ return (1 << 4);
+
+ case CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+ return (1 << 5);
+
+ case SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+ return (1 << 6);
+
+ case CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+ return (1 << 7);
+
+ case CLIENT_KEX:
+ return (1 << 8);
+
+ case NEXT_PROTOCOL:
+ return (1 << 9);
+
+ case HANDSHAKE_CCS:
+ return (1 << 10);
+
+ case FINISHED:
+ return (1 << 11);
+
+ // allow explicitly disabling new handshakes
+ case HANDSHAKE_NONE:
+ return 0;
+
+ default:
+ throw Internal_Error("Unknown handshake type " + to_string(type));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+}
+
+/*
+* Initialize the SSL/TLS Handshake State
+*/
+Handshake_State::Handshake_State()
+ {
+ client_hello = 0;
+ server_hello = 0;
+ server_certs = 0;
+ server_kex = 0;
+ cert_req = 0;
+ server_hello_done = 0;
+ next_protocol = 0;
+
+ client_certs = 0;
+ client_kex = 0;
+ client_verify = 0;
+ client_finished = 0;
+ server_finished = 0;
+
+ server_rsa_kex_key = 0;
+
+ version = Protocol_Version::SSL_V3;
+
+ hand_expecting_mask = 0;
+ hand_received_mask = 0;
+ }
+
+void Handshake_State::confirm_transition_to(Handshake_Type handshake_msg)
+ {
+ const u32bit mask = bitmask_for_handshake_type(handshake_msg);
+
+ hand_received_mask |= mask;
+
+ const bool ok = (hand_expecting_mask & mask); // overlap?
+
+ if(!ok)
+ throw Unexpected_Message("Unexpected state transition in handshake, got " +
+ to_string(handshake_msg) + " mask is " +
+ to_string(hand_expecting_mask));
+
+ /* We don't know what to expect next, so force a call to
+ set_expected_next; if it doesn't happen, the next transition
+ check will always fail which is what we want.
+ */
+ hand_expecting_mask = 0;
+ }
+
+void Handshake_State::set_expected_next(Handshake_Type handshake_msg)
+ {
+ hand_expecting_mask |= bitmask_for_handshake_type(handshake_msg);
+ }
+
+bool Handshake_State::received_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type handshake_msg) const
+ {
+ const u32bit mask = bitmask_for_handshake_type(handshake_msg);
+
+ return (hand_received_mask & mask);
+ }
+
+KDF* Handshake_State::protocol_specific_prf()
+ {
+ if(version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ return get_kdf("SSL3-PRF");
+ }
+ else if(version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V10 || version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V11)
+ {
+ return get_kdf("TLS-PRF");
+ }
+ else if(version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ if(suite.mac_algo() == "SHA-1" || suite.mac_algo() == "SHA-256")
+ return get_kdf("TLS-12-PRF(SHA-256)");
+
+ return get_kdf("TLS-12-PRF(" + suite.mac_algo() + ")");
+ }
+
+ throw Internal_Error("Unknown version code " + version.to_string());
+ }
+
+std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format>
+Handshake_State::choose_sig_format(const Private_Key* key,
+ std::string& hash_algo_out,
+ std::string& sig_algo_out,
+ bool for_client_auth)
+ {
+ const std::string sig_algo = key->algo_name();
+
+ const std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> > supported_algos =
+ (for_client_auth) ? cert_req->supported_algos() : client_hello->supported_algos();
+
+ std::string hash_algo;
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != supported_algos.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(supported_algos[i].second == sig_algo)
+ {
+ hash_algo = supported_algos[i].first;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(for_client_auth && this->version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ hash_algo = "Raw";
+
+ if(hash_algo == "" && this->version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ hash_algo = "SHA-1"; // TLS 1.2 but no compatible hashes set (?)
+
+ BOTAN_ASSERT(hash_algo != "", "Couldn't figure out hash to use");
+
+ if(this->version >= Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ hash_algo_out = hash_algo;
+ sig_algo_out = sig_algo;
+ }
+
+ if(sig_algo == "RSA")
+ {
+ const std::string padding = "EMSA3(" + hash_algo + ")";
+
+ return std::make_pair(padding, IEEE_1363);
+ }
+ else if(sig_algo == "DSA" || sig_algo == "ECDSA")
+ {
+ const std::string padding = "EMSA1(" + hash_algo + ")";
+
+ return std::make_pair(padding, DER_SEQUENCE);
+ }
+
+ throw Invalid_Argument(sig_algo + " is invalid/unknown for TLS signatures");
+ }
+
+std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format>
+Handshake_State::understand_sig_format(const Public_Key* key,
+ std::string hash_algo,
+ std::string sig_algo,
+ bool for_client_auth)
+ {
+ const std::string algo_name = key->algo_name();
+
+ /*
+ FIXME: This should check what was sent against the client hello
+ preferences, or the certificate request, to ensure it was allowed
+ by those restrictions.
+
+ Or not?
+ */
+
+ if(this->version < Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ if(hash_algo != "" || sig_algo != "")
+ throw Decoding_Error("Counterparty sent hash/sig IDs with old version");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if(hash_algo == "")
+ throw Decoding_Error("Counterparty did not send hash/sig IDS");
+
+ if(sig_algo != algo_name)
+ throw Decoding_Error("Counterparty sent inconsistent key and sig types");
+ }
+
+ if(algo_name == "RSA")
+ {
+ if(for_client_auth && this->version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ hash_algo = "Raw";
+ }
+ else if(this->version < Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ hash_algo = "TLS.Digest.0";
+ }
+
+ const std::string padding = "EMSA3(" + hash_algo + ")";
+ return std::make_pair(padding, IEEE_1363);
+ }
+ else if(algo_name == "DSA" || algo_name == "ECDSA")
+ {
+ if(algo_name == "DSA" && for_client_auth && this->version == Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ {
+ hash_algo = "Raw";
+ }
+ else if(this->version < Protocol_Version::TLS_V12)
+ {
+ hash_algo = "SHA-1";
+ }
+
+ const std::string padding = "EMSA1(" + hash_algo + ")";
+
+ return std::make_pair(padding, DER_SEQUENCE);
+ }
+
+ throw Invalid_Argument(algo_name + " is invalid/unknown for TLS signatures");
+ }
+
+/*
+* Destroy the SSL/TLS Handshake State
+*/
+Handshake_State::~Handshake_State()
+ {
+ delete client_hello;
+ delete server_hello;
+ delete server_certs;
+ delete server_kex;
+ delete cert_req;
+ delete server_hello_done;
+ delete next_protocol;
+
+ delete client_certs;
+ delete client_kex;
+ delete client_verify;
+ delete client_finished;
+ delete server_finished;
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_handshake_state.h b/src/tls/tls_handshake_state.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5be5c3620
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_handshake_state.h
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+* TLS Handshake State
+* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATE_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATE_H__
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_hash.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_session_key.h>
+#include <botan/secqueue.h>
+#include <botan/pk_keys.h>
+#include <botan/pubkey.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#if defined(BOTAN_USE_STD_TR1)
+
+#if defined(BOTAN_BUILD_COMPILER_IS_MSVC)
+ #include <functional>
+#else
+ #include <tr1/functional>
+#endif
+
+#elif defined(BOTAN_USE_BOOST_TR1)
+ #include <boost/tr1/functional.hpp>
+#else
+ #error "No TR1 library defined for use"
+#endif
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+class KDF;
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* SSL/TLS Handshake State
+*/
+class Handshake_State
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_State();
+ ~Handshake_State();
+
+ bool received_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type handshake_msg) const;
+
+ void confirm_transition_to(Handshake_Type handshake_msg);
+ void set_expected_next(Handshake_Type handshake_msg);
+
+ std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format>
+ understand_sig_format(const Public_Key* key,
+ std::string hash_algo,
+ std::string sig_algo,
+ bool for_client_auth);
+
+ std::pair<std::string, Signature_Format>
+ choose_sig_format(const Private_Key* key,
+ std::string& hash_algo,
+ std::string& sig_algo,
+ bool for_client_auth);
+
+ KDF* protocol_specific_prf();
+
+ Protocol_Version version;
+
+ class Client_Hello* client_hello;
+ class Server_Hello* server_hello;
+ class Certificate* server_certs;
+ class Server_Key_Exchange* server_kex;
+ class Certificate_Req* cert_req;
+ class Server_Hello_Done* server_hello_done;
+
+ class Certificate* client_certs;
+ class Client_Key_Exchange* client_kex;
+ class Certificate_Verify* client_verify;
+
+ class Next_Protocol* next_protocol;
+
+ class Finished* client_finished;
+ class Finished* server_finished;
+
+ // Used by the server only, in case of RSA key exchange
+ Private_Key* server_rsa_kex_key;
+
+ Ciphersuite suite;
+ Session_Keys keys;
+ Handshake_Hash hash;
+
+ SecureQueue queue;
+
+ /*
+ * Only used by clients for session resumption
+ */
+ SecureVector<byte> resume_master_secret;
+
+ /**
+ * Used by client using NPN
+ */
+ std::tr1::function<std::string (std::vector<std::string>)> client_npn_cb;
+
+ private:
+ u32bit hand_expecting_mask, hand_received_mask;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_magic.h b/src/tls/tls_magic.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dced09964
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_magic.h
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/*
+* SSL/TLS Protocol Constants
+* (C) 2004-2010 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_PROTOCOL_MAGIC_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_PROTOCOL_MAGIC_H__
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* Protocol Constants for SSL/TLS
+*/
+enum Size_Limits {
+ TLS_HEADER_SIZE = 5,
+ MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE = 16*1024,
+ MAX_COMPRESSED_SIZE = MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE + 1024,
+ MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE = MAX_COMPRESSED_SIZE + 1024,
+
+ MAX_TLS_RECORD_SIZE = MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
+};
+
+enum Connection_Side { CLIENT = 1, SERVER = 2 };
+
+enum Record_Type {
+ CONNECTION_CLOSED = 0,
+
+ CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC = 20,
+ ALERT = 21,
+ HANDSHAKE = 22,
+ APPLICATION_DATA = 23
+};
+
+enum Handshake_Type {
+ HELLO_REQUEST = 0,
+ CLIENT_HELLO = 1,
+ CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2 = 200, // Not a wire value
+ SERVER_HELLO = 2,
+ NEW_SESSION_TICKET = 4, // RFC 5077
+ CERTIFICATE = 11,
+ SERVER_KEX = 12,
+ CERTIFICATE_REQUEST = 13,
+ SERVER_HELLO_DONE = 14,
+ CERTIFICATE_VERIFY = 15,
+ CLIENT_KEX = 16,
+ FINISHED = 20,
+
+ NEXT_PROTOCOL = 67,
+
+ HANDSHAKE_CCS = 100, // Not a wire value
+ HANDSHAKE_NONE = 255 // Null value
+};
+
+enum Ciphersuite_Code {
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 = 0x0004,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0x0005,
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0x000A,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x002F,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0035,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x003C,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x003D,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = 0x0096,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA = 0x0007,
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0x0013,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x0032,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0038,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x0040,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x006A,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = 0x0099,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0x0066,
+
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0x0016,
