A bad decrypt on a TLS 1.0/1.1 message would cause a mostly infinite

loop (size_t overflow), likely causing a segfault. Not exploitable as
far as I can tell, beyond the obvious crashing.

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/src/ssl/rec_read.cpp b/src/ssl/rec_read.cpp
index 4e5b69780..7e295f8a4 100644
--- a/src/ssl/rec_read.cpp
+++ b/src/ssl/rec_read.cpp
@@ -213,9 +213,14 @@ size_t Record_Reader::get_record(byte& msg_type,
          }
       else
          {
+         bool padding_good = true;
+
          for(size_t i = 0; i != pad_size; ++i)
             if(plaintext[plaintext.size()-i-1] != pad_value)
-               pad_size = 0;
+               padding_good = false;
+
+         if(!padding_good)
+            pad_size = 0;
          }
       }