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authorlloyd <[email protected]>2010-02-01 16:29:38 +0000
committerlloyd <[email protected]>2010-02-01 16:29:38 +0000
commit454e45b7c4fece11a7f43ffa412148b4a274c90f (patch)
tree5ae87c2104fba534548e59fa477d6a5f2f5a5e29 /doc
parentae6a404ec14cc3c86a96cd3e5c67c9c23be38147 (diff)
Modify the S2K interface. Instead of being stateful in terms of the salt
and iteration count, force it to be passed to each call to derive_key. So remove current_salt, set_iterations, new_random_salt, and change_salt functions from S2K interface. Update examples and test application to match. While I was in there, change the passhash example to use 64 bit salts and 128 bit PBKDF2 outputs.
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r--doc/api.tex81
-rw-r--r--doc/examples/decrypt.cpp20
-rw-r--r--doc/examples/encrypt.cpp21
-rw-r--r--doc/examples/encrypt2.cpp15
-rw-r--r--doc/examples/passhash.cpp27
-rw-r--r--doc/examples/row_encryptor.cpp7
6 files changed, 99 insertions, 72 deletions
diff --git a/doc/api.tex b/doc/api.tex
index 556e76aa0..20177a9f8 100644
--- a/doc/api.tex
+++ b/doc/api.tex
@@ -2621,53 +2621,46 @@ degree of applicability.
\subsection{S2K Algorithms}
-There are various procedures (usually fairly ad-hoc) for turning a passphrase
-into a (mostly) arbitrary length key for a symmetric cipher. A general
-interface for such algorithms is presented in \filename{s2k.h}. The main
-function is \function{derive\_key}, which takes a passphrase, and the desired
-length of the output key, and returns a key of that length, deterministically
-produced from the passphrase. If an algorithm can't produce a key of that size,
-it will throw an exception (most notably, PKCS \#5's PBKDF1 can only produce
-strings between 1 and $n$ bytes, where $n$ is the output size of the underlying
-hash function).
-
-Most such algorithms allow the use of a ``salt'', which provides some extra
-randomness and helps against dictionary attacks on the passphrase. Simply call
-\function{change\_salt} (there are variations of it for most of the ways you
-might wish to specify a salt, check the header for details) with a block of
-random data. You can also have the class generate a new salt for you with
-\function{new\_random\_salt}; the salt that was generated can be retrieved with
-\function{current\_salt}.
-
-Additionally some algorithms allow you to set some sort of iteration
-count, which will make the algorithm take longer to compute the final
-key (reducing the speed of brute-force attacks of various kinds). This
-can be changed with the \function{set\_iterations} function. Most
-standards recommend an iteration count of at least 1000. Currently
-defined S2K algorithms are ``PBKDF1(digest)'', ``PBKDF2(digest)'', and
-``OpenPGP-S2K(digest)''; you can retrieve any of these using the
-\function{get\_s2k}, found in \filename{lookup.h}. As of this writing,
-``PBKDF2(SHA-256)'' with 10000 iterations and an 8 byte salt is
-recommend for new applications.
+There are various procedures (usually fairly ad-hoc) for turning a
+passphrase into a (mostly) arbitrary length key for a symmetric
+cipher. A general interface for such algorithms is presented in
+\filename{s2k.h}. The main function is \function{derive\_key}, which
+takes a passphrase, a salt, an iteration count, and the desired length
+of the output key, and returns a key of that length, deterministically
+produced from the passphrase and salt. If an algorithm can't produce a
+key of that size, it will throw an exception (most notably, PKCS \#5's
+PBKDF1 can only produce strings between 1 and $n$ bytes, where $n$ is
+the output size of the underlying hash function).
+
+The purpose of the iteration count is to make the algorithm take
+longer to compute the final key (reducing the speed of brute-force
+attacks of various kinds). Most standards recommend an iteration count
+of at least 10000. Currently defined S2K algorithms are
+``PBKDF1(digest)'', ``PBKDF2(digest)'', and ``OpenPGP-S2K(digest)'';
+you can retrieve any of these using the \function{get\_s2k}, found in
+\filename{lookup.h}. As of this writing, ``PBKDF2(SHA-256)'' with
+10000 iterations and a 16 byte salt is recommend for new applications.
\subsubsection{OpenPGP S2K}
-There are some oddities about OpenPGP's S2K algorithms that are documented
-here. For one thing, it uses the iteration count in a strange manner; instead
-of specifying how many times to iterate the hash, it tells how many
-\emph{bytes} should be hashed in total (including the salt). So the exact
-iteration count will depend on the size of the salt (which is fixed at 8 bytes
-by the OpenPGP standard, though the implementation will allow any salt size)
-and the size of the passphrase.