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x0033,
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0039,
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x0067,
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x006B,
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = 0x009A,
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0xC007,
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0xC008,
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC009,
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC00A,
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0xC023,
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = 0xC024,
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0xC011,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0xC012,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC013,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC014,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0xC027,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = 0xC028,
+
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0x008A,
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0x008B,
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x008C,
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x008D,
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x00AE,
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = 0x00AF,
+
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0x008E,
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0x008F,
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x0090,
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0091,
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x00B2,
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = 0x00B3,
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = 0xC033,
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0xC034,
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC035,
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC036,
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0xC037,
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = 0xC038,
+
+ TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0xC01A,
+ TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC01D,
+ TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC020,
+
+ TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0xC01C,
+ TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC01F,
+ TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC022,
+
+ TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = 0xC01B,
+ TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC01E,
+ TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC021,
+
+ /* signalling values that cannot be negotiated */
+ TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV = 0x00FF
+};
+
+enum Compression_Method {
+ NO_COMPRESSION = 0x00,
+ DEFLATE_COMPRESSION = 0x01
+};
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_messages.h b/src/tls/tls_messages.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7162ece1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_messages.h
@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+/*
+* TLS Messages
+* (C) 2004-2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_MESSAGES_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_MESSAGES_H__
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
+#include <botan/tls_session.h>
+#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
+#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
+#include <botan/tls_ciphersuite.h>
+#include <botan/bigint.h>
+#include <botan/pkcs8.h>
+#include <botan/x509cert.h>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+class Credentials_Manager;
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+class Record_Writer;
+class Record_Reader;
+
+/**
+* TLS Handshake Message Base Class
+*/
+class Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ void send(Record_Writer& writer, Handshake_Hash& hash) const;
+
+ virtual Handshake_Type type() const = 0;
+
+ virtual ~Handshake_Message() {}
+ private:
+ Handshake_Message& operator=(const Handshake_Message&) { return (*this); }
+ virtual MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const = 0;
+ };
+
+MemoryVector<byte> make_hello_random(RandomNumberGenerator& rng);
+
+/**
+* Client Hello Message
+*/
+class Client_Hello : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return CLIENT_HELLO; }
+ Protocol_Version version() const { return m_version; }
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& session_id() const { return m_session_id; }
+
+ std::vector<byte> session_id_vector() const
+ {
+ std::vector<byte> v;
+ v.insert(v.begin(), &m_session_id[0], &m_session_id[m_session_id.size()]);
+ return v;
+ }
+
+ const std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> >& supported_algos() const
+ { return m_supported_algos; }
+
+ const std::vector<std::string>& supported_ecc_curves() const
+ { return m_supported_curves; }
+
+ std::vector<u16bit> ciphersuites() const { return m_suites; }
+ std::vector<byte> compression_methods() const { return m_comp_methods; }
+
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& random() const { return m_random; }
+
+ std::string sni_hostname() const { return m_hostname; }
+
+ std::string srp_identifier() const { return m_srp_identifier; }
+
+ bool secure_renegotiation() const { return m_secure_renegotiation; }
+
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& renegotiation_info()
+ { return m_renegotiation_info; }
+
+ bool offered_suite(u16bit ciphersuite) const;
+
+ bool next_protocol_notification() const { return m_next_protocol; }
+
+ size_t fragment_size() const { return m_fragment_size; }
+
+ Client_Hello(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& reneg_info,
+ bool next_protocol = false,
+ const std::string& hostname = "",
+ const std::string& srp_identifier = "");
+
+ Client_Hello(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const Session& resumed_session,
+ bool next_protocol = false);
+
+ Client_Hello(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
+ Handshake_Type type);
+
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+ void deserialize(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf);
+ void deserialize_sslv2(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf);
+
+ Protocol_Version m_version;
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_session_id, m_random;
+ std::vector<u16bit> m_suites;
+ std::vector<byte> m_comp_methods;
+ std::string m_hostname;
+ std::string m_srp_identifier;
+ bool m_next_protocol;
+
+ size_t m_fragment_size;
+ bool m_secure_renegotiation;
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_renegotiation_info;
+
+ std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> > m_supported_algos;
+ std::vector<std::string> m_supported_curves;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Server Hello Message
+*/
+class Server_Hello : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return SERVER_HELLO; }
+ Protocol_Version version() { return s_version; }
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& session_id() const { return m_session_id; }
+ u16bit ciphersuite() const { return suite; }
+ byte compression_method() const { return comp_method; }
+
+ std::vector<byte> session_id_vector() const
+ {
+ std::vector<byte> v;
+ v.insert(v.begin(), &m_session_id[0], &m_session_id[m_session_id.size()]);
+ return v;
+ }
+
+ bool secure_renegotiation() const { return m_secure_renegotiation; }
+
+ bool next_protocol_notification() const { return m_next_protocol; }
+
+ const std::vector<std::string>& next_protocols() const
+ { return m_next_protocols; }
+
+ size_t fragment_size() const { return m_fragment_size; }
+
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& renegotiation_info()
+ { return m_renegotiation_info; }
+
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& random() const { return s_random; }
+
+ Server_Hello(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ Protocol_Version version,
+ const Client_Hello& other,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& available_cert_types,
+ const Policy& policies,
+ bool client_has_secure_renegotiation,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& reneg_info,
+ bool client_has_npn,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& next_protocols,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng);
+
+ Server_Hello(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_id,
+ Protocol_Version ver,
+ u16bit ciphersuite,
+ byte compression,
+ size_t max_fragment_size,
+ bool client_has_secure_renegotiation,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& reneg_info,
+ bool client_has_npn,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& next_protocols,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng);
+
+ Server_Hello(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf);
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ Protocol_Version s_version;
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_session_id, s_random;
+ u16bit suite;
+ byte comp_method;
+
+ size_t m_fragment_size;
+ bool m_secure_renegotiation;
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_renegotiation_info;
+
+ bool m_next_protocol;
+ std::vector<std::string> m_next_protocols;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Client Key Exchange Message
+*/
+class Client_Key_Exchange : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return CLIENT_KEX; }
+
+ const SecureVector<byte>& pre_master_secret() const
+ { return pre_master; }
+
+ Client_Key_Exchange(Record_Writer& output,
+ Handshake_State* state,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& peer_certs,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng);
+
+ Client_Key_Exchange(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
+ const Handshake_State* state,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng);
+
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const { return key_material; }
+
+ SecureVector<byte> key_material, pre_master;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Certificate Message
+*/
+class Certificate : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return CERTIFICATE; }
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& cert_chain() const { return certs; }
+
+ size_t count() const { return certs.size(); }
+ bool empty() const { return certs.empty(); }
+
+ Certificate(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& certs);
+
+ Certificate(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf);
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> certs;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Certificate Request Message
+*/
+class Certificate_Req : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; }
+
+ const std::vector<std::string>& acceptable_cert_types() const
+ { return cert_key_types; }
+
+ std::vector<X509_DN> acceptable_CAs() const { return names; }
+
+ std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> > supported_algos() const
+ { return m_supported_algos; }
+
+ Certificate_Req(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& allowed_cas,
+ Protocol_Version version);
+
+ Certificate_Req(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
+ Protocol_Version version);
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ std::vector<X509_DN> names;
+ std::vector<std::string> cert_key_types;
+
+ std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> > m_supported_algos;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Certificate Verify Message
+*/
+class Certificate_Verify : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; }
+
+ /**
+ * Check the signature on a certificate verify message
+ * @param cert the purported certificate
+ * @param state the handshake state
