Substantially change Randpool's reseed logic. Now when a reseed

is requested, Randpool will first do a fast poll on each entropy
source that has been registered. It will count these poll results
towards the collected entropy count, with a maximum of 96
contributed bits of entropy per poll (only /dev/random reaches
this, others measure at 50-60 bits typically), and a maximum of
256 for sum contribution of the fast polls.

Then it will attempt slow polls of all devices until it thinks enough
entropy has been collected (using the rather naive entropy_estimate
function). It will count any slow poll for no more than 256 bits (100 or
so is typical for every poll but /dev/random), and will attempt to collect
at least 512 bits of (estimated/guessed) entropy.

This tends to cause Randpool to use significantly more
sources. Previously it was common, especially on systems with a
/dev/random, for only one or a few sources to be used. This
change helps assure that even if /dev/random and company are
broken or compromised the RNG output remains secure (assuming at
least some amount of entropy unguessable by the attacker can be
collected via other sources).

Also change AutoSeeded_RNG do an automatic poll/seed when it is
created.

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/src/entropy/egd/es_egd.cpp b/src/entropy/egd/es_egd.cpp
index 8390552c6..41c7d29f2 100644
--- a/src/entropy/egd/es_egd.cpp
+++ b/src/entropy/egd/es_egd.cpp
@@ -75,11 +75,11 @@ u32bit EGD_EntropySource::slow_poll(byte output[], u32bit length)
    }
 
 /**
-* Gather Entropy from EGD, limiting to 32 bytes
+* Gather Entropy from EGD, limiting to 64 bytes
 */
 u32bit EGD_EntropySource::fast_poll(byte output[], u32bit length)
    {
-   return slow_poll(output, std::max<u32bit>(length, 64));
+   return slow_poll(output, std::min<u32bit>(length, 64));
    }
 
 }