aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJack Lloyd <[email protected]>2015-12-19 18:55:35 -0500
committerJack Lloyd <[email protected]>2015-12-19 18:55:35 -0500
commit93737a7fe053b154ec56197d85c1b3f009826539 (patch)
tree02af9208ed3bf8da2d9b0c70e1543b8a169747db /src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp
parentcd4b4c04aa045c7bd660360f426c3964c6755306 (diff)
Move estimate of RDRAND/RDSEED entropy to build.h
GH #370 for background
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp12
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp b/src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp
index 178c52798..24fe98cf8 100644
--- a/src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp
+++ b/src/lib/entropy/rdrand/rdrand.cpp
@@ -22,16 +22,6 @@ void Intel_Rdrand::poll(Entropy_Accumulator& accum)
if(!CPUID::has_rdrand())
return;
- /*
- Don't consider rdrand as contributing any entropy to the poll. It doesn't
- make sense to trust uninspectible hardware.
-
- Even if backdoored, rdrand cannot harm us because the HMAC_RNG poll process
- is designed to handle arbitrarily large amounts of attacker known/chosen
- input (or even a reseed where every bit we reseeded with was attacker chosen),
- as long as at least one seed occurred with enough unknown-to-attacker entropy.
- */
- const double ENTROPY_ESTIMATE = 0.0;
const size_t RDRAND_POLLS = 32;
for(size_t i = 0; i != RDRAND_POLLS; ++i)
@@ -49,7 +39,7 @@ void Intel_Rdrand::poll(Entropy_Accumulator& accum)
#endif
if(cf == 1)
- accum.add(r, ENTROPY_ESTIMATE);
+ accum.add(r, BOTAN_ENTROPY_ESTIMATE_HARDWARE_RNG);
}
}