+ */
+ bool verify(const X509_Certificate& cert,
+ Handshake_State* state);
+
+ Certificate_Verify(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_State* state,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const Private_Key* key);
+
+ Certificate_Verify(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
+ Protocol_Version version);
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ std::string sig_algo; // sig algo used to create signature
+ std::string hash_algo; // hash used to create signature
+ MemoryVector<byte> signature;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Finished Message
+*/
+class Finished : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return FINISHED; }
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> verify_data() const
+ { return verification_data; }
+
+ bool verify(Handshake_State* state,
+ Connection_Side side);
+
+ Finished(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_State* state,
+ Connection_Side side);
+
+ Finished(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf);
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ Connection_Side side;
+ MemoryVector<byte> verification_data;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Hello Request Message
+*/
+class Hello_Request : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return HELLO_REQUEST; }
+
+ Hello_Request(Record_Writer& writer);
+ Hello_Request(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf);
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Server Key Exchange Message
+*/
+class Server_Key_Exchange : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return SERVER_KEX; }
+
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& params() const { return m_params; }
+
+ bool verify(const X509_Certificate& cert,
+ Handshake_State* state) const;
+
+ // Only valid for certain kex types
+ const Private_Key& server_kex_key() const;
+
+ Server_Key_Exchange(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_State* state,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const Private_Key* signing_key = 0);
+
+ Server_Key_Exchange(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
+ const std::string& kex_alg,
+ const std::string& sig_alg,
+ Protocol_Version version);
+
+ ~Server_Key_Exchange() { delete m_kex_key; }
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ Private_Key* m_kex_key;
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_params;
+
+ std::string m_sig_algo; // sig algo used to create signature
+ std::string m_hash_algo; // hash used to create signature
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_signature;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Server Hello Done Message
+*/
+class Server_Hello_Done : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return SERVER_HELLO_DONE; }
+
+ Server_Hello_Done(Record_Writer& writer, Handshake_Hash& hash);
+ Server_Hello_Done(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf);
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+ };
+
+/**
+* Next Protocol Message
+*/
+class Next_Protocol : public Handshake_Message
+ {
+ public:
+ Handshake_Type type() const { return NEXT_PROTOCOL; }
+
+ std::string protocol() const { return m_protocol; }
+
+ Next_Protocol(Record_Writer& writer,
+ Handshake_Hash& hash,
+ const std::string& protocol);
+
+ Next_Protocol(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf);
+ private:
+ MemoryVector<byte> serialize() const;
+
+ std::string m_protocol;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_policy.cpp b/src/tls/tls_policy.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f0ad89a6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_policy.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+/*
+* Policies for TLS
+* (C) 2004-2010,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
+#include <botan/tls_ciphersuite.h>
+#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
+#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h>
+#include <botan/internal/stl_util.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_ciphers() const
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> allowed;
+
+ allowed.push_back("AES-256");
+ allowed.push_back("AES-128");
+ allowed.push_back("3DES");
+ allowed.push_back("ARC4");
+ // Note that SEED and IDEA are not included by default
+
+ return allowed;
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_hashes() const
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> allowed;
+
+ allowed.push_back("SHA-512");
+ allowed.push_back("SHA-384");
+ allowed.push_back("SHA-256");
+ allowed.push_back("SHA-224");
+ allowed.push_back("SHA-1");
+ // Note that MD5 is not included by default
+
+ return allowed;
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_key_exchange_methods() const
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> allowed;
+
+ //allowed.push_back("SRP");
+ //allowed.push_back("ECDHE_PSK");
+ //allowed.push_back("DHE_PSK");
+ //allowed.push_back("PSK");
+ allowed.push_back("ECDH");
+ allowed.push_back("DH");
+ allowed.push_back("RSA"); // RSA via server cert
+
+ return allowed;
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_signature_methods() const
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> allowed;
+
+ allowed.push_back("ECDSA");
+ allowed.push_back("RSA");
+ allowed.push_back("DSA");
+ allowed.push_back("");
+
+ return allowed;
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_ecc_curves() const
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> curves;
+ curves.push_back("secp521r1");
+ curves.push_back("secp384r1");
+ curves.push_back("secp256r1");
+ curves.push_back("secp256k1");
+ curves.push_back("secp224r1");
+ curves.push_back("secp224k1");
+ curves.push_back("secp192r1");
+ curves.push_back("secp192k1");
+ curves.push_back("secp160r2");
+ curves.push_back("secp160r1");
+ curves.push_back("secp160k1");
+ return curves;
+ }
+
+namespace {
+
+class Ciphersuite_Preference_Ordering
+ {
+ public:
+ Ciphersuite_Preference_Ordering(const std::vector<std::string>& ciphers,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& hashes,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& kex,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& sigs) :
+ m_ciphers(ciphers), m_hashes(hashes), m_kex(kex), m_sigs(sigs) {}
+
+ bool operator()(const Ciphersuite& a, const Ciphersuite& b) const
+ {
+ if(a.kex_algo() != b.kex_algo())
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_kex.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(a.kex_algo() == m_kex[i])
+ return true;
+ if(b.kex_algo() == m_kex[i])
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(a.cipher_algo() != b.cipher_algo())
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_ciphers.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(a.cipher_algo() == m_ciphers[i])
+ return true;
+ if(b.cipher_algo() == m_ciphers[i])
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(a.sig_algo() != b.sig_algo())
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_sigs.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(a.sig_algo() == m_sigs[i])
+ return true;
+ if(b.sig_algo() == m_sigs[i])
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(a.mac_algo() != b.mac_algo())
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_hashes.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(a.mac_algo() == m_hashes[i])
+ return true;
+ if(b.mac_algo() == m_hashes[i])
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false; // equal (?!?)
+ }
+ private:
+ std::vector<std::string> m_ciphers, m_hashes, m_kex, m_sigs;
+
+ };
+
+}
+
+std::vector<u16bit> Policy::ciphersuite_list(bool have_srp) const
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> ciphers = allowed_ciphers();
+ std::vector<std::string> hashes = allowed_hashes();
+ std::vector<std::string> kex = allowed_key_exchange_methods();
+ std::vector<std::string> sigs = allowed_signature_methods();
+
+ if(!have_srp)
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string>::iterator i =
+ std::find(kex.begin(), kex.end(), "SRP");
+
+ if(i != kex.end())
+ kex.erase(i);
+ }
+
+ Ciphersuite_Preference_Ordering order(ciphers, hashes, kex, sigs);
+
+ std::map<Ciphersuite, u16bit, Ciphersuite_Preference_Ordering>
+ ciphersuites(order);
+
+ // When in doubt use brute force :)
+ for(u32bit i = 0; i != 65536; ++i)
+ {
+ Ciphersuite suite = Ciphersuite::lookup_ciphersuite(i);
+
+ if(!suite.valid())
+ continue; // not a ciphersuite we know, skip
+
+ if(value_exists(ciphers, suite.cipher_algo()) &&
+ value_exists(hashes, suite.mac_algo()) &&
+ value_exists(kex, suite.kex_algo()) &&
+ value_exists(sigs, suite.sig_algo()))
+ {
+ ciphersuites[suite] = i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ std::vector<u16bit> ciphersuite_codes;
+
+ for(std::map<Ciphersuite, u16bit, Ciphersuite_Preference_Ordering>::iterator i = ciphersuites.begin();
+ i != ciphersuites.end(); ++i)
+ {
+ ciphersuite_codes.push_back(i->second);
+ }
+
+ return ciphersuite_codes;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Return allowed compression algorithms
+*/
+std::vector<byte> Policy::compression() const
+ {
+ std::vector<byte> algs;
+ algs.push_back(NO_COMPRESSION);
+ return algs;
+ }
+
+/*
+* Choose an ECC curve to use
+*/
+std::string Policy::choose_curve(const std::vector<std::string>& curve_names) const
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> our_curves = allowed_ecc_curves();
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != our_curves.size(); ++i)
+ if(value_exists(curve_names, our_curves[i]))
+ return our_curves[i];
+
+ return ""; // no shared curve
+ }
+
+/*
+* Choose which ciphersuite to use
+*/
+u16bit Policy::choose_suite(const std::vector<u16bit>& client_suites,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& available_cert_types,
+ bool have_shared_ecc_curve,
+ bool have_srp) const
+ {
+ std::vector<u16bit> ciphersuites = ciphersuite_list(have_srp);
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != ciphersuites.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ const u16bit suite_id = ciphersuites[i];
+ Ciphersuite suite = Ciphersuite::lookup_ciphersuite(suite_id);
+
+ if(!have_shared_ecc_curve)
+ {
+ if(suite.kex_algo() == "ECDH" || suite.sig_algo() == "ECDSA")
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if(suite.sig_algo() != "" &&
+ !value_exists(available_cert_types, suite.sig_algo()))
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if(value_exists(client_suites, suite_id))
+ return suite_id;
+ }
+
+ return 0; // no shared cipersuite
+ }
+
+/*
+* Choose which compression algorithm to use
+*/
+byte Policy::choose_compression(const std::vector<byte>& c_comp) const
+ {
+ std::vector<byte> s_comp = compression();
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != s_comp.size(); ++i)
+ for(size_t j = 0; j != c_comp.size(); ++j)
+ if(s_comp[i] == c_comp[j])
+ return s_comp[i];
+
+ return NO_COMPRESSION;
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_policy.h b/src/tls/tls_policy.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd00331a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_policy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/*
+* Policies
+* (C) 2004-2006 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_POLICY_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_POLICY_H__
+
+#include <botan/tls_version.h>
+#include <botan/x509cert.h>
+#include <botan/dl_group.h>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* TLS Policy Base Class
+* Inherit and overload as desired to suit local policy concerns
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Policy
+ {
+ public:
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a list of ciphers we are willing to negotiate, in
+ * order of preference. Allowed values: any block cipher name, or
+ * ARC4.
