diff options
author | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2018-02-18 12:01:43 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2018-02-18 13:37:42 -0500 |
commit | 9772e10e3112f9b14669d372574bcc01981028f2 (patch) | |
tree | db1a4c6aa745ff73dd52da6dcc57a812901d3e8a /src/lib/pubkey/ecdsa/ecdsa.cpp | |
parent | 292c32bd73b3c114621ac2e4a668f6aca02c0cea (diff) |
Add functions to reduce integers mod the order to EC_Group
This allows calculating the Barett reduction params just once,
when the group is initialized, then sharing them across all
operations which use that group.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/pubkey/ecdsa/ecdsa.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/pubkey/ecdsa/ecdsa.cpp | 66 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/pubkey/ecdsa/ecdsa.cpp b/src/lib/pubkey/ecdsa/ecdsa.cpp index 96bc50ec0..163936c08 100644 --- a/src/lib/pubkey/ecdsa/ecdsa.cpp +++ b/src/lib/pubkey/ecdsa/ecdsa.cpp @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * ECDSA implemenation * (C) 2007 Manuel Hartl, FlexSecure GmbH * 2007 Falko Strenzke, FlexSecure GmbH -* 2008-2010,2015,2016 Jack Lloyd +* 2008-2010,2015,2016,2018 Jack Lloyd * 2016 René Korthaus * * Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt) @@ -52,26 +52,25 @@ class ECDSA_Signature_Operation final : public PK_Ops::Signature_with_EMSA ECDSA_Signature_Operation(const ECDSA_PrivateKey& ecdsa, const std::string& emsa) : PK_Ops::Signature_with_EMSA(emsa), - m_order(ecdsa.domain().get_order()), - m_base_point(ecdsa.domain().get_base_point(), m_order), - m_x(ecdsa.private_value()), - m_mod_order(m_order) + m_group(ecdsa.domain()), + m_base_point(m_group.get_base_point(), m_group.get_order()), + m_x(ecdsa.private_value()) { #if defined(BOTAN_HAS_RFC6979_GENERATOR) m_rfc6979_hash = hash_for_emsa(emsa); #endif } - size_t max_input_bits() const override { return m_order.bits(); } + size_t max_input_bits() const override { return m_group.get_order_bits(); } secure_vector<uint8_t> raw_sign(const uint8_t msg[], size_t msg_len, - RandomNumberGenerator& rng) override; + RandomNumberGenerator& rng) override; private: - const BigInt& m_order; + const EC_Group m_group; Blinded_Point_Multiply m_base_point; const BigInt& m_x; - Modular_Reducer m_mod_order; + #if defined(BOTAN_HAS_RFC6979_GENERATOR) std::string m_rfc6979_hash; #endif @@ -84,20 +83,21 @@ ECDSA_Signature_Operation::raw_sign(const uint8_t msg[], size_t msg_len, const BigInt m(msg, msg_len); #if defined(BOTAN_HAS_RFC6979_GENERATOR) - const BigInt k = generate_rfc6979_nonce(m_x, m_order, m, m_rfc6979_hash); + const BigInt k = generate_rfc6979_nonce(m_x, m_group.get_order(), m, m_rfc6979_hash); #else - const BigInt k = BigInt::random_integer(rng, 1, m_order); + const BigInt k = BigInt::random_integer(rng, 1, m_group.get_order()); #endif + const BigInt k_inv = inverse_mod(k, m_group.get_order()); const PointGFp k_times_P = m_base_point.blinded_multiply(k, rng); - const BigInt r = m_mod_order.reduce(k_times_P.get_affine_x()); - const BigInt s = m_mod_order.multiply(inverse_mod(k, m_order), mul_add(m_x, r, m)); + const BigInt r = m_group.mod_order(k_times_P.get_affine_x()); + const BigInt s = m_group.multiply_mod_order(k_inv, mul_add(m_x, r, m)); // With overwhelming probability, a bug rather than actual zero r/s - BOTAN_ASSERT(s != 0, "invalid s"); - BOTAN_ASSERT(r != 0, "invalid r"); + if(r.is_zero() || s.is_zero()) + throw Internal_Error("During ECDSA signature generated zero r/s"); - return BigInt::encode_fixed_length_int_pair(r, s, m_order.bytes()); + return BigInt::encode_fixed_length_int_pair(r, s, m_group.get_order_bytes()); } /** @@ -109,52 +109,46 @@ class ECDSA_Verification_Operation final : public PK_Ops::Verification_with_EMSA ECDSA_Verification_Operation(const ECDSA_PublicKey& ecdsa, const std::string& emsa) : PK_Ops::Verification_with_EMSA(emsa), - m_base_point(ecdsa.domain().get_base_point()), - m_public_point(ecdsa.public_point()), - m_order(ecdsa.domain().get_order()), - m_mod_order(m_order) + m_group(ecdsa.domain()), + m_public_point(ecdsa.public_point()) { - //m_public_point.precompute_multiples(); } - size_t max_input_bits() const override { return m_order.bits(); } + size_t max_input_bits() const override { return m_group.get_order_bits(); } bool with_recovery() const override { return false; } bool verify(const uint8_t msg[], size_t msg_len, const uint8_t sig[], size_t sig_len) override; private: - const PointGFp& m_base_point; + const EC_Group m_group; const PointGFp& m_public_point; - const BigInt& m_order; - // FIXME: should be offered by curve - Modular_Reducer m_mod_order; }; bool ECDSA_Verification_Operation::verify(const uint8_t msg[], size_t msg_len, const uint8_t sig[], size_t sig_len) { - if(sig_len != m_order.bytes()*2) + if(sig_len != m_group.get_order_bytes() * 2) return false; - BigInt e(msg, msg_len); + const BigInt e(msg, msg_len); - BigInt r(sig, sig_len / 2); - BigInt s(sig + sig_len / 2, sig_len / 2); + const BigInt r(sig, sig_len / 2); + const BigInt s(sig + sig_len / 2, sig_len / 2); - if(r <= 0 || r >= m_order || s <= 0 || s >= m_order) + if(r <= 0 || r >= m_group.get_order() || s <= 0 || s >= m_group.get_order()) return false; - BigInt w = inverse_mod(s, m_order); + const BigInt w = inverse_mod(s, m_group.get_order()); - const BigInt u1 = m_mod_order.reduce(e * w); - const BigInt u2 = m_mod_order.reduce(r * w); - const PointGFp R = multi_exponentiate(m_base_point, u1, m_public_point, u2); + const BigInt u1 = m_group.multiply_mod_order(e, w); + const BigInt u2 = m_group.multiply_mod_order(r, w); + const PointGFp R = multi_exponentiate(m_group.get_base_point(), u1, m_public_point, u2); if(R.is_zero()) return false; - const BigInt v = m_mod_order.reduce(R.get_affine_x()); + const BigInt v = m_group.mod_order(R.get_affine_x()); return (v == r); } |