-
-To get what OpenPGP calls ``Simple S2K'', set iterations to 0 (the default for
-OpenPGP S2K), and do not specify a salt. To get ``Salted S2K'', again leave the
-iteration count at 0, but give an 8-byte salt. ``Salted and Iterated S2K''
-requires an 8-byte salt and some iteration count (this should be significantly
-larger than the size of the longest passphrase that might reasonably be used;
-somewhere from 1024 to 65536 would probably be about right). Using both a
-reasonably sized salt and a large iteration count is highly recommended to
-prevent password guessing attempts.
+There are some oddities about OpenPGP's S2K algorithms that are
+documented here. For one thing, it uses the iteration count in a
+strange manner; instead of specifying how many times to iterate the
+hash, it tells how many \emph{bytes} should be hashed in total
+(including the salt). So the exact iteration count will depend on the
+size of the salt (which is fixed at 8 bytes by the OpenPGP standard,
+though the implementation will allow any salt size) and the size of
+the passphrase.
+
+To get what OpenPGP calls ``Simple S2K'', set iterations to 0, and do
+not specify a salt. To get ``Salted S2K'', again leave the iteration
+count at 0, but give an 8-byte salt. ``Salted and Iterated S2K''
+requires an 8-byte salt and some iteration count (this should be
+significantly larger than the size of the longest passphrase that
+might reasonably be used; somewhere from 1024 to 65536 would probably
+be about right). Using both a reasonably sized salt and a large
+iteration count is highly recommended to prevent password guessing
+attempts.
\subsection{Checksums}
diff --git a/doc/examples/decrypt.cpp b/doc/examples/decrypt.cpp
index ebab5d804..de261b5f3 100644
--- a/doc/examples/decrypt.cpp
+++ b/doc/examples/decrypt.cpp
@@ -106,12 +106,22 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
const u32bit iv_len = block_size_of(algo);
std::auto_ptr<S2K> s2k(get_s2k("PBKDF2(SHA-1)"));
- s2k->set_iterations(8192);
- s2k->change_salt(b64_decode(salt_str));
- SymmetricKey bc_key = s2k->derive_key(key_len, "BLK" + passphrase);
- InitializationVector iv = s2k->derive_key(iv_len, "IVL" + passphrase);
- SymmetricKey mac_key = s2k->derive_key(16, "MAC" + passphrase);
+ const u32bit PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 8192;
+
+ SecureVector<byte> salt = b64_decode(salt_str);
+
+ SymmetricKey bc_key = s2k->derive_key(key_len, "BLK" + passphrase,
+ &salt[0], salt.size(),
+ PBKDF2_ITERATIONS);
+
+ InitializationVector iv = s2k->derive_key(iv_len, "IVL" + passphrase,
+ &salt[0], salt.size(),
+ PBKDF2_ITERATIONS);
+
+ SymmetricKey mac_key = s2k->derive_key(16, "MAC" + passphrase,
+ &salt[0], salt.size(),
+ PBKDF2_ITERATIONS);
Pipe pipe(new Base64_Decoder,
get_cipher(algo + "/CBC", bc_key, iv, DECRYPTION),
diff --git a/doc/examples/encrypt.cpp b/doc/examples/encrypt.cpp
index f903c2f24..4999fa086 100644
--- a/doc/examples/encrypt.cpp
+++ b/doc/examples/encrypt.cpp
@@ -125,17 +125,26 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
AutoSeeded_RNG rng;
std::auto_ptr<S2K> s2k(get_s2k("PBKDF2(SHA-1)"));
- s2k->set_iterations(8192);
- s2k->new_random_salt(rng, 8);
- SymmetricKey bc_key = s2k->derive_key(key_len, "BLK" + passphrase);
- InitializationVector iv = s2k->derive_key(iv_len, "IVL" + passphrase);
- SymmetricKey mac_key = s2k->derive_key(16, "MAC" + passphrase);
+ SecureVector<byte> salt(8);
+ rng.randomize(&salt[0], salt.size());
+
+ const u32bit PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 8192;
+
+ SymmetricKey bc_key = s2k->derive_key(key_len, "BLK" + passphrase,
+ &salt[0], salt.size(),
+ PBKDF2_ITERATIONS);
+ InitializationVector iv = s2k->derive_key(iv_len, "IVL" + passphrase,
+ &salt[0], salt.size(),
+ PBKDF2_ITERATIONS);
+ SymmetricKey mac_key = s2k->derive_key(16, "MAC" + passphrase,
+ &salt[0], salt.size(),
+ PBKDF2_ITERATIONS);
// Just to be all fancy we even write a (simple) header.