+ */
+ virtual std::vector<std::string> allowed_ciphers() const;
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a list of hash algorithms we are willing to use, in
+ * order of preference. This is used for both MACs and signatures.
+ * Allowed values: any hash name, though currently only MD5,
+ * SHA-1, and the SHA-2 variants are used.
+ */
+ virtual std::vector<std::string> allowed_hashes() const;
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a list of key exchange algorithms we are willing to
+ * use, in order of preference. Allowed values: DH, empty string
+ * (representing RSA using server certificate key)
+ */
+ virtual std::vector<std::string> allowed_key_exchange_methods() const;
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a list of signature algorithms we are willing to
+ * use, in order of preference. Allowed values RSA and DSA.
+ */
+ virtual std::vector<std::string> allowed_signature_methods() const;
+
+ /**
+ * Return list of ECC curves we are willing to use in order of preference
+ */
+ virtual std::vector<std::string> allowed_ecc_curves() const;
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a list of signature algorithms we are willing to use,
+ * in order of preference. Allowed values any value of
+ * Compression_Method.
+ */
+ virtual std::vector<byte> compression() const;
+
+ /**
+ * Choose an elliptic curve to use
+ */
+ virtual std::string choose_curve(const std::vector<std::string>& curve_names) const;
+
+ /**
+ * Require support for RFC 5746 extensions to enable
+ * renegotiation.
+ *
+ * @warning Changing this to false exposes you to injected
+ * plaintext attacks. Read the RFC for background.
+ */
+ virtual bool require_secure_renegotiation() const { return true; }
+
+ /**
+ * Return the group to use for ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key agreement
+ */
+ virtual DL_Group dh_group() const { return DL_Group("modp/ietf/1536"); }
+
+ /**
+ * If this function returns false, unknown SRP/PSK identifiers
+ * will be rejected with an unknown_psk_identifier alert as soon
+ * as the non-existence is identified. Otherwise, a false
+ * identifier value will be used and the protocol allowed to
+ * proceed, causing the login to eventually fail without
+ * revealing that the username does not exist on this system.
+ */
+ virtual bool hide_unknown_users() const { return false; }
+
+ /**
+ * @return the minimum version that we are willing to negotiate
+ */
+ virtual Protocol_Version min_version() const
+ { return Protocol_Version::SSL_V3; }
+
+ /**
+ * @return the version we would prefer to negotiate
+ */
+ virtual Protocol_Version pref_version() const
+ { return Protocol_Version::TLS_V12; }
+
+ /**
+ * Return allowed ciphersuites, in order of preference
+ */
+ std::vector<u16bit> ciphersuite_list(bool have_srp) const;
+
+ u16bit choose_suite(const std::vector<u16bit>& client_suites,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& available_cert_types,
+ bool have_shared_ecc_curve,
+ bool have_srp) const;
+
+ byte choose_compression(const std::vector<byte>& client_algos) const;
+
+ virtual ~Policy() {}
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/ssl/tls_reader.h b/src/tls/tls_reader.h
index 3a45235b5..162f691aa 100644
--- a/src/ssl/tls_reader.h
+++ b/src/tls/tls_reader.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* TLS Data Reader
-* (C) 2010 Jack Lloyd
+* (C) 2010-2011 Jack Lloyd
*
* Released under the terms of the Botan license
*/
@@ -8,11 +8,17 @@
#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_READER_H__
#define BOTAN_TLS_READER_H__
+#include <botan/exceptn.h>
#include <botan/secmem.h>
#include <botan/loadstor.h>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+#include <stdexcept>
namespace Botan {
+namespace TLS {
+
/**
* Helper class for decoding TLS protocol messages
*/
@@ -22,6 +28,12 @@ class TLS_Data_Reader
TLS_Data_Reader(const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf_in) :
buf(buf_in), offset(0) {}
+ void assert_done() const
+ {
+ if(has_remaining())
+ throw Decoding_Error("Extra bytes at end of message");
+ }
+
size_t remaining_bytes() const
{
return buf.size() - offset;
@@ -91,6 +103,16 @@ class TLS_Data_Reader
return get_elem<T, std::vector<T> >(num_elems);
}
+ std::string get_string(size_t len_bytes,
+ size_t min_bytes,
+ size_t max_bytes)
+ {
+ std::vector<byte> v =
+ get_range_vector<byte>(len_bytes, min_bytes, max_bytes);
+
+ return std::string(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&v[0]), v.size());
+ }
+
template<typename T>
SecureVector<T> get_fixed(size_t size)
{
@@ -131,7 +153,11 @@ class TLS_Data_Reader
void assert_at_least(size_t n) const
{
if(buf.size() - offset < n)
- throw Decoding_Error("TLS_Data_Reader: Corrupt packet");
+ {
+ throw Decoding_Error("TLS_Data_Reader: Expected " + to_string(n) +
+ " bytes remaining, only " + to_string(buf.size()-offset) +
+ " left");
+ }
}
const MemoryRegion<byte>& buf;
@@ -181,6 +207,18 @@ void append_tls_length_value(MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
append_tls_length_value(buf, &vals[0], vals.size(), tag_size);
}
+inline void append_tls_length_value(MemoryRegion<byte>& buf,
+ const std::string& str,
+ size_t tag_size)
+ {
+ append_tls_length_value(buf,
+ reinterpret_cast<const byte*>(&str[0]),
+ str.size(),
+ tag_size);
+ }
+
+}
+
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_record.h b/src/tls/tls_record.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3bc58a0da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_record.h
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+/*
+* TLS Record Handling
+* (C) 2004-2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_RECORDS_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_RECORDS_H__
+
+#include <botan/tls_ciphersuite.h>
+#include <botan/tls_alert.h>
+#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
+#include <botan/tls_version.h>
+#include <botan/pipe.h>
+#include <botan/mac.h>
+#include <botan/secqueue.h>
+#include <vector>
+
+#if defined(BOTAN_USE_STD_TR1)
+
+#if defined(BOTAN_BUILD_COMPILER_IS_MSVC)
+ #include <functional>
+#else
+ #include <tr1/functional>
+#endif
+
+#elif defined(BOTAN_USE_BOOST_TR1)
+ #include <boost/tr1/functional.hpp>
+#else
+ #error "No TR1 library defined for use"
+#endif
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+class Session_Keys;
+
+/**
+* TLS Record Writer
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Record_Writer
+ {
+ public:
+ void send(byte type, const byte input[], size_t length);
+ void send(byte type, byte val) { send(type, &val, 1); }
+
+ void send_alert(const Alert& alert);
+
+ void activate(Connection_Side side,
+ const Ciphersuite& suite,
+ const Session_Keys& keys,
+ byte compression_method);
+
+ void set_version(Protocol_Version version);
+
+ void reset();
+
+ void set_maximum_fragment_size(size_t max_fragment);
+
+ Record_Writer(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> output_fn);
+
+ ~Record_Writer() { delete m_mac; }
+ private:
+ Record_Writer(const Record_Writer&) {}
+ Record_Writer& operator=(const Record_Writer&) { return (*this); }
+
+ void send_record(byte type, const byte input[], size_t length);
+
+ std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> m_output_fn;
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_writebuf;
+
+ Pipe m_cipher;
+ MessageAuthenticationCode* m_mac;
+
+ size_t m_block_size, m_mac_size, m_iv_size, m_max_fragment;
+
+ u64bit m_seq_no;
+ Protocol_Version m_version;
+ };
+
+/**
+* TLS Record Reader
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Record_Reader
+ {
+ public:
+
+ /**
+ * @param input new input data (may be NULL if input_size == 0)
+ * @param input_size size of input in bytes
+ * @param input_consumed is set to the number of bytes of input
+ * that were consumed
+ * @param msg_type is set to the type of the message just read if
+ * this function returns 0
+ * @param msg is set to the contents of the record
+ * @return number of bytes still needed (minimum), or 0 if success
+ */
+ size_t add_input(const byte input[], size_t input_size,
+ size_t& input_consumed,
+ byte& msg_type,
+ MemoryVector<byte>& msg);
+
+ void activate(Connection_Side side,
+ const Ciphersuite& suite,
+ const Session_Keys& keys,
+ byte compression_method);
+
+ void set_version(Protocol_Version version);
+
+ void reset();
+
+ void set_maximum_fragment_size(size_t max_fragment);
+
+ Record_Reader();
+
+ ~Record_Reader() { delete m_mac; }
+ private:
+ Record_Reader(const Record_Reader&) {}
+ Record_Reader& operator=(const Record_Reader&) { return (*this); }
+
+ size_t fill_buffer_to(const byte*& input,
+ size_t& input_size,
+ size_t& input_consumed,
+ size_t desired);
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_readbuf;
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_macbuf;
+ size_t m_readbuf_pos;
+
+ Pipe m_cipher;
+ MessageAuthenticationCode* m_mac;
+ size_t m_block_size, m_iv_size, m_max_fragment;
+ u64bit m_seq_no;
+ Protocol_Version m_version;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_server.cpp b/src/tls/tls_server.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..30983f48f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_server.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+/*
+* TLS Server
+* (C) 2004-2011,2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_server.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/internal/stl_util.h>
+#include <botan/internal/assert.h>
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+namespace {
+
+bool check_for_resume(Session& session_info,
+ Session_Manager& session_manager,
+ Client_Hello* client_hello)
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> client_session_id = client_hello->session_id();
+
+ if(client_session_id.empty()) // not resuming
+ return false;
+
+ // not found
+ if(!session_manager.load_from_session_id(client_session_id, session_info))
+ return false;
+
+ // wrong version
+ if(client_hello->version() != session_info.version())
+ return false;
+
+ // client didn't send original ciphersuite
+ if(!value_exists(client_hello->ciphersuites(),
+ session_info.ciphersuite_code()))
+ return false;
+
+ // client didn't send original compression method
+ if(!value_exists(client_hello->compression_methods(),
+ session_info.compression_method()))
+ return false;
+
+ // client sent a different SRP identity (!!!)
