diff options
author | lloyd <[email protected]> | 2014-01-01 21:20:55 +0000 |
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committer | lloyd <[email protected]> | 2014-01-01 21:20:55 +0000 |
commit | 197dc467dec28a04c3b2f30da7cef122dfbb13e9 (patch) | |
tree | cdbd3ddaec051c72f0a757db461973d90c37b97a /lib/modes/cbc/cbc.cpp | |
parent | 62faac373c07cfe10bc8c309e89ebdd30d8e5eaa (diff) |
Shuffle things around. Add NIST X.509 test to build.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/modes/cbc/cbc.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/modes/cbc/cbc.cpp | 299 |
1 files changed, 299 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/modes/cbc/cbc.cpp b/lib/modes/cbc/cbc.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..31834bade --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/modes/cbc/cbc.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +/* +* CBC Mode +* (C) 1999-2007,2013 Jack Lloyd +* +* Distributed under the terms of the Botan license +*/ + +#include <botan/cbc.h> +#include <botan/loadstor.h> +#include <botan/internal/xor_buf.h> +#include <botan/internal/rounding.h> + +namespace Botan { + +CBC_Mode::CBC_Mode(BlockCipher* cipher, BlockCipherModePaddingMethod* padding) : + m_cipher(cipher), + m_padding(padding), + m_state(m_cipher->block_size()) + { + if(m_padding && !m_padding->valid_blocksize(cipher->block_size())) + throw std::invalid_argument("Padding " + m_padding->name() + + " cannot be used with " + + cipher->name() + "/CBC"); + } + +void CBC_Mode::clear() + { + m_cipher->clear(); + m_state.clear(); + } + +std::string CBC_Mode::name() const + { + if(m_padding) + return cipher().name() + "/CBC/" + padding().name(); + else + return cipher().name() + "/CBC/CTS"; + } + +size_t CBC_Mode::update_granularity() const + { + return cipher().parallel_bytes(); + } + +Key_Length_Specification CBC_Mode::key_spec() const + { + return cipher().key_spec(); + } + +size_t CBC_Mode::default_nonce_length() const + { + return cipher().block_size(); + } + +bool CBC_Mode::valid_nonce_length(size_t n) const + { + return (n == 0 || n == cipher().block_size()); + } + +void CBC_Mode::key_schedule(const byte key[], size_t length) + { + m_cipher->set_key(key, length); + } + +secure_vector<byte> CBC_Mode::start(const byte nonce[], size_t nonce_len) + { + if(!valid_nonce_length(nonce_len)) + throw Invalid_IV_Length(name(), nonce_len); + + /* + * A nonce of zero length means carry the last ciphertext value over + * as the new IV, as unfortunately some protocols require this. If + * this is the first message then we use an IV of all zeros. + */ + if(nonce_len) + m_state.assign(nonce, nonce + nonce_len); + + return secure_vector<byte>(); + } + +size_t CBC_Encryption::minimum_final_size() const + { + return 0; + } + +size_t CBC_Encryption::output_length(size_t input_length) const + { + return round_up(input_length, cipher().block_size()); + } + +void CBC_Encryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + const size_t BS = cipher().block_size(); + + BOTAN_ASSERT(sz % BS == 0, "CBC input is full blocks"); + const size_t blocks = sz / BS; + + if(blocks) + { + xor_buf(&buf[0], state_ptr(), BS); + cipher().encrypt(&buf[0]); + + for(size_t i = 1; i != blocks; ++i) + { + xor_buf(&buf[BS*i], &buf[BS*(i-1)], BS); + cipher().encrypt(&buf[BS*i]); + } + + state().assign(&buf[BS*(blocks-1)], &buf[BS*blocks]); + } + } + +void CBC_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + + const size_t BS = cipher().block_size(); + + const size_t bytes_in_final_block = (buffer.size()-offset) % BS; + + padding().add_padding(buffer, bytes_in_final_block, BS); + + if((buffer.size()-offset) % BS) + throw std::runtime_error("Did not pad to full block size in " + name()); + + update(buffer, offset); + } + +bool CTS_Encryption::valid_nonce_length(size_t n) const + { + return (n == cipher().block_size()); + } + +size_t CTS_Encryption::minimum_final_size() const + { + return cipher().block_size() + 1; + } + +size_t CTS_Encryption::output_length(size_t input_length) const + { + return input_length; // no ciphertext expansion in CTS + } + +void CTS_Encryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + + const size_t BS = cipher().block_size(); + + if(sz < BS + 1) + throw Encoding_Error(name() + ": insufficient data to encrypt"); + + if(sz % BS == 0) + { + update(buffer, offset); + + // swap last two blocks + for(size_t i = 0; i != BS; ++i) + std::swap(buffer[buffer.size()-BS+i], buffer[buffer.size()-2*BS+i]); + } + else + { + const size_t full_blocks = ((sz / BS) - 1) * BS; + const size_t final_bytes = sz - full_blocks; + BOTAN_ASSERT(final_bytes > BS && final_bytes < 2*BS, "Left over size in expected range"); + + secure_vector<byte> last(buf + full_blocks, buf + full_blocks + final_bytes); + buffer.resize(full_blocks + offset); + update(buffer, offset); + + xor_buf(&last[0], state_ptr(), BS); + cipher().encrypt(&last[0]); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != final_bytes - BS; ++i) + { + std::swap(last[i], last[i + BS]); + last[i] ^= last[i + BS]; + } + + cipher().encrypt(&last[0]); + + buffer += last; + } + } + +size_t CBC_Decryption::output_length(size_t input_length) const + { + return input_length; // precise for CTS, worst case otherwise + } + +size_t CBC_Decryption::minimum_final_size() const + { + return cipher().block_size(); + } + +void CBC_Decryption::update(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + const size_t BS = cipher().block_size(); + + BOTAN_ASSERT(sz % BS == 0, "Input is full blocks"); + size_t blocks = sz / BS; + + while(blocks) + { + const size_t to_proc = std::min(BS * blocks, m_tempbuf.size()); + + cipher().decrypt_n(buf, &m_tempbuf[0], to_proc / BS); + + xor_buf(&m_tempbuf[0], state_ptr(), BS); + xor_buf(&m_tempbuf[BS], buf, to_proc - BS); + copy_mem(state_ptr(), buf + (to_proc - BS), BS); + + copy_mem(buf, &m_tempbuf[0], to_proc); + + buf += to_proc; + blocks -= to_proc / BS; + } + } + +void CBC_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + + const size_t BS = cipher().block_size(); + + if(sz == 0 || sz % BS) + throw Decoding_Error(name() + ": Ciphertext not a multiple of block size"); + + update(buffer, offset); + + const size_t pad_bytes = BS - padding().unpad(&buffer[buffer.size()-BS], BS); + buffer.resize(buffer.size() - pad_bytes); // remove padding + } + +bool CTS_Decryption::valid_nonce_length(size_t n) const + { + return (n == cipher().block_size()); + } + +size_t CTS_Decryption::minimum_final_size() const + { + return cipher().block_size() + 1; + } + +void CTS_Decryption::finish(secure_vector<byte>& buffer, size_t offset) + { + BOTAN_ASSERT(buffer.size() >= offset, "Offset is sane"); + const size_t sz = buffer.size() - offset; + byte* buf = &buffer[offset]; + + const size_t BS = cipher().block_size(); + + if(sz < BS + 1) + throw Encoding_Error(name() + ": insufficient data to decrypt"); + + if(sz % BS == 0) + { + // swap last two blocks + for(size_t i = 0; i != BS; ++i) + std::swap(buffer[buffer.size()-BS+i], buffer[buffer.size()-2*BS+i]); + + update(buffer, offset); + } + else + { + const size_t full_blocks = ((sz / BS) - 1) * BS; + const size_t final_bytes = sz - full_blocks; + BOTAN_ASSERT(final_bytes > BS && final_bytes < 2*BS, "Left over size in expected range"); + + secure_vector<byte> last(buf + full_blocks, buf + full_blocks + final_bytes); + buffer.resize(full_blocks + offset); + update(buffer, offset); + + cipher().decrypt(&last[0]); + xor_buf(&last[0], &last[BS], final_bytes - BS); + + for(size_t i = 0; i != final_bytes - BS; ++i) + std::swap(last[i], last[i + BS]); + + cipher().decrypt(&last[0]); + xor_buf(&last[0], state_ptr(), BS); + + buffer += last; + } + + } + +} |