diff options
author | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2016-11-28 05:31:02 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2016-11-28 05:31:02 -0500 |
commit | 987ad747db6d0d7e36f840398f3cf02e2fbfd90f (patch) | |
tree | e01b3845dc61e7f96bd00b3c73443576dabbb23e /doc | |
parent | 71406354a1ec7c2021b92e051ede72fe0466639a (diff) | |
parent | 06a93345fb715dfaefbdb5774ec66eff46fdfaa3 (diff) |
Fix BER decoder integer overflow
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/security.rst | 11 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/doc/security.rst b/doc/security.rst index faefca7d5..151c279f6 100644 --- a/doc/security.rst +++ b/doc/security.rst @@ -21,7 +21,16 @@ Advisories 2016 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ -* 2016-10-8871 (CVE-2016-8871) OAEP side channel +* 2016-11-27 (CVE-2016-xxxx) Integer overflow in BER decoder + + While decoding BER length fields, an integer overflow could occur. This could + occur while parsing untrusted inputs such as X.509 certificates. The overflow + does not seem to lead to any obviously exploitable condition, but exploitation + cannot be positively ruled out. Only 32-bit platforms are likely affected; to + cause an overflow on 64-bit the parsed data would have to be many gigabytes. + Bug found by Falko Strenzke, cryptosource GmbH. + +* 2016-10-26 (CVE-2016-8871) OAEP side channel A side channel in OAEP decoding could be used to distinguish RSA ciphertexts that did or did not have a leading 0 byte. For an attacker capable of |