+ if(client_hello->srp_identifier() != "")
+ {
+ if(client_hello->srp_identifier() != session_info.srp_identifier())
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // client sent a different SNI hostname (!!!)
+ if(client_hello->sni_hostname() != "")
+ {
+ if(client_hello->sni_hostname() != session_info.sni_hostname())
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+ }
+
+std::map<std::string, std::vector<X509_Certificate> >
+get_server_certs(const std::string& hostname,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds)
+ {
+ const char* cert_types[] = { "RSA", "DSA", "ECDSA", 0 };
+
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<X509_Certificate> > cert_chains;
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; cert_types[i]; ++i)
+ {
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> certs =
+ creds.cert_chain_single_type(cert_types[i], "tls-server", hostname);
+
+ if(!certs.empty())
+ cert_chains[cert_types[i]] = certs;
+ }
+
+ return cert_chains;
+ }
+
+}
+
+/*
+* TLS Server Constructor
+*/
+Server::Server(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> output_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t, Alert)> proc_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<bool (const Session&)> handshake_fn,
+ Session_Manager& session_manager,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& next_protocols) :
+ Channel(output_fn, proc_fn, handshake_fn),
+ policy(policy),
+ rng(rng),
+ session_manager(session_manager),
+ creds(creds),
+ m_possible_protocols(next_protocols)
+ {
+ }
+
+/*
+* Send a hello request to the client
+*/
+void Server::renegotiate()
+ {
+ if(state)
+ return; // currently in handshake
+
+ state = new Handshake_State;
+ state->set_expected_next(CLIENT_HELLO);
+ Hello_Request hello_req(writer);
+ }
+
+void Server::alert_notify(const Alert& alert)
+ {
+ if(alert.type() == Alert::NO_RENEGOTIATION)
+ {
+ if(handshake_completed && state)
+ {
+ delete state;
+ state = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+/*
+* Split up and process handshake messages
+*/
+void Server::read_handshake(byte rec_type,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& rec_buf)
+ {
+ if(rec_type == HANDSHAKE && !state)
+ {
+ state = new Handshake_State;
+ state->set_expected_next(CLIENT_HELLO);
+ }
+
+ Channel::read_handshake(rec_type, rec_buf);
+ }
+
+/*
+* Process a handshake message
+*/
+void Server::process_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type type,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& contents)
+ {
+ if(state == 0)
+ throw Unexpected_Message("Unexpected handshake message from client");
+
+ state->confirm_transition_to(type);
+
+ /*
+ * The change cipher spec message isn't technically a handshake
+ * message so it's not included in the hash. The finished and
+ * certificate verify messages are verified based on the current
+ * state of the hash *before* this message so we delay adding them
+ * to the hash computation until we've processed them below.
+ */
+ if(type != HANDSHAKE_CCS && type != FINISHED && type != CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
+ {
+ if(type == CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2)
+ state->hash.update(contents);
+ else
+ state->hash.update(type, contents);
+ }
+
+ if(type == CLIENT_HELLO || type == CLIENT_HELLO_SSLV2)
+ {
+ state->client_hello = new Client_Hello(contents, type);
+
+ m_hostname = state->client_hello->sni_hostname();
+
+ Protocol_Version client_version = state->client_hello->version();
+
+ if(client_version < policy.min_version())
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ "Client version is unacceptable by policy");
+
+ if(client_version <= policy.pref_version())
+ state->version = client_version;
+ else
+ state->version = policy.pref_version();
+
+ secure_renegotiation.update(state->client_hello);
+
+ writer.set_version(state->version);
+ reader.set_version(state->version);
+
+ Session session_info;
+ const bool resuming = check_for_resume(session_info,
+ session_manager,
+ state->client_hello);
+
+ if(resuming)
+ {
+ // resume session
+
+ state->server_hello = new Server_Hello(
+ writer,
+ state->hash,
+ session_info.session_id(),
+ Protocol_Version(session_info.version()),
+ session_info.ciphersuite_code(),
+ session_info.compression_method(),
+ session_info.fragment_size(),
+ secure_renegotiation.supported(),
+ secure_renegotiation.for_server_hello(),
+ state->client_hello->next_protocol_notification(),
+ m_possible_protocols,
+ rng);
+
+ if(session_info.fragment_size())
+ {
+ reader.set_maximum_fragment_size(session_info.fragment_size());
+ writer.set_maximum_fragment_size(session_info.fragment_size());
+ }
+
+ state->suite = Ciphersuite::lookup_ciphersuite(state->server_hello->ciphersuite());
+
+ state->keys = Session_Keys(state, session_info.master_secret(), true);
+
+ writer.send(CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1);
+
+ writer.activate(SERVER, state->suite, state->keys,
+ state->server_hello->compression_method());
+
+ state->server_finished = new Finished(writer, state, SERVER);
+
+ if(!handshake_fn(session_info))
+ session_manager.remove_entry(session_info.session_id());
+
+ state->set_expected_next(HANDSHAKE_CCS);
+ }
+ else // new session
+ {
+ std::map<std::string, std::vector<X509_Certificate> > cert_chains;
+
+ cert_chains = get_server_certs(m_hostname, creds);
+
+ if(m_hostname != "" && cert_chains.empty())
+ {
+ send_alert(Alert(Alert::UNRECOGNIZED_NAME));
+ cert_chains = get_server_certs("", creds);
+ }
+
+ std::vector<std::string> available_cert_types;
+
+ for(std::map<std::string, std::vector<X509_Certificate> >::const_iterator i = cert_chains.begin();
+ i != cert_chains.end(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(!i->second.empty())
+ available_cert_types.push_back(i->first);
+ }
+
+ state->server_hello = new Server_Hello(
+ writer,
+ state->hash,
+ state->version,
+ *(state->client_hello),
+ available_cert_types,
+ policy,
+ secure_renegotiation.supported(),
+ secure_renegotiation.for_server_hello(),
+ state->client_hello->next_protocol_notification(),
+ m_possible_protocols,
+ rng);
+
+ if(state->client_hello->fragment_size())
+ {
+ reader.set_maximum_fragment_size(state->client_hello->fragment_size());
+ writer.set_maximum_fragment_size(state->client_hello->fragment_size());
+ }
+
+ state->suite = Ciphersuite::lookup_ciphersuite(state->server_hello->ciphersuite());
+
+ const std::string sig_algo = state->suite.sig_algo();
+ const std::string kex_algo = state->suite.kex_algo();
+
+ if(sig_algo != "")
+ {
+ BOTAN_ASSERT(!cert_chains[sig_algo].empty(),
+ "Attempting to send empty certificate chain");
+
+ state->server_certs = new Certificate(writer,
+ state->hash,
+ cert_chains[sig_algo]);
+ }
+
+ Private_Key* private_key = 0;
+
+ if(kex_algo == "RSA" || sig_algo != "")
+ {
+ private_key = creds.private_key_for(state->server_certs->cert_chain()[0],
+ "tls-server",
+ m_hostname);
+
+ if(!private_key)
+ throw Internal_Error("No private key located for associated server cert");
+ }
+
+ if(kex_algo == "RSA")
+ {
+ state->server_rsa_kex_key = private_key;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ state->server_kex =
+ new Server_Key_Exchange(writer, state, policy, creds, rng, private_key);
+ }
+
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> client_auth_CAs =
+ creds.trusted_certificate_authorities("tls-server", m_hostname);
+
+ if(!client_auth_CAs.empty() && state->suite.sig_algo() != "")
+ {
+ state->cert_req = new Certificate_Req(writer,
+ state->hash,
+ policy,
+ client_auth_CAs,
+ state->version);
+
+ state->set_expected_next(CERTIFICATE);
+ }
+
+ secure_renegotiation.update(state->server_hello);
+
+ /*
+ * If the client doesn't have a cert they want to use they are
+ * allowed to send either an empty cert message or proceed
+ * directly to the client key exchange, so allow either case.
+ */
+ state->set_expected_next(CLIENT_KEX);
+
+ state->server_hello_done = new Server_Hello_Done(writer, state->hash);
+ }
+ }
+ else if(type == CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ state->client_certs = new Certificate(contents);
+
+ // Is this allowed by the protocol?
+ if(state->client_certs->count() > 1)
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN,
+ "Client sent more than one certificate");
+
+ state->set_expected_next(CLIENT_KEX);
+ }
+ else if(type == CLIENT_KEX)
+ {
+ if(state->received_handshake_msg(CERTIFICATE) && !state->client_certs->empty())
+ state->set_expected_next(CERTIFICATE_VERIFY);
+ else
+ state->set_expected_next(HANDSHAKE_CCS);
+
+ state->client_kex = new Client_Key_Exchange(contents, state, creds, policy, rng);
+
+ state->keys = Session_Keys(state, state->client_kex->pre_master_secret(), false);
+ }
+ else if(type == CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
+ {
+ state->client_verify = new Certificate_Verify(contents, state->version);
+
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& client_certs =
+ state->client_certs->cert_chain();
+
+ const bool sig_valid =
+ state->client_verify->verify(client_certs[0], state);
+
+ state->hash.update(type, contents);
+
+ /*
+ * Using DECRYPT_ERROR looks weird here, but per RFC 4346 is for
+ * "A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being
+ * unable to correctly verify a signature, ..."
