diff options
author | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2017-08-03 07:31:03 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2017-08-03 10:37:00 -0400 |
commit | d1af646c365197de243c844d138f245d1dcac6ba (patch) | |
tree | de18e27d17c368dbcfdbe16c0d2ecdeb01ca8b06 /src/lib/rng | |
parent | 7edeec69f09fbed01881e93b0f45dbb038bfac73 (diff) |
Refactor stateful RNG tests to cover both HMAC_DRBG and ChaCha_RNG
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/rng')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.cpp | 33 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/rng/hmac_drbg/hmac_drbg.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/rng/stateful_rng/stateful_rng.h | 17 |
4 files changed, 38 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.cpp b/src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.cpp index 86c71f9fe..ceccfef2c 100644 --- a/src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.cpp +++ b/src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.cpp @@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ void ChaCha_RNG::clear() Stateful_RNG::clear(); m_hmac->set_key(std::vector<uint8_t>(m_hmac->output_length(), 0x00)); - m_chacha->set_key(m_hmac->final()); } void ChaCha_RNG::randomize(uint8_t output[], size_t output_len) @@ -68,28 +67,34 @@ void ChaCha_RNG::randomize(uint8_t output[], size_t output_len) void ChaCha_RNG::randomize_with_input(uint8_t output[], size_t output_len, const uint8_t input[], size_t input_len) { - add_entropy(input, input_len); reseed_check(); + if(input_len > 0) + { + update(input, input_len); + } + clear_mem(output, output_len); m_chacha->cipher1(output, output_len); } -void ChaCha_RNG::add_entropy(const uint8_t input[], size_t input_len) +void ChaCha_RNG::update(const uint8_t input[], size_t input_len) { - if(input_len > 0) - { - m_hmac->update(input, input_len); - m_chacha->set_key(m_hmac->final()); + m_hmac->update(input, input_len); + m_chacha->set_key(m_hmac->final()); - secure_vector<uint8_t> mac_key(m_hmac->output_length()); - m_chacha->cipher1(mac_key.data(), mac_key.size()); - m_hmac->set_key(mac_key); + secure_vector<uint8_t> mac_key(m_hmac->output_length()); + m_chacha->cipher1(mac_key.data(), mac_key.size()); + m_hmac->set_key(mac_key); + } - if(8*input_len >= security_level()) - { - m_reseed_counter = 1; - } +void ChaCha_RNG::add_entropy(const uint8_t input[], size_t input_len) + { + update(input, input_len); + + if(8*input_len >= security_level()) + { + m_reseed_counter = 1; } } diff --git a/src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.h b/src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.h index b6a763f62..7deaa2d89 100644 --- a/src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.h +++ b/src/lib/rng/chacha_rng/chacha_rng.h @@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ class BOTAN_DLL ChaCha_RNG final : public Stateful_RNG size_t security_level() const override; + size_t max_number_of_bytes_per_request() const override { return 0; } + private: void update(const uint8_t input[], size_t input_len); diff --git a/src/lib/rng/hmac_drbg/hmac_drbg.h b/src/lib/rng/hmac_drbg/hmac_drbg.h index 1c95cb304..4d3faa082 100644 --- a/src/lib/rng/hmac_drbg/hmac_drbg.h +++ b/src/lib/rng/hmac_drbg/hmac_drbg.h @@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ class BOTAN_DLL HMAC_DRBG final : public Stateful_RNG size_t security_level() const override; + size_t max_number_of_bytes_per_request() const override + { return m_max_number_of_bytes_per_request; } + private: void update(const uint8_t input[], size_t input_len); diff --git a/src/lib/rng/stateful_rng/stateful_rng.h b/src/lib/rng/stateful_rng/stateful_rng.h index ed51aac6a..0d59d396b 100644 --- a/src/lib/rng/stateful_rng/stateful_rng.h +++ b/src/lib/rng/stateful_rng/stateful_rng.h @@ -103,12 +103,23 @@ class BOTAN_DLL Stateful_RNG : public RandomNumberGenerator */ virtual size_t security_level() const = 0; + /** + * Some DRBGs have a notion of the maximum number of bytes per + * request. Longer requests (to randomize) will be treated as + * multiple requests, and may initiate reseeding multiple times, + * depending on the values of max_number_of_bytes_per_request and + * reseed_interval(). This function returns zero if the RNG in + * question does not have such a notion. + * + * @return max number of bytes per request (or zero) + */ + virtual size_t max_number_of_bytes_per_request() const = 0; + + size_t reseed_interval() const { return m_reseed_interval; } + void clear() override; protected: - /** - * Called with lock held - */ void reseed_check(); uint32_t last_pid() const { return m_last_pid; } |