diff options
author | Simon Warta <[email protected]> | 2015-07-24 23:46:44 +0200 |
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committer | Simon Warta <[email protected]> | 2015-07-24 23:46:44 +0200 |
commit | 550d9fd71cf6c78c86cc5a695fafa17e72ae6b18 (patch) | |
tree | 618d748b2696c50b911e55ef61dea3df30aad232 /src/lib/entropy | |
parent | 99a11fd5f6d54b599fc5878364df8a9d6f024ad3 (diff) |
Fix typos
Thanks to @vlajos https://github.com/vlajos/misspell_fixer
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/entropy')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp b/src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp index 74876e203..178c52798 100644 --- a/src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp +++ b/src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ void Intel_Rdrand::poll(Entropy_Accumulator& accum) Even if backdoored, rdrand cannot harm us because the HMAC_RNG poll process is designed to handle arbitrarily large amounts of attacker known/chosen input (or even a reseed where every bit we reseeded with was attacker chosen), - as long as at least one seed occured with enough unknown-to-attacker entropy. + as long as at least one seed occurred with enough unknown-to-attacker entropy. */ const double ENTROPY_ESTIMATE = 0.0; const size_t RDRAND_POLLS = 32; |