+ */
+ if(!sig_valid)
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::DECRYPT_ERROR, "Client cert verify failed");
+
+ try
+ {
+ creds.verify_certificate_chain(client_certs);
+ }
+ catch(std::exception& e)
+ {
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BAD_CERTIFICATE, e.what());
+ }
+
+ state->set_expected_next(HANDSHAKE_CCS);
+ }
+ else if(type == HANDSHAKE_CCS)
+ {
+ if(state->server_hello->next_protocol_notification())
+ state->set_expected_next(NEXT_PROTOCOL);
+ else
+ state->set_expected_next(FINISHED);
+
+ reader.activate(SERVER, state->suite, state->keys,
+ state->server_hello->compression_method());
+ }
+ else if(type == NEXT_PROTOCOL)
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(FINISHED);
+
+ state->next_protocol = new Next_Protocol(contents);
+
+ m_next_protocol = state->next_protocol->protocol();
+ }
+ else if(type == FINISHED)
+ {
+ state->set_expected_next(HANDSHAKE_NONE);
+
+ state->client_finished = new Finished(contents);
+
+ if(!state->client_finished->verify(state, CLIENT))
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::DECRYPT_ERROR,
+ "Finished message didn't verify");
+
+ // already sent it if resuming
+ if(!state->server_finished)
+ {
+ state->hash.update(type, contents);
+
+ writer.send(CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1);
+
+ writer.activate(SERVER, state->suite, state->keys,
+ state->server_hello->compression_method());
+
+ state->server_finished = new Finished(writer, state, SERVER);
+
+ if(state->client_certs && state->client_verify)
+ peer_certs = state->client_certs->cert_chain();
+ }
+
+ Session session_info(
+ state->server_hello->session_id(),
+ state->keys.master_secret(),
+ state->server_hello->version(),
+ state->server_hello->ciphersuite(),
+ state->server_hello->compression_method(),
+ SERVER,
+ secure_renegotiation.supported(),
+ state->server_hello->fragment_size(),
+ peer_certs,
+ m_hostname,
+ ""
+ );
+
+ if(handshake_fn(session_info))
+ session_manager.save(session_info);
+ else
+ session_manager.remove_entry(session_info.session_id());
+
+ secure_renegotiation.update(state->client_finished,
+ state->server_finished);
+
+ delete state;
+ state = 0;
+ handshake_completed = true;
+ }
+ else
+ throw Unexpected_Message("Unknown handshake message received");
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_server.h b/src/tls/tls_server.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bb385e420
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_server.h
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+* TLS Server
+* (C) 2004-2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_SERVER_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_SERVER_H__
+
+#include <botan/tls_channel.h>
+#include <botan/tls_session_manager.h>
+#include <botan/credentials_manager.h>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* TLS Server
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Server : public Channel
+ {
+ public:
+ /**
+ * Server initialization
+ */
+ Server(std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t)> socket_output_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<void (const byte[], size_t, Alert)> proc_fn,
+ std::tr1::function<bool (const Session&)> handshake_complete,
+ Session_Manager& session_manager,
+ Credentials_Manager& creds,
+ const Policy& policy,
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& protocols =
+ std::vector<std::string>());
+
+ void renegotiate();
+
+ /**
+ * Return the server name indicator, if sent by the client
+ */
+ std::string server_name_indicator() const
+ { return m_hostname; }
+
+ /**
+ * Return the protocol negotiated with NPN extension
+ */
+ std::string next_protocol() const
+ { return m_next_protocol; }
+
+ private:
+ void read_handshake(byte, const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
+
+ void process_handshake_msg(Handshake_Type, const MemoryRegion<byte>&);
+
+ void alert_notify(const Alert& alert);
+
+ const Policy& policy;
+ RandomNumberGenerator& rng;
+ Session_Manager& session_manager;
+ Credentials_Manager& creds;
+
+ std::vector<std::string> m_possible_protocols;
+ std::string m_hostname;
+ std::string m_next_protocol;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_session.cpp b/src/tls/tls_session.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2e25a8ab3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_session.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+* TLS Session State
+* (C) 2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_session.h>
+#include <botan/der_enc.h>
+#include <botan/ber_dec.h>
+#include <botan/asn1_str.h>
+#include <botan/pem.h>
+#include <botan/time.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+Session::Session(const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_identifier,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& master_secret,
+ Protocol_Version version,
+ u16bit ciphersuite,
+ byte compression_method,
+ Connection_Side side,
+ bool secure_renegotiation_supported,
+ size_t fragment_size,
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& certs,
+ const std::string& sni_hostname,
+ const std::string& srp_identifier) :
+ m_start_time(system_time()),
+ m_identifier(session_identifier),
+ m_master_secret(master_secret),
+ m_version(version),
+ m_ciphersuite(ciphersuite),
+ m_compression_method(compression_method),
+ m_connection_side(side),
+ m_secure_renegotiation_supported(secure_renegotiation_supported),
+ m_fragment_size(fragment_size),
+ m_peer_certs(certs),
+ m_sni_hostname(sni_hostname),
+ m_srp_identifier(srp_identifier)
+ {
+ }
+
+Session::Session(const byte ber[], size_t ber_len)
+ {
+ BER_Decoder decoder(ber, ber_len);
+
+ byte side_code = 0;
+ ASN1_String sni_hostname_str;
+ ASN1_String srp_identifier_str;
+
+ byte major_version = 0, minor_version = 0;
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> peer_cert_bits;
+
+ BER_Decoder(ber, ber_len)
+ .start_cons(SEQUENCE)
+ .decode_and_check(static_cast<size_t>(TLS_SESSION_PARAM_STRUCT_VERSION),
+ "Unknown version in session structure")
+ .decode(m_identifier, OCTET_STRING)
+ .decode_integer_type(m_start_time)
+ .decode_integer_type(major_version)
+ .decode_integer_type(minor_version)
+ .decode_integer_type(m_ciphersuite)
+ .decode_integer_type(m_compression_method)
+ .decode_integer_type(side_code)
+ .decode_integer_type(m_fragment_size)
+ .decode(m_secure_renegotiation_supported)
+ .decode(m_master_secret, OCTET_STRING)
+ .decode(peer_cert_bits, OCTET_STRING)
+ .decode(sni_hostname_str)
+ .decode(srp_identifier_str)
+ .end_cons()
+ .verify_end();
+
+ m_version = Protocol_Version(major_version, minor_version);
+ m_sni_hostname = sni_hostname_str.value();
+ m_srp_identifier = srp_identifier_str.value();
+ m_connection_side = static_cast<Connection_Side>(side_code);
+
+ if(!peer_cert_bits.empty())
+ {
+ DataSource_Memory certs(peer_cert_bits);
+
+ while(!certs.end_of_data())
+ m_peer_certs.push_back(X509_Certificate(certs));
+ }
+ }
+
+Session::Session(const std::string& pem)
+ {
+ SecureVector<byte> der = PEM_Code::decode_check_label(pem, "SSL SESSION");
+
+ *this = Session(&der[0], der.size());
+ }
+
+SecureVector<byte> Session::DER_encode() const
+ {
+ MemoryVector<byte> peer_cert_bits;
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_peer_certs.size(); ++i)
+ peer_cert_bits += m_peer_certs[i].BER_encode();
+
+ return DER_Encoder()
+ .start_cons(SEQUENCE)
+ .encode(static_cast<size_t>(TLS_SESSION_PARAM_STRUCT_VERSION))
+ .encode(m_identifier, OCTET_STRING)
+ .encode(static_cast<size_t>(m_start_time))
+ .encode(static_cast<size_t>(m_version.major_version()))
+ .encode(static_cast<size_t>(m_version.minor_version()))
+ .encode(static_cast<size_t>(m_ciphersuite))
+ .encode(static_cast<size_t>(m_compression_method))
+ .encode(static_cast<size_t>(m_connection_side))
+ .encode(static_cast<size_t>(m_fragment_size))
+ .encode(m_secure_renegotiation_supported)
+ .encode(m_master_secret, OCTET_STRING)
+ .encode(peer_cert_bits, OCTET_STRING)
+ .encode(ASN1_String(m_sni_hostname, UTF8_STRING))
+ .encode(ASN1_String(m_srp_identifier, UTF8_STRING))
+ .end_cons()
+ .get_contents();
+ }
+
+std::string Session::PEM_encode() const
+ {
+ return PEM_Code::encode(this->DER_encode(), "SSL SESSION");
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_session.h b/src/tls/tls_session.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f8b94133b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_session.h
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/*
+* TLS Session
+* (C) 2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef TLS_SESSION_STATE_H__
+#define TLS_SESSION_STATE_H__
+
+#include <botan/x509cert.h>
+#include <botan/tls_version.h>
+#include <botan/tls_ciphersuite.h>
+#include <botan/tls_magic.h>
+#include <botan/secmem.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* Class representing a TLS session state
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Session
+ {
+ public:
+
+ /**
+ * Uninitialized session
+ */
+ Session() :
+ m_start_time(0),
+ m_version(),
+ m_ciphersuite(0),
+ m_compression_method(0),
+ m_connection_side(static_cast<Connection_Side>(0)),
+ m_secure_renegotiation_supported(false),
+ m_fragment_size(0)
+ {}
+
+ /**
+ * New session (sets session start time)
+ */
+ Session(const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_id,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& master_secret,
+ Protocol_Version version,
+ u16bit ciphersuite,
+ byte compression_method,
+ Connection_Side side,
+ bool secure_renegotiation_supported,
+ size_t fragment_size,
+ const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& peer_certs,
+ const std::string& sni_hostname = "",
+ const std::string& srp_identifier = "");
+
+ /**
+ * Load a session from DER representation (created by DER_encode)
+ */
+ Session(const byte ber[], size_t ber_len);
+
+ /**
+ * Load a session from PEM representation (created by PEM_encode)
+ */
+ Session(const std::string& pem);
+
+ /**
+ * Encode this session data for storage
+ * @warning if the master secret is compromised so is the
+ * session traffic
+ */
+ SecureVector<byte> DER_encode() const;
+
+ /**
+ * Encode this session data for storage
+ * @warning if the master secret is compromised so is the
+ * session traffic
+ */
+ std::string PEM_encode() const;
+
+ /**
+ * Get the version of the saved session
+ */
+ Protocol_Version version() const { return m_version; }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the ciphersuite code of the saved session
+ */
+ u16bit ciphersuite_code() const { return m_ciphersuite; }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the ciphersuite info of the saved session
+ */
+ Ciphersuite ciphersuite() const { return Ciphersuite::lookup_ciphersuite(m_ciphersuite); }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the compression method used in the saved session
+ */
+ byte compression_method() const { return m_compression_method; }
+
+ /**
+ * Get which side of the connection the resumed session we are/were
+ * acting as.