out << "-------- ENCRYPTED FILE --------" << std::endl;
out << algo << std::endl;
- out << b64_encode(s2k->current_salt()) << std::endl;
+ out << b64_encode(salt) << std::endl;
Pipe pipe(new Fork(
new Chain(new MAC_Filter("HMAC(SHA-1)", mac_key),
diff --git a/doc/examples/encrypt2.cpp b/doc/examples/encrypt2.cpp
index dac2f8314..41f4fb478 100644
--- a/doc/examples/encrypt2.cpp
+++ b/doc/examples/encrypt2.cpp
@@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ int main()
PKCS5_PBKDF2 pbkdf2(new HMAC(new SHA_160));
- pbkdf2.set_iterations(4096);
- pbkdf2.new_random_salt(rng, 8);
- SecureVector<byte> the_salt = pbkdf2.current_salt();
+ const u32bit PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 8192;
- SecureVector<byte> master_key = pbkdf2.derive_key(48, passphrase).bits_of();
+ SecureVector<byte> salt(8);
+ rng.randomize(&salt[0], salt.size());
+
+ SecureVector<byte> master_key = pbkdf2.derive_key(48, passphrase,
+ &salt[0], salt.size(),
+ PBKDF2_ITERATIONS).bits_of();
KDF* kdf = get_kdf("KDF2(SHA-1)");
SymmetricKey key = kdf->derive_key(20, master_key, "cipher key");
+
SymmetricKey mac_key = kdf->derive_key(20, master_key, "hmac key");
+
InitializationVector iv = kdf->derive_key(8, master_key, "cipher iv");
Pipe pipe(new Fork(
@@ -50,7 +55,7 @@ int main()
)
);
- outfile.write((const char*)the_salt.begin(), the_salt.size());
+ outfile.write((const char*)salt.begin(), salt.size());
pipe.start_msg();
infile >> pipe;
diff --git a/doc/examples/passhash.cpp b/doc/examples/passhash.cpp
index 24f7ff674..8c50de072 100644
--- a/doc/examples/passhash.cpp
+++ b/doc/examples/passhash.cpp
@@ -55,18 +55,26 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
return 0;
}
+const u32bit SALT_BYTES = 8; // 64 bits of salt
+const u32bit PBKDF_OUTPUT_LEN = 16; // 128 bits output
+const u32bit KDF_ITERATIONS = 100000;
+
std::string password_hash(const std::string& pass,
RandomNumberGenerator& rng)
{
PKCS5_PBKDF2 kdf(new HMAC(new SHA_160));
- kdf.set_iterations(10000);
- kdf.new_random_salt(rng, 6); // 48 bits
+ SecureVector<byte> salt(SALT_BYTES);
+ rng.randomize(&salt[0], salt.size());
+
+ // Encode the salt plus 96 bits of PBKDF2 output
Pipe pipe(new Base64_Encoder);
pipe.start_msg();
- pipe.write(kdf.current_salt());
- pipe.write(kdf.derive_key(12, pass).bits_of());
+ pipe.write(salt);
+ pipe.write(kdf.derive_key(PBKDF_OUTPUT_LEN, pass,
+ &salt[0], salt.size(),
+ KDF_ITERATIONS).bits_of());
pipe.end_msg();
return pipe.read_all_as_string();
@@ -81,12 +89,15 @@ bool password_hash_ok(const std::string& pass, const std::string& hash)
SecureVector<byte> hash_bin = pipe.read_all();
- PKCS5_PBKDF2 kdf(new HMAC(new SHA_160));
+ if(hash_bin.size() != (PBKDF_OUTPUT_LEN + SALT_BYTES))
+ return false;
- kdf.set_iterations(10000);
- kdf.change_salt(hash_bin, 6);
+ PKCS5_PBKDF2 kdf(new HMAC(new SHA_160));
- SecureVector<byte> cmp = kdf.derive_key(12, pass).bits_of();
+ SecureVector<byte> cmp = kdf.derive_key(
+ PBKDF_OUTPUT_LEN, pass,
+ &hash_bin[0], SALT_BYTES,
+ KDF_ITERATIONS).bits_of();
return same_mem(cmp.begin(), hash_bin.begin() + 6, 12);
}
diff --git a/doc/examples/row_encryptor.cpp b/doc/examples/row_encryptor.cpp
index 17f44ce7b..7c234105d 100644
--- a/doc/examples/row_encryptor.cpp
+++ b/doc/examples/row_encryptor.cpp
@@ -66,10 +66,9 @@ void Row_Encryptor::init(const std::string& passphrase)
{
std::auto_ptr<S2K> s2k(get_s2k("PBKDF2(SHA-160)"));
- s2k->set_iterations(10000);
- s2k->change_salt(&s2k_salt[0], s2k_salt.size());
-
- SecureVector<byte> key = s2k->derive_key(32, passphrase).bits_of();
+ SecureVector<byte> key = s2k->derive_key(32, passphrase,
+ &s2k_salt[0], s2k_salt.size(),
+ 10000).bits_of();
/*
Save pointers to the EAX objects so we can change the IV as needed