diff options
author | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2015-11-24 17:46:07 -0500 |
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committer | Jack Lloyd <[email protected]> | 2015-11-24 17:46:07 -0500 |
commit | bf59ffc4de374d7b27b7ab400789ab2723131b7a (patch) | |
tree | ee0a64e937546cbe0528124d37dd9ffbaeaa788c | |
parent | b4f9ea55bf9cec36d3f3054c2da66a240f11b9c3 (diff) |
Updates for news, readme
[ci skip]
-rw-r--r-- | doc/news.rst | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | readme.rst | 48 |
2 files changed, 34 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/doc/news.rst b/doc/news.rst index 2622c66bd..68a81f189 100644 --- a/doc/news.rst +++ b/doc/news.rst @@ -14,17 +14,16 @@ Version 1.11.25, Not Yet Released * The OpenSSL implementation of RC4 would return the wrong value from `name` if leading bytes of the keystream had been skipped in the output. -* Fixed the signature of botan_pubkey_destroy which took the wrong type and was - not usable. +* Fixed the signature of the FFI function botan_pubkey_destroy, which took the + wrong type and was not usable. -* The TLS client would erronously reject any server key exchange - packet smaller than 6 bytes. This prevented negotiating a plain PSK - TLS ciphersuite with an empty identity hint. ECDHE_PSK and DHE_PSK - suites were not affected. +* The TLS client would erronously reject any server key exchange packet smaller + than 6 bytes. This prevented negotiating a plain PSK TLS ciphersuite with an + empty identity hint. ECDHE_PSK and DHE_PSK suites were not affected. -* Fixed a bug that would cause the TLS client to occasionally reject a - valid server key exchange message as having an invalid signature. - This only affected DHE ciphersuites. +* Fixed a bug that would cause the TLS client to occasionally reject a valid + server key exchange message as having an invalid signature. This only affected + DHE and SRP ciphersuites. * Support for negotiating use of SHA-224 in TLS has been disabled in the default policy. diff --git a/readme.rst b/readme.rst index 1a0ec1e4a..144364bb4 100644 --- a/readme.rst +++ b/readme.rst @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ Botan: Crypto and TLS for C++11 ======================================== -Botan (Japanese for peony) is a C++ cryptography library released -under the permissive `Simplified BSD +Botan (Japanese for peony) is a cryptography library written in C++11 +and released under the permissive `Simplified BSD <http://botan.randombit.net/license.txt>`_ license. -It provides TLS, X.509 certificates, OCSP, ECDSA, AES, GCM, -ChaCha20Poly1305, McEliece, bcrypt, and quite a few other things. It -also provides a `botan` command line tool for various cryptographic -operations, the source for which also helps demonstrate usage of the -library. +It provides TLS, X.509 certificates, OCSP, ECDSA, AES, GCM, ChaCha20Poly1305, +McEliece, bcrypt, and quite a few other things. It also provides a `botan` +command line tool for various cryptographic operations, the source for which +also helps demonstrate usage of the library. Development is coordinated on `GitHub <https://github.com/randombit/botan>`_ and contributions are welcome. Read `doc/hacking.rst` for more @@ -47,9 +46,9 @@ may also prove useful resources. In addition to C++, botan has a C89 API specifically designed to be easy to call from other languages. A Python binding using ctypes is included, -there are also bindings for +there are also partial bindings for `Node.js <https://github.com/justinfreitag/node-botan>`_ and -`OCaml <https://github.com/randombit/botan-ocaml>`_ +`OCaml <https://github.com/randombit/botan-ocaml>`_ among others. There is also a third party open source implementation of `SSHv2 <https://github.com/cdesjardins/cppssh>`_ using the library. @@ -151,27 +150,27 @@ the very least ask for review/input on a mailing list such as the crypto lists. And (if possible) pay a professional cryptographer or security company to review your design and code. -Supported Algorithms/Protocols/RFCs +Find Enclosed ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ TLS/Public Key Infrastructure ---------------------------------------- -* TLS/DTLS (v1.0 to v1.2), including using preshared keys (TLS-PSK) - or passwords (TLS-SRP) and most important extensions (including - secure renegotiation, session tickets, SNI, and ALPN) -* X.509 certificates (including generating new self-signed and CA - certs) and CRLs -* PKIX certificate path validation, OCSP requests, PKCS #10 CSRs +* TLS and DTLS (v1.0 to v1.2), including using preshared keys + (TLS-PSK) and passwords (TLS-SRP) and most important extensions, + such as session tickets, SNI, and ALPN. +* X.509v3 certificates and CRLs +* PKIX certificate path validation with multiple test suites for same +* OCSP requests +* PKCS #10 certificate requests Public Key Cryptography ---------------------------------------- -* Encryption algorithms RSA and ElGamal (with OAEP or PKCS #1 v1.5) -* Signature algorithms RSA, DSA, ECDSA, GOST 34.10-2001, Nyberg-Rueppel, - Rabin-Williams (with PSS, PKCS #1 v1.5, or X9.31) -* Diffie-Hellman, ECDH using NIST/Brainpool prime groups, Curve25519 -* McEliece code based encryption providing a KEM scheme +* Encryption with RSA and ElGamal +* Signatures with RSA, DSA, ECDSA, GOST 34.10-2001, Nyberg-Rueppel, Rabin-Williams +* Key agreement with Diffie-Hellman, ECDH, Curve25519, and McEliece +* Padding schemes OAEP, PSS, PKCS #1 v1.5, X9.31 Ciphers and cipher modes ---------------------------------------- @@ -204,8 +203,12 @@ Other Useful Things ---------------------------------------- * Key derivation functions for passwords, including PBKDF2 -* Password hashing functions, including bcrypt +* Password hashing functions, including bcrypt and a PBKDF based scheme * General key derivation functions KDF1 and KDF2 from IEEE 1363 +* Format preserving encryption scheme FE1 +* Threshold secret sharing +* RFC 3394 keywrapping +* Rivest's all or nothing transform Recommended Algorithms ---------------------------------------- @@ -228,3 +231,4 @@ currently recommend using: or ECDSA with P-256/SHA-256 or P-384/SHA-384 * Key Agreement: ECDH P-256 or Curve25519, with KDF2(SHA-256) + Or McEliece if you are concerned about attacks by quantum computers. |