+ */
+ Connection_Side side() const { return m_connection_side; }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the SNI hostname (if sent by the client in the initial handshake)
+ */
+ std::string sni_hostname() const { return m_sni_hostname; }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the SRP identity (if sent by the client in the initial handshake)
+ */
+ std::string srp_identifier() const { return m_srp_identifier; }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the saved master secret
+ */
+ const SecureVector<byte>& master_secret() const
+ { return m_master_secret; }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the session identifier
+ */
+ const MemoryVector<byte>& session_id() const
+ { return m_identifier; }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the negotiated maximum fragment size (or 0 if default)
+ */
+ size_t fragment_size() const { return m_fragment_size; }
+
+ /**
+ * Is secure renegotiation supported?
+ */
+ bool secure_renegotiation() const
+ { return m_secure_renegotiation_supported; }
+
+ /**
+ * Return the certificate chain of the peer (possibly empty)
+ */
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> peer_certs() const { return m_peer_certs; }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the time this session began (seconds since Epoch)
+ */
+ u64bit start_time() const { return m_start_time; }
+
+ private:
+ enum { TLS_SESSION_PARAM_STRUCT_VERSION = 1 };
+
+ u64bit m_start_time;
+
+ MemoryVector<byte> m_identifier;
+ SecureVector<byte> m_master_secret;
+
+ Protocol_Version m_version;
+ u16bit m_ciphersuite;
+ byte m_compression_method;
+ Connection_Side m_connection_side;
+
+ bool m_secure_renegotiation_supported;
+ size_t m_fragment_size;
+
+ std::vector<X509_Certificate> m_peer_certs;
+ std::string m_sni_hostname; // optional
+ std::string m_srp_identifier; // optional
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_session_key.cpp b/src/tls/tls_session_key.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..83ac7540b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_session_key.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+* TLS Session Key
+* (C) 2004-2006,2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/internal/tls_session_key.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_handshake_state.h>
+#include <botan/internal/tls_messages.h>
+#include <botan/lookup.h>
+#include <memory>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* Session_Keys Constructor
+*/
+Session_Keys::Session_Keys(Handshake_State* state,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& pre_master_secret,
+ bool resuming)
+ {
+ const size_t mac_keylen = output_length_of(state->suite.mac_algo());
+ const size_t cipher_keylen = state->suite.cipher_keylen();
+
+ size_t cipher_ivlen = 0;
+ if(have_block_cipher(state->suite.cipher_algo()))
+ cipher_ivlen = block_size_of(state->suite.cipher_algo());
+
+ const size_t prf_gen = 2 * (mac_keylen + cipher_keylen + cipher_ivlen);
+
+ const byte MASTER_SECRET_MAGIC[] = {
+ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x74 };
+
+ const byte KEY_GEN_MAGIC[] = {
+ 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x6E };
+
+ std::auto_ptr<KDF> prf(state->protocol_specific_prf());
+
+ if(resuming)
+ {
+ master_sec = pre_master_secret;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SecureVector<byte> salt;
+
+ if(state->version != Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ salt += std::make_pair(MASTER_SECRET_MAGIC, sizeof(MASTER_SECRET_MAGIC));
+
+ salt += state->client_hello->random();
+ salt += state->server_hello->random();
+
+ master_sec = prf->derive_key(48, pre_master_secret, salt);
+ }
+
+ SecureVector<byte> salt;
+ if(state->version != Protocol_Version::SSL_V3)
+ salt += std::make_pair(KEY_GEN_MAGIC, sizeof(KEY_GEN_MAGIC));
+ salt += state->server_hello->random();
+ salt += state->client_hello->random();
+
+ SymmetricKey keyblock = prf->derive_key(prf_gen, master_sec, salt);
+
+ const byte* key_data = keyblock.begin();
+
+ c_mac = SymmetricKey(key_data, mac_keylen);
+ key_data += mac_keylen;
+
+ s_mac = SymmetricKey(key_data, mac_keylen);
+ key_data += mac_keylen;
+
+ c_cipher = SymmetricKey(key_data, cipher_keylen);
+ key_data += cipher_keylen;
+
+ s_cipher = SymmetricKey(key_data, cipher_keylen);
+ key_data += cipher_keylen;
+
+ c_iv = InitializationVector(key_data, cipher_ivlen);
+ key_data += cipher_ivlen;
+
+ s_iv = InitializationVector(key_data, cipher_ivlen);
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_session_key.h b/src/tls/tls_session_key.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..25de56aea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_session_key.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+* TLS Session Key
+* (C) 2004-2006,2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_SESSION_KEYS_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_SESSION_KEYS_H__
+
+#include <botan/tls_ciphersuite.h>
+#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h>
+#include <botan/symkey.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* TLS Session Keys
+*/
+class Session_Keys
+ {
+ public:
+ SymmetricKey client_cipher_key() const { return c_cipher; }
+ SymmetricKey server_cipher_key() const { return s_cipher; }
+
+ SymmetricKey client_mac_key() const { return c_mac; }
+ SymmetricKey server_mac_key() const { return s_mac; }
+
+ InitializationVector client_iv() const { return c_iv; }
+ InitializationVector server_iv() const { return s_iv; }
+
+ const SecureVector<byte>& master_secret() const { return master_sec; }
+
+ Session_Keys() {}
+
+ Session_Keys(class Handshake_State* state,
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& pre_master,
+ bool resuming);
+
+ private:
+ SecureVector<byte> master_sec;
+ SymmetricKey c_cipher, s_cipher, c_mac, s_mac;
+ InitializationVector c_iv, s_iv;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_session_manager.cpp b/src/tls/tls_session_manager.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..59fc75b9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_session_manager.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+* TLS Session Management
+* (C) 2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_session_manager.h>
+#include <botan/hex.h>
+#include <botan/time.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+bool Session_Manager_In_Memory::load_from_session_str(
+ const std::string& session_str, Session& session)
+ {
+ std::map<std::string, Session>::iterator i = sessions.find(session_str);
+
+ if(i == sessions.end())
+ return false;
+
+ // session has expired, remove it
+ const u64bit now = system_time();
+ if(i->second.start_time() + session_lifetime < now)
+ {
+ sessions.erase(i);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ session = i->second;
+ return true;
+ }
+
+bool Session_Manager_In_Memory::load_from_session_id(
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_id, Session& session)
+ {
+ return load_from_session_str(hex_encode(session_id), session);
+ }
+
+bool Session_Manager_In_Memory::load_from_host_info(
+ const std::string& hostname, u16bit port, Session& session)
+ {
+ std::map<std::string, std::string>::iterator i;
+
+ if(port > 0)
+ i = host_sessions.find(hostname + ":" + to_string(port));
+ else
+ i = host_sessions.find(hostname);
+
+ if(i == host_sessions.end())
+ return false;
+
+ if(load_from_session_str(i->second, session))
+ return true;
+
+ // was removed from sessions map, remove host_sessions entry
+ host_sessions.erase(i);
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+void Session_Manager_In_Memory::remove_entry(
+ const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_id)
+ {
+ std::map<std::string, Session>::iterator i =
+ sessions.find(hex_encode(session_id));
+
+ if(i != sessions.end())
+ sessions.erase(i);
+ }
+
+void Session_Manager_In_Memory::save(const Session& session)
+ {
+ if(max_sessions != 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ This removes randomly based on ordering of session ids.
+ Instead, remove oldest first?
+ */
+ while(sessions.size() >= max_sessions)
+ sessions.erase(sessions.begin());
+ }
+
+ const std::string session_id_str = hex_encode(session.session_id());
+
+ sessions[session_id_str] = session;
+
+ if(session.side() == CLIENT && session.sni_hostname() != "")
+ host_sessions[session.sni_hostname()] = session_id_str;
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_session_manager.h b/src/tls/tls_session_manager.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c25fecac4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_session_manager.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+* TLS Session Manager
+* (C) 2011 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef TLS_SESSION_MANAGER_H__
+#define TLS_SESSION_MANAGER_H__
+
+#include <botan/tls_session.h>
+#include <map>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+/**
+* Session_Manager is an interface to systems which can save
+* session parameters for supporting session resumption.
+*
+* Saving sessions is done on a best-effort basis; an implementation is
+* allowed to drop sessions due to space constraints.
+*
+* Implementations should strive to be thread safe
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Session_Manager
+ {
+ public:
+ /**
+ * Try to load a saved session (server side)
+ * @param session_id the session identifier we are trying to resume
+ * @param session will be set to the saved session data (if found),
+ or not modified if not found
+ * @return true if session was modified
+ */
+ virtual bool load_from_session_id(const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_id,
+ Session& session) = 0;
+
+ /**
+ * Try to load a saved session (client side)
+ * @param hostname of the host we are connecting to
+ * @param port the port number if we know it, or 0 if unknown
+ * @param session will be set to the saved session data (if found),
+ or not modified if not found
+ * @return true if session was modified
+ */
+ virtual bool load_from_host_info(const std::string& hostname, u16bit port,
+ Session& session) = 0;
+
+ /**
+ * Remove this session id from the cache, if it exists
+ */
+ virtual void remove_entry(const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_id) = 0;
+
+ /**
+ * Save a session on a best effort basis; the manager may not in
+ * fact be able to save the session for whatever reason; this is
+ * not an error. Caller cannot assume that calling save followed
+ * immediately by load_from_* will result in a successful lookup.
+ *
+ * @param session to save
+ */
+ virtual void save(const Session& session) = 0;
+
+ virtual ~Session_Manager() {}
+ };
+
+/**
+* A simple implementation of Session_Manager that just saves
+* values in memory, with no persistance abilities
+*
+* @todo add locking
+*/
+class BOTAN_DLL Session_Manager_In_Memory : public Session_Manager
+ {
+ public:
+ /**
+ * @param max_sessions a hint on the maximum number of sessions
+ * to keep in memory at any one time. (If zero, don't cap)
+ * @param session_lifetime sessions are expired after this many
+ * seconds have elapsed from initial handshake.
+ */
+ Session_Manager_In_Memory(size_t max_sessions = 1000,
+ size_t session_lifetime = 7200) :
+ max_sessions(max_sessions),
+ session_lifetime(session_lifetime)
+ {}
+
+ bool load_from_session_id(const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_id,
+ Session& session);
+
+ bool load_from_host_info(const std::string& hostname, u16bit port,
+ Session& session);
+
+ void remove_entry(const MemoryRegion<byte>& session_id);
+
+ void save(const Session& session_data);
+
+ private:
+ bool load_from_session_str(const std::string& session_str,
+ Session& session);
+
+ size_t max_sessions, session_lifetime;
+
+ std::map<std::string, Session> sessions; // hex(session_id) -> session
+ std::map<std::string, std::string> host_sessions;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_version.cpp b/src/tls/tls_version.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4445998eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_version.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+* TLS Protocol Version Management
+* (C) 2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_version.h>
+#include <botan/parsing.h>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+std::string Protocol_Version::to_string() const
+ {
+ const byte maj = major_version();
+ const byte min = minor_version();
+
+ // Some very new or very old protocol?
+ if(maj != 3)
+ return "Protocol " + Botan::to_string(maj) + "." + Botan::to_string(min);
+
+ if(maj == 3 && min == 0)
+ return "SSL v3";
+
+ // The TLS v1.[0123...] case
+ return "TLS v1." + Botan::to_string(min-1);
+ }
+
+}
+
+}
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_version.h b/src/tls/tls_version.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa689b300
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_version.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+* TLS Protocol Version Management
+* (C) 2012 Jack Lloyd
+*
+* Released under the terms of the Botan license
+*/
+
+#ifndef BOTAN_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_H__
+#define BOTAN_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_H__
+
+#include <botan/get_byte.h>
+#include <string>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+class BOTAN_DLL Protocol_Version
+ {
+ public:
+ enum Version_Code {
+ SSL_V3 = 0x0300,
+ TLS_V10 = 0x0301,
+ TLS_V11 = 0x0302,
+ TLS_V12 = 0x0303
+ };
+
+ Protocol_Version() : m_version(0) {}
+
+ Protocol_Version(Version_Code named_version) :
+ m_version(static_cast<u16bit>(named_version)) {}
+
+ Protocol_Version(byte major, byte minor) :
+ m_version((static_cast<u16bit>(major) << 8) | minor) {}
+
+ /**
+ * Get the major version of the protocol version
+ */
+ byte major_version() const { return get_byte(0, m_version); }
+
+ /**
+ * Get the minor version of the protocol version
+ */
+ byte minor_version() const { return get_byte(1, m_version); }
+
+ bool operator==(const Protocol_Version& other) const
+ {
+ return (m_version == other.m_version);
+ }
+
+ bool operator!=(const Protocol_Version& other) const
+ {
+ return (m_version != other.m_version);
+ }
+
+ bool operator>=(const Protocol_Version& other) const
+ {
+ return (m_version >= other.m_version);
+ }
+
+ bool operator>(const Protocol_Version& other) const
+ {
+ return (m_version > other.m_version);
+ }
+
+ bool operator<=(const Protocol_Version& other) const
+ {
+ return (m_version <= other.m_version);
+ }
+
+ bool operator<(const Protocol_Version& other) const
+ {
+ return (m_version < other.m_version);
+ }
+
+ std::string to_string() const;
+
+ private:
+ u16bit m_version;
+ };
+
+}
+
+}
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/utils/assert.cpp b/src/utils/assert.cpp
index 29af831d8..3747912d6 100644
--- a/src/utils/assert.cpp
+++ b/src/utils/assert.cpp
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ void assertion_failure(const char* expr_str,
format << "Assertion " << expr_str << " failed ";
- if(msg)
+ if(msg && msg[0] != 0)
format << "(" << msg << ") ";
if(func)
diff --git a/src/utils/assert.h b/src/utils/assert.h
index 67ca665e3..d68f683a6 100644
--- a/src/utils/assert.h
+++ b/src/utils/assert.h
@@ -36,6 +36,16 @@ void assertion_failure(const char* expr_str,
__LINE__); \
} while(0)
+#define BOTAN_ASSERT_NONNULL(ptr) \
+ do { \
+ if(static_cast<bool>(ptr) == false) \
+ Botan::assertion_failure(#ptr " is not null", \
+ "", \
+ BOTAN_ASSERT_FUNCTION, \
+ __FILE__, \
+ __LINE__); \
+ } while(0)
+
/*
* Unfortunately getting the function name from the preprocessor
* isn't standard in C++98 (C++0x uses C99's __func__)
diff --git a/src/utils/parsing.cpp b/src/utils/parsing.cpp
index 9ec00040c..25f021c8c 100644
--- a/src/utils/parsing.cpp
+++ b/src/utils/parsing.cpp
@@ -288,4 +288,17 @@ std::string ipv4_to_string(u32bit ip)
return str;
}
+std::string replace_char(const std::string& str,
+ char from_char,
+ char to_char)
+ {
+ std::string out = str;
+
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != out.size(); ++i)
+ if(out[i] == from_char)
+ out[i] = to_char;
+
+ return out;
+ }
+
}
diff --git a/src/utils/parsing.h b/src/utils/parsing.h
index 12370bf2b..668272309 100644
--- a/src/utils/parsing.h
+++ b/src/utils/parsing.h
@@ -32,6 +32,16 @@ BOTAN_DLL std::vector<std::string> split_on(
const std::string& str, char delim);
/**
+* Replace a character in a string
+* @param str the input string
+* @param from_char the character to replace
+* @return to_char the character to replace it with
+*/
+BOTAN_DLL std::string replace_char(const std::string& str,
+ char from_char,
+ char to_char);
+
+/**
* Parse an ASN.1 OID
* @param oid the OID in string form
* @return OID components
diff --git a/src/utils/rounding.h b/src/utils/rounding.h
index c77ab9b52..4ddd7a432 100644
--- a/src/utils/rounding.h
+++ b/src/utils/rounding.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ namespace Botan {
template<typename T>
inline T round_up(T n, T align_to)
{
+ if(align_to == 0)
+ return n;
+
if(n % align_to || n == 0)
n += align_to - (n % align_to);
return n;
@@ -35,9 +38,24 @@ inline T round_up(T n, T align_to)
template<typename T>
inline T round_down(T n, T align_to)
{
+ if(align_to == 0)
+ return n;
+
return (n - (n % align_to));
}
+/**
+* Clamp
+*/
+inline size_t clamp(size_t n, size_t lower_bound, size_t upper_bound)
+ {
+ if(n < lower_bound)
+ return lower_bound;
+ if(n > upper_bound)
+ return upper_bound;
+ return n;
+ }
+
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/utils/stl_util.h b/src/utils/stl_util.h
index 0e0617d5b..9ae5c5f7a 100644
--- a/src/utils/stl_util.h
+++ b/src/utils/stl_util.h
@@ -84,6 +84,19 @@ void multimap_insert(std::multimap<K, V>& multimap,
#endif
}
+/**
+* Existence check for values
+*/
+template<typename T>
+bool value_exists(const std::vector<T>& vec,
+ const T& val)
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != vec.size(); ++i)
+ if(vec[i] == val)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+ }
+
}
#endif